The Political Economy and Cultural Politics of Rural Nostalgia in Xi-Era China: The Case of Heyang Village

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This article offers a new theoretical framework to understand nostalgia as a political-economic and a cultural-political discourse in China. Introducing nostalgia as a "structure of feeling" in postreform China, the article analyzes its elevation as a new trope to address the economic and cultural contradictions of capitalistic global integration in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis. It then traces the trickling down of nostalgia, from its initial invocation by Xi Jinping to its ideological propagation in major state-media productions and, finally, down to its appropriation and mobilization at the county and village levels. Finally, in grounding the research in Heyang Village, Zhejiang Province, the study demonstrates how, within this discourse of development with "nostalgia in mind," a contentious enterprise of nostalgic tourism has figured as the centerpiece for rural development plans; Heyang's future is now entangled in a contextually specific enterprise of the economy of nostalgia.

Keywords: Chinese development, cultural heritage, nostalgia, rural tourism, Heyang

In 2015, China Central Television’s (CCTV's) annual Spring Festival Gala featured a song entitled Xiangchou 乡愁 ("Nostalgia"), which spoke of the bittersweet sense of nostalgic longing for the home village. Featured in the visual background were video clips of several villages in contemporary China, still deemed to possess "authentic" qualities of traditional Chinese village culture. CCTV initially shot these clips for the documentary series Jizhu Xiangchou (Nostalgia in Mind), which aired on CCTV-4 in the beginning of that same year. Given CCTV's role as the Chinese Communist Party's central mouthpiece, a sense of deliberateness is suggested in the party's thematic and rhetorical emphasis on nostalgia and, more specifically, nostalgia for the home village.

Recent years have seen a prominent reemergence of the "rural" into the discourse of postreform China's development. This reemergence is echoed by President Xi Jinping, when he unveiled his "New-Type" Urbanization Plan (NUP) during the 2013 Central Urbanization Work Conference (CUWC). In this speech, he stressed the following idea: After decades of export-driven industrialization, China has reached a pivotal point where it needs to rebalance its social and economic development toward a "human-centered urbanization" that "lets cities integrate with nature; lets citizens gaze at mountains, see waters, and have rural nostalgia in mind" (J. Liu, 2013, para. 13). Although this was reportedly the "most high-
level meeting the Chinese leadership has ever convened” on urbanization (Tiezzi, 2013, para. 2), the rural clearly has its role to play. For their part, local governments at the county and village levels have wasted little time in interpreting Xi’s quote. They have taken this shift in the rhetoric of development as an opportunity to mobilize new ways of reinvigorating China’s countryside and new ways of addressing the “rural issue”—that is, to tackle the task of rural development, specifically with “nostalgia in mind.”

A similar (re)focusing on the village has taken place at the popular level as well. Urbanites are looking toward a “nostalgic sojourn” in the countryside as a momentary escape from city life, or even as a “remedy” for what is being experienced as China’s urban disease (see e.g., Zhang, 2010, para. 1). Across China’s countryside, villagers and rural households since the late 1990s have responded increasingly to this demand by investing time and resources into operating **nongjiale** or “delights in farm guesthouses” (Park, 2014, p. 519) services, with varying degrees of success and social ramifications (see, e.g., Park, 2014; Su, 2013). On a larger scale, such services contribute to a gradual refashioning of the village into the hot urban consumer commodity of **xiangcun lüyou** 乡村旅游, or rural tourism (Gao, Huang, & Huang, 2009; Xu et al., 2013). This article argues that the face of China’s rural tourism industry—and, by extension, the whole of China’s rurality—is undergoing a tremendous transformation; so much so that the fate of China’s rural risks becoming tightly interwoven into a contextually specific form of **xiangcun lüyou** called **xiangchou lüyou** 乡愁旅游, or nostalgic tourism—an increasingly lucrative enterprise wherein the Chinese state and capital mobilizes **xiangchou** as a political-economic and a cultural-political device for governance and development planning.

This article traces the gradual incorporation of nostalgia into the Chinese state’s language of governance and development paradigm, from the initial invocation of nostalgia at the highest echelon of state power to its ideological propagation and thematic prominence in major state-media productions and, finally, down to its appropriation and mobilization into policy and development projects at the county and village levels. It proposes a new theoretical framework to understand nostalgia not merely as a sociocultural expression or, in the Williamsian sense of a “structure of feeling” (Williams, 1977, p. 128), but rather, to understand nostalgia, **xiangchou**, as a political-economic and a cultural-political tool used by different levels of government to frame China’s development. It illustrates how **xiangchou** itself becomes a tool for governance, albeit with different consequences and implications for the rural and the urban.

As part of this Special Section’s team project, I use a case study of Heyang Village, situated in Jinyun County, Zhejiang Province, to show that **xiangchou** has figured strongly as the centerpiece for local rural development plans, and that Heyang’s future is invested into developing its nostalgic tourism site. Findings from ethnographic research in Heyang reveal two conflicting narratives from the vantage points of the top-down and the bottom-up. From the top-down, the policies under the nostalgia trope are intended on paper to foster integrative urban-rural development and become a positive feedback loop to remedy both the “urban disease” and the “rural problem.” In practice, however, rather than narrowing the urban-rural divide to promote development with the rural in mind, the attempted implementation of nostalgia by the local state, with all its bureaucratic trappings, has been received with suspicion and met with resistance from the bottom-up. In other words, the enterprise of nostalgic tourism has created deep intrarural conflicts between the local state and rural residents. In fact, from the vantage point of some disgruntled Heyang
villagers, nostalgia even threatens to produce another form of dispossession—one that ultimately leaves farmers and villagers with nothing except nostalgia for their own homes.

