IAMCR on the East-West Battlefield: A Study on the GDR’s Attempts to Use the Association for Diplomatic Purposes

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This article contributes to the Cold War history of the field of communication in general and international communication associations in particular. Based on Bourdieu’s sociology and using files from Leipzig’s University Archive and the Berlin Federal Archives, the present study shows how the German Democratic Republic (GDR) used the International Association for Media and Communication Research (IAMCR) as a tool in the country’s fight for international recognition. The communists in East Berlin tried to influence both the association’s program, including the respective publications, as well as its leadership recruitment. Despite the limited success of these efforts, this episode changed the field’s structures. Since IAMCR was hampered by political fights, the International Communication Association (ICA) was able to embark on its procession to become the world’s leading scholarly communication association.

Keywords: history of communication research, associations, Bourdieu

Introduction

This article deals with an almost forgotten part of the history of communication: the East-West conflict within the International Association for Media and Communication Research (IAMCR). From the mid-1960s until the fall of the Berlin Wall, the association’s conferences were not just forums for presenting academic results but also (maybe even more so) ideological battlefields (Nordenstreng, 2008). As this analysis reveals, the Eastern European countries, especially the German Democratic Republic (GDR), tried to influence both the program, including its related publications, as well as leadership recruitment.

In essence, three objectives of the GDR can be distinguished. First, the communists wanted to promote their own concept of academic work on journalism and mass media effects. This concept included formulas, precepts, and doctrines of Marxism-Leninism. Second, and closely linked to the first aim, the Eastern Europeans wanted colleagues from developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to be...
won over by socialist ideas on how to educate journalists and other mass media practitioners. Third, along with professors and doctoral students from the third world, so-called progressive Western academics were also an important target group. Colleagues working with materialist or other classic left theories and ideas were encouraged and helped by Eastern European scholars to present the results of their work to an international audience. These objectives were part of a worldwide struggle for supremacy between socialism and capitalism in which both sides used academic venues to combat each other (Saunders, 2013) and were also part of the ongoing struggle to establish a new world information order (Padovani & Nordenstreng, 2005). However, for IAMCR it was more than a battle of ideologies. Focusing on academic issues such as theory and methodology, the definition of "good science" was also at stake.

In IAMCR, the driving force of those efforts was the GDR. For the communists in East Berlin, international organizations such as IAMCR were a tool in their fight for international recognition. Until the admission of both German postwar states to the UN in September 1973, East Berlin had almost no diplomatic relations with the Western world (Gray, 2003). Even after that, the East German communists used sports, culture, and scholarship to legitimize their state. As part of this campaign, they helped kick-start IAMCR. Formerly known as a rather small association with a chronic lack of money, IAMCR had a major conference in Leipzig in 1974 with about 250 participants from all over the world and two volumes of proceedings (Dusiska, 1974a). Emil Dusiska (1914–2002), a leading professor in the journalism training center at the University of Leipzig, became IAMCR's secretary-general and did most of the association's paperwork from 1972 to 1978. Subsequently, IAMCR's policy was discussed among the Communist Party's inner circle in East Berlin.

Taking into account all of the above, it is clear that communication's autonomy and the politicization of the social sciences during the Cold War must be at the core of the present study. Dave Park (2013) called for "a willingness to get past founding myths, and to inquire honestly into the questions that connect the history of the field of communication to the world around it" (p. 124). However, only 40 years have passed since the socialist countries tried to influence the discipline's approaches and institutions. During this time, both IAMCR and the Association for Education in Journalism (AEJ) were more important than the International Communication Association (ICA). This leads to the question of how independent from politics the academic field of communication was in the 1970s and 1980s. The essential question is, was the discipline more than just a proxy forum for the political leaders in East and West?

The answer presented in this article is based on the sociology of Bourdieu (1988) and on two major sources. First, Leipzig's university archive as well as the Federal Archives in Berlin were evaluated. Dusiska's files recovered from the archives deal with heretofore unknown reports on contact between IAMCR's long-time president James Halloran (1927 to 2007; in charge from 1971 to 1990) and leading communication researchers from both the East and the West. Second, eyewitnesses such as Kaarle Nordenstreng (Tampere, born in 1941) and Yassen Zassoursky (Moscow, born in 1929) were interviewed in 2012. Both sources provide evidence that the communication field indeed was torn between political influences and exclusively scientific criteria in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the Leipzig files show that the discipline didn't need the political changes in 1989 to gain more autonomy. Even in IAMCR, many Western academics resisted Eastern attempts to exert influence. In addition, the German communists' opportunities for success were very limited in the end. This began with a constant lack of foreign currency,
followed by a slow decision-making process within the ruling party, the diminishing interest in academic associations such as IAMCR after GDR’s international recognition in 1973 and the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, and a general disregard for the international academic field of communication in other socialist countries.

