“I’ll Be Waiting for You Guys”:
A YouTube Call to Action in the Egyptian Revolution

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In this essay, we consider the ways the YouTube videos of Egyptian youth activist, Asmaa Mafouz, may be contributing to the development of a new political language for Egypt, providing a space to create an individual public political self, and modeling a new form of citizenship and activism for Egyptians.

"If you stay home, you deserve all that’s being done to you, and you will be guilty before your nation and your people. Go down to the street, send SMSes, post it on the ‘Net, make people aware."

~YouTube video of Asmaa Mahfouz, a leader in Egypt’s April 6, 2011 Youth Movement

On January 18, 2011, a week before the massive street protests in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, Asmaa Mahfouz, a 26-year-old business graduate of Cairo University, recorded a 4-minute, 36-second video of herself and placed it on her Facebook page, from where it was quickly reposted to YouTube. In classic vlog style, the only image is a close-up of her face, in this case veiled, as she looks directly into the camera, passionately calling in Arabic for her fellow Egyptians to join her in protesting against the government.

Despite the Egyptian government’s control of most of the country’s news media, Mahfouz’s video quickly spread among Egypt’s youth, many of whom had turned to social-networking sites as the only consistent arena for free political expression open to them. Indeed, in recent years sites such as Facebook and YouTube have become the forums of choice for Egyptian activists, dissidents, and young people in general (El Din Farag, 2010; Ismail, 2008; Radsch, 2008; Rifaat, 2008; Isherwood, 2008). In this case, Mahfouz’s call to action would circulate far beyond her own circle of friends to be introduced into broader information streams that would eventually find it embedded in the online issues of leading news media such as The New York Times, The Washington Post, and various other mainstream and alternative news outlets, particularly in the United States.
The purpose of this article is to ponder the ways participatory and social media may be changing or influencing protest and dissent in non-Western settings. To do this, we examine a series of vlogs featuring Mahfouz, whose initial video came to be known outside the Middle East as the "Vlog that Helped Spark the Revolution." We believe the scope of the unrest in the Middle East in 2011 represents a milestone in terms of the use of participatory media and other digital communication by activists in non-Western settings. Because of the recentness of the events and the fluidity of our understanding of them, in this article we offer a preliminary snapshot of a broader project focused on the ways that YouTube, one of the world’s best-known forms of participatory media, was used during these historic events (Burgess & Green, 2008). In the essay that follows, we conduct a case study of this young activist’s videos, taking into consideration both what the videos tell us about how participatory media are potentially changing activism in Egypt and the ways her vlogs challenge dominant discourses and images about the Egyptian political space and women’s roles in it.

**Participatory Media**

The rise of social-networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr, and others has encouraged their users to communicate and interact in new ways that potentially disrupt existing media and even social structures. Henry Jenkins (2006) calls this the rise of “participatory culture” in which ordinary people can create their own content and distribute it via social networks. Of interest to us are the ways these ”user-created content” communities (Burgess & Green, 2008, p. 2) can change or enhance the traditional “logics” of Egyptian political action. Such changes may reflect what Castells (2007) argues is the emergence of “mass self-communication,” which can be a new means for social movements and activists to exercise dissent, potentially creating forms of power capable of countering the status quo.

These new communication forms are key to what Clay Shirky (2008) identifies as a general rise around the world in collective action by “loosely structured groups.” That is, formal groups are being replaced by informal ones, which is seen in terms of this study in the shift from traditional social-movement organizations to loosely organized networks of affinity groups, which consist of like-minded individuals who voluntarily come together to work for a common goal. Shirky (2008) argues that today it is easier than ever to form these kinds of groups using online communication resources such as Facebook to engage in non-hierarchical and participatory group actions. But these same properties mean that the shared cultural identities and collective action facilitated by participatory media may be weaker and looser than those created by sustained, real-world political action—particularly risky action. In addition, Burgess and Green (2008) argue that YouTube was not developed with an aim to facilitate collaboration among groups, but instead was created with a specific focus on the individual. This may then be reflected in what Papacharissi (2010) identifies as the “customization of activism” through the “self-driven iterations of collective identities” (pp. 159–160).