**Theoretical and Contextual Frameworks, Methodology, and the Heyang Site**

This article describes how nostalgia operates at the level of central policy and local government implementation and how it affects the daily lives of rural residents. The first section analyzes the expression of nostalgia in contemporary Chinese popular culture and the effects of its manifestation, production, and consumption in contemporary Chinese society. Raymond Williams’ concept of the “structure of feeling” helps us see the greater social and cultural significance of the pervasiveness of nostalgia in 1980s–2000s China.

The second section describes the gradual incorporation of nostalgia into the Chinese state’s language of governance and visions of rural development. As the central government invokes the idea of nostalgia in various capacities at the national level, lower levels of governance reinterpret and visibly mobilize nostalgia into policy at the village level. The analysis is therefore an integrated inquiry into the trickling down of nostalgia. The national-level analysis highlights the ideological propagation of nostalgia through major state media productions. Specifically, it uses critical multimodal discourse analysis (Gorfinkel, 2013) to reveal the thematic prominence of nostalgia during CCTV’s 2015 Spring Festival Gala. In turn, the summarized findings provide a segue into a critical analysis of a 2015 political essay titled “On Rural Tourism” penned by Zhu Jikun, party secretary of Jinyun County, Zhejiang Province. Zhu’s essay provides valuable insight into how lower levels of government reappropriate and mobilize nostalgia, turning it into development projects such as Zhu’s plan for constructing Pilot Area for China’s Nostalgic Tourism (PACNT) sites, wherein county-level officials have targeted several villages (including Heyang) within Jinyun’s jurisdiction for the plan’s implementation.

Third, and moving to the village-level analysis, this article uses Heyang as a case study. In addition to its importance in Zhu’s PACNT initiative, this village also provides an example of the experiences and reactions of local residents vis-à-vis the policies implemented upon the village along the lines of xiangchou, nostalgia. Not only was Heyang featured in both CCTV’s 2015 Spring Festival Gala and in the 34th episode of Jizhu Xiangchou, Heyang provides an entry point for a direct comparison between the ideological representation and visualization of a nostalgic rural site by state media versus the realities within the village as well. Furthermore, although Heyang’s tourism industry began before the 2000s, it was not until 2013 when the tourism industry became the central development model for Heyang. This situates Heyang’s tourism development precisely within the current developmental context of Xi-era China, allowing for an exploration of the contextually specific form of nostalgic tourism that is central to this article.

I conducted fieldwork for this study over two visits to Heyang. The first was a structured visit as part of the Global to Village project team in June and July 2015, and the second was an individual follow-up visit in spring 2016. During the first visit, interviews were informal, semistructured focus groups based on purposive sampling conducted in multiple two- to three-hour sessions over four days. In my second visit, I went to Heyang in the capacity of someone with familial ties with the village, and I made use of my
existing connections with individuals across various social and political networks, which yielded rich interviews and conversations from a multitude of perspectives. Interviewees and other consenting participants of discussions included officials from the county level down to the village level, tourists and other visitors to Heyang, local villagers still residing within the main guminju 古民居 (ancient dwellings complex) tourist site, and prospective investors. Irrespective of the nature of the interview and the topic for discussion, I found that the state of the guminju was a particularly important and recurring topic for all participants; however, it also became clear that the development of the nostalgic guminju tourist site is an enterprise caught in a web of conflicts, tensions, and challenges. My analysis highlights the tensions and suspicions between Heyang’s villagers and different levels of authorities. Furthermore, I link these tensions to some of China’s most pressing contemporary issues, such as land rights and usage, intrarural conflict, as well as bureaucratic accountability and transparency at various levels of governance—all of which have been increasingly difficult challenges across the postreform Chinese state as a whole.

**Encountering Nostalgia: From Culture to Commodity to Policy**

Nostalgia is a deeply rooted Chinese cultural and literary theme, finding its expression in poems dating as far back as the Tang Dynasty (618–907). Among its most commonly used lexical variations—such as guxiang 故乡, sixiang 思乡, huaxiang 怀乡, and, of course, xiangchou 乡愁—nostalgia is often rooted firmly in the figurative and literary soil of the rural (xiang 乡). The fact that this reminiscence for xiang fully inundated China’s popular cultural scene throughout the 1980s–2000s is of great significance. Much can be inferred about the nature of society from this yearning for a rural past in the context of a China undergoing its most dramatic cultural transformation—or, to invoke Raymond Williams (1973), a society undergoing its most definitive separation of “town and country.”

**Searching for Nostalgia**

If the chaotic fervor of reform-era China’s modernization and urbanization could be captured in one image, according to Chinese cultural critic Dai Jinhua (1997), this image would be “the ubiquitous construction site” (p. 146). Indeed, the dramatic tearing down of ancient cities to rebuild new ones is at once a paradoxical representation of construction versus destruction and of modern advancement versus cultural loss. Meanwhile, at the individual level, the simultaneously exciting and aggressive processes of globalization produced what Dai describes as “the most chaotic identity crisis in many decades,” where, surrounded by forests of anonymous skyscrapers, even “a ‘homegrown’ Chinese is suddenly stripped of hometown, homeland, and home country and abandoned to the beautiful new world” (p. 146). Wang Ban’s (2002) critical film analysis, “Love at Last Sight,” provides further insight into these social processes and their effects when he writes that Chinese society in the 1990s had hurled itself into a “fluid, bloodless cash nexus, [where] emotionally and ethically charged social relations are reduced to the bare bone of money relations” (p. 674).