To put this line of reasoning into perspective, the present article starts with a short introduction to the main ideas of Bourdieu’s sociology of science and a look at the field of communication’s situation at the time. Then an overview of the sources the article is based on are presented. Subsequently, the article demonstrates why IAMCR was the most suitable mode for serving the East German communists’ purposes. The findings concentrate on two major issues: the Leipzig conference of 1974 as the culmination of all East German efforts in the academic field of communication, and Dusiska’s plan to launch an official IAMCR journal supervised and controlled in Leipzig. All of that was no more than a short-term flash-in-the-pan. The journal was never published, and when Dusiska retired in 1978, the most authoritative, exciting, and influential exponent of GDR’s journalism training center in the international arena was gone. However, the story has yet another important point: While IAMCR was tied up in political fights in the 1970s, the first truly international association in the field was passed by ICA, which became the world’s most important scholarly communication association exactly during this period (Weaver, 1977; Meyen, 2012).

**Academia’s Autonomy, the Communication Field and the GDR**

This article investigates the heteronomy and autonomy of the academic field of communication during the Cold War. Did the socialist countries, particularly the GDR, influence the topics communication dealt with, the theories, and the methods used in the field? What was the relationship between academia and politics at that time? How did the communists try to gain influence, and even more important, did they succeed in the end? These questions emphasize one of the key themes in the history of communication as an academic discipline: a collective reflexivity concerning the field and its place in academia as well as in society (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2000). According to Park (2013), the emphasis on mutually conflicting impulses within any field at a given point in time makes Bourdieu a particularly good match for a sociological and historical consideration of the field of communication. This emphasis on conflicts would put him at odds with what he called the “communitarian vision” in the sociology of science, a view that “fails to grasp the very foundation of the scientific world as a universe of competition for the ‘monopoly of the legitimate handling’ of scientific goods” (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 45).

The present study follows Bourdieu (1988) in assuming that there are “relatively autonomous spaces” (fields) in society, which work according to “their own rules” (logic of the field) and have their own defined conditions for entering the field and obtaining a reputation. According to Bourdieu (1975),

The scientific field is the locus of a competitive struggle, in which the specific issue at stake is the monopoly of scientific authority, defined inseparably as technical capacity and social power, or, to put it in another way, the monopoly of scientific competence, in the sense of a particular agent’s socially recognised capacity to speak and act legitimately . . . in scientific matters. (p. 19)
Therefore, all scientific practices aim at the acquisition of scientific authority and thereby at the evaluation criteria of those practices themselves. What is at stake in the struggle is no less than the definition of "good science"—of the questions, theories, and methods that "may be regarded as scientific" (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 55), and that form the basis of the field. Since the acquisition of scientific authority (reputation) requires recognition by colleagues the main clients of an academic are also his or her competitors. It is important to consider the other side of the coin: Acknowledgment from the outside world is no more than a surrogate for scientific authority, at least in a mature academic discipline.

It is precisely this latter point that the present article is dealing with. No academic field can escape outside expectations involving significant social, economic, or cultural problems and the demand for graduates. However, a field such as communication should process these expectations and influences according to its own rules. According to Bourdieu, this transformational power is a crucial clue to a field’s degree of autonomy. The smaller the degree to which a field of cultural production accommodates the constraints of sponsors and clients and the more such a microcosm follows its internal rules, the more autonomous it is.

In this regard, the Eastern European countries are a special case since they did not really have autonomous spaces during the Cold War. The primacy of politics was pervasive in all aspects of society. That is not only true in journalism (Meyen & Fiedler, 2013) but also in academia, especially in the field of mass media and communication research. In the GDR, the only journalism training and research institute at the University of Leipzig worked under the very same terms and conditions as the daily press, TV, and radio stations. Here, too, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED, Socialist Unity Party of Germany) was in charge. In the political hierarchy, the members of the party’s Central Committee stood higher than ministers; the secretaries and Central Committee’s section leaders had the authority to issue directives to state ministers. Therefore, appointments of professors, pivotal research projects, training curricula, and even the employment of graduates were determined at the center of power. The Central Committee’s secretary for agitation and propaganda presided over the agitation section, which was in charge of organizing and steering both the mass media and Leipzig’s journalism institute.

It is important to be aware of this structure since the steering of the mass media in the GDR was a kind of public relations operation (Meyen & Fiedler, 2013). The topics and main concerns to be covered by the media had to support the interests of the rulers, especially in their interaction with the West. It follows that the representation of capitalist countries in the GDR media depended on the international political context. Capitalist countries were described in an extremely hostile way in the 1960s when the GDR was still internationally isolated, due in part to the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The press coverage of events in the Western world became friendlier in the 1970s when the GDR gained international recognition, particularly in the aftermath of the accession to the United Nations in 1973. In the 1980s, the country depended largely on imports and financial backup from the West, so media reports about the capitalist world had a friendly tone (Fiedler, 2014).

