Governing the “Spatial Reach”?
Spheres of Influence and Challenges to Global Media Policy

INGRID VOLKMER
University of Otago

The advanced globalization process reveals not only new ‘network’ information infrastructures but new political terrains. Although communication theory has just commenced to debate new forms of ‘public’ discourse, it is of equal importance to address new emerging issues of information sovereignty within a transnational public space. The following article attempts to ‘map’ the arising spheres of sovereignty. In the first part, the article develops the conceptual shift of ‘sovereignty’ as ‘ontological spaces’ which provide, in the second part, a framework of analysis of today’s transnational political information flows.

The advanced global communication process of the 21st century discloses new symbolic boundaries within a sophisticated globalized media sphere which constitute new layers of not only cultural but increasingly political relevance. It seems as if not only central values of ‘Western’ and ‘Moslem’ worlds indisputably collide but it has illustrated once more the powerful role of global mediated communication itself.

In comparison to today’s complex multidimensional globalization process, things were refreshingly simple in McLuhan’s time in the early satellite age. The metaphor of the “Global Village” (McLuhan/Powers, 1989) was coined to describe the notion of a cultural ‘contraction’ of otherwise conflicted societies into a borderless homogenized world. Within the dusty boundaries of the Cold War time, of ‘iron curtains’ and walls raised to (physically!) separate ideological terrains, structured international relations in those days. Given this geopolitical context, McLuhan’s vision has been perceived as a truly liberating idea, liberating through the view on the world as a whole. With ‘glasnost’ and the subsequent collapse of the bipolar ideological power centers in the late ‘80s on one hand, and new globalizing tendencies on the other, a revised view on globalization began to rapidly shape a complex and somewhat methodologically entangled discourse agenda in sociology and political science and less so in communication studies. This discourse revealed two lines of paradigms which are still apparent in today’s debate: (a) the critical paradigm of the “skeptics” who question the concept of globalization itself, (b) and “globalist” or “transformationalist” paradigm (Held/McGew, 2004, 2000: 38) which claims a somewhat
pragmatic view and addresses, among other issues, the transformation of modern social, economical, political and cultural structures as well as a new approach to 'North'/ 'South'- 'Developing'/ 'Developed'- world terminologies within a new complex set of transnational cooperation - greatly enhanced through communication spheres.

‘Non Places:’ Ontological Spheres in the Global Public Space

In the “transformationalist” view (which I am applying here) first debates in the early ‘90s, globalization represented no longer a homogenizing (which is the ongoing theme of the skeptical paradigm) but a ‘relativistic’ process. A process conceptually driven not so much by a simplified parallelism but rather an emerging ‘dialectic’ sphere of global/local relations which was first addressed in notions “stretching” and at the same time, “disembedding” (Giddens, 1990) of “the locale” as well as in a new relation of universal/particular world horizons (Robertson, 1992). One prominent key ‘domain’ of globalization is the “time-place-distanciation” (Giddens, 1990:64), i.e. “stretching of social, political, and economic activities across frontiers such that events, decisions and activities in one region of the world can come to have significance for individuals and communities in distant regions of the globe” (Held et al, 2004:69). Another aspect is viewed as “intensification” defined as a growing “magnitude” of “patterns of interaction” and a process of “speeding up” meaning the global “diffusion” of ideas in the domain of communication processes. These processes are “magnified, meaning that the “most local developments have enormous global consequences.” (Held et al, 2000, 2004: 69). These processes have gained their ‘magnitude’ through technological infrastructures and have created a new spatial communication sphere, which has conceptually surfaced over the years in various globalization theories. Appadurai has very early on addressed these ‘negative spaces’ and has coined the term of “ethno-,” “techno-,” “finance-” and “ideoscapes” as cultural forms of global “disjuncture” and “difference” (Appadurai, 1990). Another theoretical stream within this ‘relativistic’ globalization theory debates ‘negative spaces’ as a profound element of global “detterritorialization” (Giddens, 1990 Lewis, M. (2002) The Satellite-Subversives. New York Times Magazine, February 24:30-5 Luhmann, Niklas (1982) Differentiation of Society. New York: Columbia University Press., Tomlinson, 1999), also been defined as “non-places” (Tomlinson, 1999). Other debates highlight relatively new phenomena of filling these ‘non places’ with new formations of ‘diasporic’ (Cunningham, 2001) or ‘hybrid’ cultures and identities in various contexts (Gillespie, 1995; Ogan, 2001).

These debates have reached a new level in the theory of the “network” society (Castells, 1996). A theory which represents on one hand an endpoint of the first phase of ‘relativistic’ globalization almost in the format of a ‘negative dialectic,’ by transforming former global/local dichotomies to place/space notions and, on the other, structuring a new increasingly dense set of connections and disconnections across ‘networked’ communication spheres in which conventional formations of economic, social and cultural modernity are radically transformed through technologically enhanced globalization but also modern public (i.e. enlightened) discourse! A new set of flows through ‘nodes’ and ‘spaces’ appear which develop their own - borrowing a term from Luhmann’s system theory - “self-referential” dynamics (and autonomies !) within globalized networks which are transforming concepts of public discourse.

