Uncanny Resemblances? Captive Audience Positions and Media-Conscious Performances in Berlin During the 1936 Summer Olympics and the 2006 FIFA World Cup

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With an eye to attracting global media attention, the ordinary cityscape is purposefully transformed into an out-of-the-ordinary eventscape during major sports occasions. Focusing on the production of captive audience positions and event-goers’ associated media-conscious performances, this article compares the implementation of event spaces in the totalitarian-propagandist context of the 1936 Berlin Olympics with the commercially branded 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany. Apart from blatant dissimilarities in ideological-commercial motifs and emotionally charged forms of audiencehood between these urban spectacles, variable media-densified audience positions were carefully built into the design of both events. The key commonalities include the turning of urban public spaces into strictly controlled event enclaves, civic education aimed at image leveraging through ambassadorial conduct, and atmospheric intensification by enthusiastic audience-performers. We conclude that these measures to maximize positive media publicity continue to steer, in increasingly multimedial ways, the production of urban megaevents even in the digitalized present.

Keywords: cityscape–mediascape interplay, sports megaevents, propaganda, branding, captive audience positions, media-conscious performances

Outside media studies in the strict sense, a sizable literature exists on how aspiration for positive worldwide media exposure is entangled in the production of megaevents in urban environments (e.g., Bourdieu, 1998; Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006; Roche, 2000). Inter alia, studies on the traveling models for hospitality, ceremonial canons, and architectural facelifts in Olympic or other megaevent host cities have regularly involved viewpoints on how the expectations of vast media coverage underpin the local implementation of event-steered urban transformations (e.g., Gold & Gold, 2007; Roche, 2006). Equally relevant for this study, many scholars of megaevent-related policy mobilities have analyzed interrelationships between transnational media attention, hypercommodified branding concepts, and

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extensive security arrangements (Broudehoux, 2017; Giulianiotti, 2011; Klauser, 2011; Lauermann, 2014). In these valuable social scientific studies, however, one dimension linked with the integrated exploitation of the mass media and mass gatherings during mega-scale sporting festivals has been explored less systematically: the preplanned top-down strategies of steering performative and emotionally engaged audience practices in cities with an eye to global media attention. With its empirical focus on similarities and differences between the urban staging of the 1936 Summer Olympics and the 2006 FIFA World Cup, this article inquires into how the desired forms of megaevent urban audiencehood, as part of the historically varying workings of propaganda and branding machineries, are predicated on the production of captive audience positions in the cityscape and media-conscious performances by event-goers.

Increasingly sensitized to addressing both media and cities, media scholars have begun to tackle urban audience practices. Especially regarding the uses of digitally sustained urban spaces, current research examines the multifaceted encounters of people on the move in the city with media technologies and representations (Carpentier, Schröder, & Hallett, 2014; Krajina, 2014; McQuire, 2013; McQuire, Papastergiadis, & Cubitt, 2008; Ridell & Zeller, 2013; Tosoni, 2015; Vuolteenaho, Leurs, & Sumiala, 2015). Applicable to this study is Tosoni’s (2015) concept of captive audience positions to denote spaces and situations in which commuters and other urbanites are forced to glance at the bombardment of digital advertisements and billboards (see also Cronin, 2006). In transport stations and other ordinary public spaces, this capturing of attention typically takes place in the midst of the everyday flow of urban life. Instead of studying these types of audience positions peculiar to the ordinary city (Amin & Graham, 1997), we argue here that during spectacular and carnivalized sporting events, analogical yet more multilateral processes of perceptual captivation can be identified in the urban environment (on urban festivalization, see Smith, 2016, pp. 33-37).

While comparing period-specific and ideologically differentiated urban manifestations of two momentous megaevents organized on German soil, this article’s aim is not to study the experiences of event-goers on reconstructed event-led cityscapes (on various ethnographic strands of audience and fan studies, see, e.g., Hills, 2002; Jenkins, 1992; Tosoni & Ridell, 2016, pp. 1278, 1285). Instead, our approach is to investigate top-down attempts to encourage and boost brand- or propaganda-favorable bottom-up performances. Precisely because the megaevent stages are built to seen by event tourists and media followers from all over the world, a reciprocal relationship between urbanites and media inheres in the event city. Bluntly put, media-conscious subjects find themselves in audience positions surrounded by explicit and implicit invitations to actively perform particular types of action roles in a megaevent’s urban settings. In this article, we take our cue from two conceptualizations of mediated audiencehood. Dayan and Katz (1992) insist that media events with wider national and global significance generate emotionally uniting collective rituals and forms of participation. Elaborating on this view, according to Nick Couldry (2005), in today’s technologically advanced consumer culture, media spectacles are preplanned with an eye to people who perceive themselves as performers alongside their other, less engaging roles as media event audiences.

This article’s rationale for examining megaevents held in Berlin in 1936 and 2006 is that the currently prevailing forms of mediated urban audiencehood in entertainment-festive events have not
emerged ex nihilo, yet detailed research on their evolution that is informed by media theory remains exiguous. Analyzing how the 1936 Olympics and the 2006 FIFA World Cup were constructed to leverage positive images through global media attention, we seek to open a transmodern window into the historically malleable top-down strategies of producing and steering megaevent-related crowd practices. The importance of both watershed events under investigation here goes beyond the fact that both events broke previous spectator and media-follower records. In qualitative terms, the 1936 Olympics and the 2006 World Cup have been posited as important moments on a continuum on which mass-mediated megaevents have had short- and long-term repercussions for urban eventization on a global scale. In both cases, influential gambits were used to extend the events from the sporting facilities themselves to temporally spectacularized and media-densified urban public spaces to increase the events’ overall traction and people’s affective engagement (cf. Smith, 2016, p. 42). Despite drastically differing politico-ideological contexts between the 1936 state-propagandist and the 2006 branding-dominated sporting festivals, both events have left lasting imprints on the globally circulated repertoire of organizing megaevents as emotionally captivating occasions. We also discuss how the analyzed commonalities and dissimilarities between the 1936 Summer Olympics and the 2006 FIFA World Cup relate to more recent digitally mediated forms of audiencehood and spectacle making in urban megaevents.