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1 It is acknowledged that multiple forms of nostalgia can exist simultaneously and that during the early reform era, revolutionary nostalgia was another strong theme. The word nostalgia here refers explicitly to xiangchou, or rural nostalgia.
Dai’s portrayal of the proverbial “identity crisis” and Wang’s harrowing image of the loss of humanism provide the context for understanding the rise of nostalgia in Chinese cities since the 1990s. Indeed, across the pages, canvases, screens, and other cultural media, the pervasive expression of nostalgia was an unmistakable manifestation of a widespread sociocultural and urban malaise. While the state turned its focus toward the urban with large construction projects and policies labeled as “progress,” a pervasive popular reaction in cultural texts was to look backward through the lens of nostalgia toward an increasingly irrecoverable past.

The Consumption of Nostalgia: Romanticizing the Rural Past

Ironically, if nostalgia expressed a yearning to escape the trappings of the modern and commoditized world, Dai (1997) notes how nostalgia itself became the most sought-after and fashionable commodity. A romanticized, and ultimately invented, past was the target of desire that was not only consumed through the figurative and literary portrayals of nostalgia but became a literal commodity, especially in the form of cultural and rural tourism—industries that started to gain massive popularity among urban consumers at the turn of the new millennium.

In the words of a Beijing-based financial analyst and rural tourism enthusiast Xu Liang,

Life in the city is too complicated and busy. . . . Villagers here [in the countryside] are very yuanshi 原始 [primitive, pristine] and shishi zaizai 实实在在 [truthful, sincere, authentic]. . . . Their life is a very authentic life. . . . Here, you still can feel ren de qi 人的 [the vitality and warmth of humanity], but not in the city. (Park, 2014, p. 520)

This quote is from Choong-Hwan Park’s (2014) anthropological research on China’s nongjiale tourism. Here, Xu explains how, in the search for an authentic human experience, she and her peers enjoy frequenting villager-run guesthouses in the countryside. However, subjected to her positionality as a white-collar urbanite, this authenticity is ultimately a romanticized and idyllic version of rurality, a rural past conjured from Xu’s memories, desires, and ideals.

Thus, implicated within such tourist sites—or in the construction of traditional rural culture and village life as spectacles (Debord, 1967/1995; Hillman, 2003; Stenbacka, 2011)—is the notion of an urban imagination of the village as a place permanently set in the past for one to revisit and return to. Whether an attempt to rediscover one’s identity or to reconnect with the humanism of social relations, nostalgia not only emerged as a strong cultural and literary theme, but it was also realized through rural tourism as a physical and concretized site for the literal consumption of the past and an implicit critique of the present (Tannock, 1995). To revisit Dai (1997), nostalgia, especially as it transcended the material confines of media and literature, was undoubtly “one of the most important cultural realities of contemporary China” (p. 144); so much that nostalgia even became a general “structure of feeling.”
The Nostalgic Structure of Feeling and the Construction of Rurality

In the most general sense of the term, a “structure of feeling” refers “to the different ways of thinking vying to emerge at any one time in history” (Buchanan, 2010, p. 455). As Ian Buchanan (2010) argues, Raymond Williams developed the term throughout his works as a way to problematize the Gramscian concept of hegemony (see, e.g., Williams, 1961, 1977). When put into practice, it was used to define the “gap between the official discourse of policy and regulations, the popular response to official discourse and its appropriation in literary and other cultural texts” (Buchanan 2010, p. 455). In essence, then, a structure of feeling appears when official policy and popular responses are not aligned; and it is precisely within this misalignment where nostalgia is said to exist.

Nostalgia occupied that space between private unconscious and public social articulation, and it appeared as a pervasive Chinese cultural discourse with xiang fixed at the core of its expression. Indeed, if the feverish “hyperbuilding” (Ong, 2011) of innumerable anonymous skyscrapers were any indication, an aggressive industrialization and urban expansion underwritten by an export-driven economic model was at the forefront of China’s discourse of development throughout the 2000s. All the while, the nostalgic structure of feeling continued its quiet articulation within popular culture as a parallel undercurrent alongside the official and normalized discourse of progress.

Nostalgia was at once a counterdiscourse as well as a popular cultural reality that constructed its own world surrounding the pristine, yuanshi countryside as an “alternative to the homogenous narrative of globalization” (B. Wang, 2002, p. 670). Yet, if this imagined village represents the theoretical gap between official discourse and the pervasive popular-cultural response to it, then the real gap is that between the imagined rurality produced by the nostalgic structure of feeling, and the impoverished rurality produced by a severely urban-biased set of developmental policies throughout the reform era (Jacka, 2006; Whyte, 2010).

The Emerging Political Economy of Nostalgia

If the 1990s marked the period when the urban malaise began its strongest articulation, then this was also the period when the urban-rural imbalance began regaining concern. Within the political economy of industrialization and globalization, the Chinese state’s perception of rurality and the valuation of its peasantry has undergone several changes. Procurers of grain in the 1980s evolved to a “burdened” entity in the 1990s (X. Lu, 1997) and to the carriers of the Sannong/”Three Rural” problem in the 2000s (Wen, 1999/2001). In the post-2008 world, however, it is the viability of China’s economic model per se that is being reconsidered.

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2 It is acknowledged that considerable debate surrounds the precise meaning and usage of a “structure of feeling” (Matthews 2001; Middleton 1989). However, this article refers to the definition provided by Buchanan’s (2010) A Dictionary of Critical Theory, because it is the most general interpretation of the term.
China’s supposedly too-big-to-fail economy was shaken up after 2008, and the shock of the 2008 global financial crisis and the bursting of the real estate bubble revealed the frailty and unsustainability of overinvestment and underconsumption (see Hung, 2009, p. 190). The country’s development has reached a critical juncture where it needs to, among other things, foster a sustainable economy driven by domestic consumption. This was the essence of Xi Jinping’s New-type Urbanization Plan, laid out for 2014–2020, and the first official plan on urbanization of its kind (H. Lu, 2014). According to an official statement released shortly after the landmark Central Urbanization Work Conference in 2013, “urbanization is the road China must take in its modernization drive”; it is key to addressing rural problems, balance urban-rural development, and unleash domestic demand (“China Pledges,” 2013, para. 2).

