

Putting Out Fire With Gasoline in Tahrir Square: Revisiting the Gamson Hypothesis

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This study situates the Gamson hypothesis in the non-Western country of Egypt with an attempt to explore the relationship between the Gamson typology and political behavior in a country that has traditionally been under an authoritarian regime. Furthermore, this study suggests that additional factors might play important roles in the traditional relationship; it examines a possible link among media use, political corruption, and political rights to the Gamson typology based on a representative national survey conducted in Egypt. Several results differed from studies conducted in the Western world. Dissidents were more likely to engage in conventional political activities, which goes against the Gamson hypothesis. High efficacy regardless of trust level predicted conventional activities. This study aims not only to enrich the model but also to enhance our understanding of the diverse nature of the relationships among the Gamson typology and perceptions of political system, media use, and political activities in a non-Western authoritarian state.

Keywords: Gamson hypothesis, Gamson typology, Egypt, political behavior, media use

On January 25, 2011, tens of thousands of Egyptians occupied Tahrir Square in Cairo to protest against the government. They demanded the end of the regime, and this action is widely acknowledged as one of the groundbreaking uprisings in the Arab Spring. This unprecedented uprising could not have occurred without a series of important developments in recent Egyptian politics, such as the simultaneous emergence of political activists, independent journalists asserting press freedom, organized laborers, and oppositional political groups challenging the Egyptian regime (Sinder & Faris, 2011).

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In an attempt to understand political uprisings, scholars have explored the interrelationships between political trust and efficacy built on the Gamson hypothesis (Bandura, 1982; Gamson, 1968, 1971; Hively, 2007; Paige, 1971; Sigelman & Feldman, 1983). The Gamson hypothesis studies the interrelationship between internal political efficacy and political trust and its effects on traditional and protest behaviors. Researchers have elaborated a four-group typology for the Gamson model: Dissidents, Assureds, Alienateds, and Subordinates. The most interesting group, Dissidents, who hold low government trust and high self-efficacy, are more likely to engage in both conventional and radical political activities, from voting to participating in protest marches.

However, a few studies have suggested that because of different types of government, distinct cultures, and the diverse nature of politics, the Gamson hypothesis is not always supported in non-Western countries (Fraser, 1970; Hawkins, Marando, & Taylor, 1971). In authoritarian governments like Egypt, it might be that those low in trust and high in efficacy (Dissidents) would engage in protest activities less than those high in trust and efficacy (Assureds), or it might be that those low in trust and efficacy (Alienateds) would engage in radical mobilization the most because they do not trust the government and are deprived of the ability to participate in the political process (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013).

While several studies have explored the effects of the Gamson hypothesis among democratic countries, particularly the U.S. (Hollander, 1997; Kaase, 1999; Sigelman & Feldman, 1983), there is a remarkable lack of attention to how it works in the Arab world under an authoritarian system. This study therefore looks at Egypt to explore the relationship between the Gamson typology and political behavior in a country under the non-Western authoritarian regime.

This study adds to the existing Gamson model by suggesting that political corruption and political rights might play important roles in the traditional Gamson model. This study employs structural equation modeling (SEM) based on a representative national survey conducted by Afrobarometer in Egypt in 2013. The study examines the following: (a) the influence of newspaper, television news, radio news, and Internet news use on the four Gamson typology groups; (b) the direct effects of the four Gamson groups on political behavior; (c) the indirect effect of the perception of political corruption and rights on political behavior; and (d) the direct effects of perception about political corruption and rights on participation and protest.

This study aims not only to enrich the original model but also to enhance our understanding of the diverse nature of the relationships among the Gamson typology, perception of political system, media use, and political behavior in a non-Western, authoritarian state.

Literature Review

Political System and Media in Egypt

Democratic countries such as the U.S. and Western Europe give individual citizens the power and right to influence how their countries are governed. But in Egypt, one individual or ideology governs the

country. Egypt, a nation with a traditionally authoritarian regime, underwent political liberalization under Muhammad Anwar el-Sadat in the mid-1970s and then under Mubarak through the early 1990s. Nevertheless, the revolutionary impulse declined and was replaced by a narrower concern with self-maintenance of the ruling party. This led to a partial and uneven political reform in Egypt (Wickham, 2002). Egypt reverted to authoritarian rule with few democratic gains, and it was ranked 138 of 165 independent states and two territories in the Democracy Index released by *The Economist* Intelligence Unit (2015).

However, scholars have pointed out that the pace of change of the Egyptian media landscape has been much faster than the one in the political realm (Khamis, 2011). Newly emerging pluralistic media outlets, including both oppositional media and social media, create a divide between official spheres presented by mainstream media and popular spheres. The discrepancy has been even more significant during political upheaval. Egyptian alternative media have been credited with playing a vital role in the spread of the Arab Spring across borders and bringing people together on the streets (Lim, 2012).