In this context, the key characteristic of today’s advanced ‘spatial’ communication sphere is the communicative ‘interpenetration’ arising precisely from the contact point of the ‘net’ and the ‘self’ which
Castells’ (1996) has highlighted in his theory as varying forms of project ‘identity’ in the ‘digital’ political space of either ‘0’ or ‘1’ connections beyond and within the boundaries of ‘legitimate’ national identities.

I absolutely agree with Castells’ argument and claim that ‘interpenetration’ is no longer a ‘deterritorialized’ i.e. ‘negative’ space but constitutes a new sphere of political reflexivity in a global public terrain. It is a new sphere of political reflexivity which defines in a phenomenological angle ‘world construction’ and in response to Juergen Habermas, justifies values through communicative action in a lifeworld which is not located in the normative grounds of consensual ‘place’ but in the center of a subjective globalized communication space providing new trajectories of discourse (see for example in Habermas, 1987).

This process involves more than the ‘extension’ of the “individual’s phenomenal world” in which “people … include distant events and processes more routinely in their perceptions of what is significant for their own personal lives” (Tomlinson, 1999:115) through globally connected communication infrastructures. As Saunders has recently argued in his study on the role of the Internet in transforming the national identity among young Russians living outside the Russian Federation to a global “gentrifying class:” “Rather than being ‘Russified’ by their cyberspatial experiences, ethnic Russians roaming the electronic corridors of the virtual near abroad are instead being ‘globalized,’ that is undergoing identity shifts which promote inclusion in the deterritorialized community of transnational elites…”(Saunders, 2006:50). Saunders argues that “mental mobility enabled by cyberspace allows Russians to conceive of denationalized personal trajectories which are not constrained by their minority status within their country of residence.” (Saunders, 2006: 55) As this example shows, the ‘negative dialectic’ of the “self” and “the net” (Castells, 1996) as the interpenetration of the lifeworld (in the “self”-metaphor) and the globalized communication sphere (in the “net”-metaphor) shapes an increasingly powerful domain of political discourse and spatially-mediated formats of political ‘public’ communication (for instance through virtual community spaces, search engines, blogs as well as satellite television).

In this sense, the global communication sphere, involving fragmented satellite television targeting specific audiences worldwide and the Internet, provides not so much ‘global’ communication but particular globalized communication, which as Saunders’ study illustrates, ‘de-nationalizes’ identity and creates - in lack of a better word - ‘ontological spheres’ which not only reach the living room but shape and reinforce world perception in the domain of lifeworld experience of global consensual reflexivity. Global flows shape in this sense not so much ‘cultural’ experiences (that too) but ontological ‘openings’ in identifying, negotiating, constructing – and defending! - the ‘self’ and ‘the other’ and in the terrain of global lifeworld reflexivity. In fact, one could argue, that ‘ontological spheres’ shape new discourse ‘places’ in a global space, providing ‘meaning’ and defining ‘Dasein’ (Heidegger, 1962) as historical being in a globalized reflexivity across developed and developing geographical ‘places’ from Denmark to Syria and Saudi Arabia, across global centers and peripheries within the worldwide network of consensual communication nodes. One could argue that aspects of ontological spheres are debated for some time since Benedict Anderson (1991) has famously addressed notions of “imagined communities” in the context of and imagined national identity. Benedikt Anderson has detected this phenomenon, which he has coined “long distance nationalist,” meaning “to play identity politics by participating in the conflicts of” an “imagined Heimat – now only fax-time away” (Anderson, 1991:13). However, I claim that ontological
spheres shape worldwide spaces of meaning in a supra- and subnational setting almost replacing former vertical global/local relations in a horizontal structure of colliding and/or contesting ontological spheres of self- and other-ness, competing in the worldwide communication space not so much for universal 'reason,' but 'truth.' A process which is reflected in Ulrich Beck's recent remark: "A lot of people reinforce borders, they want to exclude others. But, on the reverse side of this, we somehow are related to the otherness of the other as we never expected to happen" (Beck, 2006: 254).

The inevitable debate about the freedom of 'liberal' societies which addresses the globally colliding ontological spheres in this enlarged communication space (this is in my view the hidden agenda of the 'Danish cartoon case'), are only the beginning of a larger slowly emerging metatheoretical shift from 'globalization,' which remains a somewhat vague concept for many anyway, to 'cosmopolitanism' as a normative (i.e. rational) approach to the universal rights of a world citizen. However, 'normative' values are achieved through public discourse, which is possible in the protective parameters of a nation-state, providing (democratic) institutions and also a safeguarded and structured discursive space – the national public sphere not only for the debate but also the constant justification of 'norms' of citizenship through the 'inclusion of the other.' The national public sphere is in this sense a protected sphere of civil 'public' discourse, i.e. the justification of values, 'filtered' and 'defined' through an almost Kantian intersubjective reflection in the discourse mechanism of the categorical imperative within the borders of a mutually (in democratic nations) or politically established discourse ethics.