What is said to qualify this model as a “new-type” urbanization is its emphasis on being human-centric, green, and wholly integrative between city and nature and between city and countryside. Or, to put the idea in party rhetoric, China’s development needs to prioritize “clear waters and green mountains” over the pursuit of “mountains of gold and silver,” and uphold the tenets of the NUP by “cutting trees cautiously, demolishing fewer houses, and letting residents have rural nostalgia in mind” (Liu, 2013, para. 1). Therefore, within what could be considered a pivotal moment in rebalancing China’s political economy, a profound shift in the discourse surrounding the perceived function of China’s rurality is emerging. The key to a complete developmental overhaul now seemingly lies in both a political-economic transformation and a cultural-political shift toward the nostalgic countryside—a space to redirect capital investment and to redirect domestic (urban) consumption and to facilitate China’s transition from an export-oriented to a consumption-driven economy. As all levels of government are responding to and reappropriating the party’s rhetorical call to action to mobilize the “new-type” model of development, what becomes of the state of China’s rurality and the agency of affected villagers in a new top-down and urban-centric enterprise of an orchestrated nostalgia?

The Ideological Propagation and Mobilization of Nostalgia

Li Sisi: Spring Festival is a time for tens of thousands of families to reunite. Youzi [traveler, sojourner] are returning home, families are reuniting, and friends meet again. And for every youzi born outside of the home village, perhaps this moment fills within them an intense sense of nostalgia. For thousands of years, the literati has composed poems and classics about nostalgia, these famous works have lingered in our minds. I’m sure 大家 [everyone] is now wondering by now, what exactly is nostalgia?

Sa Beining: Nostalgia is that place you’ve left but will always have in mind; nostalgia is every single rooftop across China currently shrouded in chuiyan [cooking smoke] from their chimneys—it is this that we call home, and it is this that gives the faraway youzi strength. We just wish for 大家 [everyone] to see mountains, gaze at waters, and have nostalgia in mind. (CCTV Chunwan, 2015)

What Is Nostalgia? To Whom Does It Belong?
Just before the welcoming of the New Year, program hosts Li Sisi and Sa Beining retook the CCTV 2015 Spring Festival Gala (SFG) stage and engaged in the above dialogue to introduce a performance of the song “Nostalgia” by singer Lei Jia (CCTV Chunwan, 2015). Although their brief exchange lasted just shy of a minute to segue into the main song, their remarks are imbued with sociocultural, political, and ideological significance. They even provide greater depth to the meaning of nostalgia depicted in the song. For instance, Li’s mentioning of nostalgia in China’s literary history points to its cultural embeddedness. Yet following this with the question of “what exactly is nostalgia?” suggests a sense of unacquaintedness, a new facet to the concept as far as Li’s intended audience of the youzi, “traveler,” is concerned.

Sa’s answer to Li’s question is even more revealing. His mentioning of chuiyan is an explicit cultural invocation of traditional rural life and culture (see R. Zhao, 2015), and its usage alongside the phrase the “faraway youzi” paints a bifurcated image of the wandering traveler and the fixed home village. The target audience is thus interpellated as being a subject not of the countryside, xiang, and not necessarily ever having been part of rural life. Yet the youzi is still in the position to return to the village, and is nonetheless someone who harbors a deeply held, but still abstract cultural attachment to the xiang.

Stepping back to analyze the hosts’ exchange as a whole, there is even a detectable didactic quality in the air. This is most notable when Li suggests on behalf of “everyone,” dajia, that the exact definition of nostalgia is unclear, or needs their clarifying. Sa’s immediate reply from the standpoint of “we,” women, portends toward a notion of “let us,” the state-sponsored program, “instruct dajia”—depicted here as the sojourner unacquainted with rurality—“what exactly is nostalgia.” Above all, supplementing this didacticism is the reappropriation of Xi Jinping’s line from his CUWC speech into Sa’s definition of nostalgia. This demonstrates a clear merging of the top-down official discourse of nostalgia with the otherwise idiosyncratic qualities of nostalgia as a sentiment and cultural phenomenon. Nostalgia, as propagated in such a way on CCTV’s most televised program is no longer a “structure of feeling” but is essentially “indoctrainment” in its most impactful form (Gorfinkel, 2013; Sun, 2009).

The “Indoctritainment” of Nostalgia

At precisely the stroke of midnight on February 15, the People’s Daily published an official media write-up of Lei Jia’s performance of “Nostalgia.” Entitled “Lei Jia’s Tears During ‘Nostalgia’ Embodies the Nation’s Affection for Its Rural Roots,” the report states that Lei felt strong emotions because “the song is not just about individual melancholy, but it also encompasses the sentiment of the nation” (H. Wang & Huang, 2015, para. 1). This further reinforces the now-national significance of the term. It was a moment when nostalgia as a popular cultural trope became a political tool—a decisive formation of the cultural politics of nostalgia.

