International Journal of Communication 20(2026) Blaming News Media for Fake News
Blaming News Media for Fake News: The Role of Elite Media Discourse and Partisans’ Media Perception in Perceived Fake News Exposure and Attribution
Mihye Seo[1]
Sungkyunkwan University, Korea
Ki Deuk Hyun
Akita International University, Japan
Gunho Lee
Ewha Womans University, Korea
This study examines how political and media perceptions shape perceived exposure to fake news in news media and the attribution of fake news to news media in South Korea, where progressive elites more often criticize news media bias and raise fake news concerns. Survey analyses demonstrate two routes linking elite discourse to blaming the news media. A cue-taking route from elites’ recent fake news discourse shows that greater news consumption among progressives is associated with higher perceived exposure to fake news in news media, which in turn is positively associated with stronger attribution of fake news problems to news media. A news media perception route indicates progressive voters hold stronger hostile media perceptions, which reduce trust in the news media and, subsequently, increase perceived exposure to fake news and the attributions of fake news to the news media. The findings imply elites’ power in shaping public fake news perceptions.
Keywords: fake news, media trust, hostile media perception, political ideology, media bias, political elites, South Korea
Mihye Seo: [email protected]
Ki Deuk Hyun: [email protected]
Gunho Lee: [email protected]
Date submitted: 2026-02-18
To address this research gap, this study explores factors that may affect people’s perceptions of exposure to fake news in the news media and the attribution of fake news problems to the news media. The politicization of fake news debates can undermine trust in and the democratic function of news media. Understanding the mechanism by which the public associates fake news with news media is necessary to assess whether people blame the news media, even though attacks on the media lack substantive evidence. This study can also help address the problem of fake news while maintaining the essential social roles of news media.
Given the impacts of partisan elite discourse on their supporters’ perceptions about news media in general (Ladd, 2012; Watts et al., 1999) and fake news specifically (Tong et al., 2020; Van Duyn & Collier, 2019), we suggest individuals’ political orientations and media perceptions play a key role in either facilitating or suppressing fake news exposure perception and blame attribution. Prior research has demonstrated that views of general news media and fake news can vary by partisanship and ideology. For example, in the United States, conservatives tend to perceive strong news media bias and less trust in news media (Knight Foundation, 2018; Watts et al., 1999), presumably because of conservative leaders’ negative rhetoric about news media.
In particular, we expect that elites’ communication about news media can affect people’s views about fake news through two distinct routes. First, partisan elites’ direct accusations of fake news would promote their followers’ associations of fake news problems with news media. Partisan elites’ accusations are not merely extensions of general media criticism. Such issue-specific elite cues can directly shape how citizens interpret their media experiences, leading politically aligned audiences to perceive that they encounter fake news in the news media and to attribute responsibility for it to the news media as an institution. Second, beyond these direct associations, partisan leaders’ long-standing critical discourse about news media can indirectly shape perceptions of fake news by fostering hostility toward the media and eroding media trust. This indirect effect helps explain why strong partisans may be especially receptive to such accusations and more likely to interpret news content as fake news.
We test our theses using survey data collected in South Korea, where leaders from two competing partisan camps—progressive and conservative—offer contrasting discourse about news media and fake news. Progressive leaders have long accused mainstream Korean news media of having a conservative bias (Hyun & Seo, 2021; Kim, 2016; Roh Moo-hyun Foundation, 2012). More recently, they have also raised the issue about problems of fake news and initiated legislation in the form of an anti-fake news law, whereas conservative elites opposed the attempts (Choe, 2018). We expect that rival partisan elites’ contrasting approaches to news media and fake news issues affect their supporters’ perceptions of fake news exposure from news media as well as their blame attribution.
More particularly, because of the influence of more direct progressive elites’ fake news discourse, we predict the use of news media that deliver partisan views on fake news issues would be positively related to fake news perceptions and blame attribution and that this relationship would be stronger among progressive voters in Korea. Further, we predict that progressive voters in Korea have stronger perceptions of news media bias against their positions, which relate to news media distrust, leading to greater perceptions of fake news exposure from, and blame attribution to, news media.
News Media System and Discourse in South Korea
Korea has a partisan news media system that reflects and reproduces the political divide between progressive and conservative forces. News outlets tend to show ideological and partisan affinity for one of the two major parties when covering political events and issues (Han, 2018). Despite such a political parallelism, it is widely recognized that conservative media have a stronger position than liberal outlets in the media market and public sphere (Hyun & Seo, 2021; Rhee et al., 2011). The top three national newspapers with the highest circulation are conservative in their editorial stance. Among the four cable TV channels affiliated with major newspapers, only one (JTBC) is regarded as progressive. The origin of the asymmetry in power balance dates back to the period of democratization from the late 1980s. During that period, mainstream newspapers began to lean toward the conservative side of politics, seemingly to take advantage of a social structure dominated by the conservative political and business establishment, inherited from the earlier authoritarian regimes (Rhee, 2005; Shin, 2016).