While the public openly discussed politically sensitive subjects and expressed dissidence on social media and satellite TV (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012), El Issawi (2014) has argued that "the Egyptian media revolution has not happened. The complexity of the political transition has overshadowed the debates on reforming traditional media" (p. 9). She noted that Egyptian journalists in mainstream media have not gained their own independence from the political sphere.

In the Arab world with an authoritarian regime, political participation is limited in range and manipulative in nature (Hinnebusch, 1983). It has been found that the voter turnout in Egypt remained low (Leeson, 2008). People who were illiterate were more vulnerable to intimidation by state authorities (Blaydes, 2006) as they were twice as likely to vote as those who could read. As for the nature of protest, studies indicate that in democratic regimes, people protest peacefully with meticulous planning (Daubert & Moran, 1985). However, protests taking place in authoritarian regimes such as Egypt feature violent and radical characteristics. Research has revealed that the roots of protests in Egypt lie in anti-regime grievances concerning corruption, oppressive government, growing inequalities, and looming unemployment (Lim, 2012).

Given the distinctive properties of the political regime and media landscape in Egypt, it is intriguing to examine the mechanisms of political activities—traditional political participation as well as protest participation in this particular context. The Gamson hypothesis, which highlights the role of political trust and self-efficacy in shaping political activity, serves as an appropriate theoretical framework to investigate participation and protest in Egypt.

The Gamson Hypothesis Model

Political scientists in the 1960s and early 1970s were puzzled why the period saw an explosion in protests for civil and women's rights and against the Vietnam War at a time when voting and traditional political participation declined (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). They had long associated low levels of trust with individuals being alienated and apathetic (Citrin, 1974; Miller, 1974). However, sociologist William

Gamson (1968, 1971) seemed to solve this mystery. He argued that rather than weakening the political system, political distrust could increase protest activities when coupled with high levels of internal efficacy, the belief one can influence the political system.

Gamson argued that citizens who distrust the government yet have high levels of political self-efficacy (Dissidents) are angered by the actions of the government and believe they have the power to change the political system. Therefore, Dissidents are likely to engage in protest behaviors to bring about change to the system.

Other researchers, building on Gamson's findings, have explored other combinations of trust and internal efficacy. If low trust and high efficacy lead people to engage in protest activities, then those high in both trust and self-efficacy should participate in more traditional behaviors, such as voting or working to elect a politician. They trust politicians and believe that working on their behalf can influence the political process (Bandura, 1982; Chan, 2016; Hively, 2007; Paige, 1971; Sigelman & Feldman, 1983). Other combinations of trust and self-efficacy, however, will not lead to conventional political activities. Those who are Alienateds (low in trust and low in self-efficacy) withdraw from politics. Those who do not trust the political system and believe they have no power to influence it express feelings of apathy and hopelessness and therefore do not participate in the political process (Sigelman & Feldman, 1983). Subordinates, those high in trust and low in self-efficacy, do not actively participate in either traditional or protest behaviors because they trust the government to do what is right and therefore see no need to try to influence government action (Bandura, 1982; Paige, 1971). All these studies have examined the Gamson hypothesis in a U.S. context, except Sigelman and Feldman's work based in Canada and five European countries. No studies in this vein have directly tested it outside of Western democracies, particularly in authoritarian countries, to see if high levels of trust and efficacy lead to more traditional political participation and whether low levels of trust and high levels of efficacy mobilize people to engage in protest behaviors as they do in the West.

Studies have suggested that high efficacy and low trust may lead to more traditional forms of protest, such as marches or signing petitions. Low trust and self-efficacy may promote more violent types of protests (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). In the authoritarian nations, where citizens are limited in the degree they can participate in the political system, they may rely on protests to bring pressure on governments to redress their demands (Chang & Chyi, 2009).

RQ1: Are Egyptian citizens more likely to be Assureds, Dissidents, Alienateds, or Subordinates?

RQ2: How do Assureds, Dissidents, Alienateds, and Subordinates in Egypt differ in terms of demographics, media use, and political activity?

The Gamson Hypothesis and Media Use

Only a few studies have explored the influence of traditional media use on the four groups identified by Gamson. Researchers have assumed that because trust in traditional media is linked to trust in government (Avery, 2009; Lee, 2005) and typically to high efficacy (Ha et al., 2013; Kenski & Stroud,

2006) that traditional media users should be Assureds (Johnson & Kaye, 2013; Johnson, Kaye, & Kim, 2010). However, results have been mixed. Johnson and Kaye (2013) found considerable support for the Gamson hypothesis with reliance on both broadcast TV news and newspapers strongly linked to being Assured and negatively related to being Dissident. Cable TV news use was unrelated to being either Dissident or Assured. An earlier study found the opposite: Reliance on online newspaper sites and broadcast news sites was not linked to being Assured or Dissident, whereas reliance on cable news sites led to being Assured and negatively related to being Dissident (Johnson et al., 2010). Given talk radio may attract those who are disenchanted with the government such as dissidents, Hollander (1997) examined the effects of talk radio on the Gamson hypothesis and found that listening to talk radio predicted being Dissident and also predicted being Assured and Alienated.