**Captive Audience Positions and Media-Conscious Performances in Megaevent Cities**

In this section, we theorize the interplay of event-led urban developments, branding-oriented and propagandist forms of image leveraging, and mediated audiencehood using two interrelated umbrella concepts—the urban production of captive audience positions and media-conscious performances—as variably applied preconditions for favorable, enticing, and believable emotion-charged event images to be broadcast to media-following audiences in other spatial contexts (see Figure 1). Five key dimensions of the production of captive audience positions and media-conscious performances form the conceptual pillars of this study.

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1 More than 3.7 million people watched events on-site in the 1936 Summer Olympics, and radio coverage from Berlin reached 300 million listeners (Krüger & Murray, 2003; Large, 2007, pp. 251–252). Moreover, the games’ media technological novelty (television broadcasts) reached 162,000 viewers in 25 indoor viewing facilities scattered around Berlin. During the 2006 FIFA World Cup, the official FIFA Fan Fests that took place in public spaces in the 12 German host cities proved an immense success: they were visited by around 21 million people, more than six times as many as in the main event venues. In addition, the tournament’s television broadcasts broke records: 376 channels showed the megaevent, and a total of 43,600 broadcasts were aired across 214 countries and respective territories.
First, as a prerequisite for the transformation of the ordinary cityscape into an out-of-the-ordinary eventscape, a series of infrastructure arrangements and regulatory enforcements need to facilitate the efficient operation of inter- and intraurban traffic systems during a tournament. Implemented by civic authorities in line with stipulations by the event owners, these systems feed the pulses of people and material flows into and away from specific event sites. At the same time, the channeling of traffic patterns through select routes and spaces of transnational consumption characteristically leaves many less privileged or uninviting neighborhoods untouched by event-related economic benefits (see Giulianotti, Armstrong, Hales, & Hobbs, 2015).

Second, from as early as the interwar period (e.g., Large, 2007), international sporting organizations such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) and their continental-scale counterparts have developed increasingly comprehensive requirements for hosting governments. In their candidacy files, or “bid books,” each potential host city must agree to these stipulations, which also govern their access-controlled event enclaves outside the event venues (e.g., Eick, 2011; Smith, 2016; Steinbrink, 2013). In addition to ensuring the smooth running of the events, one strategic goal of these requirements is to retain the event owners’ legally shielded grip on their and their business partners’ exclusive commercial rights. In practice, the transient actualization of the official enclosures takes place through the provisioning of “globalized solutions for globalized security threats” (Klauser, 2008, p. 183), including state-of-the-art security systems, police forces, barriers, signs, phalanxes of event employees and volunteers, and fencing off the event spaces from the rest of the urban fabric.
Third, during what Dayan and Katz (1992) dubbed the “high holidays of mass communication” (p. 1), the hosting state and cities are invested with tremendous economic and symbolic interest globally. In the event cities, the specific “corporate kettles” (the official enclaves, key traffic nodes, and channels) become the nuclei of worldwide public attention (Giulianotti, Armstrong, Hales, & Hobbs, 2015). As a controversial path setter for this megatrend, in Berlin’s central public spaces during the Nazi Olympics, swastikas and the Olympic rings hung side by side, heralding the regime’s supremacy and goodwill to the rest of the planet. By the same token, multiple strategic advantages of the efficient spatiotemporal concentration nurture contemporary tournament hosts and brand owners. Through an accumulation strategy in which the cityscape and the mediascape are carefully orchestrated in tandem, the attention of event-goers and media followers is directed to the required commercial iconography and images of a positive people-generated tournament atmosphere.

Fourth, throughout the (late) modern urban history of megaevents, sporting nationalism (Hoberman, 2004) has been a preeminent driver in the production of euphoric tournament ambiences, with Pierre de Coubertin (1863–1937) acknowledging a dynamic tension between the Olympic movement’s internationalist ideals and the omnipresent rituals of flagging particular nations (Hoberman, 2004, p. 184). Instead of being treated as mere spectators, sports megaevent audiences are encouraged to cheer their own national athletes and colors, as if to punch above their weight as active galvanizers of event stands and media footage. Led by Mussolini’s Italy and subsequently Nazi Germany, the ultranationalist regimes in early 20th-century Europe were particularly decisive in involving ordinary people as enthusiastic actors in the regimes’ propaganda spectacles (Krüger & Murray, 2003, p. 4). Even in present-day cities and event stages where individualized and globalized consumerism as well as digitally mediated social networking are rife as seemingly “borderless” phenomena (e.g., Tamir, 2014), the inherited status of nationalism as a source of persuasive, or “soft,” power in sports megaevents has not faded (Broudehoux, 2017; Nye, 2005).