'Ontological spheres,' Cosmopolitanism and Information Sovereignty

When applying these modes of normative 'civil' discourse as parameters of cosmopolitanism to a transnational level, it is quite surprising to realize on one hand, that not only the global public space has become a highly complex but also a highly dynamic discourse framework within the last decade, and on the other that global media policy primarily addresses 'free trade,' 'copyright' and 'digital divide' and less so policy frameworks for structuring and sustaining a cosmopolitan global media. Whereas public spheres of democratic nation-states represent key domains of national sovereignty in the sense that public discourse is perceived (and legally enforced) as a 'protected' communication sphere, between the government and 'the people,' e.g. through constitutional and legal rights as well as 'public' i.e. democratic institutions, including journalism as a 'fourth estate' and the 'system' of news media, the arising global public space as a network of ontological spheres can be best described as a somewhat open territory for a variety of political flows, operating in constantly changing forms and dynamics, continuously managing, absorbing, negotiating, and transforming conventional agenda setting. In fact, one could argue in a somewhat analytical viewpoint that the global public space consists, on one hand, of differently structured 'publics,' which indeed, originate in diverse cultures and societies (of national but also of statist political spheres communicative cultures), appear and 'convene' in a variety of communicative (not necessarily discourse) 'formats' and 'places' of ontological spheres as a 'global public.' One could also argue that the rising complexity of political information 'flows' create own fragmented semi-'public' institutions of intersubjectively shared discourse flows (e.g. through 'communities,' 'chats,' 'individuals,' NGO's) – not so much in the contextual framework of the universalism of 'humankind,' but rather in a self-referential, self-centered or autopoetic, intersubjective peer-to-peer consciousness.
In Habermas’ (Habermas, 1992) analysis, ‘debate’ and ‘reason’ is viewed as a condition sine qua non of ‘enlightened’ debate. However, the global public space seems to be less guided by the ‘linearity’ of discourse than by associations, re- and deconstructions, images and iconographic, what I call ‘digital’ (Volkmer, 2006) worldviews, which initiate varying centers and peripheries, engaging not in ‘linear’ but ‘circular’ modes, revolving issues within ontological spheres, less guided by ‘universal’ but ‘particular’ (self) interests.

Whereas in Habermas’ view the “national (bourgeois) public constituted the normative ideas of the dissolution of domination into the consensual rule of reason through the mechanisms of open discussion and debate” (Baker, 1992:187), the global public space could, however also be perceived as a normative framework, however as a normative discursive terrain, in order to, as Beck argued (see above), create and protected space for a communicative relation to “the otherness” of “the other.” For this reason it is in particular in today’s advanced globalization process relevant to argue in favor of such a ‘discursive’ public as a new ‘sovereign space’ of an increasingly complex global society within universal coordinates of a global media policy.

These global media policy frameworks are relevant to bridge arising gaps of the process of globalization which appear in the perspective from communication theory. The sphere of global communication reveals a global information infrastructure, not necessarily technologies as such (Internet, satellite, etc.) but rather “traderoutes,” shaping new “markets of loyalties” (Price, 2002) on one hand (creating the ‘network’) and ‘information’ flows (providing the communicative ‘energy’) on the other, which shape and, indeed, ‘energize’ the symbolic, or as many might argue, the “mediated” (for example, Bennett/Entman, 2003 Corner/Pels, 2003, Rantanen, 2005) topography of global public discourse. These interesting aspects are not visible in the view of conventional analyses of global communication phenomena, however they appear when we begin to study the transformation of concept of ‘sovereignty’ of (a) the information infrastructure and (b) information flows in the context of the global space. Or in other words: whereas the ‘sovereignty’ of the information infrastructure is becoming globalized in the sense that it is regulated through inter-governmental, and in this sense ‘universal’ consent, ‘sovereignty’ of information flows is transformed into a particular (for an example commercial) communicative nexus providing the specific platform for global ontological spheres.

Reviewing globalization discourses in sociology, political science, communication studies and economy over the last two decades reveals that most debates are primarily concerned with the role of the nation-state within the process of globalization. Many concepts view, for example, globalizing forces as being the main factors delineating the nation-state, thus creating and shaping new ‘risks’ as Beck (1986) has argued. Others claim that the nation-state itself is being transformed through globalization Various processes are viewed as being responsible for these developments, which are, indeed, shaped through a globalization media infrastructure.

However, when viewing these modes of globalization, i.e. ‘distanciation, ‘intensification’ and ‘global diffusion’ from the perspective of communication theory, it could be claimed that these processes undermine not so much the nation-state ‘as such,’ but more precisely can be understood as parameters of a new concept of ‘information sovereignty,’ or rather sovereignty of information space.
'Sovereignty' already appeared as a political concept in the early phase of the 17th century in Europe. In particular, the Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648 enforced an early model of what might be called an 'extended' sovereignty as an early phase of international 'co-existence' through granting each other the rights of jurisdiction within their territories, which is sometimes viewed as the birth of a modern international political (i.e. inter-governmental) system. Furthermore, "the principle of the sovereign equality of all states among states, became adopted as the paramount principle governing the formal conduct of states toward one another, however representative or unrepresentative were their particular regimes." (Held, 1995:75). In these early centuries of 'internationalization,' a great number of states throughout Europe were already 'connected' and able to communicate among each other: postal routes can be considered as early 'information routes' crossed many borders within a relatively small geographical territory. However, 'sovereignty' of the 'information space' within a state's territory was still absolutely congruent with its geographical 'place,' indeed, the term 'sovereign,' the prince, the duke represents the unification (or rather: personalization) of power over territory and power over, as we say today, public 'information space.' The sovereign oversaw in this sense, 'public communication,' and, occasionally, secured stability and power through restrictions. These early 'information routes' (postal routes) were primarily used for the delivery of diplomatic and other political correspondence (between monasteries etc), but also first 'newsletters,' which were not 'public' but targeted a particular transnational trading community, which represent an early form of a transnational public: "Through the news they shared, the wheat traders of Venice, the silver traders of Antwerp, the merchants of Nuremberg, the financiers of Augsburg, and their trading partners around the world, were being drawn together into a society based on this new sensibility; on common interests – the fate of some ships sailing from India to Lisbon; on common values – a belief in the rights of capital." (Stephens, 1988:77)