But traditional media may have a different relationship with the Gamson typology in the Arab world. Political trust is strongly linked to confidence in government. Therefore, trust in Egypt's authoritarian government means support for the status quo rather than democratic change (Jamal, 2007). While authoritarian countries try to boost trust in the legitimacy of government through either coercion or patronage (Sztompka, 1999), trust in government is typically lower in authoritarian countries because of perceived widespread corruption, abuse of power, and lack of tolerance of dissent; in general, the institutions are less effective in securing and protecting citizen interests (Jamal, 2007).

If levels of political trust are linked to confidence in government, then, logically, media controlled by the state such as radio, newspapers, and domestic TV should be linked to increased political trust among those with high confidence in the government. This seems to be true for television, as viewing state-run television stations increased support for the government and reduced support for rebels. However, other scholars have suggested it is not reliance on traditional media, but credibility that makes a difference. For instance, those who judge government-controlled media, including newspapers, radio, and television, as credible news sources, are more likely to trust the government (Martin, 2011). Based on the discussion above, this study aims to explore the following hypothesis and research question:

H1: Use of newspapers, television, and radio news should be positively associated with groups high in trust (Assureds and Subordinates) and negatively associated with groups low in trust (Dissidents and Alienateds).

The Gamson Hypothesis and the Internet

The Internet serves as an illuminating venue to study the Gamson hypothesis because it is a place of paradoxes. Several studies have shown that the Internet helps mobilize individuals to work on behalf of a cause (Bennett, Breunig, & Givens, 2008; Dimitrova, Shehata, Stromback, & Nord, 2011). Because the Internet allows users for considerable control, it enables them to look only at political news that supports their interests or to avoid news altogether (Prior, 2007). Furthermore, the Internet allows political actions to occur and reduces the time and effort to conduct political business such as contributing money, signing a petition, or contacting a political official (Bimber, 2003). But the Internet is also a haven for those opposed to government policies and for those who would try to bring about the violent overthrow of the government (Johnson & Kaye, 2013). Because the Internet is populated with those who

both support and oppose the government, Internet use may lead to being Assured or Dissident.

Previous Gamson studies have suggested that the Internet plays a negative role as reliance on political websites is negatively related to being Assured, and Assureds are less likely to report visiting political websites (Johnson & Kaye, 2013; Johnson et al., 2010). In the Arab context, scholars have claimed the Internet serves as a conduit for people to express their views, disclose information authorities are trying to hide, demand a greater say in politics, and effectively mobilize when necessary (Khamis, 2011).

Several researchers credited social media, with its low entry costs and ability to turn information consumers into producers, with playing a pivotal role in the Arab Spring (Castells, 2012; Howard & Hussain, 2013). Other scholars are not as convinced the Internet has fundamentally shifted life in Egypt and other Arab countries. Less than half of Egyptians are online ("Internet World Stats," 2016), and only 8% of Egyptian adults relied on Facebook or Internet news sites for information about the Arab Spring (International Republican Institute, 2011). Hamdy (2009) has questioned whether or not individuals express their true opinions online for fear the government will be able to trace them. Also, while the Internet may allow activists to be more effectively mobilized, it can also be used as a tool by the government to delay or suppress social movements (Lynch, 2011).

Studies of how the Internet influences political efficacy suggested that Internet use in general and use of specific components such as e-mail messages were unrelated to political efficacy in Egypt, Kuwait, and Tunisia (Al-Kandari & Hasanen, 2012; Breuer & Groshek, 2014). Social media did prove a strong predictor of Tunisian efficacy after its revolution (Breuer & Groshek, 2014). While demonstrators in the Arab Spring were more likely than onlookers to use Facebook/Twitter and news websites to get information about protests, after controlling for other factors, including trust in government, only reading text messages remained as a predictor of actually participating in the protests (Brym, Godbout, Hoffbauer, Menard, & Zhang, 2014). Based on conflicting evidences about the relationship of the Internet with political trust and efficacy, this study addresses the following research question:

RQ3: What is the relationship between Internet use and the Gamson typology?

The Gamson Hypothesis and Political Corruption

While Gamson (1968, 1971) focused on the relationship between political efficacy and trust, he contended that trust and efficacy were not the only factors that affect how people fit within the typology; he noted that characteristics such as interest in politics and knowledge of the political system are also influential. In regard to finding other potentially influential characteristics in the Gamson typology, there has been a growing body of literature portraying political, institutional, and social trust as both the cause and effect of corruption (Morris & Klesner, 2010). The clearest definition of political corruption is stated by Nye (1967), who said that a political act is corrupt when it deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding wealth or status gains or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence.

Some scholars pointed to the lack of trust in others and in political institutions as a major causal component underlying the individual's perception of corruption, whereas others found clear evidence that corruption fostered low levels of political trust and eroded regime legitimacy (Bunce, 2000). The idea that corruption has a negative relationship with trust is open to both theoretical and empirical challenges. Anderson and Tverdova (2003) argued that a country's political culture shaped people's perception of corruption and could diminish or eliminate the relationship.

