Logics of Mobility: Social Movements and Their Networked Others

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Issues of mobility and agency are central to how we understand the success of social movement organizing. This study examines these issues by unpacking the twin logics of networking and displacement as they drive organizing around Indigenous access to land in India. It first traces the shape of national-level networking in movement organizing, focusing on both alliances and fractures related to the passage and subsequent implementation of the Forest Rights Act, which enables Adivasi groups across the country to determine and exercise their historic rights of access to forest lands. The study then shifts scale to analyze how logics of displacement were manifested among the Jenu Kuruba tribe in and around Bandipur in South India, identifying four major phases of displacement. I bring these logics together to argue that the outcome and attendant agency of social movement organizing is often shaped by the place of the networked other in relation to the movement, and that viewing the networked other as incorporated, resistive or deprived, shapes how movement agency and success is understood in instrumental, affective, and constitutive terms, respectively.

Keywords: Adivasi, agency, digital technologies, logic of displacement, logic of networking, mobilization, social movements

The term social movement has a long and rich sociological history, and it is perhaps our most evocative metaphor for social transformation. To move something is, after all, to change it, both spatially and affectively. Issues of mobility and agency are thus central to social movement organizing—indeed, mobilization is a key term in social movements themselves—but their potential to help develop a communicative understanding of social movement organizing is yet underdeveloped. Doing so is particularly important in light of the highly visible forms of activism evident across the globe in the first two decades of the 21st century (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Bimber, Flanagan, & Stohl, 2013) and attendant claims about their effectiveness and reach.

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Questions of movement form, efficacy, and issue formation and impact have been historically central to studies of social movement organizing, and debate continues to swirl around how efficacious contemporary networked digital movements are (Rohlinger & Bunnage, 2017), the relationship between digital engagement and the willingness of individuals and communities to participate and mobilize (Koc-Michalska & Lilleker, 2016), and the importance of coalitional and cross-cultural organizing in contemporary movements (Costanza-Chock, 2014). My objective in this article is to consider these broad issues by looking afresh at issues of mobility in social movements. I do so by unpacking two broad logics of mobility that are evident in social movement organizing around Indigenous access to land in India, which implicate agency in different ways. The analysis zooms in and out from the Jenu Kuruba community in Bandipur, designated by the Indian state as a particularly vulnerable tribal group. Shifting analytical scales is particularly important given that the questions and issues outlined above implicate relatively common and universalized assumptions about the highly networked shape and reach of contemporary social movements; this process, in turn, calls attention to the need for movement accounts that draw from flexible analytical scales (Burawoy, 2000). My analysis shows how the twin logics of mobility produce the Jenu Kuruba community as a networked other in relation to the larger movement, the agency of which is shaped by how the networked other is configured as incorporated, resistive, or deprived.

Before highlighting how logics of networking and logics of displacement implicate mobility and agency in different ways, I first discuss issues of networking, power, and mobility in contemporary movements to set the stage for the analysis. Subsequently, after a brief discussion of methods, I discuss in detail how logics of networking and logics of displacement work to produce a multiscalar and fractured activist network that mobilizes around Indigenous access to land. Two broad contributions to the study of social movements and communicative agency are considered at the end of the article.

Networking, Power, and Mobility

A large body of research on the dynamics of contemporary movements focuses on their capacity for digitally networked action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Juris, 2008); their promiscuous, protean, and fluid communication (Ganesh, 2015; Jackson, 2007); and their participative and inclusive forms (Costanza-Chock, 2014). Ganesh (2018) identifies three common and universalized assumptions of contemporary networked movements: They have the ability to bring diverse and disparate groups into political coalitions; they have the capability to blur traditional boundaries between media production and media consumption; and they do not rely on formal organizations to perform traditional social movement functions, relying instead on digital network formations.

