How to Conceptualize a Culture of Support Through “Language Plus”
Presented at the Right Time to the Right Audience

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This study examines how Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has conceptualized a culture of support and authority, deploying “language plus” in the cultural domains of his pious and nationalistic audience, and inculcated an indisputable moral obligation to support him. The article puts forward a claim that, despite the unstable political and social situation in Turkey, Erdoğan has created a commonsense consensus to build an image of a powerful leader. He received indispensable moral support from the electorate and increased his votes by 10% in the months around the November 2015 parliamentary election. The sociocognitive aspect of Erdoğan’s contextually recurrent public speeches is examined by critical discourse analysis against the backdrop of crises in the country.

Keywords: political language, language plus, commonsense consensus, Aristotle’s rhetoric, Erdoğan’s rhetoric, discourse and context

This article analyzes how, over time, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan built authority and trust in the cognitive frames of the pious and nationalistic electorate and took advantage of the nation’s political and social instability during the November 2015 parliamentary election. Erdoğan influenced emotions through rhetorical instruments such as metaphor, metonymy, syllogism, and contradictory cognitions. The study traces Aristotle’s five basic persuasive rhetorical appeals to ethos (character), logos (reasoning), pathos (emotion), telos (purpose), and kairos (time and setting) in Erdoğan’s rhetoric. The Turkish president deployed all these rhetorical instruments to build a sense of power and pragmatic moral support among the electorate.

To gain trust and manage perceptions, good rhetoricians align their speech to their audiences’ time, place, and culture. Drawing from classical rhetoric, the brilliance of Winston Churchill’s parliamentary and public speeches have been the subject of numerous rhetorical studies; Leith (2012) writes that “He was a product of place, time, personality, luck and oratorical command” (p. 158). In rhetorical studies, the theory of context also attracts attention to the “insight into the whole, complex context in order to know how power is related to text and talk, and more generally, how discourse reproduces social structure” (van Dijk, 2010, p. 7). In this sense, a political speech needs to be understood not only in the context of a political figure addressing an audience in order to hold power but also in the context of the speaker’s and the elector’s sociocognitive mental frame, cultural and ideological background, and current social situations. Van Dijk
(2010) explains his context model as follows: “It is not social situation that influences (or is influenced by) discourse, but the way the participants define such a situation” (p. 10). Thus, we can claim that the strength and effect of a speech cannot be analyzed without reading the cultural and ideological DNA of a nation (or sections of a society) and the speaker as well as the political situation and the mediatization of politics by populist leaders (Waisbord, 2012, pp. 438–440).

Given that Erdoğan’s public speeches and interviews have been broadcast in their entirety by supportive popular television channels and covered by many newspapers, the concept of the mediatization of politics is implicitly validated in this analysis. In the context of discourse, power, and ideology, there is also the notion of a relation between power and common sense in political speeches. This notion assumes that “a dominant discourse is the subject of naturalization in which it appears to lose its connection with particular ideologies and interests and become the common-sense practice of the institution” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 70). This view asserts that common sense (taking things for granted or as natural) is substantially ideological and that ideological common sense is “in the service of sustaining unequal relations of power” (p. 89). Given the widespread coverage of Erdoğan’s public speeches and interviews, we can assume that his views created a commonsense consensus (taking all his ideologies and activities for granted) among a high proportion of the population. Significant contrary perspectives and actions did not receive coverage or were manipulated by the mainstream media.

This article focuses on the sociocognitive aspects of Erdoğan’s contextually recurrent public speeches involving the conservative public’s most sensitive cognitive mental frames: Islam and nationalism. Four important areas of crises in the country are examined to understand how Erdoğan conceptualized a culture of support even against the backdrop of severe crises in the country involving Islam and nationalism.

**Time-Critical Crises Before the November 2015 Election**

In 2015, Turkey held two general elections in the space of five months. The results of the June 7 and November 1 parliamentary elections paved the way for important debates about Turkey’s political state of affairs. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, or Justice and Development Party) was founded in 2001 by members of existing conservative parties developed from the tradition of Islamism and neo-Ottoman ideology. The AKP won a majority in the parliament in 2002, 2007, 2011, and in June and November 2015, obtaining 34.3%, 46.6%, 49.8%, 40.9%, and 49.5% of the total votes, respectively. Although the AKP had held a majority of seats for 13 years, the June 2015 election result was a shock to the party because it lost its majority to form a government, obtaining only 258 seats in the parliament. Only five months later, in November 2015, a new general election was held, which resulted in a victory for the AKP. The party regained a parliamentary majority to form a government by increasing its votes over the June elections by almost 10%.

As for the political situation in Turkey, four main issues attracted public opinion: the Syrian war; the peace process with the Kurds; Erdoğan’s interference with free elections; and a corruption scandal. The Syrian war failed to accord with the AKP’s aspirations (Yetkin, 2016). It affected Turkey-Syria border security, economy, and tourism and increased army expenses to $22.6 billion by 2014 (Akmeht, 2015). According to the European Commission’s European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (2016),
an "overwhelming influx of refugees into Turkey has reached over 3.9 million, making Turkey the host country with the largest refugee population in the world" (para. 1).