If a country's culture predisposes people to view corruption as an acceptable practice and relatively benign, measures of corruption may not coincide with how people in different cultural settings respond to corrupt practices. With this premise, higher levels of corruption do not always associate with distrust toward government. Some scholars viewed corruption as beneficial for economic growth (Leff, 1964). Based on the discussion above, this study posits a possible relationship of the Gamson typology with political corruption.

RQ4: How do Assureds, Dissidents, Subordinates, and Alienateds differ in terms of attitudes toward political corruption?

The Gamson Hypothesis and Political Rights

Another characteristic, which received remarkably little attention despite its possibly influential role in the Gamson hypothesis, is the notion of political rights. Political rights exist to the extent that the national government is accountable to the general population, and each individual is entitled to participate in politics directly or through representatives (Bollen, 1986). The term *political rights* encompasses the traditional human rights such as life, liberty, security of person, and freedom of expression (MacMillan, 1986). Democracy is closely related to political rights in that strong political rights indicate substantial political power for citizens (MacMillan, 1986). When political rights are present, the government derives its authority from the population. The dominant mechanism for implementing these rights has been elections. Other mechanisms include freedom of speech without fear of repression or joining a political organization.

A substantial number of political communication studies view democracy in terms of the existence of political rights, in particular, the right to vote (BenYishay & Betancourt, 2014; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000). When the level of democracy is low, political rights are expected to be low, and thus a low voter turnout. However, political rights may not be the sole indicator of political participation. In some nondemocratic and democratizing countries, high voter participation does not necessarily indicate the public's widespread control of government (Lerner, 1968). In fact, because many countries have mandatory voting laws, high voter turnout may indicate that the elite have considerable political power over the nonelite (Bollen, 1980).

Thus, authoritarian countries with a poor record on political rights might have high voter turnout figures. It is unclear the relationship between how Egyptians their political rights and political participation. Based on the discussion above, this study posits a question toward the possible relationship of the Gamson typology with political rights.

RQ5: *How do Assureds, Dissidents, Subordinates, and Alienateds differ in terms of attitudes toward political rights?*

Method

This study tests the Gamson hypothesis based on the survey data in Egypt collected by Arabbarometer in 2013. Arab Democracy Barometer is a nonpartisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues in more than 10 countries in the Arabic world. Data for our study were from the third wave of Arab Democracy Barometer fielded from 2012–2014 in Egypt made publicly available in the fall of 2014.

The sample size for our study was 1,200 participants, with an equal percentage of male and female participants (50.3% female). About 9.4% of the survey participants were 21 years old or younger, 34% were between 22 and 34, 20.6% were between 35 and 44, 17.5% were between 45 and 54, 13.3% were between 55 and 64, and 5.3% were aged 65 or older. In terms of highest level of education, 28.5% of the participants had no formal schooling, 14.4% had informal or some primary schooling, 40.3% had high school education, and 16.8% had a college/university degree.

The Gamson Typology

This study emphasizes internal efficacy and political trust, which are the political attitudes that define the Gamson typology including Assureds, Dissidents, Subordinates, and Alienateds.

Internal efficacy

The survey included one item that measured internal efficacy based on a 5-point scale (from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*). Respondents were asked to assess their agreement with the following statement: Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what is going on ($M = 2.19$, $SD = 1.13$).

Political trust

Based on a 4-point scale (from *not at all* to *a lot*), the survey assessed respondents' levels of political trust in the following 11 institutions: the president, parliament, electoral commission, tax department, local government council, ruling party, opposition political parties, police, the army, courts of law, and the Constitution Drafting committee. Factor analysis yielded one distinctively meaningful factor, which enabled us to combine the 11 items into one index ($M = 1.11$, $SD = 0.63$, Cronbach's $\alpha = .85$).

The trust and efficacy measures were next grouped into high and low ones, respectively. Here we used the mean score of trust 1.12 to define the two groups, High Trust (higher than 1.12) and Low Trust (lower than 1.12). Next, we used the mean score of self-efficacy 2.15 to identify the High Self-efficacy and Low Self-efficacy groups.

The internal efficacy and political trust indices were then cross-tabulated to create a four-group typology. Table 1 summarizes the distribution of the four groups and illustrates that the majority of the participants in the survey were Alienateds (39.3%) and Subordinates (33.4%).

Table 1. The Distribution of Four Groups Based on the Gamson Hypothesis.

Group	Frequency (percentage)
Assureds	$n = 107$ (12.8%)
Dissidents	$n = 121$ (14.5%)
Subordinates	$n = 279$ (33.4%)
Alienateds	$n = 328$ (39.3%)

Political rights

The political rights variable was measured by three items based on a 4-point scale (from *not free at all* to *completely free*), including "how free are you to say what you think," "how free are you to join any political organization you want," and "how free are you to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured." Factor analysis yielded one distinctively meaningful factor, which enabled us to combine the three items into one index: political rights ($M = 3.25$, $SD = 0.96$, Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.93$).