Fifth, we argue that event-goers’ enhanced consciousness about the tremendous concentration of cameras and sound-recording devices and reporters at a megaevent substantially influences the forms of behavior among the attending crowds. In the prescient words of Walter Benjamin (1999), "masses are brought face to face with themselves" (p. 251) in watching military parades, political mass rallies, and sports events. In addition, technological innovations prompt people to adopt new types of audience positions—a transmodern tendency witnessed in our material, for instance, among amateur filmmakers and photographers documenting events during the 1936 Olympics. Nonetheless, only in recent decades has fans’ predilection to make a spectacle of themselves in front of (television) cameras exploded. Clearly, this relatively novel behavioral megatrend echoes an intensified and internalized desire among ordinary spectators to be seen at the center of global media publicity for a fleeting moment. At the same time, this phenomenon reflects the ideal of acting in compliance with the megaevent organizers’ and broadcasters’ allied wishes—as “ambassadorial co-producers” who strengthen the event hype by “living the brand” (cf. Elliott & Percy, 2007) with media-conscious dedication and enthusiasm.

Based on this theoretical framework in which the desired forms of mediated urban audiencehood in mega-scale sporting events are predicated on both the production of captive audience positions in the cityscape and the emotionally engaged event-goers and their media-conscious performances, the following
Data and Method

In our theory-driven content analysis (Crabtree & Miller, 1992) of the 1936 and 2006 megaevents based on the above conceptualization, we used historiographic and social scientific studies as well as journalistic accounts of these events. We focus particularly on interpretations and often-fleeting observations of the forms of mediated audiencehood and branding- and propaganda-related phenomena occurring during the events. In addition, we deployed a wide range of sources: field observations, photos, official tournament booklets, printed promotional materials, websites, television and radio broadcasts, and documentary and amateur films. The rationale behind the use of multiple time- and event-specific materials was to convey variable types of processes related to the production of mediated urban audiencehood in the analyzed megaevents.

During the 2006 FIFA World Cup, the article’s first author gathered research material by observing urban spaces, writing diary notes, taking photographs, and video-recording all the tournament’s televised fixtures. Spending one week in Berlin and two weeks in six other host cities, Kolamo observed the World Cup stadiums and their vicinities and official viewing arenas in public spaces as well as city centers, shopping malls, airports, train and bus stations, major roadsides, and designated pedestrian traffic routes and zones set up for the tournament’s duration. In these public spaces, he conducted ethnography to observe and document interaction patterns, performative acts, and emotional gestures and expressions as well as particular moments of high affectual intensity among the megaevent audiences (cf. Ahmed, 2004; Seyfert, 2012).

For the filmed and photographed materials of the 1936 Summer Olympics, we analyzed Leni Riefenstahl’s two-part documentary Olympia (the all-time classic of artistic propaganda in the field of sport), the documentary compilation Olympia 1936: Die Olympischen Spiele 1936 in Privaten Filmaufnahmen (2011), and the photographic book Olympia in Berlin (Hübner, 2017)—the last two of which consist of cuts of amateur filmmakers’ cine films and hobbyists’ shots of the Berlin Olympics and its preparations. Analogously to the reading of the ethnographic materials from 2006, we took detailed notes on the images and scenes expressive of audience performances and affects in the 1936 data.

We interpreted all the field notes, filmed materials, other forms of data, and pertinent observations made in accounts of Berlin’s 1936 and 2006 megaevents with a content analysis in line with the five-part conceptual lens described earlier (see Figure 1) and the relevant thematic subcategories that emerged from our data.

Propagandist Event Spaces: Persuading People to Become Nazi Germany’s “Goodwill” Ambassadors

Usually mentioned only in passing in atrocity-focused historiographies on the Nazi regime, the 1936 Summer Olympics (alongside the Garmisch-Partenkirchen Winter Olympics earlier the same year)
constituted the Nazis’ “first big international show—their coming-out party on the world stage” (Large, 2007, p. 12; Roche, 2000). In Riefenstahl’s Olympia, a medley of shots of foreign-language radio reporters excitedly commenting on the events captures the concentration of the entire world’s attention on the Berlin Olympics. On the domestic front, the Olympic spectacle was a crucial part of the regime’s spiritual mobilization to consolidate its ideological sway over the German people. To international and domestic ends, the harnessing of mass media was an Olympic propaganda tool of utmost importance. Although Joseph Goebbels considered the press “a great keyboard which the government can play,” (Large, 2007, p. 245) his Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda reveled in wider media technological development and the fact that newspaper journalism was far from the only medium through which the ministry’s concentrated propaganda was disseminated (Large, 2007, pp. 245, 248). Among other successful publicity stunts made to please the attending international sporting community and reporters and tourists from all over the world, copies of the vehemently anti-Semitic newspaper Der Stürmer disappeared from the street-corner reading cases a few weeks before the opening day of the Summer Olympics on August 1, 1936 (Hart-Davis, 1986, p. 126).

All aspects of the Olympic Games’ organization were carefully planned in advance. In close collaboration with state and party organizations, several industries and German-based corporations were involved in the infrastructure and financial preparations. Inter alia, Telefunken and Daimler-Benz developed the world’s first mobile television transmitting unit (a train-like vehicle in the main event area of the Reichssportfeld that picked up and transmitted camera images to airships). AEG, Agfa, and Zeiss Optics were responsible for a range of technological solutions related to the media spectacle’s implementation (Hart-Davis, 1986; Krüger & Murray, 2003; Large, 2007). To extract revenue and cover part of the costs, ad hoc sponsorships were formed. Consequently, documentary shots and photos in our material reveal that people in the city during the event were bombarded not only by myriad swastikas, Olympic rings, and national flags but also by commercial logos in Tempelhof Airport, central avenues, and other key locations across Berlin.