Looking at IAMCR from the mid-1960s to the 1980s, one must keep in mind the political background. In the Federal Republic, the Hallstein Doctrine had been in effect since 1955 (Gray, 2003). In fact, this doctrine hindered diplomatic relations with the communists in East Berlin since West Germany,
an economic superpower, only supported those countries that did not officially recognize the GDR. The gradual softening of the Hallstein Doctrine only started in 1969 when a social democratic-liberal coalition took over. Before 1973, the GDR was more or less isolated, only recognized by socialist countries and, starting in 1969, by some Arab and African states such as Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Algeria, and Congo. France and the UK, to give just two examples, established diplomatic relations with East Berlin only after February 1973. It is easy to understand why international recognition became the major objective of GDR’s foreign policy from the mid-1960s on. Like the mass media, academia became a political battlefield. International associations such as IAMCR were seen as tools to demonstrate to the world that the GDR was a legitimate and fully competent player in the international arena.

It goes without saying that the field of communication is part of the larger scientific field, which functioned differently in the 1960s or 1970s than it does today (Simonson & Peters, 2008). But at that time, too, the scope of people and institutions were shaped by objective relations between positions within the field (i.e., individuals, such as professors, and institutions, such as departments, universities, journals, or academic associations). Seeing the academic world through Bourdieu’s lens, scientific work is always a social practice, framed by the interests of those within a given field, by the autonomy of that field, and by its position in the larger social space. There are neither "pure" research interests and intellectual controversies nor "objective" judgments on any talk or paper. Scientific work is first and foremost about social power, and every investment is organized by (conscious or unconscious) reference to anticipation of the chances for profit. So, every "choice" (area of research, theories and methods, place of publication) is directed toward maximization of scientific capital (Bourdieu, 1975, pp. 22–23). The structure of a scientific field or subfield at any given moment is "defined by the state of the power distribution between the protagonists in the struggle"; it is the result of previous struggles, "which is objectified in institutions and dispositions and commands the strategies and objective chances of the different agents and institutions in the present struggles" (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 27). Looking back to the 1960s and 1970s and paraphrasing Bourdieu, one can ask about the actors, the hierarchy, and the logic of the communication field: How far had the discipline progressed on its road to autonomy back then?

That is a legitimate question because communication is both the latecomer of the social sciences and a product of political and economic necessities (Park & Pooley, 2008). In the first half of the 20th century, other social science disciplines such as sociology, economics, anthropology, psychology, and political science were already born, but communication did not yet exist as a field (Abbott, 2002). It took World War II with its interdisciplinary work on propaganda that was clearly conditioned by the Rockefeller Foundation’s support, military, CIA, and State Department funding (Pooley, 2008), the search for effective propaganda design in the early Cold War sponsored by the very same agents (Glander, 2000), and, last but not least, the growing interest of both media industry and students that “communication research [begin] to be recognized as a distinct academic field” (Craig, 2008, p. 676). Or, as in the case of West German Publizistikwissenschaft, solve its legitimacy crises by a shift from a humanistic to an empirical social science pleading for the use of quantitative methods (Löblisch, 2007). However, Craig (2008) associated the "rapid growth and institutional consolidation as an academic discipline" that communication underwent with certain problems: a strain on resources, an overemphasis on practical training of undergraduates, and the threat of co-optation by commercial interests. It is not necessary to look back to the debate surrounding Bernard Berelson’s pronouncement of the death of the field in Public Opinion
Quarterly some 50 years ago when this academic enterprise was still newborn (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2004). Even in the 1980s, communication was still seen as an "academic Taiwan," claiming all of China as its own tiny island (Peters, 1986, p. 544).

East Berlin communists' support for IAMCR and their advertising for the well-equipped journalism department in Leipzig a perfect match for this situation. Looking back to the late 1960s and early 1970s, we find a small discipline fighting for its existence. ICA "was more like a family affair" (Krippendorff, 2012, p. 1704) back then. Klaus Krippendorff, who became an assistant professor at the University of Pennsylvania in 1964, described the early days of the association:

The scholars who gathered at annual conventions knew each other, and the program was printed on one page folded three ways. For me, one of the most interesting conferences was in Phoenix, Arizona, in 1971. ICA rented a motel with rooms around a swimming pool, and there were few parallel sessions. The climate was completely different. (ibid.)

According to Jack McLeod, born in 1930, and a professor at University of Wisconsin from 1962 to 2001, both ICA and AEJ moved toward research in the 1960s, but AEF made more steady progress by developing divisions or a new constitution. While an AEJ convention in the late 1960s would almost look like one from the present day (with discussants, 90-minute sessions in which two or three papers were presented, and papers available for advance reading prior to the sessions), "it took ICA more than ten years to reform itself as a more substantial association" (2012, p. 1743).