Political corruption

The survey measured the public's perception of the levels of political corruption based on a 4-point scale (from *none* to *all of them*) for the following seven groups: the president and officials in his office, members of parliament, government officials, the police, tax officials like Ministry of Finance officials or local government tax collectors, judges and magistrates, along with members of the Constitution Drafting committee. Factor analysis yielded one distinctively meaningful factor, which enabled us to combine the seven items into one index: political corruption ($M = 1.44$, $SD = 0.60$, Cronbach's $\alpha = .83$).

Political Activities: Conventional Versus Protest Participation

Conventional political participation

The survey measured conventional political participation by three items: attending a community meeting, getting together with others to raise an issue, and voting behavior. We reduced them to binary variables to keep consistency and then combined the three items into one index: conventional political participation ($M = 1.62$, $SD = 0.28$, Cronbach's $\alpha = .54$).

Protest participation

The survey measured protest participation by using one item, which is whether the respondent had attended a demonstration or protest march in the last 12 months ($M = .91$, $SD = 0.29$).

Analysis of the Conceptual Model

We used the structural equation modeling program AMOS (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999) to investigate the relationship among political trust, self-efficacy, political corruption, government’s protection of citizens’ rights, political participation, and protest in Egypt. Pasek, Feldman, Romer, and Jamieson (2008) noted that AMOS allows performing a maximum likelihood analysis on the relationship between a predictor, such as Alienateds, and a latent variable, such as protest. Therefore, we used AMOS to examine whether political trust and self-efficacy were related to citizens’ opinions concerning political corruption and government’s protection of citizens’ rights as well as their political and protest participation. As shown in Figure 1, we used AMOS to evaluate the entire SEM. The endogenous variables in the model are political corruption, protecting citizens’ rights, political participation, and protest; the exogenous variables are the Assureds, Dissidents, Subordinates, and Alienateds. In this model, we controlled for political corruption and protecting citizens’ rights to determine direct and mediating effects of Assureds, Dissidents, Subordinates, and Alienateds on political participation and protest.




Figure 1. The conceptual model.

Results

Media News Use and Gamson Groups

The results showed that Dissidents and Assureds were more likely than Subordinates and Alienateds to use the Internet and newspapers to obtain news. As indicated in Table 2, the analysis of variance showed significant difference in Internet use to get news, $F(3, 825) = 17.70, p < .001$. Tukey's post hoc test illustrated that Dissidents ($M = 1.68, SD = 1.83$) and Assureds ($M = 1.37, SD = 1.72$) relied significantly more on the Internet to get news than Alienateds ($M = 0.74, SD = 1.45$) and Subordinates ($M = 0.65, SD = 1.34$) did. However, there was no significant difference between Alienateds and Subordinates or between Assureds and Dissidents. An analysis of variance also revealed significant difference in use of newspapers to get news, $F(3, 827) = 14.79, p < .001$. Similarly, Tukey's post hoc test showed that Dissidents ($M = 1.82, SD = 1.78$) and Assureds ($M = 1.77, SD = 1.58$) relied significantly more on newspapers to get news than Alienateds ($M = 0.92, SD = 1.44$) and Subordinates ($M = 1.14, SD = 1.58$) did. However, there was no significant difference between Alienateds and Subordinates or between Assureds and Dissidents. Moreover, there was no significant difference between the four groups in news consumption from television or radio. This study found limited support for Hypothesis 1. Newspaper use was linked to Assureds, but not to Subordinates. Broadcast news and radio news were not linked to any of the Gamson groups. In answer to Research Question 3, Dissidents and Assureds were the two groups most linked to Internet use.

Table 2. Differences Among the Four Gamson Categories in Terms of Media News Use.

Media news use	Assureds	Dissidents	Subordinates	Alienateds	η^2
Internet news use***	1.37 ($SD = 1.72$)	1.68 ($SD = 1.83$)	0.65 ($SD = 1.34$)	0.74 ($SD = 1.45$)	.06
Newspapers news use***	1.77 ($SD = 1.58$)	1.82 ($SD = 1.78$)	1.14 ($SD = 1.58$)	0.92 ($SD = 1.44$)	.05
Television news use	3.83 ($SD = 0.54$)	3.86 ($SD = 0.65$)	3.75 ($SD = 0.78$)	3.81 ($SD = 0.66$)	.00
Radio news use	1.56 ($SD = 1.78$)	1.17 ($SD = 1.62$)	1.08 ($SD = 1.58$)	1.30 ($SD = 1.70$)	.01

Note. Mean range: never (0)–every day (4). * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Levels of Conventional Political Participation and Protest Participation

A chi-square test of independence showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the level of conventional political participation among the four groups, $\chi^2(9, N = 826) = 60.34, p < .001$. Specifically, Alienateds and Subordinates were more likely than Assureds and Dissidents to have low levels of conventional political participation.