New concepts of sovereignty of information space emerged with the advent of the telegraph in the early 19th century. The telegraph is the first technology, as James Carey famously remarked, which separated "communication from transportation" (Carey, 1989: 203). This distinction of the 'separation of communication from transportation' created a network of information routes across a newly formed international communication territory. Within the British Empire, the telegraph served as a network of, what I call, 'extended' sovereignty through means of communication, meaning that the concept of 'information sovereignty' was extended to the colonies. As Thussu argues, "The rapid development of the telegraph was a crucial feature in the unification of the British Empire ... the telegraph allowed the Colonial Office and the India Office to communicate directly with the Empire within minutes, when, previously, it had taken months for post to come via sea." (Thussu, 2000:14). In the mid-'60s of the 20th century early satellites and in the mid-'90s, Internet technologies have further fractured the concept of a place-based 'information sovereignty.'

Globalization of today's media flows are not arranged in a 'place'-based nexus, distributing a signal within one geographical and cultural territory from a to b through identifiable (and licenced!) channels and gatekeepers. It is rather an advanced 'space'-based nexus, providing new discourse spheres which could provide conceptual frameworks for information sovereignty.

Within such a global information space three 'globalizing' sovereignty terrains seem to overlap, merge or co-exist. Whereas in the early days of the telegraph, 'extended sovereignty' created an early
international communication space, advanced telegraph developments, however, called for new forms of international cooperation in order to regulate and manage the increasing transborder communication spectrum. One of the first examples of ‘co-sovereignty’ within an intergovernmental organization is the International Telegraph Union (ITU), formed in 1895 in Paris by 20 European countries. The sole purpose was (and is basically today) the technical harmonization of the communication spectrum. The ITU administered and regulated the international telegraph infrastructure and, a few years later, radio frequencies in a multilateral setting. Being a UN agency today (involving 189 countries), the ITU allocates orbital slots for satellites, seeks agreements on sharing tariffs between telecommunication providers and supports telecommunication initiatives in developing countries (see Siochru/Girard, 2002:37). A second layer of policies within these spheres of co-sovereignty emerged after the Second World War around the paradigm of “free flow doctrine” as part of the liberal ‘free market’ approach in Western Countries. This approach is for instance represented through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), formed in 1947. GATT included the ‘service sector’ over time and when GATT was transformed into the WTO in 1995, the WTO policy was the ‘privatization’ and ‘deregulation’ not only of services but also of ‘media services’ which involves both the content of communication and the infrastructure, including all technological means of transmission – cable, radio, satellites, telecommunication. WTO is considered as the “single most powerful player in media and communications governance globally.” (Siochru/Girard, 2002:56).

A second notion or claim for ‘sovereignty’ emerged in the ’70s of the 20th century questioning the ‘free-flow’ doctrine. UNESCO provided a platform for these concerns and the MacBride Report has shaped the subsequent debate on the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). Protectionist sovereignty concepts are the basis for a variety of, in particular, national regulatory frameworks, attempting to regulate and sometimes minimize information in-flow. Examples are China’s dual approach of ‘technology versus content,’ protectionism of religious values in Arab countries, protectionism of political spheres in Russia, and so on. As Siochru/Girard claim: “The declining sovereignty and relevance of national governments in an era of globalization, the weakness of the UN system and its ability to intervene effectively in major global agendas, and the ascendance of the global trade paradigm and institutions more powerful than governments” (Siochru/Girard, 2002:152) and concludes that “the net effect is that governments ... are losing influence in the international arena, individually and as members of multilateral organizations” (Siochru/Girard, 2002:153) and are forced into a new sphere which I call ‘negotiated sovereignty.’

These globalizing policy spheres emerged in the ’90s, in particular, as a reaction to processes of convergence and an increased complexity of the global media infrastructure with severe implications for global policy, “because local policies can no longer be exclusively guided by cultural considerations” (Katz, 2005:45). Models of negotiated ‘information sovereignty’ emerge which now ‘negotiate’ not large-scale concepts of sovereignty but fractured ‘sovereign’ spaces in remaining spheres supra- as well subnational spheres within a globalized policy framework of information infrastructure regulation.