The progressive camp reacted to the imbalance, claiming conservative mainstream media was serving the interests of an antidemocratic, conservative force (Roh Moo-hyun Foundation, 2012). Such criticism is echoed in the prevalent discourse that accuses the press of being members and advocates of the conservative cartel (Shin et al., 2021). The progressive government that ruled between 1998 and 2007 attempted press reform, which sparked strong resistance from conservative news media. Progressive opinion leaders participated in the so-called war with the press, initiating an anticonservative press campaign and encouraging the cancellation of conservative newspapers (Kim, 2016). The recent partisan debates over the anti-fake news bill proposed by the progressive government can be understood in the context of long-standing tensions and conflicts between the progressive camp and the conservative mainstream news media.
Discourse on and Public Perceptions of Fake News
Political elites can affect people’s perceptions of fake news by linking it with mainstream news media. Political leaders from different countries have labeled critical news reports and media as fake news (Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2019; Farhall et al., 2019). Studies suggest that their strategic use of the term can cause negative evaluations of news media. Subjects exposed to politicians’ fake news discourse in experiments reported lower news media trust (Van Duyn & Collier, 2019), and the negative effect on media trust was stronger when politicians used the term (Collier & Van Duyn, 2023). Notably, different partisan groups can have varying levels of association of fake news with news media, depending on the extent of their in-group leaders’ communication about fake news. In the United States, for example, President Trump has often labeled critical news reports and mainstream media as fake news as an extension of conservative elites’ media bias attacks (Lischka, 2019; Meeks, 2020). Accordingly, Trump supporters and Republicans are more likely than others to believe mainstream news media fabricated stories about Trump (Guess et al., 2017). Conservatives also blamed the news media for fake news more often than liberals and independents (Tong et al., 2020).
The influence of elite fake news rhetoric on public perceptions can be explained by cue-taking tendency and associative priming. As people often form opinions and attitudes by relying on cues from in-group leaders (Cohen, 2003; Zaller, 1992), partisan elites’ associations of fake news with news media can shape their followers’ perceptions of fake news (Tong et al., 2020). Politicians’ mentions of fake news can heighten people’s concerns about it without actual exposure (Van Duyn & Collier, 2019). When primed with the term “fake news,” American conservatives were more likely to cite mainstream news media, presumably because their in-group leaders mention it more frequently (van der Linden et al., 2020). To summarize, when in-group partisan elites frequently mention fake news problems, the term may become more accessible to followers in evaluating news media and promote the association between fake news and news media.
In Korea, progressive leaders have actively made accusations of fake news and proposed a bill to counteract it. They promoted the bill as a measure to combat the reporting of deliberately and grossly negligently false information. Conservative elites countered the liberal camp’s attempts, arguing that the bill is intended to silence critical news media and that it harms freedom of the press (Choe, 2018). The progressive leaders’ frequent mentions of fake news can increase their supporters’ association of fake news with the news media. On the other hand, conservative audiences’ exposure to in-group political leaders’ positions against the bill would seem to hamper the association. Therefore, the first hypothesis is:
H1: Progressives are more likely than conservatives to (a) perceive fake news from news media and (b) attribute it to news media.
Elite cues about fake news are unlikely to operate uniformly among citizens. Their influence depends on opportunities to encounter such cues. News media serve as a major source of information to receive elite cues and arguments. Individuals who consume more news are more likely to encounter partisan elites’ positions and issue framing and, in turn, to activate their partisan predispositions to form opinions (Dancey & Goren, 2010; Zaller, 1992). When opposing partisan elites take polarized positions about the issue, their supporters tend to align their opinions even more closely with those of their leaders (Druckman et al., 2013).
Fake news debates in Korea represent such polarization, as the major progressive and conservative parties have taken clearly opposing positions. News media regularly reported the progressive side’s concerns about fake news and the partisan confrontation surrounding the legislation of the anti-fake news bill (Choi & Youn, 2022). Partisans who consume more news media should get more exposure to such stark oppositions between the two sides and be more motivated to align their views with in-group elite positions. Partially supporting the moderating function of news media for fake news perceptions, Hyun et al. (2024) found that Korean progressives had stronger hostile and third-person perceptions toward fake news as they consumed news about the fake news bill debates more often. Similarly, news media use may condition the extent to which partisan orientation shapes perceptions of fake news exposure and blame attribution. Taking their in-group leaders’ cues about the issue of fake news from news media, progressives are more likely than conservatives to believe they encounter fake news from news media and attribute fake news problems to mainstream media. Therefore, the following hypothesis is suggested:
H2: Media use moderates the relationships between political ideology and (a) the perceived exposure to fake news from news media, as well as (b) the attribution of the problem of fake news to news media. Specifically, as progressives consume more news, they are more likely than conservatives to perceive fake news from news media and attribute it to mainstream media.