A chi-square test of independence showed that there was a statistically significant difference in attending a protest among the four groups, $\chi^2(3, N = 829) = 15.03, p < .01$. The results showed Alienateds and Subordinates were less likely to attend a demonstration or protest march than were Assureds and Dissidents.

Interest in Public Affairs

The analysis of variance showed that there were significant differences in interest in public affairs, $F(3, 831) = 6.47, p < .001$. Analyses using Tukey's post hoc test illustrated that Assureds ($M = 2.47, SD = 0.69$) were significantly more interested in public affairs than Alienateds ($M = 2.13, SD = 0.78$) and Subordinates ($M = 2.15, SD = 0.71$). However, there was no significant difference between Dissidents and the other three groups.

Political Corruption

To address RQ4, the analysis of variance showed that there was a significant difference among the four groups in terms of perception of political corruption, $F(3, 660) = 29.50, p < .001$. As illustrated in Table 3, analyses using Tukey's post hoc test showed that Dissidents ($M = 1.70, SD = 0.60$) and Alienateds ($M = 1.59, SD = 0.62$) were significantly different from Assureds ($M = 1.36, SD = 0.61$) and Subordinates ($M = 1.17, SD = 0.47$). Dissidents and Alienateds were more likely to think that government officials were involved in corruption than the other two groups. Additionally, Assureds were significantly different from the other three groups, and Subordinates were also significantly different from the other three groups.

Political Rights

To answer RQ5, the analysis of variance revealed a significant difference among the groups in terms of perception of political rights, $F(3, 789) = 6.27, p < .001$. Analyses conducted using Tukey's post hoc test showed that Alienateds ($M = 3.07, SD = 0.97$) were significantly different from Assureds ($M = 3.47, SD = 0.82$) and Subordinates ($M = 3.33, SD = 0.96$). Alienateds were more likely to perceive that they have less freedom than were Assureds and Subordinates. Additionally, Dissidents were not significantly different from the other three groups.

SEM Modeling

Model A was this study's SEM model. Table 4 shows the results of the SEMs in Egypt that tested the effects of trust and self-efficacy by predicting political participation and citizens' perception of political corruption and political rights. The several fit estimates used to assess the adequacy of Model A were satisfactory. These fit estimates are Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Normed Fit Index (NFI), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the ratio of the normed chi-squared statistics to the degrees of freedom for the model (CMIN/DF). CFI values greater than roughly .90 may indicate reasonably good fit of the model (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The NFI is another incremental measure of fit and NFI value above .95 is considered good, between .90 and .95 is marginal, and below .90 is a poor fitting model (Bentler &

Bonett, 1980). The RMSEA considers the error of approximation in the population (Byrne, 2010). An RMSEA value of less than .05 indicates good fit and a value as high as .08 indicates reasonable errors of approximation in the population (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). The CMIN/*df* measures the degree of the model fit with the data and a ratio of 3 or less is an indication that models are a good fit (Kline, 1998).

Table 3. Differences Among the Four Gamson Categories Concerning Attitudes Toward Political and Corruption Issues and Attending Protests.

Measures and items	Assureds	Dissidents	Subordinates	Alienateds	η^2
Levels of conventional political participation***					
High	35 (29.2%)	27 (22.5%)	34 (28.3%)	24 (20.0%)	
Medium	12 (16.9%)	14 (19.7%)	21 (29.6%)	24 (33.8%)	
Low	49 (9.4%)	61 (11.7%)	177 (34.0%)	234 (44.9%)	
None	10 (8.8%)	16 (14.0%)	45 (39.5%)	43 (37.7%)	
Attended a protest march**					
Yes	17 (20.2%)	20 (23.8%)	26 (31.0%)	21 (25.0%)	
No	90 (12.1%)	98 (13.2%)	251 (33.7%)	306 (41.1%)	
Interested in public					
affairs*** (mean range: <i>not at all interested</i> [0]– <i>very interested</i> [3])	2.47 (<i>SD</i> = 0.69)	2.30 (<i>SD</i> = 0.78)	2.15 (<i>SD</i> = 0.71)	2.13 (<i>SD</i> = 0.78)	.02
Political corruption***					
(mean range: <i>none</i> [0]– <i>all of them</i> [3])	1.36 (<i>SD</i> = 0.61)	1.70 (<i>SD</i> = 0.60)	1.17 (<i>SD</i> = 0.47)	1.59 (<i>SD</i> = 0.62)	.12
Political rights*** (mean					
range: <i>not at all free</i> [1]– <i>completely free</i> [4])	3.47 (<i>SD</i> = 0.82)	3.14 (<i>SD</i> = 1.07)	3.33 (<i>SD</i> = 0.96)	3.07 (<i>SD</i> = 0.97)	.02

Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

**Table 4. Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Model A
(Significant Differences Between the Four Trust/Self-Efficacy Groups).**

Structural component	Model A B (SE)
Dependent variable: political rights	
Assureds vs. Dissidents	-0.33 (0.13) [#]
Assureds vs. Alienateds	-0.39 (0.11) [*]
Alienateds vs. Subordinates	0.26 (0.08) [*]
Dependent variable: political corruption	
Assureds vs. Subordinates	-0.19 (0.07) ^o
Assureds vs. Dissidents	0.33 (0.08) [*]
Assureds vs. Alienateds	0.22 (0.07) ^o
Dissidents vs. Subordinates	-0.53 (0.07) [*]
Subordinates vs. Alienateds	0.41 (0.05) [*]

Note. [#] $p < .05$; ^o $p < .01$; ^{*} $p < .001$.