When revisiting the actual performance, this certainly was an emotionally affective and politically effective show. As Lei serenaded her audience in a pristine white gown, short videos of “traditional Chinese villages” graced the screen behind her, inundating the colossal SFG stage with the top-down and

3 Chuiyan is the smoke from cooking with firewood. Because gas and electric stoves have largely replaced firewood, this is an invocation of the traditional way of life less common in modern homes.
nationwide (and beyond) propagation of nostalgia. While the bulk of the song is composed of only a few repeating and simple refrains (Minge Zhongguo, 2015), it is in the pairing of the lyrics with the iconic visual imagery of the guxiang—and its wider sociopolitical context as a carefully orchestrated national production—where the song derives its greatest significance. For instance, from approximately 4:25:26 to 4:25:52 Lei sings: "Over time, as foreign lands become the new home / Youzi, don’t you remember the fragrance of the soil?" The camera pans outward, putting in full view the background visuals, which depict in sequence alongside the lyrics: a family gathered around a dining table in a traditional-style courtyard (4:25:28), aerial shots of ancient architectural rooftops (4:25:31), a montage of lush fields and agriculture (4:25:48), and a close-up of an elderly villager’s face (4:25:52). These clips were shot in several different villages across China deemed by the show’s producers to possess the iconic qualities of xiang. With such a visual pairing, the lyrics of what could have been an otherwise more abstract construction of place ("foreign lands"/"the soil") and the subject positionality ("youzi") are filled with meaning directly derived from the visuals of the supposedly authentic “traditional village life,” which is further supplemented by the quick lesson from Sa and Li. With the countdown toward 2015 winding to its end—or toward a new beginning—it was almost as if to say: This is nostalgia.

The Economy of Nostalgia

This is nostalgia, and it is beautiful, rural, and potentially profitable; these are the main tenets of "On Rural Tourism," an essay penned in 2015 by Zhu Jikun, then party secretary of Jinyun County, Lishui City, Zhejiang Province. Zhu’s beautifully written essay, published and circulated in provincial and county-level media outlets, outlined the state of the county and prospects for its future trajectory. It set the theoretical foundations for the economic and sociocultural development for Jinyun, and later even doubled as a foundational policy document for the county’s new development plan. Indeed, almost as if taking up the call to action to mobilize nostalgia, Zhu’s first sentence opens with none other than Xi Jinping’s CUWC line of “keeping nostalgia in mind” (Liu, 2013, para. 13). The message is immediately clear: Development entails an enterprise merged with rural tourism on the basis of nostalgia.

Zhu structured his essay around three interrelated questions: How can the village develop tourism? Can we build an economy upon nostalgia? What will we use to retain “beautiful nostalgia?” (J. Zhu, 2015, para. 2). Satisfying all three of these inquiries was the proposed development strategy for the construction of a Pilot Area for China’s Nostalgic Tourism. According to Zhu, who was also a member of the standing committee in the Lishui Municipal Chinese Communist Party, this proposal was very well received within and beyond the county. In fact, on March 3, 2015, a special county-province summit was even convened on PACNT, where county and provincial representatives agreed to direct Jinyun’s development trajectory down the path of innovative nostalgic rural tourism (Zhu, 2015; see also. Chen, 2016). To borrow directly from Zhu (2015), “hidden beneath ‘Beautiful Nostalgia’ is a ‘Beautiful Economy’” (para. 2).

Yet the backbone of the county’s PACNT and “beautiful economy” are real villages, such as Heyang. Nestled among green mountains and quiet streams, this ancient village is one of the main sites targeted by Zhu to mobilize PACNT. However, a regrounding of this analysis from the bottom-up vantage
point reveals, perhaps, a less beautiful facet to nostalgia: Rather than a “beautiful economy,” beneath Heyang’s “beautiful nostalgia” is a village in contestation.

**Nostalgic Heyang: Culture, Cash, and Contestation**

Heyang is a medium-size village of 3,600 in Jinyun County, Zhejiang Province, and it is one of the few remaining villages in postrevolutionary and postreform China that has retained a well-preserved complex of traditional architecture. At the heart of Heyang is its main guminju, ancient-dwellings complex site, which boasts an architectural layout dating back to the Yuan Dynasty, and is home to numerous ancestral halls, residential courtyards, temples, and sculptures inherited from the Qing and Ming eras (Ma, 2007). Given these ancient and precious features, it is no surprise that Heyang, and especially its guminju, is not only of value to the county’s development, but it was also officially placed under the protection of Zhejiang Province’s Administration for the Protection of Cultural Relics in 2011, and further elevated to the status of a National-Level Key Cultural Relic in 2013. In fact, Heyang was one of the villages featured during CCTV’s SFG performance of “Nostalgia,” the subject of the 34th episode of CCTV’s “Nostalgia in Mind,” and highlighted in other similar entertainment programs listed under CCTV-Online “Sannong Television-Series” (http://sannong.cctv.com/). Clearly, the preservation of this village’s “authentic rurality” is a matter of national significance.

**Heyang: Party Propaganda Meets Reality**

Bearing the weight of nearly 1,100 years of history, Heyang possesses both the hardware and software embodied in that authenticity so sought after by CCTV SFG’s production of “Nostalgia.” Many shots of traditional rural housing, ancient tiled rooftops, and quaint, cobbled streets were filmed in Heyang’s guminju, where several scenes taken to depict mundane rural life were also filmed. This includes the above-mentioned moment at 4:25:26 that features local villagers assembled around the table to represent a family enjoying a traditional New Year banquet in a traditional rural courtyard.

Interestingly, this was not the original courtyard that the program producers wanted to film. The initial sought-after site was Heyang’s most well-preserved and iconic courtyard, named Lianrang Zhijian 廉让之间. However, in the behind-the-scene moments of the actual filming, another drama was unfolding: The film crew was greeted not with happy villagers enacting the scene of familial gathering for their camera; instead, they were met with resistance. What began as a squabble between the film crew, their local handlers, and two villagers still residing in Lianrang Zhijian 廉让之间 soon snowballed into a prolonged and tense standoff between the film crew and a mob of disgruntled villagers. Although the first two villagers were acting in direct resistance toward the imposed presence of the film crew in their home, it was a culmination of pent-up frustrations and discontent from the group of villagers that brought this drama to its climax.