Accompanying these assumptions are several ideas about agency, power, and mobility. First, scholars have suggested that contemporary movements are characterized by communication abundance (Blumler & Coleman, 2015) and that they are able to exert a kind of participatory communication power, mobilized by digital media, on an unprecedented scale (Beer, 2009; Castells, 2009; Obregón & Tufte, 2017). Second, they are able to mobilize affect and sentiment ranging from outrage and fear to hope and inspiration rapidly, broadly, and ambiguously (Castells, 2012). Third, contemporary movements are seen to have efficacy and therefore agency, not only in terms of the actual outcomes of mobilizing efforts but in terms of people’s very belief in the collective efficacy of the movement itself (Velasquez & LaRose, 2014).
However, these assumptions about communication, mobility, and networks are fragile for several reasons. First, they are often not subject to analytical accounts that address multiple scales and registers of social movement organizing; indeed, they often focus on digital networks themselves, which renders them vulnerable to overextending claims about reach and effectiveness (Bakardjieva, 2015). Second, and critically, they are often based on the experiences of researchers in the Global North, and by virtue of their location are prone to both theoretical and methodological parochialism (Stohl, 2001). Therefore, this article asks how one can conceive of movement and agency in the context of what appear to be highly networked social movements in the Global South but whose reach might not be extensive, whose action and power might resonate differently, and where the movement itself might move otherwise. In other words, how do we understand networked movements in relation to their others?

India is ideal terrain to address this question because social movements in the region have a long and vibrant history—the country both contains and sustains huge amounts of cultural, economic, caste, gender, and religious inequities—and also because it is a poster child for capitalist digital technological development in the third world (Rao & Dutta, 2017). The case I discuss has to do with mobilization by Adivasi (First People) groups around their traditional right to access forest land. It offers a study in contrasts. On the one hand, there has been considerable political and legal change since the late 1980s on how forest land is managed, and some significant mobilizing by coalitions of Adivasi groups led to the passage of the Forest Rights Act in 2006, which granted Adivasis historic rights to land designated as forests. On the other hand, despite considerable movement organizing on a national scale, there has been little to no scalar change in the relative deprivation of Jenu Kuruba communities, and they continue to be dispossessed.

It is tempting to frame this tension, as others have done (e.g., Hyndman & de Alwis, 2004), as involving mobility on one hand and immobility on the other. However, I seek instead to shed light on the various logics of mobility that both enable mobilization around Indigenous rights and result in the continuing displacement—displacement is a kind of movement, after all—of Adivasi groups. The insight derived is drawn not only from a historical review of the issue but from a set of interviews with (a) nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and Adivasi leaders working on the issue at a national level; (b) ethnographic interviews with people working with Jenu Kuruba communities in and around Bandipur; (c) ethnographic interchanges with Jenu Kuruba community members in six villages, in three fieldwork trips in 2017 and 2018; and (d) interviews with academics and students who have studied Jenu Kuruba communities for their academic projects. A total of 14 interviews were used for the present article. The larger project from which these interviews were culled aims to assess the communicative dynamics of consensus and silence in obtaining Adivasi opinions about their historic access to land.

The next section outlines how the logic of networking is imbricated in the mobilization of Indigenous rights. I then outline how a logic of displacement informs and underwrites the continuing dislocation of Jenu Kuruba communities in and around Bandipur. And, finally, I outline a series of implications for scholars of communication and social movement organizing.
Logics of Networking: The Campaign for Survival and Dignity

The issue of Adivasi access to forest lands is at least a century old in India, and the precarious place of Adivasi groups vis-à-vis the social order is even older. However, it was the colonial Indian Forest Act (1927) that resulted in the legal definition of many millions of Adivasis as encroachers on their own land, more than half a century after their mobility was restricted by the passage of the Criminal Tribes Act in several presidencies, starting in 1871 and culminating in 1913. Since then, agitation by Adivasi groups for access to land has been quite visible (Dreze, 2005), even during the initial formation of the post-independence Indian state, when their rights were neither acknowledged nor verified during the period that forests were being administratively consolidated, and “a narrative of deforestation was used by the state to extend its authority in rural areas since the colonial period” (Arora-Jonsson, 2017, p. 4). This resistance took the form of encroachment, protest, getting registered as voters, lobbying politicians, and petitioning in courts for access to land.

Once Adivasis were constructed as encroachers, a series of eviction drives by local and state governments, often in collusion with powerful castes, seized control of Adivasi land for a range of reasons, sometimes related to the expansion of protected zones, sometimes to correct alleged encroachment, and sometimes even to evict them from land that vested interests wanted to seize for cultivation. It was only in the 1990s that any government recognition of the issue began, with the submission of the BD Sharma report and its recommendation to regularize alleged encroachment by Adivasis.