For Model A, the CFI was 1.00, the NFI was $>.99$, the RMSEA was $.00$, and the CMIN/DF was 0.69 . The values of these fit estimates indicate that Model A fits the data well. In this model, we included a correlation between the error terms of political corruption and protecting citizens' rights, implying that there is a synchronous correlation between the two variables, but with no causal effects. This is similar to what other researchers did (Eveland, Hayes, Shah, & Kwak, 2005) by connecting the error terms of variables that are synchronously correlated, but with no causal effects.

With regard to significant causal paths in Egypt, the model (see Table 4) reveals significant differences between Assureds, Dissidents, Subordinates, and Alienateds in predicting political participation citizens' perception of political corruption and political rights. For instance, the Assureds are more likely to participate in political activities than Subordinates ($B = 0.16$, $SE = 0.03$) and Alienateds ($B = 0.18$, $SE = 0.03$). Additionally, Dissidents are more likely to participate in politics than Subordinates ($B = 0.09$, $SE = 0.03$) and Alienateds ($B = 0.11$, $SE = 0.03$). However, there is no significant difference between Subordinates and Alienateds in predicting political participation.

The model shows that there are also significant differences between Assureds, Dissidents, Subordinates, and Alienateds in predicting citizens' perception of political rights. For example, Assureds have significantly lower scores than Dissidents and Alienateds ($B = 0.33$, $SE = 0.13$) and Subordinates ($B = 0.39$, $SE = 0.11$), respectively. Also, Subordinates have significantly lower scores than Alienateds ($B = 0.26$, $SE = 0.08$). However, the model illustrates that there is no significant difference between Subordinates and Dissidents in predicting citizens' perception of political rights.

Regarding perception of political corruption, the model shows that there are significant differences between Assureds, Dissidents, Subordinates, and Alienateds in predicting political corruption. For instance, Assureds have significantly lower scores than Subordinates ($B = 0.19$, $SE = 0.07$) and significantly higher ones than Dissidents ($B = 0.33$, $SE = 0.08$) and Alienateds ($B = 0.22$, $SE = 0.07$).

Also, Subordinates have significantly higher scores than Dissidents ($B = 0.53$, $SE = 0.07$) and significantly lower ones than Alienateds ($B = 0.41$, $SE = 0.05$).

Concerning political behavior, the model shows that there are no significant direct paths between group membership (i.e., Assureds, Dissidents, Subordinates, and Alienateds) and protest participation. Furthermore, political participation significantly predicts protest ($B = 0.46$, $SE = 0.03$), but there is no significant direct path between political rights and political participation.

Discussion

Studies of Western democracies demonstrate that Assureds and Dissidents are the dominant groups who have the ability to influence the government. To put it another way, whether they channel their activities into traditional political behaviors or protests depends on the degree of their trust in the government (Johnson & Kaye, 2013; Johnson et al., 2010; Sigelman & Feldman, 1983). But in an authoritarian country such as Egypt, people normally have little room to influence government decisions. The result shows that almost three-quarters of Egyptians were identified as either Alienateds or Subordinates. Only a few categorized themselves as Assureds, who were high in both trust and efficacy. The low efficacy scores would prove problematic in a democracy where politicians depend on citizens to engage in campaign activities and come out to vote. But low trust simply reflects the reality in a country like Egypt, the government of which is run by a small group of elites.

Media use measures help to explain the differences among the four groups in Gamson's typology. Dissidents and Assureds tended to use the Internet and newspapers to attain news while Alienateds and Subordinates were more likely to consume news on television and radio. This result echoes with our finding on the educational divide among groups. It is feasible to argue that as compared with television and radio, consuming news on the Internet and newspaper requires higher literacy or educational levels. Therefore, Dissidents and Assureds, who have a higher level of education, are more likely to consume news via the Internet and newspapers than are the other two groups.

In addition, the political measures further draw a line between the four groups. As for political behavior, the finding shows that compared with Alienateds and Subordinates, Assureds and Dissidents were more likely to attend both conventional political participation and protest. On the one hand, this supports earlier findings on Assureds as a group with interest in conventional politics and Dissidents as one devoting themselves in protest. On the other hand, the finding runs counter to studies that suggested Assureds avoided protest behaviors and Dissidents did not engage in traditional political activities (Johnson & Kaye, 2013).