The allure of rural authenticity that initially drew CCTV’s attention is also the main selling point for the guminju’s tourism industry, which has been attracting sojourning tourists in recent years. Villagers have been compliant, and initially even supportive of the tourism enterprise. From the frequent cleaning
and maintenance of their yards to hanging their laundry out of plain view, and even just by putting up with the constant coming and going of people in their homes and in their daily lives, villagers were willing to go out of their way to present an orderly and clean image to the tourists and visitors. However, they have gained nothing from their compliance—and they would gain nothing from the filming by CCTV. It was perceived as merely another episode of life, disrupted.

The disgruntled villagers hijacked the CCTV filming session to voice their grievances over what was ultimately a lack of participation in the tourism development process—or at least, a lack of agency in a one-way compliance. It was also a demonstration of their helpless frustration toward the reality of the uneven distribution of economic benefits at the village level, if any at all, deriving from the tourist operation that continues to be so imposing on their lives. However, despite such a quick escalation of passions and events, the end was wholly anticlimactic. The crew’s local handlers managed to dissolve the scene and redirect the cameras to another similar courtyard, where the residents were given a small cash compensation for the filming. It was this courtyard—which happens to be where a village official resides—that made it onto the SFG screen to depict the authenticity of nostalgia and of “mundane rural life.” As the saying goes, “the show must go on”; however, as far as Heyang’s villagers are concerned, this drama is far from being resolved.

Heyang: Development Meets Culture

To be sure, Heyang’s tourism industry had already begun before the 2000s, as it was swept up in the “mad rush” for cultural heritage designations in the early 2000s (Shen, 2010) and in the “first wave” of China’s cultural and rural tourism boom (see, e.g., Gao et al., 2009). However, it was after the reemergence of the countryside in national discourses and mass media, and especially after the reemergence of the village into the political economy of national development, when the local state put forth a concerted effort to develop Heyang’s guminju into a flourishing enterprise.

In fact, a new governmental body was created under the Jinyun County government’s tourism bureau in 2008 that was specifically in charge of overseeing the guminju’s cultural preservation and the tourism industry’s development—at the time, prioritizing the former over the latter. Officially named the Jinyun County Heyang Ancient Dwellings Protection and Development Management Committee, or the Management Committee (MC) for short, this entity, along with its mandate to protect and develop, was initially vested with hope by local villagers. Villagers even took the initiative to contribute ancient artifacts, handed down through generations from their own household collections to be displayed in the Heyang guminju museum that the MC was trying to revamp. At the onset, tourism development was meant to be a coordinated effort between local state and local society to reinvigorate the village—an important undertaking, especially within the broader sociopolitical climate of the “hollowing out” and “greying” of villages in China’s countryside (Davis, 2014).

Heyang: Culture Meets Cash

When Heyang received its high-level cultural recognitions in 2011, this marked the significance of the guminju’s development, an opportunity to procure more funds from the top-down toward growing the
tourism enterprise. Therefore, in 2012, the county party and government, members of the village council, and other designated stakeholders came together to reconfigure the MC’s authority and mandate over the development of the guminju. The result was a signed contract that not only bestowed the MC with a 50-year lease on the rights to use the village, but it also made the MC Heyang’s de facto business broker, political intermediary, and even a “stability-maintenance” force—all of which sat on top of Heyang’s own village governance structure. This was done in the name of village heritage preservation and tourism development, a public good and for the benefit of public welfare.

On paper, this contract allows the MC to “borrow” the rights to use the guminju for the purposes of protection and development. However, according to the village council chairperson, in practice, the MC now looks to be central authority over the future of the guminju and the de facto state governing over the village residents. In essence, everything—and everyone—encircled within the regions designated as “protected” are now under the MC’s jurisdiction for the next half-century. As for those still residing within the guminju, ownership over their childhood homes, their inherited relics, and even the full agency over their own futures have become a blur of public and private rights, property, and interests. Now the village’s future appears to be tightly interwoven into the increasingly contentious and now wholly top-down enterprise of nostalgic tourism. According to the village council chairperson, ”the owner of Heyang is no longer the villagers, but the MC; and under this new owner, there is no protection, only development . . . there is no xiangchou, only jingji (finances)” (personal interview, April 2, 2016).

Although the village council chairperson in his remarks seems to prioritize protection over development, poorer residents desperately want economic and infrastructural development to improve their quality of life. And ironically, whether it was due to the MC’s incompetence, a lack of communication, poor administrative organization, or simply bad circumstances, there was little jingji to speak of. Heyang’s tourism actually declined under the MC. As a local village official opined, the tourism site certainly did become a much bigger deal following the establishment of the MC; however, the MC did not turn near the profit it set out to achieve (personal interview, 2016). Based on the local village official’s observations, three main factors contributed to the slump in revenue. The first two are relatively straightforward, but the third he could not divulge in detail:

The entrance tickets were priced excessively high in 2008. No one wanted to come all the way out here at such a hefty price. In any case, the national economy was at a low point at this time anyway. It has gotten better now, there’s a train. But when it comes to the question of money, actually, a clearer answer can be found in the pockets and minds of those in the MC. (Personal interview, March 26, 2016)

The “question of money” and its whereabouts became a recurring theme. Irrespective of the actual meaning behind the local village official’s cryptic third reason, what is clear is that concerns exist over transparency and official accountability. In fact, these issues would continue to fester, soon becoming the primary loci of suspicion and mistrust from rural society toward the state, and even between different branches of local state organs.