One crucial point in that development was the presidential address of Mark Knapp, ICA president in 1975. Eyewitness Klaus Krippendorff (2012) states, "He sought to instill pride in being a small association but counting the best people as its members" (p. 1705). According to Knapp himself:

In those days, we had people from government, people from business, and teachers who didn't want to do scholarship. The organization didn't have a clear identity. I said, "Let those who aren't interested in research go to other organizations if they choose, and let's make ICA the scholarly organization in communication." This was pretty controversial at that time, because some of my friends were people who weren't likely to be comfortable in such an organization and wanted it to be more inclusive. (Knapp, 2012, p. 1695)

All of that is clearly true. However, IAMCR's history, as it is presented in this article, could be another reason for ICA's ultimate success. Although IAMCR had a head start, unlike ICA it couldn't really extract itself from the grip of politicians or practitioners. IAMCR was a child of the postwar era. It was founded with UNESCO support in 1957 "on ecumenical soil crossing both East-West and North-South divides," and its beginnings were dominated "by Europeans, particularly the French" (Nordenstreng, 2008, p. 229). Those origins dominated the association at least until the end of the Cold War. Simply put, IAMCR was more about politics than serving as a locus for the "competitive struggle" for scientific authority described by Bourdieu.
Sources

As noted above, the present study is based on two kinds of documents—archive material and interviews with eyewitnesses. Among these sources, the files coming from Leipzig’s university archive are by far the most significant ones. In this archive, Emil Dusiska’s entire correspondence is available. Dusiska was elected IAMCR’s secretary-general in 1972 and resigned in 1978 when he retired from his professorship at Leipzig. As secretary-general he was the main contact partner of James Halloran from the University of Leicester in the United Kingdom, the association’s president from 1972 to 1988. In addition to many letters, Dusiska’s reports on the regular meetings of IAMCR’s inner circle and his conceptual papers on GDR’s engagement within the association are preserved in the archive. Most of these reports and papers were sent to the section of agitation at SED’s Central Committee.

It is important to know that Dusiska was not a typical academic. Born in 1914 as a locksmith’s son, he started out as a print worker. Like many other later functionaries of the GDR, Dusiska was actively involved in the revolutionary workers’ movement from very early on and forced into illegality when the National Socialists took over in 1933 (Meyen & Fiedler, 2013). He survived the war as a dispatcher in a printing office, joined the Communist Party in 1945, worked first as an economic official, and then became a journalist for the SED’s mouthpiece Neues Deutschland from 1950 to 1955. On his CV, there is only one year of academic education, at Berlin’s Higher Party School from 1949 to 1950. This course was a requirement for any leading position in the GDR. It can be assumed that Dusiska’s talents as an agitator and journalist were discovered there. Thanks to his economic knowledge, he became a full-time member of SED’s newly founded agitation commission in 1955. This commission was conceived as a kind of think tank for matters of agitation and propaganda. Here, the party’s reasoning was developed. In addition, the commission set its sights on the mass media as well as the journalism faculty at the University of Leipzig. When Leipzig’s dean, Hermann Budzislawski (1901–1978), became ill and tired of his position in the early 1960s, Dusiska was sent to the party’s institute for the humanities in order to quickly get a doctoral degree and was appointed a full professor at Leipzig right after finishing his dissertation in 1965.

This life story is recounted in detail for two reasons. On the one hand, it is the first piece of proof that the field of communication, media, and journalism research in the GDR was not about scientific reputation at all but dominated by politics. In all major instances, the Communist Party decided on staff and strategy. On the other hand, Dusiska himself had very close ties to Berlin’s inner circle. His predecessor, Budzislawski, was also a party member, of course, and a journalist as well, but he was also famous far beyond the GDR. In the 1930s, he was editor-in-chief of the German-language exile magazine Die Neue Weltbühne. After his emigration to the United States, Budzislawski became, among other things, the assistant and ghostwriter of Dorothy Thompson. However, like most of the other German communists surviving the Third Reich in Western countries, he couldn’t join the Berlin power circuit after his return (Siemens, 2013). In IAMCR, Budzislawski was an individual member since the association’s foundation in 1957. In 1964, he joined the executive committee, but only with Dusiska did IAMCR suddenly become an important stage for GDR’s foreign policy.

In addition to Dusiska’s letters and reports, Leipzig’s university archive holds comprehensive records of the IAMCR conference in 1974. These records comprise not just the two-volume proceedings
and the correspondence with the association’s officials, speakers, and participants, but also reports about the conference itself including detailed discussion and behavior protocols. Many of Leipzig’s students had to serve as conference attendants. It was part of their job to talk politics with the foreign academics during breaks and at the hotel bars. Furthermore, some files used for the present contribution come from the Federal Archives in Berlin. These files provide information about the party’s IAMCR strategy and the significance of that stage.