**Participatory Media in Egypt**

Despite a tendency among mainstream news media to suggest that participatory media suddenly arrived in Egypt for the 2011 Revolution, these new forms of media have been used by Egyptians for some time (Fahmy, 2010; Isherwood, 2008; Radsch, 2008). Isherwood (2008) notes that participatory media
such as blogging were actually predated by other communication changes in Egypt, particularly the spread of satellite television and the development of what he identifies as an opposition press. The rise of these new media forms within Egypt has been perhaps best documented through various studies of blogging, which has played a particularly significant role in Egypt’s online political communications scene.

Radsch (2008) argues that by 2005, blogging had moved from a form used by a small group of early adopters to a key means of communicating among activists. Indeed, researchers have repeatedly identified the Egyptian blogosphere as having helped created an alternative public space where activists could network and distribute information absent in Egypt’s mainstream media (El-Nawawy & Khamis, 2010; Fahmy, 2010; Isherwood, 2008; Ismail, 2008). For example, Fahmy (2010) documented how controversial content, particularly stories involving police brutality that rarely if ever appear in Egypt’s mainstream news coverage, became a staple for one of Egypt’s best-known bloggers, Wael Abbas, who blogged about what appeared to be leaked government information that would never have appeared in the mainstream news. Likewise, El-Nawawy and Khamis (2010) found that blogs helped expand discussion about religious conflicts within Egypt.

Blogs also have been identified as contributing to new communication styles and practices in Egypt. Isherwood (2008) notes that some bloggers have opted to use amiyya, a less-formal form of Arabic that is understandable to all classes, rather than standard Modern Arabic as is usually seen or heard within mainstream news. In fact, Fahmy (2010) calls some blogger’s language “vulgar” (p. 16). In another change, bloggers have provided Egyptians with a place to actively comment on each other’s arguments and ideas and, thereby, potentially enhance their abilities to publicly debate sensitive issues (El-Nawawy & Khamis, 2010; Isherwood, 2008). While not always living up to the rational debate expectations of a true public sphere, bloggers nonetheless have contributed additional and previously unaired points of view (El-Nawawy & Khamis, 2010).

Another way that bloggers have introduced new communication practices is through their attempts to develop networks of bloggers even among those who may have ideological differences, such as secularists and members of the Muslim Brotherhood. As part of these new practices, some Egyptians used their blogs to host citizen-shot videos of controversial events, such as showing women being sexually harassed during an Islamic holiday. Thus, the use of video by online activists is not new to Egypt. In one of the most discussed and disseminated videos before the revolution, Abbas, the blogger mentioned earlier, posted graphic video on his high-profile blog of a bus driver being abused by police. It eventually resulted in the prosecution and conviction of the officers. While bloggers, then, have obviously laid a groundwork for activists to communicate outside the traditional Egyptian media, the role of participatory media in the uprising would seem to have reached an important turning point in terms of their ability to help activate and to gain attention for their messages within Egypt and beyond.

The Asmaa Mahfouz Videos

We examined four different videos of Asmaa Mahfouz, all self-created in vlog style, meaning the video features her looking into the camera and talking with nothing else appearing on screen. The first video was created January 18, 2011, posted to her Facebook account, and appeared on YouTube later that
same day. The date the video was posted is important because the activism taking place in Egypt at that point was virtually invisible within the mainstream news media, even outside Egypt’s domestic news. Thus, displaying the video was a means of original information dissemination that was taking place outside the traditional communication system. The original audience for the videos would have been those within Mahfouz’s own social network; however, the immediate posting to YouTube allowed the video to potentially reach a different, larger audience on YouTube and beyond.

Using YouTube’s analytics, we can see the video spread by what appears to be a network of interested viewers. The same day the video was first posted on YouTube, it began to circulate, appearing on mobile devices, within YouTube searches and on Facebook pages. It appears that the video then attracted immediate attention within Egypt. In fact, YouTube’s analytics confirm that this first video was viewed mostly by Egyptians; the second most frequent location of its viewers was Saudi Arabia. The next video appeared on January 24, 2011, the night before the major “Day of Rage” protest taking place on the official Egyptian holiday, Police Day, and it echoed the first video, although in this one, Mahfouz provided more specific directions about joining the protests. A third video was made the night of January 25, 2011, after a major protest had taken place, and this one expressed Mahfouz’s view of what a new, politically active Egypt would look like. The following day saw reports that participatory media were being blocked in Egypt, suggesting that the government feared these tools for their ability to assist the protesters, as well as for providing them with a means of sharing information with those outside the country (Bryant, 2011).