It became easier for activist groups across the country after the communication ecology of the country—historically split between vernacular, Hindi, and English media—began to be digitized after the diffusion of the Internet across urban centers in India, and communication itself became instant, frequent, and relentless. A pivotal event occurred in 2002 when the Ministry of Environment and Forests used a 2001 Supreme Court verdict to direct all state governments to evict encroachers, resulting in several cases of violence, including police firing and the destruction of Adivasi huts, which were duly noted by Amnesty International (Kashwan, 2017). The response was almost immediate, and it resulted in the creation of a national-level, cross-state Adivasi coalition to resist eviction and change the law in a matter of months: the Campaign for Survival and Dignity, or CSD. The CSD is a loose federation of tribal forest dwellers’ organizations from states including Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan; Orissa, and Tamil Nadu.

Scholars have already commented on the CSD’s identity as a networked mobilizing structure in its early years (Kumar & Kerr, 2012). In the first few years of its formation, the CSD developed communication tactics with familiar networked social movement signatures, bearing important hallmarks of three aspects of a spatial networking logic that implies movement along three fronts: coordination, consensus, and exchange (Juris, 2008). The CSD became a platform for state organizations to coordinate with one another and even attend one another’s rallies, as they organized protests, marches, and demonstrations and “Jail Bharo” drives against evictions in multiple states. The latter literally means “fill the prisons” and is a protest method involving voluntary arrest. The CSD also conducted several high-profile public hearings, including one in 2004 in Delhi, which involved in-person testimonies of evicted communities. At times the CSD became a coordination and information sharing hub with other activist and NGO actors as well, including international
groups such as the Mining Zones People’s Solidary Group in organizing against POSCO, a Korean company seeking to form the largest special economic zone in the country in Orissa to start an iron ore mine using over 3,000 acres of tribal forest land. The CSD also was able to effectively lobby local, state, and central politicians of parties on both the left and the right to muster agreement for the need for the Forest Rights bill when it was first drafted by the Ministry of Tribal Affairs and eventually passed by Parliament.

What is less obvious but no less remarkable in the CSD’s work has been its ability to co-opt prominent leaders not only from tribal communities but from English-speaking and highly educated elites who were politically committed to supporting labor and tribal rights. Madhu Sarin, for example, a Chandigarh-based urban activist, became a supporter of the coalition early on and was a member of the technical support group in the ministry that drafted the Forest Rights Act. Other coordinators of the CSD, such as Shankar Gopalakrishnan and Pradip Prabhu, hail from Adivasi communities but have educated themselves formally in English and are qualified lawyers. These leaders served as critical brokers as the coalition formed in 2002.

However, the relationship between, on one hand, the CSD and other Adivasi networks that worked on the Forest Rights Act and, on the other hand, a range of NGOs that work on the issue has not been without tension. The CSD has continued to be extremely active since the passage of the Forest Rights Act in 2006. It continues to serve as a coordination, information-sharing, and consciousness-raising hub for tribal activist groups across the country. Doing so has been especially important, because the implementation of the Forest Rights Act has not actually occurred in most Adivasi areas; in fact, the first directive was issued in Maharashtra only in 2009, three years after the passage of the act. The coalition also has continued to engage in active advocacy of the need for the Forest Rights Act because of vocal opposition to it from other environmental NGOs that cite a range of reasons for opposing it, including accusations that it dilutes environmental protection and furthers the vulnerability of Adivasis by rendering them more subject to exploitation, land seizure, displacement, and encroachment. The CSD has continued a form of networked engagement with its opponents by putting online several open letters to other NGOs, including groups such as Vanashakti, Bombay Natural History Society, Wildlife Protection Society of India, Wildlife First, and Conservation Action Trust. Several of these groups have filed a petition in the Supreme Court to strike down the Forest Rights Act, so the advocacy work for the coalition continues unabated.