Emil Dusiska died in 2002, so he couldn’t be interviewed. The same is true for most of the other Eastern European protagonists of that time, such as Mieczyslaw Kafel (1912–1971) from Warsaw, who was elected IAMCR’s vice president in 1964, or Vladimir Klimes (1910–1983) from Prague, who became the association’s secretary-general in the very same year. However, Kaarle Nordenstreng and Yassen Zassoursky, two other major players are still available. Nordenstreng, who became a professor at Tampere in Finland in 1971, was the Eastern bloc’s candidate for IAMCR’s presidential elections in Buenos Aires in 1972. According to a report addressed to the SED’s agitation secretary, Werner Lamberz, Nordenstreng refused the offer after a period of consideration (Dusiska, 1972a), became vice president instead, and stayed in the association’s leadership until 1988. Zassoursky is both a long-time dean of Moscow State University’s faculty of journalism (1965–2007) and a long-time vice president of IAMCR (1968 to 1988). The East German files establish him as the most important point of reference for all decisions Eastern Europeans had to make within the association.

**Results**

This section will show, with the support of a chain of arguments organized into four theses, why, how, and to what end the GDR and its comrades from Eastern Europe were involved with IAMCR. The format of this article only allows the inclusion of limited archival evidence to support the successive stages of the argument.

*Thesis 1: From the mid-1960s on, the main goal of the socialist countries within IAMCR was a political victory.*

Even making allowances for the rhetoric of official political communication in communist states, the strongest proof of this thesis is Dusiska’s report of the 1974 conference in Leipzig written for the SED’s Central Committee (Dusiska, 1974a). Summarizing both the talks given in the conference’s four working groups and the discussions following those presentations, he concluded that the conference was “a triumph over the representatives of the bourgeoisie” (ibid., p. 17). The most important factor was the great coherence of the socialist camp. Particular praise was given to the comrades from the Soviet Union. Dusiska recalled their knowledge of foreign languages and applauded their witty repartee: “They immediately joined the discussion when Marxist positions were attacked” (ibid.). In this report, France Vreg (1920–2007) from Ljubljana served as Dusiska’s unsuspicious witness. The Yugoslavian academic had underlined how impressed he was with his GDR colleagues: “That and the socialist solidarity prompted him to deviate from his written text and to emphasize the common Marxist position” (ibid., p. 18). In addition, Dusiska distinguished between “progressive representatives of bourgeois communication research,” (ibid., pp. 18–19) such as Herbert Schiller (1919–2000) or Kaarle Nordenstreng, and
pronounced anticommunists. The last group included the three West Germans Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1916–2010), Otto B. Roegele (1920–2005), and Martin Löffler (1905–1987), as well as Georges H. Mond from France. Even IAMCR's president, James Halloran, got a critical note because of "some disrespectful remarks about Marxist contributions" (Dusiska, 1974a, p. 8). Apart from these exceptions, the majority of the Western academics would finally recognize the restrictions on the freedom of the press arising from media concentration and the journalists’ dependence on their employers. Beyond the academic content, Dusiska also spoke about the unqualified success of the GDR as a host, praising the smooth running of the event as well as the theme tours to editorial offices and tourist sights (Dusiska, 1974a).

In the same report, one could also find the four major objectives the East German communists had for the Leipzig conference, which are nearly the same as those pursued by Eastern European countries within IAMCR generally:

1. Presenting the Marxist-Leninist views on the class-related functions of mass media; falsifying convergence theory; addressing the bourgeois theories of press and information freedom.

2. Announcing the extensive academic publications on mass media from the socialist countries in order to influence journalism in developing countries.

3. Providing an opportunity for young Marxist-Leninist and Leftist academics from capitalist European countries to criticize the capitalist system.

4. Presenting the great breadth and diversity of mass media in the socialist countries, especially in the GDR and the Soviet Union. (Dusiska, 1974a)

Although the core of these objectives stayed the same from the late 1960s to the 1980s, the nuance shifted along with the changes in the international political climate. Three years before the Leipzig conference, in a document on the socialist countries’ involvement with IAMCR written by Yassen Zassoursky, the fourth and final point of the above list is missing. Instead, there are two additional goals: explaining the communist parties’ politics and studying the most recent methods and findings of journalism, mass media, and communication research all over the world (Zassoursky, 1971). The era of détente policy was just beginning and so was the constant academic exchange. Before IAMCR’s Warsaw conference in 1978, professors of the Leipzig journalism institute wrote a rather political agenda including a goal of strong influence in all of the association’s sections as well as a kind of symbolic politics. In this paper, in third place was a demand for fighting all ideological interferences from outside and revealing those efforts as threats to peace (University of Leipzig, journalism department, 1978). Therefore it is easy to conclude that the Warsaw conference, at least for the East Germans, was not about scientific reputation at all but rather was a part of the political game of the time.

_Thesis 2: To meet their targets, the socialist countries used all of IAMCR’s stages and levels from the association’s leadership positions and its venues through the programs and proceedings of the_
conferences to discussions of talks and the statute. A minimum aim was the essential balance between the two ideological camps as constructed in Eastern Europe.