In a case telling of economic and cultural protectionism, despite the Coca-Cola Company’s advertising collaboration with the International Olympic Committee since the 1928 Summer Olympics in Amsterdam, the company faced recurrent anti-Coke campaigns and reported middling sales during the Berlin Olympics. Sideling the IOC’s commitments, the German organizing committee granted its own exclusive Olympic beverage rights to a German brewery. Coke was “not [to] be sold within the Olympic facilities and had to settle for sidewalk stands outside the official venues” (Large, 2007, pp. 185–186). Overall, however, our photo and cine film materials corroborate that the Nazis held no disdain for ads, food and drink sales, event-related merchandise sales, and other money-raising gambits during the Olympic Games, provided the saliency of “the new world of commercialized mass sport” (Krüger & Murray, 2003, p. 3) did not overshadow the displays of Nazi Germany in the urban landscape (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. A still image from the 1936 documentary _Olympia_ shows a swastika- and Olympic ring–infused street scene from the Berlin Olympics.

In constructing a veneer of hospitality, all Germans—and, above all, Berliners—were quite literally educated to be the Third Reich’s goodwill ambassadors. As Goebbels instructed his readers in _Der Angriff_ newspaper: “We must be more charming than the Parisians, more easy-going than the Viennese, more vivacious than the Romans, more cosmopolitan than London, and more practical than New York” (quoted in Mandell, 1971, p. 140). In the run-up to the games, ordinary Berliners received very specific instructions:

Men were to give up their seats to women in buses, trams and trains, even if the woman looks like a Jewess. They were not to discuss anti-Semitism between 30 June and 1 September; nor were they to inquire into the origins of “any exotic-looking stranger” who might catch their eye. (Hart-Davis, 1986, p. 126)

If anything, these vignettes exemplify how the local people’s performances in the cityscape were deliberately harnessed by the Nazi regime for propaganda purposes.

**Audience Positions by the Torch Relay and Via Triumphalis**

In conjunction with the planning of specific events linked to the megaevent, the Nazi regime paid immense heed to the roles of city dwellers in Berlin and other localities. An illustrative case is the pre-
event torch run, an antiquity-inspired but invented tradition that the Nazis inaugurated on a grand transnational and transurban scale. As spectacularly displayed in Riefenstahl’s documentary and less flamboyantly in amateur cine films, this ceremonial run was accompanied by a convoy of cars, reporters, filmmakers, escorting runners, and phalanxes of schoolchildren, athletes, and Nazi Party members lining the streets (Hart-Davis, 1986, pp. 132–137, 154; Large, 2007, pp. 3–13). Starting from Greece’s Olympia ruins, the run’s 12-day journey traversed mountain passes, villages, towns, and capitals across seven southeastern and central European countries. Several jam-packed festivities were conducted along the route, both in stopover places where the procession was rapturously welcomed and in places (such as Vienna and the Slavic portions of Czechoslovakia) where the relay was boisterously received as a bone of contention between local political or ethnic groups. In the German press, the torch trek was disingenuously portrayed as the carrier of an Olympic peace message with triumphal overtones. Once the German border was crossed on July 31, the rest of the ceremonial venture through Saxony and Brandenburg resembled a victory lap with cheering crowds all along the route (Large, 2007, pp. 8–9). As the relay ended in the Olympic stadium, the opening fete’s audience burst into a “tremendous gasp” when the final torchbearer in a chain of 3,075 runners entered this hitherto unparalleled global attention hub (Hart-Davis 1986, pp. 154, 159).

In Berlin, the most ostentatious restaging of a streetscape occurred along the so-called Via Triumphalis. Tens of thousands of Germans had camped out overnight to stake out a decent place to watch one of the highlights of the Olympics: the passing of Hitler and his cadre along with Olympics officials and, a bit later, the Olympic torch—all on their way to the opening ceremony. As a 15-kilometer axis festooned with swastikas, Olympic rings, flags, and garlands, the event’s proudly renamed main corridor ran from Alexanderplatz in the east through Unter den Linden, the Brandenburg Gate, Ost-West Achsee (currently Strasse des 17. Juni), and Charlottenburg to finally reach Reichssportfeld in the west (Mandell, 1971, pp. 127–128). To many foreign reporters’ bafflement regarding how the entire metropolis was suddenly carried away with enthusiasm, 500,000 people crowded into Unter den Linden alone (Hart-Davis, 1986, p. 153). In addition to its architectural and symbolic grandeur, transportation arrangements and loudspeakers perched on lampposts that kept people abreast of Olympic events ensured the status of Via Triumphalis as a key Olympic location. The ambient loudspeaker technology, in particular, was agential in keeping urbanites in captive audience positions throughout the duration of the Summer Olympics. Again, this exemplifies how the Nazi regime morphed urban event spaces and audience positions by investing heavily in state-of-the-art media technologies (Rennen, 2007, p. 118; see also Goebbels’ admiration of radio as an easily distributable propaganda tool in Large, 2007, p. 248).

Reportedly, many eyewitnesses were spellbound by the megaevent’s media technological novelties. In the words of Finnish live radio reporter Vuokko Arni:

In different parts of Berlin such as at the Potsdamer Platz, it is now possible to follow the stadium events through tele-visual-radio. Doesn’t it sound fully incredible that kilometers away from the stadium, one can see and hear what is happening there?
Equally symptomatic, some German Olympic tourists were preoccupied with keeping abreast (through radio and other media) of Hitler's appearances in the cityscape in order to obtain photos on the Reichskanzler to add to their private photo albums (Hübner, 2017, p. 18).