For example, negotiated sovereignty in a supranational context appear in the context of Internet regulation. In fact, this model of media policy emerged with the technology of the Internet and the new global communication territory of cyberspace. Cyberspace was very early on associated with a global
information society which required new policy structures and frameworks. A new global policy framework was suggested in the early '90s by the then U.S. Vice President Al Gore in conjunction with a new global information infrastructure, creating new debates about media policy and governance of the global information society (see for instance, Kahin/Nesson, 1997), a debate which also began to search for new ‘dislocated’ frames of cultural sovereignty within this new enlarged communication terrain (Volkmer, 1996). One of the outcomes of these debates was a quite interesting trilateral approach for cyberspace regulation through which governments, private industry and consumers negotiate regulatory frameworks and “governance institutions” of the global information society (Kleinwaechter, 2002:61). An outcome for this model is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) as a new form of ‘regulatory agency’ of cyberspace. ICANN is neither an intergovernmental treaty organization nor a NGO, but a not-for-profit private corporation under Californian law. The Internet is currently managed by this organization established by the U.S. Department of Commerce and based in California.

Negotiated sovereignty also begins to appear in a subnational territory. One example of subnational negotiated sovereignty is the constantly debated role of the Internet in China. The Internet is considered as a tool to modernization (in particular economic modernization) by the Chinese government (in this sense and coming back to our initial debate: representing information infrastructure but not information flows!) Based on this assumption and the centrality of the government in enforcing societal developments, Internet content flows are monitored and censored and sometimes ‘negotiated’. However, technological advancements as well as ‘reciprocal’ information spaces (such as the location of critical content on servers outside the country) circumvent these censorship measures and create a subnational negotiation space of sovereignty. In this sense, the global information space permeates (again) remaining structures of centralized policy.

When comparing these here only briefly described concepts, I argue, that the concept of ‘sovereignty’ has been fractured within the coordinates of an increasing ‘universal’ concept of ‘information space’ regulation.

However, the study of political ‘information flows’ within the globalized sphere reveals new notions of ‘sovereignty’ not so much in view of a universal but an increasingly particular framework. I argue that sovereignty resurfaces as ‘spheres of influence’ i.e. new nexus information flows in today’s global public space.

'Spheres of Influence’ –Examples of Information Flows in the Global Public Space

“The News will continue from now on and forever.” These were the first words being aired on CNN. The date was January 1, 1980 and the place a small studio in Atlanta, Georgia. In today’s perspective, these words have, indeed, proven to be quite a precise prediction for a new era of political information. ‘News’ does not only “continue” “forever” in unprecedented continuous ‘flows,’ but these flows have also transformed political information – not only in the U.S., but worldwide.

Reviewing these last two decades of news journalism in some depth, it can be argued that of course it is not ‘only’ CNN’s ways of gathering and presenting U.S. and international news, but rather the
tremendous innovations in distribution technologies which have transformed and reshaped the global space of information flows. Global news providers and new technologies have transformed concepts and formats of journalism and have created today’s electronic epoch of political communication.

One of the most relevant technological innovations is not only the Internet but the extension of satellite capacity – a sometimes easily overlooked key factor in this transformation process of the global public space. (1) Of around 900 satellites lining up above the equator today, 400 satellites provide not only sophisticated platforms for worldwide telecommunication (such as transnational mobile telephony, GPS, Internet access) but they also carry an increasing number of news programs to even the remotest world regions. (2) In conjunction with these technological advancements, new satellite delivery formats, such as ‘point-to-multipoint’ (DTH), and ‘point-to-point’ allow new news delivery to private household antennas and/or relay stations located in otherwise (for instance, terrestrially) not accessible areas. (3) The decrease of satellite leasing costs as another important factor, which has and is still creating a new, again unprecedented, program diversity being delivered worldwide. In my view these three components have transformed (and are still transforming) not only the worldwide news infrastructure, but also, on a much more profound level, news ‘values’ and ‘agendas,’ and, as we have all witnessed during recent world crises, the utilization of news for the construction of messages in an increasingly globalized territory of political communication.

By simply magnifying the ‘surface’ of this transnational news sphere from a global perspective, it becomes apparent that news ‘flows’ are not merely constituted by powerful Multi-National Corporations (MNCs), such as CNN, by Western broadcasters, agencies such as BBC’s World, which have become ‘icons’ of the global news sphere, but increasingly by a number of somewhat diverse transnationally operating news channels which have appeared in particular since the early nineties in conjunction with the above described new satellite technologies. These ‘niche’ channels target not a somewhat diverse ‘mass’ audience, but, highly specific globally dispersed news communities. For instance MBC (the Middle-East Broadcasting Center), serving Arab expatriate communities has already been established in 1991 in London/UK and can be viewed as the first Pan-Arab channel serving Arab communities living in Europe, who already had access to Arab newspapers (such as Sharq al-Awsa) since 1978. ZEE-TV, a highly successful channel targeting the expatriate Indian community of 25 million worldwide, began international distribution in 1993. Al Jazeera, founded already in 1996 and having only gained worldwide recognition years later during the war in Afghanistan; Others, who emerged more recently are for instance, TV Globo International, the major Brazilian television company, which operates in many world regions as does Canal 24 Horas/Retevision, based in Madrid; China Central Television targeting Chinese audiences, and a second channel, CCTV 9, provides the Chinese perspective of the news for English language audiences worldwide; the French government is currently discussing the launch of a worldwide French news Channel ‘Canal France International.’ In addition, a variety of small ‘grassroots’ stations have emerged. They tend to be supported by organizations, such as NGOs and even individual entrepreneurs and, though serving ‘only’ transnational micro-audiences, they provide authentic and powerful news ‘flows’ within this globalized infrastructure.