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4 All names have been removed for privacy.
Heyang: Culture Meets Conflict

According to the interviews and stories shared by Heyang’s villagers, the village has fallen into a series of conflicts common to China’s rural politics and governance (see, e.g., Chuang, 2015; Ho, 2005). Observations and passionate conversations have painted an image of social fragmentation, divisions among the village elites, and deep layers of tensions accrued from the top-down imposition of “preservation” and “development.” Indeed, with unfulfilled promises for housing reallocation and compensation came unenforceable land appropriation schemes and forced demolitions. Suspected collusion between officials and construction companies were paired with intrusive, low-quality construction projects and neglect for residential safety. The disorganized bureaucratic system was met with a lack of transparency in governance; and meanwhile, from the expected but uncompensated compliance of villagers to the overruling of individual villager’s agency and participation, residents in the guminju began referring to their home as the kuminju, a play on words replacing gu, for “ancient,” with ku, for “bitter.”

Beneath the rhetoric of constructing “beautiful nostalgia” is the reality of an unhealthy society, now crippled by conflict, mistrust, and suspicion. A term that came up frequently in conversations with both villagers and local officials was xieqi ("perverse winds"), indicating that the social environment of Heyang is now “poisoned.” Without proper communication channels, problems have been arising frequently, responsibilities shirked freely, rumors spread quickly, and, as the local village official suggested earlier, money might have slipped away quietly. As far as villagers are concerned, it was the establishment of the MC, an ultimately alienating imposition, and its penetration into and disruption of village life that is the cause of their troubles. The reality, however, is much more complicated—the village council itself, for example, is known for its divisiveness.

Heyang: Development Meets Dispossession

Heyang is a contested space, and its “sickness” arises out of overlapping and conflicting interests, some of which stem from the villagers themselves. The biggest example of this overlap of self-interests and stakeholders can be witnessed by the underlying factors that have produced a staggering number of villagers who now find themselves in desperate need of a new home. Specifically, because the MC now manages the designated protected sites, households are forbidden to renovate or build new houses inside the guminju in order to keep the site’s “authentic” flavor. Ironically, in other instances, several households that resided in one of the village’s ancestral halls were ordered to vacate their homes as to allow the state to carry out renovations, all in the name of preserving the building’s flavor and to refashion it into a tourist attraction. In this latter case, the MC promised the displaced villagers with new land on which they could build new homes.

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5 As a legacy of the Mao-era land reform, this hall was turned into residential quarters for the homeless and poor peasant families.
The complications in this exchange stem largely from the fact that other households still hold the contracted rights to the lands promised to those forced to relocate from the guminju, and some of these households refuse to budge. Knowing the value of these lands, current holders of land rights try to coerce the state into giving them a bigger cash payout. In a similar vein some of the guminju's villagers have also tried to extort more money or negotiate other material benefits out of the government in exchange for the use rights to the ancestral halls that they have long considered as homes, but are now considered as “national treasures” and tourist destinations as far as various levels of the state is concerned. This stalls the development of the tourism site, and the highly decentralized nature of the local state further complicates the process. To illustrate, while the provincial/county-level government procures the funds for Heyang’s development projects, the MC handles all the money and liaises with its selected contracting team. However, it is the village council that needs to negotiate with villagers, and in some cases, “pull out the nails” (Li & O’Brien, 1996). Indeed, these cases demonstrate the power of “nail-like villagers,” who, according to Kevin O’Brien and Li Lianjiang (1996), resist the state for personal gain, and “ignore and violate laws and policies and have little concern for public welfare” (p. 31).

To be sure, disruptions caused by nail-like persons have been, regrettably, common across China’s countryside in the past two decades. For instance, Julia Chuang’s (2015) ethnographic case study of Sichuan Province’s Lan-Ding village details a similar form of land expropriation, rural dispossession and displacement, and bureaucratic inefficiencies. However, while it was the processes of an aggressive state-mandated urbanization that caused the plight of Lan-Ding villagers in Chuang’s study, for the villagers of Heyang, their plight is part of the new economy of nostalgia. More specifically, from the perspective of some of these nail-like villagers within the guminju, even if the exchange of land is successful, they simply cannot afford to build new homes anyway. Moreover, though the ancient dwellings may be in good shape from the standpoint of preserving ancient cultural heritage relics, as homes, they are riddled with hazards, including outdated plumbing and electrical systems and ancient and brittle walls that do not retain warmth.

These dwellings may harbor a sense of “nostalgic comfort” for visitors, but they are not conducive to a life of material comfort. Trapped between the top-down imposition of restrictions to upgrade their homes themselves, and a total lack of financial means to completely relocate, the villagers’ bottom-up resistance and extortion for more cash is a basic instinct of personal preservation and survival. In fact, it is the poorer families, especially their elderly and their grandchildren—the most dependent, the most impoverished, the “left-behind”—who are the most implicated in this debacle. Meanwhile, those with the financial means to move out built new houses outside and surrounding the guminju long ago.