**Extreme Fanaticism and Camera Shyness**

As many foreign eyewitnesses have described, in the midst of synchronized en masse Nazi salutes by audience-performers, it was hard to avoid feeling emotionally captivated while watching the Olympic events. In the athletes' opening march, several national teams wavered on whether they should collectively greet Hitler with this ancient gesture when passing his box of honor. As shown in Riefenstahl's *Olympia*, some teams (such as the Greeks and the French) saluted; others, such as the Finns and the Americans, refrained. "Wrapped in the cocoon of lies, distortion and suppression" (Hart-Davis, 1986, p. 32), for the Reich citizens in the spectator space, such hesitancy was an unthinkable nonoption and a life-endangering heresy.

The stadium—the capital's newest architectural glory and the world's largest sporting venue since its opening in April 1936—had been filled for the first time in early July to test its loudspeaker system and the Olympic bell's penetrating sounds (Hart-Davis, 1986, pp. 58, 129). At the grand opening, the stone colossus's stunning qualities were consummated with a massed array of 100,000 galvanized bodies. To borrow from Duff Hart-Davis's (1986) portrayal of the stadium's ritualistic-emotional magnetism, when the Führer entered the effervescent cauldron, "there burst out a roar so gigantic that many people present felt that the arena was not so much a stadium as a crater, liable to erupt at any moment" (pp. 155–156). Our materials included an array of parallel depictions and images of the audience-produced Olympic spectacle.

Despite all these concerted efforts, however, the intended hospitality toward non-German visitors did not take place without cracks in the Reichssportfeld's venues and other event spaces across Berlin. Liberal-minded and left-leaning reporters from different countries brought to light barely hidden pretentious or explicitly uninviting aspects in the Nazi arrangements and draconian police measures as well as in native audiences' behavior (Krüger & Murray, 2003). The Olympic stadium saw frequent occasions during which the home audience engaged in heckling and whistling to distract foreign athletes' performances. The American author Thomas Wolfe was one of those perceptive enough to see that the Olympic Games' extremely meticulous arrangements suggested something sinister about the "orderly and overwhelming demonstration in which the whole of Germany had been schooled and disciplined" (quoted in Large, 2007, p. 212). In contrast, signals of such skepticism were present only by their absence in visual materials analyzed for this study.

There were limits, however, to the event-goers' hyperactive involvement in the Berlin 1936 Olympics. A fine-grained reading of Riefenstahl’s staged documentary (with its supremely premeditated visual language and dozens of scenes of enthusiastic crowds) and the amateur-produced film materials (that also give glimpses of less stunning scenes during the 16 days the games lasted) reveals the seemingly incongruent coexistence of extreme fanaticism and noticeable camera shyness in audience positions and performances peculiar to the Berlin Olympic festival (see Figures 3a and 3b).
Figure 3a. Still image of the 1936 Olympic stands: Riefenstahl’s Olympia.

Figure 3b. Still image of the 1936 Olympic stands: An amateur cine film from the 1936 Olympics.
On the one hand, native event-goers were forcibly educated into media-conscious performances by the totalitarian government, especially when it came to the "continuous saluting" and "hysterical adulation" accorded to Hitler wherever he went (Hart-Davis, 1986, p. 32). On the other hand, shrewd observers remarked that the crowd behavior was subdued (e.g., Hart-Davis, 1986, pp. 153, 160). In the analyzed amateur shots, the event-goers rarely pay noticeable attention to the presence of camera eyes in the Olympic streetscapes or mass gatherings. Instead, locals tend to behave in camera-shy ways, as if avoiding becoming the center of attention. Only a few instances of eye contact with or acts of deliberate posturing (of a frozen type) to the camera characterize the footage of the Berlin Olympics. This observation stands in stark contrast to the individualistically oriented, openly camera-conscious performances in recent sports megaevents, such as the 2006 FIFA World Cup, to which we now turn.

FIFA World Cup in Germany 2006: Carnival-Spirited Performers in Trademarked Enclaves

Originally a field note written for the first author’s dissertation on FIFA’s power strategies as globe-trotting branding machinery (Kolamo, 2014), this vignette exemplifies how desired forms of mediated audiencehood are part and parcel of the implementation of sports megaevents in cities today:

A series of flashbacks today in Berlin. Arriving from metro stations and bus stops to the fenced open-air event stages, the massive flows of people, in the midst of tournament colors, sponsor logos, and monumental architecture’s symbolic bombardment, iterated things already seen in Munich, Nuremberg, Frankfurt am Main, Cologne, Dortmund, and Leipzig. Observing the carnival-spirited fans and soccer tourists, it was indeed difficult to escape a kind of déjà vu. . . . Innumerable wavers of German flags, and fan groups singing in unison the Deutchlandlied (Deutschland, Deutschland über alles), were recurring scenes.

In the telecasts from the 2006 World Cup exclusively disseminated by FIFA’s affiliate Infront Sports & Media AG, explicitly attention-hungry crowd behavior was prevalent. An overwhelming number of these circulating images came from the stadiums and public viewing sites across the 12 German host cities, including Berlin’s newly renovated 74,220-seat Olympic stadium and the city’s Fan Mile, where 9 million people gathered to follow games and enjoy other events during the tournament.