The peace process with the Kurds ended on February 28, 2015, with a declaration to the public by the government and Halkın Demokrasi Partisi HDP delegation in Dolmabahçe Palace. The declaration, however, did not instill confidence among the public, because neither the parliament nor the public had any idea what the peace process entailed. The conflict between Turkey and Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK, or Kurdistan Workers’ Party) has been ongoing since 1984 and has resulted in some 40,000 to 100,000 mortal casualties and great economic losses for Turkey as well as spiritual and physical damages to the Kurdish population. To stop the war, Erdoğan officially announced a peace process on December 28, 2012, on a television program. The meetings for peace were held at Imralı Island in the Marmara Sea, where Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was imprisoned. Sharp polarization between pro- and antigovernment camps negatively affected the antigovernment public about the process. For the November election, Erdoğan’s first strategy to regain the votes of the nationalists he had lost because of the peace process was to announce that he did not accept the joint declaration of the peace process actors and the Dolmabahçe Agreement.

President Erdoğan’s interference with free elections by campaigning for the AKP under the guise of “public opening” rallies and meetings to promote the presidential system during the June 2015 election were criticized by the opposition for contravening the political neutrality of the president. Erdoğan’s main arguments for the style of his presidential system relied on his belief that, to achieve a more stable and strong Turkey, the president should enjoy unfettered freedom to act without any hindrances. He was accused of misinforming and misleading the public to create a presidency for himself by ignoring the checks and balances that exist in Western democracies to restrict the powers of the president.

Another challenge to the AKP and Erdoğan came from a religious group known as Hizmet. The group is led by Fethullah Gülen, who lives in the United States. A scandal arose when Gülen-linked intelligence officers and prosecutors uncovered alleged evidence of corruption in AKP ruling circles (Yılmaz & Sozer, 2015). Long-term rumors about AKP’s corruption was allegedly revealed by a recorded telephone conversation on December 17, 2014. Erdoğan rejected the evidence and called the tape recording first a montage and then a dubbing. The situation grew worse and became embarrassing for the government. Three ministers resigned from office for involvement in corruption. Thousands of prosecutors and police officers were either furloughed or assigned to inferior positions for attempting to bring the AKP government to its knees.

Only five months later, on November 1, 2015, a new general election was held, resulting in victory for the AKP, which regained a parliamentary majority to form a government. In this election, the AKP won 317 seats, the CHP won 134 seats, the HDP won 59 seats, and the MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) 40 seats. The AKP’s victory was attributed to positive coverage among popular media, the negative attitude of the opposition parties to form a coalition with the AKP, and the escalation of terror attacks by the PKK and İŞİD (Iraq Şam Islamic State/Iraq Demascus Islamic State). Erdoğan’s ongoing influence on the AKP and his intervention in the election campaigns reinforced a perception that only a powerful leader could cope with this level of disorder.
As nationalist sentiment increased with tragic news about the deaths and life stories of police officers and soldiers killed by the PKK militancy, a considerable number of nationalists voted for the AKP in the November election instead of for the nationalist MHP, which lost half of its seats. Ironically, the resumption of the PKK attacks helped the AKP to increase its votes by almost 10%, mostly gained from the nationalist party MHP. Two additional important factors affected the election result: (1) The opposition parties CHP, MHP, and HDP were unable to effectively propagate their views to the masses because such views were repressed by the AKP-supportive media, and (2) the HDP was reluctant to boldly condemn the PKK militancy, which meant that many Kurds and some Turks rejected the return of the PKK violence because they preferred peace and stability (Alabbasi, 2015).

The election results surprised the opposition parties and Western observers as well. Despite all the political scandals and controversies in Turkey, Erdoğan always wins, even with the sharp divisions between the conservative, religious, and nationalistic right and the secular left (Akyol, 2014). To understand Erdoğan’s victories, one needs to examine Turkish society and its political patterns. For more than 60 years, Turkish society has roughly been divided into two unequal parts: the right, which constitutes about 60%–65% of the votes, and the left, which constitutes the remaining 35%–40%. The right is defined by respect for tradition, especially Sunni Islam, and a focus on economic development. The left is defined by secularism and socialist themes of equality.

This article asserts that the main factor in Erdoğan’s success was his ability to conceptualize a culture of public support and solidarity within the concept of Islam and nationalism at the right time, in the right setting, and for the right audience. Drawing on this assumption, I provide examples from his speeches encompassing Islam and nationalism against the backdrop of crises in the country.

Research Approach

Working With Aristotle’s Rhetoric

The study uses the tools of critical analysis to examine the contextual traces of classical rhetoric in Erdoğan’s speeches and his pragmatic deployment of classic rhetoric to evoke trust and manage the cultural domains of his audience. This research was inspired by Leith’s (2012) work on rhetoric. He writes: “Rhetoric is language at play; language plus. It is what persuades and cajoles, inspires and bamboozles, thrills and misdirects. It causes criminals to be convicted and then frees on appeal. It causes governments to rise and fall” (p. 6). Leith also notes that “a speech needs to be suited to the moment of speaking” (p. 234).