Tensions between NGOs and Adivasi groups such as the CSD occur not only because some NGOs are aligned with an Indigeneity-weak approach to conservation. Adivasi groups maintain that several NGOs that work to implement portions of the Forest Rights Act that were originally designed to increase the capacity of Adivasi groups to make decisions about their historic land rights, actually view it as an opportunity to insert themselves into the solution matrix. In interviews, several activists and members of NGOs themselves referred to the “NGOization” of forest rights, arguing that NGOs tended to try to turn themselves into the solution by becoming arbiters of land rights decisions, filing petitions on behalf of Adivasi groups, or advocating to district authorities on their behalf, instead of enabling Adivasi groups themselves to develop the capacity to do so. National-level Adivasi groups such as the CSD have been critical of these initiatives because they undermine the rights of Adivasis to their own self-determination. Thus, the networked realm of activist politics around the Forest Rights Act issue is not seamless, but is fractured on
multiple fronts, with different groups collaborating strategically on specific issues but engaging in critique and dissent on others.

**Logics of Displacement: Jenu Kuruba Communities in Bandipur**

Like a logic of networking, a logic of displacement is also spatial and implies movement, but unlike the former, it involves a clear subject and object of displacement: a displacing agent and a displaced body. Scholarly attention to displacement has been considerable, but as a force and logic it can be said to have three elements. First, a logic of displacement is banal (Orslander, 2007), and displacement is considered inevitable—a necessary, unremarkable, and common part of everyday life. Second, displacement is modern (Escobar, 2003)—a re-placing and re-territorializing logic that detaches people from locale and re-embeds them at the edges of networks, grids, and hierarchies. Finally, displacement is brutal. In Sassen’s (2014) terms, it is a process and result of an increasingly “savage sorting” that is itself produced by the complexity of a capitalist economy currently undergoing disruptive contraction. The contemporary phase of expulsion of people from the global economy (not only by displacement but through equally brutal unemployment, suicide, mortgage foreclosures, and imprisonment) is a result of a potent and explosive mix of poverty produced by financial instrumentalization, and in India this occurs against the backdrop of the developmental state.

The logic of displacement is particularly evident in the recent history of the Jenu Kurubas. In 1962, the Indian government classified the Jenu Kurubas with the derogatory moniker “primitive tribe.” The term implies that subsistence livelihoods are pervasive in the tribe and that they are traditionally nomadic hunters and gathers, not agrarian land-owning groups. The very term *Jenu Kuruba* means “honey gatherer.” This census category was changed to “particularly vulnerable tribal group” in 2006 at the time of the passage of the Forest Rights Act. About 3.2 million people in 75 Adivasi groups were classified in this category in the 2001 census. The exact population of Jenu Kurubas is difficult to calculate. By some estimates, there were about 34,000 members in the 2001 census; others estimate about 29,000 (Vijayendra & Bhat, 2004). The Jenu Kurubas are considered one of several indigenous groups in the Western Ghats in the Karnataka region, but they are the only group officially designated as particularly vulnerable. This was evident during my fieldwork visits, where the quality of life in portions of resettlement hamlets occupied by Solige tribal communities was palpably better than the portions of the hamlets occupied by Jenu Kurubas, despite the two groups being resettled at about the same time, under similar conditions.

From interviews and news reports, there appear to be four identifiable phases of displacement evident among Jenu Kurubas who live in the Bandipur area. The first occurred in the lead-up to the creation, in 1955, of the Nagarhole wildlife sanctuary, now called the Rajiv Gandhi National Park and referred to without irony by Wikitravel as one of the best-run national parks in the country. The park is an integral part of the over 5,000-square-kilometer Nilgiri Biosphere Reserve, designated as a World Heritage Site in 2012. At least 27 tribes live within the reserve. The creation of the park and the tiger reserve resulted in Jenu Kuruba groups being denied access to the forest to gather honey, their traditional source of livelihood. Several communities were banded together into hamlets within the park, away from the temporary tree houses in which they had traditionally dwelled (H. K. Bhat, personal communication, January 11, 2018;
Vijayendra & Bhat, 2004), and according to estimates, about 6,000 families were moved out in the 1950s (Sayeed, 2010; V. A. Sayeed, personal communication, December 23, 2017).

The second phase of displacement began during the construction of the Kabini and Taraka dams in the 1970s. Jenu Kuruba groups, who had been herded into hamlets, were displaced from them because of the creation of the dam reservoirs. Several thousand people were forcibly removed from these locations and were relocated to huts at the edge of the sanctuary. Several were provided with land by the state government and were enrolled in schemes to train them to grow fruit and vegetables. Reports are unclear as to how many families actually took to this scheme at the time, but subsequent studies have shown that honey gathering continued until the early 2000s to be the only economically sustainable occupation for the communities (Demps, Zorondo-Rodríguez, García, & Reyes-García, 2012).