The final video appeared February 28, 2011. This one followed Mahfouz’s absence from the protest scene for some days and attempted to explain the concerns that led her to briefly abandon then rejoin the movement’s public actions. It should be noted that more than one version of each video has been posted, thus diluting page views and numbers of comments. In the course of the writing of this essay, some posts of the same video disappeared and YouTubers added others. A summary of the specific version of videos examined here appears in Table 1.

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1 As of March 11, 2011.
Table 1. Original Arabic Language Asmaa Mahfouz Videos.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Views (as of 3/15/2011)</th>
<th>Comments (as of 3/15/2011)</th>
<th>Uploaded by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>126</td>
<td>modeykokey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>149,318</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>wolfinside1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/26/2011 تالصليدا دعي ذويتيا موي انداعيهم 4 رعيم راعي لا كل بدء</td>
<td>55,204</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>wolfinside1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/28/2011 فيه اقصى مشاعر تفوق ... أسماة مكافحة</td>
<td>87,998</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>wolfinside1985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The English translation of the first video, entitled, "Meet Asmaa Mahfouz and the vlog that Helped Spark the Revolution," appears February 1, 2011. The same YouTube poster translated the next two videos as well. The second one was titled in English, "Asmaa Mahfouz's vlog on the Eve of the Revolution." The third one was "Asmaa Mahfouz describes Jan 25th and gears for the big Friday." The last video had not been translated into English as of this writing.

Nearly two weeks passed before the first English-language version of the video appeared on YouTube. (Of course, it’s possible that such a version was posted and removed.) Keeping in mind that fewer than a quarter, or 24%, of Egyptians are online (Egypt, 2009.), this suggests the video and those that followed were first intended for the limited number of Egyptians who were both online and personally connected to Mahfouz. It appears to have then quickly spread either among those people and whoever they were connected to and perhaps to an even broader sphere of viewers who are members of "synchronized groups," likely other activists or even non-activist Egyptians who might not normally have participated in political activities but became involved in the massive demonstrations, discovering and sharing information through their own communication networks ("Clay Shirky," 2011, para. 6). After reaching these groups, the video spread to other audiences outside Egypt and not connected in any way with the protests, such as readers of the U.S.-based blog "Boing Boing" and The New York Times, where the video was embedded in one of the newspaper’s blogs. Taking into account this possible path of circulation, we provide below an assessment of these videos in terms of social media’s roles in Egyptian political communication during the revolution.

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2 Available at [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KRMpm4ejJS8](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KRMpm4ejJS8)
3 Available at [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hKgN6A0UWCU&feature=related](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hKgN6A0UWCU&feature=related)
4 Available at [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qFdhE8KXm_q](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qFdhE8KXm_q)
5 Available at [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4wc-IMjnYY](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4wc-IMjnYY)
Developing a New Language for Politics

In general, political rhetoric in Egypt has historically been delivered in a more formal classical Arabic that indicates the topic is “important.” Yet Mahfouz does not use that sort of complicated language to make her call for others to participate in the protests. There is no political position from a particular party, nor any complex ideological message with her video. Instead, she uses a notably simplistic language, one that would be understood by virtually any Egyptian who happened to hear it, asking them to join her in demonstrating against the regime. Indeed, her language is not merely simple, it is slangy. For example, after talking about how four Egyptians set themselves on fire to express their frustration with government corruption and the lack of economic opportunity, she asks viewers, “Are you going to kill yourselves too? Or are you completely clueless?”