Leith describes rhetoric as "language at play" and, with ultraconceptualization, "language plus," which comprises subtlety, cunning, persuasion, guidance, incitement, communication, inculcation, common sense, stimulation for power, and perception control. Aristotle’s five basic persuasive rhetorical appeals—ethos (character), pathos (emotion), logos (reasoning), telos (purpose), and kairos (timing/setting)—still have significant impact on studies of rhetoric (Aristotle, 1991, 1992; Kinneavy & Eskin, 2002; Leith, 2012). Ethos involves the personal character of the speaker and how the speaker presents him- or herself to the audience. The audience should know whether the speaker is one of them, speaking in good faith and meeting
expectations; whether the speaker is credible; and whether the audience defers to the speaker’s authority in the context of one’s cognitive frame.

A speech must prove a truth by persuasive arguments suitable to the case presented (logos). Persuasive speakers have a clear purpose, and they construct their speeches around that purpose. However, proof in rhetoric is not the same as the absolute proof in logic and mathematics (Leith, 2012, pp. 59–60). Syllogism, which is a way of combining two premises and drawing a fresh conclusion, is a term in logic (all humans are mortal/I am a human/I am mortal). An enthymeme is, so to speak, a generalized syllogism and has a covert assumption (protestors are all anarchists/those who protest the education system are all anarchists). Another persuasive appeal in logos is analogy. The AKP, for example, focused its political campaign on a powerful one-party rule by comparing it to the previous coalition governments, creating a mental frame that the latter lacked the power to perform demanding tasks for the country. A speech must stir emotions to be effective (pathos). Pathos appeals not only to excitement but also fear, love, and patriotism. Ethos, pathos, and logos form the interrelated elements of the persuasive arts. Emotion (pathos) and reasoning (logos) cannot be separated from the credibility of the speaker (ethos)—in other words, whether he or she is speaking as a member of the audience.

The term kairos, which is receiving renewed attention in political discourse analysis, represents the right time and the right words appealing to a particular moment. In other words, the words should be immediately applicable, appropriate, and engaging for the right time for a particular audience (Kinneavy & Eskin, 2002; Leith, 2012). Kairos is an umbrella concept of fitting a speech to the temper and expectations of its audience. Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech, for example, is accepted rhetorically as an effective and powerful speech because it changed minds and persuaded people to support the civil rights movement because of its kairotic moment. The where (the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC), the why (the civil rights movement), and the when (networks carried the speech live during a march that had drawn more than 250,000 people to the capital) created the perfect moment for King’s message to reach the largest number of receptive listeners (Leith, 2012, p. 119).

Aristotle’s contributions to the content, idea, and goals in a speech (invention); organization to reach the goals, such as styles, gestures, metaphors, and word selection (arrangement); remembering the words (memory); and, finally, delivering the speech in the best way to influence the audience (delivery) are also important factors in analyzing speech. Evaluative discourse material is selected from Erdoğan’s prepared speeches that reflect the statements he emphasized and significantly accentuated prior to the elections in 2015.

**Working With Critical Discourse Analysis Tools**

“The purpose of critical analysis is to understand how public communication contributes to the ‘power’ that arises from connecting with audiences, and we can do this as much by considering failure as success” (Charteris-Black, 2014, p. xvi). These lines define the purpose of critical discourse analysis in broad terms within the context of the assertions of this article. Critical sociocognitive approaches to language use, discourse and power, discourse and discrimination, discourse and ideology, and creating common sense and media messages grew into an international research methodology for critical studies on
text and speech and became the field of critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1995, 2001; Fowler, 1991; Gamson, 1992; Gee, 2011; Smitherman & van Dijk, 1988; van Dijk, 1989, 2002, 2010; Wortham & Reyes, 2015). Critical discourse analysis in political communication enables us to view the intentional use of discourse as a tool of power, authority, oppression, perception management, and persuasion. It also explores the role of metaphors and metonymies in language, which are “conceptual instruments that embody otherwise amorphous or remote concepts in ways that public can readily understand” (Santa Ana, 1999, pp. 195). Conceptual metaphoric or metonymic use of language helps us construct social realities and the cultural identity of the participants in a communication process (Charteris-Black, 2005, 2014; Chilton, 1985, 2004; Chilton & Ilyin, 1993; Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; McGlone, 2007; Semino, 2008, Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). As described by Gibbs (1996), “metaphor is not merely a figure of speech, but is a specific mental mapping that influences a good deal of how people think, reason, and imagine in everyday life” (p. 309). A political leader who has a powerful command of rhetoric can use these functions of rhetoric creatively to suit the spirit of the time and culture of the audience. This analysis discusses Erdoğan’s rhetoric, his metaphoric and metonymic use of language, and his conceptual domain to better understand and comment on how he uses language to maintain power by manipulating his audience’s feelings, rationalizes even the most contradictory cognitions, and shapes public opinion regarding threats.