Proceeding to a more abstract level of analysis, it can be argued that not only technologies, but today’s advanced globalization process, i.e. the new ‘relativity’ of globalization in view of a rise of
particular, rather than universal structures, provides the ‘push/pull’ mechanism for this increasingly diverse globalized ‘news sphere.’ These interrelated and integrated dynamics create a degree of complexity which gradually affects national in/out-flow paradigms and, indeed, challenges conventional concepts of the ‘public’ sphere. I argue that one of the interesting outcomes of this transformation process is a paradigmatic shift from ‘news’ as providing a ‘sense of place,’ meaning a ‘material’-national territory, to a ‘sense of space,’ a rather symbolic deterritorialized arena, not so much bridging but connecting dispersed identities. I view CNN and Al Jazeera as two phenomena appearing on the surface of such a complex new framework. In order to distinguish this new deterritorialized news ‘space’ from concepts of ‘place,’ a review of prior phases of ‘foreign’ journalism helps to detect relevant transformations.

A somewhat first concept of ‘foreign’ journalism and in this sense, ‘inter’-‘nationalisation,’ has appeared in many world regions. This concept is closely linked to ‘modern’ nation-state building in Western Europe (in the 19th century), the formation of a national-e pluribus unum-identity in the U.S., as well as the shaping of a common notion of ‘the world’ within colonizing systems: England, France, Germany etc. (Boyd-Barrett, 1980, Baldasty, 1992, Read, 1992.) In Arab countries, but also in the former Eastern Europe as well as in China, governments distinctively framed the notion of ‘us’ and ‘them’. In all of these instances, the ‘domestication’ of ‘foreign’ news in the first era of ‘mass’ print media, for instance, the creation and shaping of a specific ‘national’ angle of viewing ‘the world,’ was considered a crucial element within the process of construing and defining a national identity. This notion is based on a specific congruence between a geographical and a symbolic territory. A territory, which is defined by clearly marked (physical) borders and immigration regulations (passport controls), but also by a common idea of a societal ‘destiny.’

With the formation of national broadcasters in the early decade of the radio in the early 1930s throughout the world, these clear lines of sovereignty over a physical ‘place’ were for the first time (and I would argue, quite severely) challenged in many respects. In particular ‘shortwave’ radio technologies enabled a first and – already politically immensely powerful – transborder flow of ‘news’ and political information. A phenomenon, which already challenged and sometimes questioned national worldviews by providing all of a sudden new ‘counter-realities’ for instance in times of severe international conflicts. In return, for instance, totalitarian states in Europe, imposed penalties and created sophisticated technologies to detect these unwanted radio news in-flows. The Voice of Russia (VoR) was already launched in 1929 (the first program targeted Germany, called “Hier ist Moskau”), The BBC Worldservice began its transborder program as the ‘Empire Service’ in 1932, the BBC ‘European Service’ began in 1940, and the ‘Overseas Service’ in 1958, broadcasting to Australia. The Voice of America (VOA) began in 1942 also with a German program.

In addition to (not instead of!) such a shortwave ‘journalism,’ another format of transregional news flow became possible by means of satellite delivery from the early ‘60s on, which constitutes a third phase of transnational news delivery. Selected events, mainly of Western interest and considered as being ‘relevant’ within the Super-Power-‘Cold War’ agenda, were delivered ‘live’ not only into neighboring countries but transcontinental via first satellites. It seemed that a new dimension not only of transborder but transcontinental news flows had emerged: the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II, Armstrong’s first steps on the Moon. These were the same images being distributed ‘live’ not directly (and this is an
important point) to worldwide audiences but to national newsrooms, which then constructed domestic frames for their national (and to remain in my metaphor) “place-based” audiences. Whereas Armstrong’s first steps on the moon were interpreted as an accomplishment of science in the Western world, the same ‘live’ images were framed differently in Arab nations. Algerian Television commented on the globally broadcast ‘live’ images of the moon landing, Armstrong’s first steps on the moon, in local frames. The ‘live’ coverage was associated with comments of Algerian television, that Armstrong heard the voice of the Muezzin while taking his first steps on the moon, in order to ‘domesticate’ this global event for local Islamic audiences and provide a religious framework for this unique scientific achievement (Volkmer, 1998).

A fourth concept of foreign journalism commenced in a new ‘transnational’ news sphere, which has been inaugurated by, and this is quite interesting, commercially operating ‘news’ channels. A process within which ‘foreign news’ (a) as a matter of national concern or (in the case of the previous satellite phase, of a political world of international alliances) and (b) a domain of national sovereignty has been transformed into a commercially exploitable ‘entity’ or more simple: product – a product concept now targeting various global regions as ‘lucrative markets’, creating trans-national communities not around national but topical contexts. By attempting to reach not only global audiences but also worldwide news organizations (CNN’s agency model), new news formats such as ‘breaking news’ and ‘fact journalism’ (avoiding national slants in international news), CNNI has been viewed as the inaugurator of a new phase not only of transborder (or transcontinental) but globalized news flows. The fact that CNNI promoted in the early years a new view of the world, in which the concept of conventional ‘foreign’ journalism did not seem to be an appropriate ‘frame’ for covering an increasing range of worldwide events (Turner’s memo to replace ‘foreign’ with ‘international’). This new concept has established CNNI’s power as a ‘Global News Leader’ for worldwide broadcasters and audiences alike. This powerful role is reflected in a survey among members of ‘Eurovision,’ a European news pool for national broadcasters in Europe, many of which acknowledged in 1991, that they would constantly monitor CNNI in their newsrooms to see “what is going on in the world.” In today’s view this is a quite chilling statement, which was, however, in those days been viewed as a rather positive challenge for conventional national journalism in various world regions. In response to CNN’s immense power in the first war in the Persian Gulf, additional news channels were (sometimes quite hastily) created to compete with CNN: Euronews (by Eurovision) in 1993, BBC World Service Television and later BBC World (1995) and Al Jazeera (1996), now modeled after BBC World.