Almost from its beginnings, the socialist countries were strongly represented in IAMCR’s leadership. As stated above, Mieczyslaw Kafel from Poland was elected vice president in 1964. In the same year, Vladimir Klimes became the association’s secretary-general. That why the association’s administration moved from the Netherlands to Prague at the time. In 1968, Yassen Zassoursky became a vice president too. Kafel died in 1971. Since Jacques Bourquin from Switzerland, elected president in 1964, was weary of office, the Buenos Aires conference in 1972 suddenly took on immense significance. According to the Leipzig files, the representatives from Eastern Europe agreed on the plan to elect Kaarel Nordenstreng as IAMCR’s next president. In the SED reports, which are based on statements of both Eastern European academics and communists from Finland, Nordenstreng is called a progressive professor who would try to position himself as a leading representative of Marxist views on mass media (Dusiska, 1974b). There was plan that in Buenos Aires, Emil Dusiska would stand first as a vice president and then as a secretary-general in order “to prevent an official from a capitalist state in any case.” Whereas the latter objective was reached by unanimity, the presidential one wasn’t. Nordenstreng supported Halloran (Dusiska, 1972). The potential candidate himself 40 years later:

I was already convinced of him in 1970 at the conference in Konstanz. To me, Halloran represented my ideal of scholarship. He was progressive and innovative. Politically, he was Labour oriented. I thought he had both the proper credentials and the age to become a president. I was just 31. I couldn’t consider that idea seriously. So I tried to convince Emil Dusiska and his colleagues that Halloran is okay and not somebody to be suspicious of. It was almost part of the Eastern habitus to be suspicious of people in the West. For some reason, I had their confidence. Halloran did not. They took him as a potential dissident or whatever. (personal communication, July 24, 2012)

In Konstanz, Dusiska had proposed for the very first time that IAMCR should go to Leipzig in 1974. Although the West Germans didn’t like this idea at the time, they also voted in favor of the GDR in Buenos Aires. However, the two East German representatives, Emil Dusiska and Günter Heidorn, a historian from the University of Rostock, felt forced to leave the conference temporarily because the Argentineans didn’t have a GDR flag (Dusiska, 1972a). The IAMCR’s choice of venue of 1966 had also been politically motivated. Since most NATO countries refused the entry of East Germans back then, Hermann Budzislawski proposed Herceg Novi in Yugoslavia (Fischer, 1966). The venues remained an important battlefield. In June 1978, Emil Dusiska wrote Klaus Raddatz from SED’s agitation section saying how proud he was of the next meeting place. Warsaw had been passed despite the resistance of Western representatives. In 1980, IAMCR would probably go to Nigeria or Venezuela (it became Caracas, finally) “where obviously only very few of our comrades could take part.” Now, the bourgeois forces within the association would try to dominate the Warsaw conference program (Dusiska, 1978).

The files document how vigorously and viciously the struggle raged over every presentation and proceeding slot. Dusiska just counted numbers. In Warsaw, for example, two of the four working group secretaries and 10 out of 27 talks came from the socialist camp (Dusiska, 1978). In Leipzig, the GDR used
its home advantage. Right from Dusiska’s concrete initiative dated August 17, 1973, the main objective was quite clear: “The preponderance of our theoretical ideas must be ensured” (Dusiska, 1973a). In the end, the host provided all four secretaries, one working group head (Dusiska: “Mass Media and Participation”), and 24 out of 52 full papers that were submitted in advance. More than once, IAMCR officials such as Nordenstreng or Halloran asked Dusiska for restraint. For example, Nordenstreng wrote in June 1974, “You know that I don’t like the idea of mechanistic balance in politics. However, such a constellation is a risk for our very own progressive objectives.” In contrast to 1974, Dusiska failed in Leicester and Warsaw. After the 1976 conference, he wrote that the balance had been lost during the preparation. The reason is rather human: Most of the colleagues he proposed as speakers did not meet the deadline (Dusiska, 1976). In 1978, Dusiska’s list with talk proposals simply came too late. Halloran (1976) wrote an eight-page response talking about “some confusion.” In an association that now had 51 member states, it would be rather unusual for 50% of the speakers to come from Poland and the GDR.

The discussions opened after the conference talks were a special case. In order to be prepared, the Eastern European representatives held regular meetings to formulate and adopt a unified strategy. Before the Buenos Aires conference in 1972, for example, there were two meetings in Leipzig (February) and Krakow (April) (Heidorn, 1972). Although Yassen Zassoursky in 2012 didn’t want to remember those events, according to Dusiska’s reports and other archival documents, the Soviet academic was the most important player in these meetings. The other participants mainly came from the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Conversely, Bulgaria and Romania didn’t show any strong presence, even in the Leipzig meeting—just three delegates altogether (Dusiska, 1974a). In the summer of 1974, the Leipzig journalism institute had several internal briefings on tactics. What should the participants say, for example, about the free flow of information? “How do we achieve an equal share during discussions? However, comrades, we don’t want to dominate visibly” (University of Leipzig, 1974). At the end of August 1974, Uwe Boldt, a professor at Leipzig, went to Prague promoting the conference. In his report, he complains that the Czech university colleagues would underestimate IAMCR’s importance. For this reason, Boldt also went to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia. There, he received the promise of 7 to 8 Leipzig participants from Prague selected according to their knowledge level, ready wit, and combative spirit (Boldt, 1974).