To analyze how Erdoğan manages perceptions by conceptualizing a culture of public support for social stability, I first identify the problem areas in Turkey before and after the June 2015 elections; then, to demonstrate how he manipulated perceptions to gain power, I investigate the meanings behind Erdoğan’s nuanced words and phrases. The article examines the meanings behind each word or sentence as well as the speaker’s cultural and ideological background. For the critical analysis of Erdoğan’s words and phrases, I selected the situated meaning tool (SMT), the figured world tool (FWT), and the big D discourse tool (BDDT) from among Gee’s (2011) 27 discourse analysis tools.

I investigated the meaning behind Erdoğan’s words to demonstrate how any word, phrase, or structure can take a range of possible situated specific meanings in the context of his previous experiences, knowledge, feelings, worries, and hopes and how he functionally uses words to affect his audience. The figured world tool, which is drawn from a theory of psychological anthropology and depicts a simplified world that is taken to be typical or normal that varies by context and by the speaker’s culture and worldview, helps me demonstrate how Erdoğan constantly evoked a simplified worldview (good and evil). For example, the concept of an ideal citizen changes depending on one’s culture and experiences. One’s figured worldview about an ideal citizen may be based on obedience to the state and being Muslim or on incorruptibility and conscientiousness. The capital D of the big D discourse tool refers to how Erdoğan spoke to his audience as a member of his social and cultural background or groups (devoted Muslims). According to Gee (2011), “some tools will yield more illuminating information than for other data” (p. x). To comply with this journal’s word and page limit guidelines, I have limited the selection to just three of Gee’s tools, which directly appeal to the aim and focus of the article: how Erdoğan situates meaning (SMT), how he creates a simplified worldview of contradictory situations (FWT), and how he amalgamates his religious and cultural background with the electorate’s (BDDT). In addition, a researcher’s interpretation of a critical discourse analysis depends on his or her theoretical and methodological approach. In qualitative methodology, subjectivity guides everything from the choice of topic to the formulation of hypotheses to the selection of methods and
tools to interpret data. This is a cognitive and communicative study focusing on a set of symbols discovered in Erdoğan’s speeches within the chosen methodology.

**Method**

I employed an empirical method to specify and interpret the relation between Aristotle’s appeals to rhetoric and their traces in Erdoğan’s public communication: how Erdoğan positioned himself in relation to the electorate, how he met voters’ expectations, whether his words appealed to a particular moment that could be immediately applicable, and whether the words are appropriate and engaging for the right time and for a particular audience. To frame and project the methodology to accord with the study’s goals, I divided the analysis into two sections: Stage A (personal credibility) and Stage B (using personal credibility as a tool of perception management). I retrieved from the Web and analyzed a selection of Erdoğan’s statements that exemplify his contextually recurrent major public arguments in the context of Islam and nationalism. I argue that they were the core essence of his arguments applying to the sociocognitive mental frames of the audience.

**Stage A: Personal Credibility**

For 13 years, Erdoğan has intensely and effectively created a cultural domain, embedded in almost every argument, on Islamic values, holy figures, God, Islamic martyrdom, the respectability of religious schools, head scarves on women, and a personal interpretation of women’s place in Islam. Thus, he legitimized covertly through his public speeches (which were broadcast live by supportive TV channels) an antisecular worldview and created a perception that only his party can stop the oppression of Muslims and situate an Islamic lifestyle. Erdoğan has controversially turned religion into a campaign issue, and this both strengthened the consolidation of his pious electorates in the projected sociocultural mold and created a front against critical local and global enemies (the democratic secular West). No structure of political cognitions can persist unless it projects shared social beliefs about what is right and wrong. Erdoğan is well aware of the religious and educational profile of his electorate. According to a KONDA (2014) survey, 67% of AKP voters have an education level below high school, 23% have a high school education, and 10% have attended university. For the CHP, these percentages are 43%, 35%, and 22%, and for MHP they are 49%, 33%, and 18%, respectively. As for religion, 99% of the votes AKP received were from Sunni Muslims, and 1% were from Alevis (a sect in Islam); 78% of the votes CHP received were from Sunni Muslims, 18% were from Alevis, and 4% were from other beliefs; 98% of the votes MHP received were from Sunni Muslims and 2% were from Alevis. Another interesting finding from the KONDA survey is that 16% of women who support the AKP do not veil themselves (with a head scarf, turban, chador, etc.); 59% of women who support CHP do not veil themselves; and 30% of women who support MHP do not veil themselves. Erdoğan has always been a patient Islamist. Before he came to power, he had famously compared democracy to a bus ride. "When it gets him to where he wants to get to [Islamic State], he will get off” (Murray, 2016, para. 6).

Samples presented at Stage A are selected from among Erdoğan’s most frequent statements reflecting how, during his 13 years of governance, he gained the support of the conservative or solid Muslim
electorate through religion. How a speaker presents him- or herself and establishes a close bond with the audience are the most important factors in gaining trust (ethos).

Erdoğan promoted Islam and Islamic lifestyles under the label of democracy. For example, wearing the veil is considered an Islamic obligation, but freedom of the veil—in universities and later at all the levels of education and in public workplaces—represented for Erdoğan democracy and basic human rights regarding freedom of belief and expression. However, the viewpoint involving women’s freedom with head covering ignored the violation of the basic democratic rights of women, which the civil code already grants to Turkish women.