A third phase of displacement began in 1992, with renewed and intensive attention being paid to the remaining communities who were still dwelling within the national park and another wave of resettlement of families from inside the park to resettlement areas outside it. There is controversy over whether these resettlements were voluntary. One commentator (Dattatri, 2005) has testified that resettlements of Jenu Kurubas were an exemplary instance of a partnership model of stewardship between wildlife authorities, local NGOs, and tribal leaders (although it is worth noting that the author is a well-known wildlife advocate). Other accounts have testified that these resettlements restated the structural problem with partnerism and joint forest management approaches in that they were not voluntary; rather, they were mandated under the pretext of a heightened fire risk in the park because of a major fire during that time (V. A. Sayeed, personal communication, December 23, 2017). It is clear that in 2017 several families had been in the holding area for two decades and were still awaiting the promised allotment of land, and hearings into why allotment had not occurred had only just begun (“Two Decades Later,” 2017).

The most recent phase of displacement occurred after the incorporation of the Rajiv Gandhi National Park into Project Tiger in 2000 and the subsequent tightening of access to the national park, which cut off communities who still depended primarily on honey gathering for their livelihood. Occasional reports indicate that relocations of Jenu Kurubas from inside to outside the park continue even after the passage of the Forest Rights Act, with at least one well-documented case of 53 families being relocated outside the park in 2014 (“Jenu Kuruba Families,” 2014). Of the six hamlets I visited on the edges of the park, only two were electrified, and my sources indicate that, although school buses have been provided on paper, the buses do not exist, and the drivers live elsewhere. A local NGO provides a bus service.

The phases of displacement highlight its banality and its everydayness, not only in the popular media but in the discourse of forest officials and even in the responses of Jenu Kuruba themselves. The relocation of Adivasi groups was set up for decades by park officials as an unquestioned problem that needed to be solved, and the Adivasis themselves took it for granted for decades that they would continue to be moved. In this way, they became incorporated as objects into the edges of the modern developmentalist grid, set up and defined as a census category that called them “primitive” and, in the last decade, a “particularly vulnerable tribal group” in need of relocation, rehabilitation, and resettlement. The displacement of Adivasis is thus integral to the project of the modern state and its development priorities, and not an unfortunate and avoidable externality.
The problems produced by displacement have heightened since the 1990s on multiple fronts, at the same time that discourses of partnerism in the form of allegedly joint forest management projects were on the rise. Multiple families in makeshift shantytowns continue to await resources and land that have been formally allocated to them. Several families have been allocated land on a use basis, and the ownership of the land itself is with the park. Part of the discourse of joint forest management is “to develop partnerships between local community institutions (as managers) and state forest departments (as owners) for sustainable management and joint benefit sharing of usually degraded public forest lands” (Sarin, 1995 p. 30).

The extensive critique of joint forest management discourses by scholars such as Nandini Sundar (2000) and Arora-Jonsson (2015) is thus particularly evident here. The hamlets that the Jenu Kuruba have been allocated since the creation of the dam are at the edges of the national park. In the Kabini area, the vegetables and fruit that the Jenu Kuruba grow (on land that they do not own) for the seven luxury resorts in the area are regularly raided by elephants; even the elephant watchtower that I saw had been destroyed by the herd. In Bandipur, it seems clear that more of the land allocated to Jenu Kurubas has been sublet by other wealthy contractors who pay Jenu Kuruba communities a small fee to rent the land and then employ the community to work on it—ensuring the Jenu Kurubas’ further alienation from the land. In this way, the dispossession and “precarification” of the Jenu Kuruba have intensified.