Berlin Fan Mile and Other Event Spaces: Capturing Audiences in Privatized Public Urban Space

Extremely efficient transportation arrangements, based on a transportation plan for the FIFA World Cup drawn up by each host city, characterized the German tournament on game days. The event-goers’ movements and rhythms were channeled via a standardized set of placards placed at the intersections of public transportation stations, highly simplified maps on information boards, and arrows on posters fixed on lampposts and mounted over pedestrian pathways. All over the city, these placards provided to-the-minute travel times for reaching an event site. High-frequency bus lines, S-Bahn and U-Bahn networks, and high-speed Deutsche Bahn trains fed the massive flows of soccer fans to the Fan Mile and the Olympic stadium. In
Berlin and other host cities, the Fan Fests were not only centrally located but also flanked by iconic landmarks, such as the Cathedral of Cologne, the Old City of Nuremberg, and the Brandenburg Gate and Siegessäule (Victory Column) in Berlin. The organizing coalition (FIFA and its affiliates, hosting nations and cities, and select corporate partners) not only reinforced positive historical associations linked to the tournament’s official trademarks but also ensured that the maximum number of ordinary tourists and soccer-indifferent urbanites alike were forced to experience the FIFA World Cup atmosphere.

In the capital, among the marriages of historical iconicity and heavyweight commercialism was a miniature replica of Berlin’s Olympic stadium, erected temporarily next to the German Reichstag building. Sponsored by Adidas, especially during the fixtures of die Nationalmannschaft, this construction was sold out well before the opening whistle, with 10,000 enthusiastic fans watching the game from two gigantic video screens placed at both ends of the artificial turf. The most extensive event location, however, was the Fan Mile, a major audience zone surrounded by a 3.4-mile and seven-foot-tall fence (Klauser, 2011, p. 3204) that overlapped with a section of Via Triumphalis 70 years earlier. Whereas Unter den Linden hosted half a million spectators on the Olympic opening day, at best an equivalent number of soccer fans gathered concurrently in the redesigned Strasse des 17. Juni during the highlights of the FIFA World Cup.

As discussed in the previous section, the Nazi regime hijacked Coca-Cola’s IOC-contracted exclusive rights (as a non-German brand) to sell its refreshments in the vicinity of the 1936 Olympic facilities. In contrast, today, FIFA exclusively imposes the products and logos of its own sponsors on the urban landscape in a legally sanctioned procedure that is set during the bidding stage (with the organization insisting that host applicants accept all branding conditions and security demands). The article’s first author witnessed how even a city tour guide (not affiliated with the World Cup) lamented the fencing and excessive commodification of key locations in Berlin. As an encapsulation of how the FIFA Fan Fest branding concept functioned in the streetscape, Volker Eick (2011) stated:

From FIFA’s point of view, giving supporters without stadia tickets the opportunity to watch the matches was clearly not the main purpose of the fan miles. The pivotal issue was about marketing and advertisement rights. The (transient) take-over of public space during the 2006 World Cup by FIFA came in an attempt to assure that the exclusive rights for ground-advertisement space are safeguarded for FIFA sponsors. Already in 2002, FIFA extended its exclusive rights to sell advertisement space to the precincts of the stadia and tended its sovereignty to the so-called Controlled Access Sites as well. In 2006, the exclusive rights for ground-advertisement were to include the so-called "event-stadia and other official sites." (p. 285)

As a crowning example of the FIFA-steered strategy with an aim to perfect the FIFA World Cup’s commercial exploitation, the Berlin Fan Mile (see Figure 4) incorporated seven gigantic video screens, innumerable official sales points of global brand products (e.g., Coca-Cola, Adidas, Fuji, Hyundai, Toshiba, MasterCard, and Philips), and ancillary events powered by these same sponsors along with tens of thousands
of fan consumers. An excerpt from the 2006 FIFA World Cup Germany Official Programme illustrates how FIFA regulated not only nonsponsoring corporations but also people’s appearance and behavior in this and other event enclaves: “Do not bring any such promotional fan items (e.g. flags, banners, balloons or promotional hats and scarves) with commercial branding (company names, logos etc.) from these ‘ambushing’ companies into the stadium” (FIFA, 2006, p. 101). Equally trapped in preplanned audience-consumer positions, if fans did not carry cash in the official fan shops, they could make purchases only with MasterCard, the tournament’s authorized credit card.

![Figure 4. An early-morning view of Berlin’s Fan Mile, June 2006 (photo by author).](image)

Less ubiquitously yet by no means infrequently, captive audience positions in relation to the tournament brands were also set up outside FIFA’s temporary jurisdiction. In these locations, no one present (including those who felt disaffiliated with the ongoing soccer fever) could escape from being perceptionally captured as occasionally façade-tall ads of official sponsors dominated the entire visual ambience (see Figure 5). Iconic urban monuments were decorated with soccer-related symbols, as with Fehrehturm, whose round-shaped restaurant over 200 meters above the Alexanderplatz was repainted as a huge soccer ball. The first author’s fieldwork on a wider urban scale uncovered occasions on which the commercial reign of FIFA was openly challenged, or in which nonsponsoring corporate giants or smaller-scale local enterprises took advantage of the lure of the soccer feast. Nike, a rival of Adidas (FIFA’s faithful sportswear business partner since the 1980s), was a salient advertiser in shopping facilities. Inter alia, an

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2 In the case of Fan Fests, these same spaces were simultaneously “very important media platforms” from which “80 per cent of non-action related stories came from” (FIFA Fan Fest, n.d., para. 1) by FIFA’s own reckoning.
immense Nike billboard covered a portion of the façade of the prestigious KaDeWe department store in a prime location in West Berlin.