Stage B: Using Personal Credibility as a Tool of Perception Management

This section presents findings about how Erdoğan constructed a rhetoric during the November 2015 election campaigns on nationalism, anxiety, and instability at the right time to the right audience. After the June election, which was a failure for the AKP, terror atrocities increased. During this period between elections, Erdoğan used ethos (the impact of his character on the electorate) suffused with logos and pathos to stir love, anger, hate, and pity to increase nationalistic feelings. A radical anti-Western antagonism based on Turkish nationalism increasingly infused his speeches at this stage. He attempted to evoke emotions regarding love of country in the cultural domains of his devoted conservative constituents by conceptualizing a culture of public engagement on nationalism, social stability, and unity. In doing so, he turned a blind eye to the causes of the dramatic increase in terrorist acts (Cagaptay, 2016). In summary, during the November election campaigns, Erdoğan played a nationalist card embedded in Islam by using personal credibility he had acquired through the years. In other words, he effectively infused his pragmatic messages into the electorate's sociocultural mental frames despite the rising level of terrorism and a faltering economy.

Findings

Stage A: Personal Credibility

Erdoğan uses generalized syllogism (enthymeme) that has a covert assumption concerning Islam. Erdoğan acts as a member of his social and cultural background. He is a graduate of a religious high school and has always maintained close relations with Islamic communities. Essentially, though enriched with rhetorical instruments, he speaks to his audience as a member of the same social and cultural background. He draws a simplified, one-dimensional portrayal of Islam and a world accorded to his own culture and mental cognitions, which supplies us with rich data for commenting on what kind of world he aspires to have. An example of Erdoğan’s cognitive mental frame reflects a unified one-dimensional picture about Islam: “The term moderate Islam is ugly and offensive; there is no moderate or immoderate Islam, Islam is Islam” (Spencer, 2007, para. 6). Erdoğan usually articulates units of thoughts and relationships between ideas and reasons by generalizing a probability, not a certainty, about Islam (logos). This approach justifies the critique that “rhetoric deals with probabilities rather than certainties: With analogy and generalization” (Leith, 2012, p. 59).
The use of metaphors (and/or metonyms) in the political domain is both crucial and problematic because they help the listener grasp external and complicated notions of society in terms of a familiar part of life (Chilton & Ilyin 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, pp. 195–198; Santa Ana, 1999). Research on metaphors and metonyms indicates that they can also be viewed as instruments of social control, and when used in contradictory dichotomies, they facilitate the listeners’ grasp of a notion more effectively.

Erdoğan repeatedly used metaphors such as “I started this march by wearing a shroud” (“Erdoğan Challenges,” 2015, para. 4) and “We have embarked upon this journey with our shrouds on” (Erdoğan, 2015b, para. 6). These statements evoke mythic cognitive concepts such as martyr, hero, and saint. People who are of lower status and want to overcome their hardships are eager to believe and trust an authority in the position of a saint or hero (ethos). The conceptual metaphors of “this march,” “this journey,” and “journey with our shrouds” (meaning being prepared to die on a holy mission fighting enemies), which Erdoğan uses quite often, imply that he is entrusted with a holy mission to die for the salvation of Islam and the country. The image of people starting a journey with their shrouds on is a thrilling mythic expression to activate knowledge of religious tales in the subconscious minds of religious audiences and evoke emotional responses. By doing this, Erdoğan situates the mission in his mind, pointing to the reconstruction of the country suitable to his pious cognitions (BDDT/SMT). He communicates the central idea that he is an Islamic hero walking on the path of God (pathos). Erdoğan, as a member of his social and cultural past (BDDT), provides evidence of his religious background and uncompromising character. “Our martyrs and veterans crown this country. . . . We have never lost our sensitivity about our martyrs and veterans. . . . In our faith, being a martyr and being a veteran are accepted as one of the two most glorious things” (Erdoğan, 2015c, para. 1).

Erdoğan’s speeches, which essentially convey the notion that he is a dedicated believer, are, in fact, metonymic evocations of a larger structure of beliefs. The sentence syntax works better than a metaphor or metonymy for subtly suggesting the structure of his mental frame. Almost all rhetorical tools work synchronously in the above passage (ethos, logos, pathos, telos, and kairos). A martyr (şehit) is a person killed on the way of Islam or nation. It is believed that one who performs or experiences martyrdom (şehadet) goes directly to paradise. We can see the intense indoctrination of Turkish youths through Islamic culture and the publications of the directorate of religious affairs (Diyanet), which provides religious services to Muslims (who constitute the majority in Turkey). The Diyanet is criticized by secularists for serving only the Sunni sect of the Islamic population, ignoring other sects and religions, and also for deceptive Islamic indoctrinations from time to time. In a Diyanet cartoon publication, for example, a preteen boy asks his father: “Would you like to be a martyr, Daddy?” The father replies: “How blessed it is to be a martyr, who would not want that, who would not want to reach heaven” (Tremblay, 2016). The martyr metaphor is often used in Erdoğan’s speeches (SMT/pathos). Erdoğan’s rhetoric resonates with the popular myths, beliefs, and views, which complies with his political objectives in accordance with his cultural background (pathos/logos).