The Jenu Kuruba have been not only transformed by the logic of displacement from “people in place” to “people in networks” (Escobar, 2003) by being reterritorialized at the edges of the modern developmentalist state as its objects and its “beneficiaries,” but they have been produced at the edges of the very networking logic that has generated the CSD and allied groups. This has happened in several ways. First, members, mostly men, in communities have been associated with local movements that are networked into the larger CSD. Some of them are involved with the Budakattu Krishikara Sangha, or BKS—a social movement organization in Karnataka that is affiliated with the CSD—but their involvement appears to be strategic. They support the BKS on occasion but reject its intervention and invitation to participate at other times because they believe that it will not help with their land allotment issues or with the employment of Jenu Kuruba men in the national park. Community members tend to be aware of the broader mobilization for Adivasi rights, but they appear to be suspicious of it in equal measure.

Second, community members, especially women, have begun to get involved in local mobilization and are more assertive than they used to be about approaching the media, local NGOs, and state and forest officials. As I detail in the next section, some mediated interchanges that I had with Jenu Kuruba community members evidenced such assertiveness. Some are actively involved in protesting the increasing presence of predatory moneylenders in the area. Others have begun complaining to local NGOs that the community is experiencing an extensive number of stillbirths because most babies are born at home and they do not have access to doctors during pregnancies. Still others have become more willing to go into the forest to access both traditional sites for honey gathering as well as their ancestral burial grounds. As one woman said: “people like us don’t have a life if we don’t go into the forest.”
The Networked Other, Mobility, and Agency

This case has shown how a logic of networking, produced by dynamics of informational capitalism, was central to both the eventual passage of the Forest Rights Act as well as resistance to it. A multi-state loose coalition of Adivasi groups and movements that became known as the Campaign for Survival and Dignity in 2002 was a major actor in the national-level debate. Networking logic not only enabled this coalition to lobby effectively but produced the coalition in its particular form with familiar contemporary accoutrements: a formal, Western-style communication campaign, complete with an NGO-style acronym, website, and social media presence that afforded it considerable international and national visibility, and enabled it to access and leverage a range of resources. The logic of networking also produced the opposition of several urban initiatives by wildlife conservationists to protest the act, including environmental rights groups and several prominent tiger conservationists. And finally, as Kurfürst’s (2015) oxymoronic phrase “networking alone” illustrates, networking has clear limits, edges, and internal fractures.

The case also traces how a large-scale logic of displacement continues to shape the deprivation faced by Jenu Kuruba communities in and around Bandipur and Kabini in Karnataka. Displacement, as has been argued by several scholars (e.g., Escobar, 2003), is a fundamental, banal, and brutal tactic of the modern developmentalist state. The continued transience and precarity of Jenu Kurubas has taken the form of four phases of displacement and the progressive “villageization” of the historically nomadic honey-gathering culture. Displacement since the 1990s has seen a series of failed attempts by the government to develop joint forest management partnerships with the Jenu Kurubas as well as multiple attempts to “rehabilitate” the community by training them in alternative livelihoods. Deprivation by a logic of displacement is anything but static for Jenu Kurubas; it is complex, dynamic, precarious, and always moving.

The logic of networking and the logic of displacement are therefore twin mobile logics: They work together to both turn the Jenu Kurubas into the marginalized other of development and position them on the edges of a contemporary communication network of issues and mobilizations. This postulate helps us qualify two major issues in contemporary communication studies relating to social movement organizing. First, it helps draw lines around notions of communication abundance that underlie contemporary theories of digitally networked social action, both contrasting and connecting it with what Sassen (2014) calls the complex production of brutality.

Here, the case establishes that digital networks have a networked other. That digital formations, and indeed any media institution, have always had another is well known and captured perhaps most cleanly in discourses about the digital divide, which make sharp distinctions between digital haves and have-nots, treating otherness in terms of absence. Even approaches that conceptualize divides in terms of flexible and shifting zones of silence (Ganesh & Barber, 2009; Potter, 2006) treat the network other in terms of absence. Thus, a critical move in qualifying issues of communication abundance and reach, is to position the other as not lying purely in absence outside the network but in terms of presence, networked into it, and positioned by the twin logics of mobility at the frayed and worn edges of the network itself.

Conceived as such, the networked other is neither silent nor still. Accordingly, in network terms, we need to conceive of otherness in terms not of binary linkages and nonlinkages but of the quality and
kind of linkage and place and examine carefully what networks do with their edges. In this way, we need to consider digital technologies as both far more and far less than the opportunity structures that Loudon (2010) outlines, and understand them in terms of what McNay (2014) has called the irreducibility of networks as a dense complex of heterogenous and dynamic interrelations.