The complexity of today’s news landscape is caused by an overlap of these four conceptual phases, not only in the sphere of the West, but increasingly in various world regions as well. In Eastern European countries this overlap has in particular made it difficult to define ‘transition’ strategies from government-controlled journalism to a more liberal approach. Muhammed Ayish argues, for example, that in various Arab countries this complexity has created an overlap in the way that ‘foreign’ news are framed from the view of “traditionally government-controlled” television, as well as “reformist government-controlled television” and “liberal commercial television,” represented by Al Jazeera, which has triggered new journalistic concepts (Ayish, 2002:139).
Power of Proximity

One of the amazing experiences in the very early days of CNN was not so much the various ‘breaking’ news reports, but rather, the worldwide weather report, predicting the daily weather forecast for London, Tunis, as well as Beijing, Sydney and New York – map-by-map. The ability to provide immediate weather updates for Japan, Australia or Mexico – whether the viewer was located in the Netherlands or Hong Kong – conveyed a new sense of the world. Although it represented more the meteorological relativity than anything else and a minor - if not even non-existent - news issue, it conveyed an interesting first notion of ‘proximity.’ Today, more than 20 years later, the power of ‘proximity’ is by far more advanced and diversified. News programs in conjunction with the Internet carry ‘particular’ content for globalized communities.

The advanced stage of the power of proximity taxonomies can be illustrated by NITV, an Iranian channel, based in Los Angeles, which hypothetically, however, likewise be based in Montreal, London or Madrid. NITV’s goal is to connect Iranians living around the world, with the particular aim of targeting the political sphere in Iran but from the ‘outside.’ In this context, the power of proximity rests not so much on the fact that communities worldwide are ‘simply’ connected, but that they are connected in a political power vacuum between expatriate and national audiences. NITV views itself as a ‘connection’ between Iranians in exile and their home country in a very unique way. Although NITV’s signal is occasionally scrambled by the Iranian government, it can be received in Iran by illegal satellite dishes. Based on this potential, the channel attempts to influence political activities directly in Iran. For instance, around September 11, the channel asked viewers in Iran to protest the regime’s routine of American flag burning. “The next week, 87,000 people inside Iran responded ... on another occasion the channel asked “Iranian youth to show their solidarity with the United States by carrying a candle into the streets. Thousands in Tehran complied” (Lewis, 2002).

Power of Immediacy

Even in the early years, CNN extensively made use of the ‘breaking’ news format – the continuous coverage of an ‘unfolding’ event – in so-called ‘rolling’ news which created constant news flows and a continuous journalistic search for even the slightest twist in a storyline. Covering international events in a ‘breaking news’ format being aired simultaneously across continents has, throughout the early nineties, shaped a new pace of political communication, which only increased the power of ‘breaking news’. This power of immediacy is reflected by a CNN journalist who recalls the first minutes of the war in Kuwait: "I remember being ... in the newsroom when we first heard that Baghdad was being bombed, and ... this group of people in Atlanta knew it maybe two minutes before the world knew it. And the world knew it because of CNN" (Volkmer, 1999:146). This statement illustrates the still intact gatekeeping roles of news journalism within the domain of ‘immediacy’ in the context of a world crisis. A role has now been shared by ‘citizen journalists’ by latest technologies, such as mobile phone cameras which allow to distribute images on the Internet almost instantaneously which are in many cases delivered through major news outlet platforms (such as CNN’s constant news stream platform, CNN pipeline).
**Power of Continuity**

In today's advanced stage of globalization, the news media are not simply characterized by time-space distanciation, and the power of ‘immediacy,’ but additionally by constant flows of news updates via television, newsgroups, weblogs and so called ‘alternative’ news sources. This power of continuity provides constant updates and, if repeatedly aired by various news outlets, creates political pressure.

As James Baker III has stated: "in Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Chechnya, among others, the real-time coverage of conflict by the electronic media has served to create a powerful new imperative for prompt action that was not present in a less frenetic time" (1995, in Gilboa, 2002:9) and as Gilboa further argues, former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd blamed foreign correspondents covering the Bosnian crisis for advocating military intervention by being the founding members of the “something must be done” school (Gilboa, 2002:10). The ‘power of continuity’ has been coined in communication studies “the CNN Factor,” which means that continuous coverage of, for instance, humanitarian crises has the power to influence foreign policy.