The congruence between Assureds and Dissidents in political behavior can be explained by the particular political system in Egypt. With regard to political attitudes, Assureds demonstrated strongest interest in public affairs among the four groups, which coincides with previous research (Johnson & Kaye, 2013; Johnson et al., 2010). Dissidents and Alienateds perceived higher level of corruption among government officials while Assureds and Subordinates gave higher evaluation on government's protection of citizens' rights.

Overall, results for Assureds in Egypt largely parallel most of what has been found in the United States (Johnson & Kaye, 2013). Assureds, who trust government and believe they can influence it, are well-educated newspaper readers with a high interest in public affairs, and in turn they participate in conventional political activities. Unlike their counterpart in the United States, Egyptian Assureds are also likely to engage in political protests. When the knowledgeable and informative Egyptian Assureds find their government in a wrong condition, they would extend their political repertoire from conventional participation to protest.

In the United States, Dissidents and Assureds are largely mirror opposites, but they greatly resemble each other in Egypt. Both Assureds and Dissidents have higher interest in public affairs than Alienateds and Subordinates; however, the difference between Assureds and Dissidents is not significant. Dissidents and Assureds are similar, because they both have high efficacy, believing they have the ability to change the system. Dissidents may have much lower trust in the government, but they are channeling their efforts into peaceful means to democratize the country.

This study is also similar to American studies in that the Alienateds are most unplugged from the political system. More than eight in 10 said they engaged in few if any conventional political activities but also were least likely to engage in protest activities. They are lowest in newspaper use probably because they are the least literate. The Alienateds are the most likely to believe the government fails to protect their political rights, which suggests they consider themselves disenfranchised. Other studies in authoritarian systems suggest it is the Alienateds who might be most likely to engage in violent protest to gain their rights because they do not trust the government and are denied participation in the political process (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). This study only had a measure of peaceful protests, so this could not be directly tested.

As the first study to situate the Gamson hypothesis in Egypt, this study expands on it by including political corruption and political rights in the model. This study, then, clarifies the mechanism of trust and efficacy on political activities including conventional political participation and protest participation in Egypt. With regard to the four groups in predicting citizens' perception about political corruption and political rights, it reveals that it is Assureds who perceive a higher political corruption level than the other groups, and, inversely, it is also Assureds who perceive less protection by the government. As past research pointed out, Assureds upheld higher political interest and more political knowledge (Johnson & Kaye, 2013; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). In this sense, we conclude that Assureds with adequate political knowledge are more aware of corruption and the feeling of deprivation of political rights from the government.

Last, the valid path from conventional political participation to protest participation in Egypt provides valuable empirical evidences to the everlasting debate on whether conventional political participation leads to radical participation such as protest and also whether the relationship is negative or positive (Bean, 1991; Muller, 1977). This study showcases a positive causal relation between conventional and radical participation in authoritarian regimes such as Egypt, indicating that conventional political participation might serve to prepare people with political resources as well as political opportunities to participate in protest.

Conclusion

This study is the first one to situate the Gamson hypothesis in a country outside the West that is working toward democratization. It also adds political corruption and political rights as possible mediating variables. The study modeled the paths through Gamson typology to both attitudinal and behavioral variables.

It clarifies the working mechanism from the Gamson hypothesis to both conventional political activity and protest behaviors in an authoritarian country. Dissidents are more likely to engage in conventional political activities, which goes against the Gamson hypothesis. High efficacy regardless of the level of trust predicts conventional activities, and no group is significantly related to protest participation.

What is interesting in the case of Egypt is that the Alienateds, those who are denied the right to participate and lack trust in government, are the ones more likely to engage in protest activities. This is in line with previous studies conducted in other parts of the world (Breuer & Groshek, 2014; Chang & Chyi, 2009; Hooghe & Marien, 2012).

Limitation and Suggestion for Future Studies

One of the main drawbacks of this study is that it does not examine each of the four typologies separately in predicting perception toward political corruption, political rights, and political behavior, including conventional political participation and protest participation. Instead, the study compared two of them each in the paths, thus making it difficult to clarify the individual mechanism of the Dissidents, Assureds, Subordinates, and Alienateds in the study's model.

This study yields that none of the Gamson groups predicts protest behavior. The results for protest may be hampered by the weak protest measure that only asked about whether or not someone protested in the last year and failed to distinguish between more conventional protest activities (e.g., a protest march) and more violent political activities.

Furthermore, the survey that this study relies on only asked about Internet use in general. Previous studies suggested that social and mobile media proved key to social movements in the Arab Spring (Castells, 2012; Dalacoura, 2012; Howard & Hussain, 2013; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012). Therefore, future studies should include more refined measures of Internet use by differentiating platforms (e.g., online news sites, government sites, social network sites, and mobile application) and also content (e.g., news, blogs, advocate pages, etc.). Also, future studies may examine specific television channels and radio stations to distinguish between domestic and satellite stations. More studies are needed to explore the Gamson hypothesis in other Middle Eastern nations and beyond, to further our understanding in political communication.

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