This is important for several reasons. Modern Egypt has a tradition of attempting to differentiate between colloquial Arabic and classical Arabic, with the latter historically being seen as the appropriate language for important communications such as news, university lectures and public meetings (Armbruster, 1996). In addition, Armbruster (1996) notes that this language distinction carried with it a class division as well with classical Arabic being seen as an indicator of the elite classes and even of the country’s progress toward modernity. What has changed in recent years in Egypt is the increasingly public use and acceptance of more informal language to address serious or sensitive issues that is both understandable and accessible by the general population. This was indicated above in research about blogs in particular but also can be seen in a less coarse form on satellite television through the shows of influential televangelists such as Amr Khaled, whose satellite television discussions of religion are presented in an informal Arabic, which Moll (2010) calls “the linguistic register of everyday life and conversation” (p. 2). Thus, we argue that Mahfouz’s style of speaking continues this break with the standard expectations of how one communicates about politics in Egypt. This language is important because it invites all Egyptians to see themselves as participants. What appears to be different from earlier uses of online media such as blogs is that her approach employs a personal video to deliver the message—a video that she created that is about herself—not a cell phone submission from someone else or her own filming of others.

Just like the communication modes of the new Muslim evangelists, she also employs a personal story to make her case: In that way, her video also embodies the participatory media ethos of YouTube and vlogging in particular:

I posted that I . . . am going down to Tahrir Square and I will stand alone and I will hold up a banner. . . I even wrote my number so maybe people will come down with me. No one came except three guys! Three guys and three armored cars of riot police. And tens of hired thugs, and officers, came to terrorize us. They shoved us roughly away from the people.
While these rhetorical breaks from the standard political communication style may not have originated with her, their use via the visual medium of personal video coupled with the power of social networking to inspire political activism appears to be a significant moment in the evolution of Egypt’s modes of political communication. Mahfouz has helped to further what obviously began with Egypt’s bloggers—an attempt to create an activist language for those who do not have any experience in protests or even in free expression. While the Egyptian blogosphere may have popularized the use of colloquial language to discuss politics, these videos appear to have taken the form further, ultimately creating a fresh way of communicating about politics that is visual and intensely intimate.

Creating a Public Self

For a Western audience, the directness of the video and its call to action might seem familiar; indeed, an inspired young person in front of a camera saying what she thinks is not surprising. However, we argue that the video has more significance within the Egyptian context due to the country’s suppression of free expression and political activities. Beyond that, unlike some of Egypt’s brash bloggers making bold political statements—but remaining anonymous—Mahfouz was completely visible with the camera quite close to her face and she completely identified herself by name. Thus, there was no attempt at anonymity even though appearing in the video and calling for fellow citizens to protest against the government was risky. While something similar might be accomplished on blogs, the visual properties of YouTube make this a much more compelling act. Peters and Seier (2009) in their study of YouTube call this “self-staging,” a potential means of generating social and political transformation of one’s self. Therefore, Mahfouz’s action in fact generated authority for herself. This ability to create a public self seems inherently tied to the publicness of posting the video on YouTube where it would be visible to anyone and available to be remediated by anyone seeking to embed the video on their own website in addition to being responded to by anyone choosing to comment on it.

Also notable is the fact that just because YouTube is a Western tool, the self that Mahfouz creates is not a Western one. In each of her four videos, she appears veiled, an act that the West has consistently associated with a lack of agency and evidence of oppression of Muslim women. Yet clearly, this is how she normally dresses, and she does so by choice. Thus, employing video gives her the power to create herself. Interestingly, she chooses to define her gender in relation to male expectations in Egypt:

Whoever says women shouldn’t go to the protests because they will get beaten, let him have some honor and manhood and come with me on January 25th . . . If you have honor and dignity as a man, come and protect me, and other girls in the protest.

This seems to be a bit of gender jujitsu. While her language and provocation may not be within more traditional gendered communication styles, she uses gender roles, indeed, calling herself a “girl,” as a means of appealing to male viewers. Her message itself is one that would resonate with many Egyptians because of society’s embedded patriarchal ideas about honor and the general expectation that any honorable man would step up to protect a woman who was in harm’s way (whatever the reality on the ground might be). That is, she uses these expectations to bolster her own aim (to turn out protesters)
because if she, a young woman, goes alone into the square with the likely crackdown from Egyptian security forces, it becomes the duty of Egyptian men to go as well to “save” her or, at the least, stand in solidarity with her.

Thus, the video and its public display provided Mahfouz with a chance to construct herself for viewers without being remediated or reduced into a sound bite by a mainstream news report. This is important because as Ismail (2007) argues, Muslim self-presentation represents a “redefinition of community” (p. 9), and while on the surface this is a mobilization call, it is also an attempt to offer a vision of a different Egypt and a different mode of expression and freedom. The ability to create a public self may also be accorded to bloggers, but the ability for others to remediate that self and to believe they know her does seem to make the YouTube version more powerful.