A real estate developer and first-time visitor to Heyang from Wenzhou told me a story. When residents in a neighboring village heard about the state-sanctioned protection placed on Heyang’s guminju, they immediately took up their hammers and tore down their own ancient dwellings (personal interview, March 29, 2016). In place, they began constructing new, more comfortable homes with modern furnishings and essentials. The developer had just come from this other village. After a relatively successful career in Wenzhou and other major cities, he hoped to expand his enterprises beyond the concrete jungles, and when he heard about Jinyun’s new PACNT initiative in early 2016, he immediately boarded a bullet train to the county. Upon arrival, he decided to tour Jinyun’s countryside, scouting for the
most promising village to invest in, looking eventually to build a *minsu* 民宿, a bed and breakfast style of accommodation. Indeed, with simplicity and a sense of no-frills, rusticity at the core of its aesthetic, the *minsu* is becoming an increasingly lucrative industry, rapidly replacing hotel chains and the humbler villager-run *nongjiale* inns as urbanites’ most sought-after choice for lodging during their nostalgic sojourns in the pristine, *yuanshi* countryside.

**Conclusion: Hope for a Nostalgic Future?**

This article traces the trickling down of nostalgia—from its initial invocation at the highest echelon of state power to its ideological propagation and thematic prominence in major state-media productions, and down to its appropriation and mobilization into policy and development projects at the county and village levels. With reference to existing literature on the expression of nostalgia in contemporary Chinese popular culture, this article illustrates how *xiangchou*—at once an urban-centric imagining of rurality and an interpellation of the urban subject as a wanderer with rural roots—is no longer merely a sociocultural expression, nor a “structure of feeling” in the Williamsian sense, especially in the context of Xi-era China. Furthermore, through an in-depth analysis into government documents and by using critical multimodal discourse analysis to study the portrayal of rural China in prominent state media productions, this article describes how nostalgia became itself the official and top-down tool for governance. Finally, using the village of Heyang as a case study, this article illustrates how *xiangchou* was co-opted by the Chinese state and fully incorporated into postreform, Xi-era China’s developmental paradigm, with all its actors, intentions, and contentions intersecting at the “nostalgic countryside.”

Stuart Tannock (1995), in interpreting Fred Davis’s (1979) work, has argued that “nostalgia functions in modern society as an ‘outlet’ or ‘safety valve,’ [and] by sanctioning soothing and utopian images of the past, [it] lets people adapt both to rapid social change and to changes in individual life histories” (p. 459). However, within the rising political economy and cultural politics of nostalgia, nostalgic home villages are repurposed and refashioned into both the safety valve and the engine for economic growth and development. More specifically, the nostalgic countryside is posited as being able to allow for China’s economy and ongoing developmental reforms to overcome the multifaceted challenges of the accumulation of capital, ecological crisis, and sociocultural malaise.

As a case in point, nostalgic tourism, at least from the macrolevel perspective of Jinyun County, seems to hold the potential for bridging the separation between town and country, narrow the urban-rural gap, and even foster self-sustaining local cultural economies carried by the PACNT initiative. Whether the local state can realize this potential through effective policies and development projects is another question.

Since the time of Zhu’s writing, the mountainous Jinyun County has seen some tremendous changes. For instance, the county tourism bureau has invested in marketing campaigns to promote its tourism industry, making use of the penetrating reach of the local state’s various media organs such as television programs, radio broadcasts, and articles in official news sources (G. Chen, 2016). Moreover, to facilitate greater urban-rural integration, the much-anticipated high-speed bullet train route to Jinyun was officially put into operation in December 2015, directly connecting the once-isolated and relatively poor...
county to megacities such as Shanghai, Wenzhou, and Beijing ("New Jin-wen Railroad," 2015), attracting more tourists and even figures like the above-mentioned real estate developer to the region. This train line, part of China’s expanding national high-speed railway grid, has been instrumental to the growth of Jinyun’s tourism. In fact, according to an article from Jinyun News in early 2016, the county government even held a promotion that advertised free admission to tourist attractions with the purchase of a train ticket (G. Chen, 2016). Based on the figures provided by this same article, by February 2016, Jinyun reportedly raked in an unprecedented RMB1.58 million (US$23 million) from tourism alone (G. Chen, 2016).

In Heyang, there have also been rapid changes. At the end of 2015, the MC leadership went through an overhaul, and the new MC has put in motion several new projects aiming to rectify Heyang’s issues accrued from years of social fragmentation and conflicts, some of which this article has tried to detail. At this delicate transitionary stage for the MC and the village, the road ahead is still riddled with challenges. However, at the very least, the new MC has committed to beginning a fresh, new chapter for Heyang under the new rhetoric of “Protection as Primary, Development as Secondary” (Tong & Hu, 2015). Or, in other words, to rebalance the village’s developmental trajectory, reevaluate the relationship between local state and rural society, to reinvigorate development, and, above all, to keep the “villagers in mind.”

Indeed, since the time of my research, the whole of Jinyun has seen a tremendous upsurge of incoming travelers and visitors who are now greeted upon arrival at the train station with slogans and visual propaganda depicting Jinyun’s authentic, yet innovative, nostalgic rural tourism attractions. This is the ultimate coming together of rural tourism, mass media, the allure of nostalgia, and China’s nationwide transitioning economic model. This is the ultimate formation of the economy of nostalgia: an enterprise wherein the political economy and cultural politics of the state’s governance have merged at nostalgia and in the countryside.

To be sure, Heyang’s case is but one story within China’s diverse cultural geography, and within this rising economy of nostalgia, Heyang is not alone. As the case of Heyang illustrates, this is an enterprise still characterized by a complex and dynamic web of conflicting and intersecting power relations and, above all, a tendency to neglect the peasantry and their agency. The plight of Heyang’s dingzihu highlights deep tensions and contradictions between cultural preservation and enterprising development; between rural authenticity and rural modernization; and between the consideration for individual gain and the collective good. These tensions were, and continue to fester at the heart of China’s new enterprise of nostalgic tourism. And, by extension, these are just few of the tensions that portend a completely new facet to the rural issue within China’s political economy and cultural politics of nostalgia.

References