Figure 5. A street scene next to Zoologischer Garten U-Bahn station exemplifies how World Cup–related logos and images dominated portions of urban space outside the FIFA-controlled territories, June 2006 (photo by author).

"A Time to Make Friends": Branding Event Cities With Ideal Fans

The official slogan of the German World Cup was "A Time to Make Friends" (Die Welt zu Gast bei Freunden). This slogan dotted fences of Fan Fest arenas, trains, buses, and metros, corridors of public transportation stations, roadsides, and many other places. The friendship message underscored the German hosts’ hospitality and relaxed party mood—a reverse image of their stereotypical seriousness and state-phobic post–World War II discourses (see Foucault, 2008). In the context of reunified Germany, this nation-(re)branding endeavor succeeded perfectly if we are to believe Der Spiegel’s column, which lauded during the games that "Germany’s fairy tale" had come true, with a "newfound sense of patriotism [that] captured the hearts and minds of Germans" and the whole nation united under a "black, red and gold banner" ("World Cup Jubilation," 2006).

According to Grix (2012, p. 10), local people’s emotional and performative involvement is a crucial ingredient in the believability of event organizers’ branding efforts. For the 2006 World Cup, Horky (2006) observed that the vast majority of people who went to the tournament’s public viewing spaces did so for the sake of the vivid atmosphere and shared experiences. On the FIFA website, face-painted fans corroborated that the main reason they attended a Fan Fest was for the atmosphere. In a survey, only 60% of Fan Fest visitors identified themselves as fans (Horky, 2006). These findings are in line with
Kuper’s (2012) notion of the currently prevailing fervor-filled “party nationalism,” which refers to “ideal fans” who flirt with fans of other teams and paint their faces with national colors, yet do not take nationalism as a serious personal mission (Brüssig, 2006; Kolamo, 2014). The first author noticed that many of these “party nationalists” continued celebrating for fun after their national team had lost a match.

Among the official institutions that promulgated party nationalism were Fan Embassies, where multilingual staff distributed fan guides to event-goers in each host city. Not completely unlike the run-up to the 1936 Olympics, this booklet provided concrete instructions for ambassadorial and friendly conduct in meeting strangers in the Fan Fest zones. Specific campaigns were launched to escalate the tournament fever. Via FIFA’s website, for instance, Hyundai used a pretournament crowd-sourcing strategy in which the company invited soccer fans around the globe to compose slogans for the attending national teams and vote for the best slogan for each team. During the tournament, the winning slogans decorated the 32 national teams’ Hyundai-branded buses, as exemplified by the phrase “Vehicle monitored by 180 million Brazilian hearts” that moved along with the Brazilian team wherever it traveled (see also Figure 6).

Partly contradicting claims that a new kind of apolitical party nationalism prevails in sports megaevents of the globalized age (e.g., Tamir, 2014), the 2006 World Cup showed poignantly that in contemporary corporate nationalism (Silk, Andrews, & Cole, 2005), the fans’ and tourists’ roles as fanatical performers have become even more important ingredients for top-down branding strategies, which event organizers and sponsors exploit to sell their products to advertisers and media audiences.

Figure 6. During the 2006 German World Cup, it was typical for television cameras to actively pick up “ideal fans” from the stands to be shown not only on official telecasts but also on on-site video screens. This image depicts the Fan of the Match at Dortmund’s Westfalenstadion during the second-round match between Brazil and Ghana, June 2006 (photo by author).
This is how soft power in sportive nationalism functions. It relies on “spectacles of supporting” (King, 1997, p. 236), which are intended to create emotion-rich and memorable experiences for the crowds at the event venues as well as for home audiences in front of their television sets.

As befits the spirit of late-modern party nationalism, audience-performers in Berlin’s Fan Mile and other authorized event spaces tended not to hesitate when it came to celebrating wildly. A phenomenal explosion in the number of all types of image-recording devices compared with the embryonic camera hobbyism in 1936 (Hübner, 2017) and, above all, strikingly altered forms in camera-conscious fan behavior were among key differences between event stages in the two analyzed megaevents. Although the instant sharing of selfies and other images through social media was in 2006 a far less prevalent phenomenon than it is in the 2010s, many event-goers endorsed accentuating their own action roles in the midst of ongoing events (e.g., McQuire, 2013). The first author noted that this essentially media-centered performativity was most blatantly manifested by loudly shouting fan groups in national carnival outfits, especially in moments of the observable presence of photographing fans or accredited camera crews. In the image streams of Infront Sports & Media AG and national broadcasters, such scenes were, in turn, repeatedly disseminated as “edgy and real” examples of emotional magnetism. In this way, the official telecasts capitalized on innumerable fans’ affirmative responses to the FIFA World Cup branding machinery’s call for them to create an enthusiastic and lively tournament atmosphere.

**Conclusion**

To paraphrase Walter Benjamin (1999), in the Nazis’ integrated exploitation of the mass media and mass gatherings during the 1936 Summer Olympics, a key intention was to give the (German) people “a voice and a face” as a supposedly singular and internally coherent social formation (see also Weber, 1996, pp. 46–47). By several criteria, the Berlin Olympics were the first truly global media event (Couldry, Hepp, & Katz, 2010; Dayan & Katz, 1992). For the first time in history, a sporting event was not only broadcast worldwide on the radio but also televised, with Zeppelin airships transmitting the events live to public viewing rooms around Berlin.