A second contribution of this case is its illustration of how mobile logics of displacement and networking work together, helping qualify and complicate the place of agency in our understandings of im/mobility. This understanding, in turn, helps expand the range of registers that we might develop to understand the communicative success of social movements themselves, thereby reducing the possibility of analytical reductionism (Ganesh, 2017). Here I propose as a provocation, the idea that the agency of a movement is shaped by the configuration of the networked other in relation to the broader movement. One can get a sense of the multiple dimensions of such configuration by considering, in turn, how Jenu Kurubas’s relationship with the broader Adivasi movement can be read alternatively as incorporated, resistive, or deprived.

The mainstreaming of Adivasi issues to the extent that NGOs across the country are invested in opportunities it might provide for their own work is a clear instance of how the incorporation of the networked other into the developmental apparatus can be read as a form of success. This success, in turn, is closely tied to common understandings of the communicative agency of social movements in instrumental terms. That is, the extent to which movements have procured outcomes in the form of policy or legal changes or informal changes in practice are, strictly speaking, instrumental aspects of movement agency. In this sense, the passage of the Forest Rights Act and the extensive participation of Adivasi activists in drafting it can be read as a key index of movement success.

However, movements exert agency in other registers as well, and two are particularly important in this case. From my fieldwork thus far, it is clear that Jenu Kuruba communities are not just passively incorporated into a developmentalist apparatus, but they negotiate and resist it in multiple ways. In a visit in January 2018, I was struck by the forceful and assertive character of a Jenu Kuruba woman’s negotiation with us. We were talking with her about the history of her settlement, and she stopped early in the exchange and said that she would be happy to discuss the issue further with us if there was a clear benefit to her. In particular, she said that if we could procure her a cow, she would be happy, in turn, to talk and provide us with honey. The tenor of this interchange underscored my more general observation that the assertion of Jenu Kuruba demands has intensified lately. It is clear that Adivasis, particularly women, are more prone to acting on anger, articulating issues, and placing complaints. As one activist told me, they are extremely aware, not only of their own loss of tradition and livelihood, but of what is happening in Delhi, and this awareness translates—albeit in diffuse and indirect ways—into their everyday negotiation and resistance to their own displacement. This highlights the fact that movements can exert affective agency: Mobilization involves, as I pointed out at the outset, the ability to move and rouse emotional states. Indeed, affect is a powerful platform upon which to build a movement, and several scholars, such as Castells (2012) and Costanza-Chock (2014), have pointed out that one of the enduring successes of the Occupy movement was its ability to build affective networks of outrage and hope that continue to sustain other organizing efforts to this day.
Finally, Jenu Kuruba community members demonstrated a keen sense of their place of relative deprivation vis-à-vis not only Lingayats and other caste groups but other tribal groups such as Soliges, despite expressing resignation or even acceptance of their standing. Such self-understanding points toward the fact that movements exert agency in constitutive terms by creating populations and categories and articulating subject positions and identities. In the Occupy movement, for example, participants were able to build an intersectional solidarity through the slogan “We are the 99%,” which, by virtue of its memetic character (Chesterman, 2016), spread instantly across the world, translated into myriad contexts and regions. Such intersectional solidarity appears to have been more difficult for CDS to build for any number of reasons, not least of which had to do with suspicion of anything to do with national-level politics by local Adivasi groups. However, intersectional solidarity has been successful in other parts of the movement—notably among Dalits and Adivasi groups in Odisha (Bijoy, Gopalakrishnan, & Khanna, 2010).

If these three views of Jenu Kuruba as a networked other—as incorporated, resistive, and deprived—help produce a more nuanced reading of social movement agency in terms of instrumental, affective, and constitutive force, then it is clear that we need to develop a broader vocabulary for how networks produce agency for engaging with the others on their edges. We have tended to consider otherness in terms of alienation, appropriation, displacement, and disaffection. However, in network terms, we perhaps need to take more seriously words such as drift, disconnect, or bypass, which connote mobility without much agency attached to it. Much more in-depth empirical fieldwork about the edges of contemporary movement networks and the logics that shape it is necessary in order to develop this much-needed vocabulary.

References