"My rights, your rights, our rights!": Evangelizing for Activism

In the vlog produced January 26, 2011, Mahfouz begins with a chant, "The people want to bring down the regime! The people want to bring down the regime!" She then explains that that is what the protesters on Egypt’s “Day of Rage” were chanting in the streets. Like each of her videos, this one embodies her vision of what it means to be Egyptian, presenting a path toward a post-Mubarak national identity of active participants in the country’s social and political life. She tells her viewers, “The most beautiful thing about it [the protests] is those who worked on this were not politicians at all. It was all of us, all Egyptians.” This is notable for several reasons: It means she is breaking with traditional modes of political communication as well as gender and age expectations for civic leadership in Egypt, and she is suggesting that authentic political action is no longer the realm only of professional politicians.

Just as important, we find that her videos represent a sort of Egyptian citizen’s guide to protest in which she explains, exhorts, and models a form of active citizenship—keeping in mind the oppressive context in which this political activity is taking place. For example, she describes how fliers calling for protests were disseminated in “taxis, at the metro, in the street, schools, universities, companies, government agencies.” In her videos, she holds up a handwritten sign reading “No to Corruption,” and she encourages viewers to carry Egyptian flags. At one point, she even picks up a small flag and calls it a shield, telling her online viewers, “I’ll be waiting at 2 p.m. sharp. Don’t be late and bring a flag of Egypt with you.” The vlog format makes this invitation intensely personal. A single, sincere face looking out from the computer screen, delivered as if a personal call.

This exhortation to activism appears to build upon the ways calls to action became a staple of popular televangelists’ shows such as those of Amr Khaled, which Echchaibi (2009) argues embodies a form of “civic militancy,” imbued with “the oratorical passion of sermonizing to encourage public participation, civic engagement” (pp. 4–5). Thus, we see in Mahfouz’s videos a similar yet vastly more radical call to embrace activism as a form of new Egyptian nationalism, one colored by a religious sensibility. In one video she says, “Don’t be afraid of the government. Fear none but God! God says he will ‘not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves’ “ (a verse from the Quran). She later says, “Today all of us will pray, Muslims and Christians, will pray to God. God alone can give us victory and he alone will protect us.” Thus, the videos fit within a broader context that van
Nieuwkerk (2008) identifies as the growth of an Islamic cultural sphere comprised of music, television, and other artistic products, some of which intend to “serve nationalist and Islamist purposes” (p. 172). In doing so, they potentially contribute to the creation of new publics. In the case here, the new public will be one that is patriotic, religious, and politically active—clearly an indigenous view of civic life and not one imposed by forces from outside of the region. As she says, “This is the Egyptian people we always dreamed of. I can now say I am proud to be Egyptian.”

Conclusion

When the state shuts off meaningful public participation in a country’s political and social life, some citizens will seek other outlets through which to express themselves. In Egypt, the alternatives that have emerged range from a reimagining of religious messages and delivery of that information via the satellite television shows of a new generation of televangelists to the rise of a vibrant, resistant blogosphere. In the revolution of January 2011, many young Egyptians turned to participatory and social media in conjunction with real-world organizing and demonstrating. That is, participatory media were used as platforms for political activism, a use that activists had increasingly employed to compliment real-world actions. Of course, it should be noted that activist networks of youth, labor, and other politically motivated Egyptians using participatory media existed before January 2011. The revolution did not introduce this phenomenon.

What appears to have happened that is different, however, is that political communication via participatory media was amplified with a new intensity that pushed individual voices such as Asmaa Mahfouz’s beyond activists’ personal ties to larger networks of other, perhaps previously unconnected groups and individuals, many of whom decided to articulate their discontent on the streets of Egypt. The overall result of complimentary online and real-world actions could be considered a loosely synchronized enactment of a new form of Egyptian citizenship. While we can never know the exact contribution of this one activist to the dramatic changes that took place, clearly YouTube and other participatory media were employed as political tools to create new forms of personalized dissent for Egyptians such as Asmaa Mahfouz and, in doing so, appear to have led to a new media logic for Egyptian political actions.
References