In contrast, in the entanglements of city- and mediascapes peculiar to the 2006 FIFA World Cup, the balance between the Olympic Games’ nationalist and commercial ends had drastically altered in favor of maximizing the branding- and sales-related values. Echoing late modernity’s individualized consumer society, the ubiquity of swastikas (side by side with national flags) had changed into all-pervasive corporate trademarks (again in companion with national flags and colors). In terms of the event-goers’ performative practices, the fanaticism expressed in synchronized Nazi salutes by otherwise somewhat subdued crowds had en route mutated into carnivalesque congregations, with individuals and troupes ecstatically acting and shouting in the proximity of camera eyes. During the Nazi Games, the strongest emphasis was on the aesthetization of deceptively peace-willing political aims. In the latter case, the production of the games’ emotional lure and audience positions for fans’ hyperactive involvement was, on the contrary, indelibly linked with the organizing coalition’s image-leveraging initiatives and boosting short- and long-term economic gains.
Despite these blatant dissimilarities, certain continuities in the typical captive audience positions associated with two historic megaevents need to be underscored. First, both events were triumphs of extremely systematic planning—from traffic-pattern arrangements to the steering of crowds into specific epicenters of surveillance, symbolic bombardment, galvanized ambience, and, above all, global media attention. Second, period-specific forms of mass media were sine qua non prerequisites for the implementation of both megaevents. Although “the greatest single medium in the transformation of sport”—that is, television—was still a curiosity with poor-quality live footage in 1936 (Krüger & Murray, 2003, p. 4), the Via Triumphalis event artery, for instance, was morphed into a public space where pedestrians had no escape from the Nazi radio propaganda transmitted through ambient loudspeaker technology. In 2006, gigantic video screens set up in official event spaces likewise produced captive audience positions. In addition to omnipresent commercial messages, event-goers were bombarded by match footage with live and replayed scenes of celebratory fandom, which further catalyzed carnivalesque performances among those present at the Fan Fests. The impacts of the ease and low cost of digital photography also had discernibly remolded the interaction rituals among the audiences, although the era of social media and smartphones had not yet veritably dawned in 2006.

Third, both analyzed megaevents yielded specific legacies for subsequent (sporting) megaevents in terms of the ritualization and enclavization of space on the intraurban and transnational scales. To reenact the ceremonial preevent ritual of the torch relay, the organizers of the planned 1940 Summer Olympics in Helsinki consulted the German organizers of the previous Olympic Games. Graphically, they sought to arrange the next Olympic torch relay through Finland’s “most culturally significant” places and “population-dense” areas “for filming purposes” (Mämmelä, 2012). Although this event was canceled due to World War II, the tradition has proved uninterrupted to date (with the exception of the 1948 Winter Olympics in St. Moritz). As for the urban stages of accumulated attention emanating from the 2006 FIFA World Cup, the Fan Fest concept has been effectively transferred to other soccer megaevents (e.g., Klauser, 2011; Kolamo & Vuolteenaho, 2013). Thus, the 2006 FIFA World Cup marked a major change in the restructuring of event cities into spatially extended and media-dense fan enclaves in urban public spaces (Klauser, 2011; Schulke, 2010; Smith, 2016). As a transnational extension of this event branding concept inaugurated in 2010, immense numbers of willingly captivated event-goers throughout the world have watched FIFA World Cup games in public viewing areas erected for the tournaments’ duration not only in cities of host countries but also in other metropolises with a sufficient number of soccer enthusiasts.

This article’s conceptualizations and findings point toward the importance of studying the interplay of diverse media and the production of megaevent-related urban audience practices. In particular, the creation and intensification of powerful emotional moments during megaevents, as illuminated through our sporting-focused and time-specific cases, seems to be a key for understanding their unsurpassed magnetism for many urbanites and tourists, and for the nation-states and cities that fiercely compete to host these events. To be sure, there continues to exist a range of bottom-up, temporally diffuse, or spatially dispersed urban events that differ from the mega-scale Olympic Games, soccer tournaments, and other large events with restricted time frames (Giulianotti, 2011; Wynn, 2015). In these less grandiose sporting and nonsporting events, the regulative effects of political and economic power elites on the ordinary cityscape are typically less comprehensively and meticulously fabricated with
an eye to positive global media exposure. It is also notable that the top-down media-driven imperatives of producing cities as promotional “entertainment machines” have not remained unchallenged by critical publics and many frustrated locals (Clark, 2011). Nonetheless, due to their immense monetary gains and sheer dominance of the worldwide media landscape (if momentarily), the strictly controlled ways of producing enclaved event locales and associated forms of mediated audiencehood described in this article remain powerful models for designing megaevents.

To conclude, a critical focus on the institutional production of urban audience positions as well as on media-conscious performances played out in the enclaves of accumulated media attention and beyond the routinized qualities of the ordinary city opens intriguing and largely uncharted windows for “non-media-centric media studies” (Morley, 2009). One multistranded research challenge that lies beyond this study’s (trans)historical focus involves the rapid development of social media platforms and networked smartphones and the associated practices of digitalized multitasking and life publishing, which have further pluralized the forms of media-conscious performances in sports megaevents in the 2010s (see, e.g., Hutchins & Rowe, 2012). The maximization of positive media publicity in increasingly multimedial ways steers the production of media-dense urban gatherings in connection with the Olympic Games and other internationally coveted sporting spectacles.

References