Many of Erdoğan’s speeches can be evaluated, at least in part, as sermons. They are dense with quotations and intertextual allusions to the Koran, the Prophet Mohammed, and religious authorities, suggesting the method of traditional sermons. He stated, “We love the creatures, due to the Creator” (“Erdoğan Bizim ilkemiz,” 2012). He also uses the verses of Turkmen dervish Yunus Emre, who deeply
influenced Turkish literature, culture, and philosophy of life. The most important concept in Yunus Emre’s philosophy is the love of humanity. Erdoğan often makes intertextual Islamic references to revive the Islamic mental cognitions of his conservative followers by appealing to the holy knowledge frames that are stored in the long-term memory of his conservative audience (pathos/logos).

Erdoğan appeals to his pious core supporters, because in Islamic teaching women are subordinated to men (father, husband, and even older brother), and their subordination to men is praised. To situate women’s position to this concept, the role of motherhood is emphasized. Erdoğan’s conceptualizations about women involving different actions and cases, have a figured Islamic proposition (FWT). Women’s differences are due to the fact that they cannot do all the work done by men because of their delicate nature. “You cannot put women and men on an equal footing” (“Turkey President Erdoğan,” 2014, para. 2). “It is against nature. Women cannot do all the work done by men, because it was against their delicate nature. Our religion regards motherhood very highly” (para. 9). On the other hand, Erdoğan discloses his conceptual framework about women’s high status as mothers for his Muslim listeners. Metonymic use of motherhood generates a core meaning: Women’s duty is to bear children, and this is the only function they can perform to strengthen their position in society. “A woman who refuses maternity and gives up housekeeping faces the threats of losing her freedom. She is lacking and is a half person no matter how successful she is in the business world” (Bruton, 2016, para. 4). Further, “Childless women are deficient and incomplete” (Bruton, 2016, para. 1). Erdoğan describes a simplified world that is assumed to be typical or normal in the context of his and his audience’s culture and worldview (FWT/SMT/BDDT). He evokes emotions by reasoning women’s status in Islam (pathos/logos). “Feminists don’t understand that, they reject motherhood” (“Turkey President Erdoğan,” 2014, para. 10).

Erdoğan frequently courts controversy with his statements and refers to contradictory cognitive dichotomies to justify his views and refute opposing viewpoints: woman acting as a mother versus woman acting as a militant (logos)—or, for example, “shameless militant woman disguised under the name of a journalist” (Dearden, 2014, para. 6).

In almost all his speeches on terrorism and the Fethullah movement, Erdoğan dissociates Islam from the Islamic terrorist groups and explains the reasoning behind this by promoting Islam and degrading Islamic terrorist groups (logos/SMT). The following statement is illustrative of this strategy: “Be careful I do not use the word ‘IŞİDı,’ but ‘DEAŞ’” (“Erdoğan: IŞİDı,” 2014, para. 1). IŞİD stands for Irak Şam İslam Devleti (or Iraq Damascus Islamic State).

**Stage B: Utilization of Personal Credibility as a Tool of Perception Management**

Terrorism and electoral fraud claims caused controversy in the run-up to the June election. Terrorist violence between the June and November 2015 elections increased and targeted all the major parties, civil life, the police and military headquarters, candidates, and supporters. Adjusting to the new climate in Turkey, Erdoğan changed his communication strategy by appealing mainly to the nationalistic sensitivities of his conservative supporters, ornamented and fueled with religious tones. His main theme was the notion of a "great Turkey" and how keen he was to protect it. Despite all the accusations against him—corruption charges, his political strategy in the Syrian war, refugee problems, his authoritarian character, his discriminative language,
his control of the judiciary and the media, and increasing terrorism—Erdoğan maintained electoral victory by winning eight consecutive elections, including two referenda, breaking all records in Turkish political history. Supporters of Erdoğan explain his success by asserting that the Turkish nation votes for a strong and stable government that will stand up to terrorism, chaos in Syria, and internal and external threats.

None of the victorious rightist parties, which were not involved in political scandals and controversies like the AKP was, could stay in power for such a long time. Erdoğan’s success lies in his rhetorical expertise in combining the center right and Islamist right in his party at the beginning and targeting and affecting the nationalist right. Erdoğan’s most arresting characteristic is his capacity to align his speeches to the time, place, and culture of the audience. His Islamic rhetoric and symbolism please the Islamist right, and during the November elections, Erdoğan’s nationalistic messages were equally welcomed by conservative nationalists.