Thesis 3: The GDR was the driving force behind the Eastern European initiatives within IAMCR. In East Berlin, from the mid-1960s, the association was seen as a tool in the fight for international recognition. By joining the UN in 1973, this stage lost its significance. Besides this there are two more reasons for the slow withdrawal of the country from IAMCR: a permanent shortage of foreign cash and political decision-making structures that couldn’t match the rules of an academic field such as communication.

Before the Vevey conference in 1961, IAMCR came into the SED’s focus for the first time. The Central Committee’s agitation section recommended participation by the national journalists’ association because of IAMCR’s link to UNESCO (Drobela, 1961, p. 81). However, back then, another international stage was by far more important for East Berlin’s mass media experts: the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ). In 1966, the GDR organized the IOJ congress in Berlin and spent almost one million marks on the event. At the time, the IOJ represented journalists from 42 countries that were almost exclusively Eastern European, African, Asian, and Latin American. From SED’s point of view, this
configuration was the IOJ’s weak spot. Most Western national journalists’ associations were members of the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) that was founded in 1952 (GDR’s journalists’ association, 1966a). According to the SED files, in the mid-1960s the IFJ still rejected all contacts with the IOJ (“application of the journalistic Hallstein doctrine,” GDR’s journalists’ association, 1966b).

In IAMCR, the situation was quite different. The membership was cheap (just 50 Swiss francs a year for a single person), and the GDR was well represented by Hermann Budzislawski and, even more important, as is usual in academic fields, on equal terms with West German representatives (Fischer, 1966). The East German academics cleverly used that situation to get travel authorizations and foreign cash. In their reports and applications, they pointed to the GDR’s external policy objectives, to the link between IAMCR and UNESCO, and to a vague hope for receiving research money from UNESCO. A 1971 report, for example, referred to respective initiatives from the Americans, British, and West Germans (Dusiska, 1971). In December 1972, the SED’s Central Committee got information about a 2.5 million dollar UNESCO research program in progress which the Leipzig professors would like to work on (SED’s Central Committee, 1972, p. 69). A short time before, Dusiska had promised “a considerable dollar income by UNESCO funded projects” to the minister of higher education (Dusiska, 1972b).

The reality looked somewhat different. IAMCR was a rather poor association at the time. In 1973, there were less than 30 full paying members (Halloran, 1974, p. 1). To give another example, in the very same year, Halloran had to reject a request for 1,000 marks by the West German Martin Löfler, who planned a separate meeting of IAMCR’s legal section in Strasbourg (Halloran, 1973). UNESCO was no real help. The only exceptions were travel costs for IAMCR’s major conferences. In 1974, UNESCO was funding two expert rounds in Leipzig with US$9,000. That money helped IAMCR to invite 11 top academics, including Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Kaarle Nordenstreng, James Halloran, and Alfred Opobor (1937–2011) from Michigan State (Willings, 1974). “I don’t think that UNESCO was an important financial funder to anybody” said Nordenstreng in the summer of 2012.

They rather were giving just their name and a bit of seed money and, then, expected a lot of resources from the recipient. Certainly I saw this game between the UNESCO and the GDR. They wanted to legitimize themselves and their research with UNESCO but so did others, even we in Finland. We always considered it as very useful to have the UNESCO emblem on this or that project. (personal communication, July 24, 2012)

It is easy to understand why IAMCR’s Western representatives were delighted by the GDR offers. In 1973, the association’s leadership was invited to Leipzig. That very first executive meeting on socialist soil was fully funded. The 1974 conference had a budget of more than 80,000 East German marks. The opening reception was sponsored by the GDR government, and the participants were welcomed by a minister (GDR’s government’s presidium, 1974, pp. 157–161).

However, at that conference the GDR’s interest in IAMCR had already passed its peak. When the idea came up in 1970, the international political situation was completely different. Just two years later, in August 1972, Hermann Axen, the SED’s foreign affairs secretary, already questioned the usefulness of Dusiska’s international activities. Axen considered the journey to Buenos Aires unnecessary. The two
professors, Dusiska and Heidorn, would be much more useful in their lecture halls at home (Axen, 1972, p. 59). The altered position of the GDR in the international arena also complicated the financing of the Leipzig conference, particularly since many more participants applied than the expected 120. Dusiska had to write many letters begging for money (see Dusiska, 1974c).

These examples demonstrate that Dusiska was not the procedure’s master. Even if it was minor, he had to ask for the Central Committee’s permission. The SED’s inner circle decided everything from foreign cash to travel authorizations to the Leipzig funding. Therefore, Dusiska and his comrades celebrated IAMCR’s decision to hold the 1974 conference in Leipzig, but they were also happy to have an alternative with Leicester if the Communist Party wouldn’t agree in the end (Förster, 1972). In 1975, IAMCR had only three active (paying) members from the GDR: Dusiska, Heidorn, and the national journalists’ association. James Halloran, remembering the spectacular 1974 conference just some months before, was surprised and asked in Leipzig about mistakes in his lists (Viertel, 1975).