If one points a satellite dish in Barcelona, in London, Copenhagen or Ankara to Eutelsat, it is possible to receive 55 Arab channels (national as well as transnational), 10 Tamil, 8 Farsi, 7 U.S., 4 Bengali, 4 Chinese, 3 Pakistani, 2 Malayalem, 2 Thai, 2 Armenian, 1 Filipino, 1 Hebrew, 1 Japanese, and 1 Vietnamese, delivering not only entertainment but also particular news and political information. Similar transnational scenarios are available in South America and Asia.

Supra- and subnational news ‘flows’ are not only further fracturing globalized ‘terrains’ of political communication but also represent side aspects of ‘spheres of influence’ in a nexus of the global public, providing ‘circular’ public discourse spaces.

**Microspheres**

As already indicated, all major world crises since the first Gulf War have been associated by the launch of new news channels (Euronews, Al Jazeera, Al Arabya, French Channel etc.). In the context of these, new globalized so-called ‘microspheres’ are established which provide micro-news flows, forming transnational ‘authentic’ information platforms. I argue that currently one of the most elaborate ‘microsphere’ spaces has been shaped for Arab communities worldwide. Besides Al Jazeera, which tends to be a somewhat ‘liberal’ voice within the Arab media world, other transnational Arab channels operate globally, MBC, which I have already mentioned, the Jordanian Radio and Television Corporation has launched the Jordanian Arab Space Channel in 1993, which also airs into Europe, Canada and the U.S. Al Arabya has been launched in February 2003 (by MBC), weeks prior to the U.S. invasion in Iraq and represents a more conservative pan-Arabic channel. Furthermore, on the ‘micro-sphere’ level a range of national Arab channels are distributed worldwide. In this context, Al Jazeera’s goal can be seen as attempting to counterbalance conservative Arab state channels within this particular microsphere. It can be claimed that these microsphere spaces gain a particular prominence in times of world crisis, when these fragmented ‘flows’ gain intensity and provide ‘authentic’ feedback and information within the global public space (see also Volkmer, 2003).
It is quite interesting to observe, that CNN has began to enter this Arab microsphere, by launching an English language website. Al Jazeera, in return, has created an English language service. It could be argued, that these microspheres create not only 'diasporic communities' but 'private public spaces’ within the global sphere (Slade, 2004).

While the Arab microsphere is the most advanced worldwide, others are also beginning to emerge. Examples are for instance the Chinese state channel CCTV4, which is available on all continents but also NHK World TV, the global Japanese channel of the national Japanese broadcaster, as well as Thai TV. CCTV 4 is meant to provide information of Chinese state television for the Chinese community worldwide and CCTV 9 provides the “Chinese Perspective” for the English language audience worldwide. These national community media distribute the political worldview of the country of origin within the global space, for instance, to the Chinese population in Europe, the U.S., and the Americas. Other examples for this model are original national/statist channels of a variety of Arab countries, which are aired in Europe, such as Jordan TV etc. ARIRANG, from Seoul, distributed in North and South America, Europe and Asia, PTA Armenia, Europe/Africa and Asia.

Two Iranian channels, IRIB 1 and 2 are available in Europe, the U.S. and Asia. Fox News from the U.S. can be received via satellite in Europe and the Middle East as well as in Japan.

**Self-referential Networks**

I would also argue that, for instance, CNN and Al Jazeera represent not only ‘powerful’ news platforms within their political domain, but, from a global level, can also be viewed as ‘self-referential’ networks. 'Self-referential' networks, which almost serve as ‘public' institutions within this global space in realms of politics, news media and audiences. The former UN secretary Boutros-Ghali has once stated that “CNN is the fifth member of the Security Council.” Self-referential networks exercise investigative journalism, ‘create’ the news agenda, provide platforms for announcements by those Heads of State, which have no other way of communicating their messages by diplomatic means (Saddam Hussein’s interview on CNN, Osama bin Laden’s video messages on Al Jazeera) or in cases, where diplomatic relations have broken down. In view of journalism, these self-referential networks provide co-orientation for other news organizations within microsphere or other transnational terrains through community discussion sites.

These are only some examples of ‘spheres of influence’ shaping discourse topographies of ontological spheres within the global space. Political communication within a globalized space is on the agenda of communication studies for some time. Whereas some debates highlight the impact of (journalistic) information flows within a somewhat globalized territory (e.g. Zelizer/Allan, 2002), others focus on the mediation of world crises and conflicts (e.g. Thussu/Freedman, 2003, Hess/Kalb, 2003), the impact on foreign policy (e.g. Gilboa, 2002) and the perception of mediated ‘news’ and political events by an international ‘public’ (e.g. Volkmer, 2006).

However, the dialectic of global communication, the gap of a globalized infrastructure and the increasing ‘spatial reach’ shaping ontological spheres as the fragmentation of a ‘universal’ public into
spheres of global lifeworld reflexivity transforms conventional terminologies of ‘power’ of ‘access’ and ‘participation.’ Given the role of communication and media in the advanced globalization process in the shaping of global ‘reality,’ of ‘crises’ and ‘conflicts’ and perceptions of the world, it is important to create frameworks of a global public in order to provide a discourse platform not only for the debate of the "otherness "of "the other" but – finally! – new normative parameters of cosmopolitanism.

References


**Links**

- Aljazeera.net: [http://aljazeera.net](http://aljazeera.net)
- CNN.com: [http://cnn.com](http://cnn.com)
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