Erdoğan’s performances at several large campaign events persuaded and activated the electorate by evoking a larger structure of beliefs intertwined with physical and social factors, such as fanciful engineering projects, radical social changes that broke the traditional power of the secularist army, and meeting the needs of an increasingly affluent population. His supporters were well prepared to identify with Erdoğan’s proposals. A speech succeeds if it inspires confidence about the speaker’s personal credibility (ethos). His speeches that mention the Turkish flag, nation, a unitarian state, motherland, and stability highlight Erdoğan’s timely conceptualization of nationalistic communication to manage perceptions (kairos). This strategy increased his votes 10% in five months, which is a record in Turkish political history. Kairos involves the where (the presidential palace or arenas crowded with party supporters) and the when (almost all mainstream media broadcast his speeches live), while telos involves the why (because Turkey will be great and peaceful under his leadership). We can trace all the constituents of rhetoric in his efficacious public statements, such as “One nation, one state, one flag, one religion” (“Erdoğan: tek dil değil,” 2012, para. 1) and “One nation, one flag, one motherland, one state” (“Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,” 2015, para. 4).

Though Erdoğan made a highly discriminative remark about “one religion” earlier in 2012, he later changed his slogan to gain the favor of and stir emotions among (pathos) the more fundamentalist nationalists (nation-flag-motherland-state). He stated: “Sunday elections is a breaking point for 2023 goals. We will respect November 1 results. If our nation gives opportunity for a one-party government, stability continues” (“Erdoğan: Milletimiz,” 2015, para. 1). “In the November one election the nation will manifest itself in favor of stability. . . . Let’s be as one, be brothers and all be Turkey together” (Cockburn, 2015, para. 2). “It is obvious in today’s election how beneficial stability is for our nation and today our citizens will make their choice based on this” (“Turkey Election,” 2015, para. 7). “1 November election will be the election between stability and instability” (İbrahim, 2015, para. 5). He also emphasized that an election win would be a vote for stability (“Erdoğan Says,” 2015, para. 1).

Erdoğan frequently used “2023” as a metaphor to conceptualize the great mission he dreams of realizing on the 100th anniversary of the foundation of Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The 2023 metaphor conveys the notion of the ideal system that he will establish in 2023, which is situated in his cognitive mental frame (SMT/BDDT).
Because Erdoğan was well aware that he was speaking to a religious as well as a politicized community, he repeatedly announced that the country preferred development, action, unity, and integrity. His language formed a bridge between semisacred and political rhetoric (constructing a great Turkey with God’s permission). He blessed stability by situating it (SMT) as the only salvation in the midst of chaos and referred to a contradictory dichotomy of two options in the mental cognitions of the audience: stability or instability (logos).

Erdoğan associates HDP with the terrorist group PKK and expresses his regret about the peace process, in which HDP was involved. Erdoğan is extremely successful in creating rigid dichotomies between the AKP and his opponents by associating them with terrorist groups. He typically uses generalized syllogism (enthymeme)—as in, I am against terrorists/those who are against me are terrorists or help terrorists. All other parties that criticize the AKP or Erdoğan are evaluated in this concept (logos/FWT).

The following quotations from a November 2015 speech (Erdoğan, 2015a) illustrate this strategy:

“Despite all attacks, Turkey will reach its 2023 economic goals and be the shining star of the world” (para. 71).

“Despite everything, Turkey stands as an island of confidence and stability in a region where instability, clashes and chaos are ever-increasing” (para. 98).

“We stand up for all oppressed people and victims without paying attention to their roots, sects, or beliefs, let them be Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens, Yazidis, Shi’ite, Sunni, Nusayri, Christian or Jew” (para. 104).

“With great self-sacrifice, our nation gave a humanitarian lesson to the international community” (para. 108).

“Although some politicians, some media organizations, some traitorous foreign circles support the terror organization, Turkey will absolutely not make any concessions on its struggle for freedom and future” (para. 169).

“We should stand united in solidarity and cooperate in the face of terror by leaving aside all our differences. We should not allow the slightest weakness on this side. This is the issue that we need most for our local and national stand” (para. 204).

“We must be strong-willed and band together in the face of ongoing change in the global system and turmoil in our region” (para. 207).

“Let us build the powerful, great and new Turkey together and leave a trace in history that we will remember with gratitude” (para. 217).

“We could not seize this opportunity in the Parliament” (para. 218).
Several expressions in this speech convey a dream, the myth of a "great Turkey": “a shining star,” "an island of confidence and stability,” Turkey’s "struggle for freedom and future,” “united in solidarity,” and “cooperate in the face of terror.” The dream of a country united against terror irrespective of citizens’ personal, ethnic, or social background, struggling for solidarity and freedom under a strong-willed leader, relates to the time and to the mood of all citizens. Erdoğan situates (SMT) the myth of a great Turkey under his leadership, accusing 25th term of parliament (essentially parliamentary system). He frequently expressed in his speeches that the Parliament decelerated his speed in making reforms. He communicates his reasoning with carefully selected metaphors referring to contradictory dichotomies: an island of confidence and stability versus traitorous foreign circles (logos/pathos); citizens’ cooperation for stability and freedom versus local and global cooperation with terrorists (logos/pathos). He delivers his messages at the right time and in the right setting (kairos) with the right purpose (telos). He attracted huge crowds in arenas close to governmental facilities that were broadcast live by the supportive media.

Discussion and Conclusion

The sociocognitive aspects of Erdoğan’s contextually recurrent public statements are analyzed using the tools of critical discourse analysis in the context of the five constituents of classical rhetoric. Several examples illustrate interrelated appeals of rhetoric: ethos (personal credibility), pathos (rhetorical capacity to move emotions), and logos (persuasion).