**Thesis 4:** Apart from GDR’s declining interest in IAMCR, there is a second significant reason of the decreasing influence of Eastern European representatives on the association’s agenda. In the early 1970s, in the field of communication, academic logic began to triumph over political logic.

Again, the best proof of this thesis is one of GDR’s efforts to influence the internal logic of the communication field. In April 1973, James Halloran sent Dusiska’s “Project of a scientific journal to be published by the IAMCR” to all members of the association’s executive board. Although Dusiska named one precondition (money from UNESCO’s mass communication department for an independent documentation section within the journal), his proposal was very tempting since he promised both very low printing costs and editorial support from the Leipzig institute (Dusiska, 1973b).

In the past, IAMCR’s journal initiatives had been rather disappointing on the whole. In the first five years, only two bulletins were published by the association. From October 1962 to December 1964, there was an official IAMCR information letter within *Gazette*, both produced in Amsterdam at the time and pushed by Maarten Rooy, secretary-general at the time (Cohen, 1977, p. 4). This journal disappeared when UNESCO stopped funding and Vladimir Klimes from Prague was elected as the new secretary-general. At the time there was already a plan for an IAMCR journal, but this plan was blocked by the socialist countries since their representatives were afraid of paying foreign money for the dissemination of bourgeois theories (Dusiska, 1973c). So, for almost a decade, IAMCR members just got presidential letters. At the 1970 Konstanz conference, George Gerbner (1919–2005) resurrected the idea of an IAMCR journal. That’s why the association founded a publication section composed of Gerbner, Nordenstreng, Dusiska, and Frans Kempers from the Netherlands, who promoted, not surprisingly, a new cooperation with *Gazette* (Kempers, 1973). Kempers was supported by Olaf Hulten from Sweden, for example (Hulten, 1973).

Dusiska’s plan, which was not yet confirmed by the SED’s Central Committee, sounded simple but included two traps. The new journal would be published by the IAMCR presidium that “will appoint an Editorial Board chaired by the Secretary General” (i.e., himself) (Dusiska, 1973c). “The Editorial Board will decide the acceptance or rejection of papers on the consensus principle” (Riegel, 1973, p. 1). This means,
no paper would be published without GDR’s authorizations. There was a second crucial point that was even more discussed within IAMCR: “According to UNESCO regulations, the papers shall not contain any attacks on any member country of UNESCO” (Dusiska, 1973c, pp. 1–2). In a letter to IAMCR’s executive from May 1973, Oscar W. Riegel (1902–1997) named that paragraph a prohibition of critical science. “We don’t need East-West bipolarity in international communication journals.” In the very same letter, Riegel also rejected Kempers’ Gazette plan since this would just pursue Kempers’ own interests (Riegel, 1973).

At the Leipzig conference, it came to a final showdown. IAMCR’s publication section rejected Dusiska’s project with an academic argument summarized by Frans Kemper (1973, p. 8):

> Whoever is to decide on what an attack on a member country is? Every truly scientific analysis is based on the critical analysis of reality and may be interpreted by political authorities as an attack whenever it pleases them . . . . Such a price is too high to pay for UNESCO in my opinion. The sole criterion for publications of articles ought to be their scientific level.

Interestingly enough, in 1974 George Gerbner reinvented the *Journal of Communication*. Within a short period of time, that ICA publication became flagship journal of the communication field. In 1973, Emil Dusiska was asked at least twice to serve as a “consulting and contributing editor” for the *Journal of Communication*. Gerbner’s reasoning was that the field would need a “strong and central publication” integrating academics from all over the world (Gerbner, 1973). Following the arguments presented in this article, it is easy to guess that Dusiska had other things to do.

**Summary**

The arguments of the present article are three-fold. First, it shows a virtually forgotten part of communication’s early evolution. The Eastern European socialist countries—first and foremost the GDR—tried to influence the discipline’s institutions from the mid-1960s onward in order to use the field for political purposes. That is why the East Germans helped kick-start IAMCR. In return, IAMCR’s policy was discussed in the Communist Party’s inner circle. Second Eastern European involvement in the international field of communication depended both on the political climate and the field’s autonomy. Although the GDR used IAMCR as a tool in its fight for international recognition, the country’s interest in the association immediately declined after that very important goal was achieved. In addition, this development was surely influenced by the growing maturity of the academic endeavors in the field. In the early 1970s, academic reasons started to triumph over political logic. Third, despite the short duration and limited success of the East German efforts, this episode changed the field’s structures. Since IAMCR was hampered by political fights and not even able to launch a journal of its own, ICA could embark on its triumphal procession to become the world’s leading scholarly communication association.
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