Erdoğan always has a clear purpose and mission, right or wrong, and constructs his speeches around that purpose (telos) at the right time and in settings for the right audience. His speeches are broadcast by supportive media in prime-time news programs, both live and as news material, which sets the political agenda in Turkey (kairos).

This article investigates the power of "language plus,” which provided Erdoğan a 10% increase in votes in only five months. Erdoğan’s November 2015 election speeches contrasted a need for unity, solidarity, and love of Turkey against threats, which were worded more powerfully with a commonplace expression: “Turkey’s enemies.” He frequently invited people to know Turkey’s enemies (terrorists and those who supported them—implying the West, opposition politicians, and critical media). He often implicitly referred to a semantic relation between honorable voters (his supporters) and dishonorable voters (opposition). He also created contradictory cognitive dichotomies between good (his supporters) and evil (the enemies of Turkey), describing the latter with terms such as “vile,” “traitor,” “indecent,” “slanderer,” and “ones who assault our private lives.” Those who will vote for the AKP’s “new Turkey” mission are honorable, and those who do not will undermine their own honor. These concepts thrilled his supporters and instilled a sense of national pride—and almost half of the electorate placed Erdoğan in the center of this national pride.

During the November election campaign, Erdoğan also employed Gamson’s (1992) three components of persuasion for collective reaction: (1) injustice (confronting the wrongs inflicted on the country by terrorists and their direct and indirect supporters), (2) agency (creating a consciousness that citizens can change conditions), and (3) identity (feeling that “we” are devoted to Islam and love the country more than others do).
Although the study does not take into account all the speeches Erdoğan made that evoked religious concepts directly or indirectly, the samples examined are sufficient to demonstrate how explicitly deity is expressed in his rhetoric. Erdoğan effectively communicates his passion, anger, and enthusiasm through nuanced changes in the tone and pitch of his voice. He stirs feelings of compassion or revenge among the public with his interpretation of Sunni Islam in the context of, for example, extreme sensitivity toward veiled pious women, mosques, the place and duty of women in Islamic society, abortion, and martyrdom. These ideas are not confined to the conclusion of speech, as is done in the speeches of some Western leaders; rather, they often dominate the entire speech.

If the judiciary, education, and media systems of a country are structured on authoritarian, religious, and conservative cognitions, then unprivileged or less educated sections of society are likely to take them for granted (common sense theory) regardless of whether the systems are realistic and just. As Edelman (1977) has noted, “Public policies rest on the beliefs and perceptions of those who help make them, whether or not those cognitions are accurate” (p. 9). No political belief can persist unless people share it. Thus, Erdoğan’s unchallenged norms for ethics, morals, and value systems have been popularized to become common sense among his followers. The common sense created about Erdoğan’s personality and his actions and the fear and confusion created by the chaotic climate of the time played an important role in the surprising results of the November 2015 election. As Chilton (2004) states, “fear of intruders and unknown people . . . might have an innate basis and be stimulated automatically in the political use of language” (p. 204).

For a political leader to rally his or her country during a crisis is a meaningful ethos appeal test. Erdoğan’s political success arises from his character (ethos), luck (the right timing to test his ethos appeal), his oratorical command (pathos, logos), purpose (telos), setting (kairos; large crowds in arenas and live broadcasts), and an audience culturally suitable to accept his ideas. A politician’s success is often linked to her or his ability to persuade an audience. The time and the culture of the audience are important considerations for audience persuasion. Recall that 99% of the votes the AKP received were from Sunni Muslims, and 67% of the votes were from people with less than a high school education. Successful arguments must be founded on the common assumptions of the audience. Erdoğan invents his goals and ideas (Aristotle’s invention); organizes his speeches to reach his goals using style (dichotomies), gestures, metaphors, and word selection (Aristotle’s arrangement); uses a prompter so as not to forget the selected theme and words (Aristotle’s memory); and delivers his speeches in the best possible way to influence his conservative and nationalist audience (Aristotle’s delivery).

This critical discourse analysis of Erdoğan’s political rhetoric enables us to observe that language can be a tool of power, authority, oppression, perception management, or persuasion in particular situations and contexts. The article describes the contextual traces of classical rhetoric in Erdoğan’s speeches and how they were pragmatically deployed to manage the cultural domains of the audience to gain their trust. The main difference between Aristotelian and Erdoğan’s concepts of rhetoric is their perception of democracy. Aristotle argued that persuasion was an essential part of civic life, allowing people the opportunity to debate options, “and therefore rhetoric contributed to democracy” (Charteris-Black, 2014, p. 5). When analyzed from this perspective, Erdoğan’s rhetoric provides abundant data on his use of language to inculcate rather than communicate to practice and preserve his power. “Inculcation attempts to naturalize partial and
interested practices to facilitate the exercise and maintenance of power” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 62). To this end, Erdoğan conceptualizes a culture of public support through metaphor, metonymy, and syntax, evoking mythic cognitive structures in people’s cognitions; thus, he controls culture.

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