Elite Media Criticism and Public Media Perception
Public opinion research suggests citizens rely on political elites’ communication to form their opinions about social and political issues. Partisan elites’ cues serve as cognitive shortcuts for citizens to make political judgments, and voters align their opinions with the positions held by trusted in-group elites (Cohen, 2003; Zaller, 1992). Such elite leadership in public opinion formation has also been documented in people’s views about news media (Ladd, 2012; Watts et al., 1999). Partisans tend to follow in-group party leaders’ discourse about news media performance. Notably, elites from different political or ideological camps provide varying degrees of media criticism. In the United States, where Republican and conservative leaders accuse news media of having a liberal bias, their supporters tend to have more negative attitudes toward news media (Guess et al., 2017; Knight Foundation, 2018). In many European countries where populist leaders routinely attack mainstream news media, people who hold populist attitudes tend to have stronger media bias perceptions (Schulz et al., 2020).
In the case of South Korea, as discussed, progressive leaders have accused mainstream news media of having a bias in favor of conservative parties and interests, mainly because of conservative media domination in the media market and public sphere. Such criticism may facilitate progressives’ belief that mainstream media is a conservative out-group, as illustrated by the antipress sentiment toward an allegedly collusive relationship between conservative forces and mainstream media (Shin et al., 2021). Further, given progressive elites’ more common criticism of news media (Hyun & Seo, 2021; Kim, 2016; Roh Moo-hyun Foundation, 2012), supporters should encounter critical media discourse from in-group elites more often than conservative voters. Based on such elites’ cues, progressive voters may form more negative attitudes toward mainstream news media. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H3: Progressives have stronger hostile media perceptions than conservatives.
Hostile media perception can weaken people’s trust in news media. When people perceive unfavorable partisan or ideological bias from news media, they likely believe news media harm their in-group images and threaten its status (Hartmann & Tanis, 2013) and consequently may discredit news media as public sources of information about intergroup conflicts in diverse contexts, such as during election campaigns or polarized policy debates. Previous studies provide evidence that perceptions of news media bias and trust are related; attitude-consistent messages and sources are perceived as more credible than counterattitudinal ones (Fischer et al., 2005; Metzger et al., 2020).
Perceptions about news media bias alone, as well as via media trust, can affect citizens’ beliefs about fake news. Individuals who perceive media bias may believe they often encounter fake news from news media because they interpret disagreeable information they see in the news as fake news. Partisans in the United States tend to associate the term “fake news” with out-group partisan news media (van der Linden et al., 2020) and blame disagreeing partisan media for fake news problems (Tong et al., 2020), implying that partisans may consider ideologically incongruent news as fake. Scholars also argue that fake news debates thrive in an environment of declining media trust. Nielsen and Graves (2017), based on audience interviews, concluded that citizens may consider any news they do not believe as fake news, including poor journalism such as inaccurate and sensational reporting. Empirical research supports that perceived exposure to fake news is negatively related to news media trust (Lee et al., 2023).
In summary, citizens’ views about fake news may relate to their appraisals of news media in general. Fake news debates are prominent in a media landscape in which belief in objective media is questioned and media trust is declining (McNair, 2017; Nielsen & Graves, 2017). Thus, we predict that people’s perceptions that news media are biased against their positions are positively related to the perceived exposure to fake news from news media, while media trust is negatively associated. We also expect hostile media perception can indirectly affect perceived fake news exposure through lowered media trust because the belief that news media are biased against their positions can be associated with media distrust, which can induce the perceptions of exposure to fake news from news media.
Taken together, political ideology is expected to shape citizens’ perceptions of news media, which in turn influence how they perceive fake news in news coverage. In particular, compared with conservatives, progressives are more likely to perceive news media as biased against them. Such media bias perceptions may shape perceived exposure to fake news both directly and indirectly through news media trust. When citizens believe news media are biased against their positions, such beliefs can erode trust in news media, which in turn can foster the belief that fake news is prevalent in news coverage. Therefore, we raise the following mediation hypothesis:
H4: Political ideology is indirectly associated with perceived exposure to fake news from news media through hostile media perception and media trust. Specifically, compared with conservatives, progressives perceive stronger hostile media bias, which is associated with higher perceived exposure to fake news directly and indirectly through reduced media trust.
News Media Perception and Attribution of Fake News to News Media
While negative attitudes toward news media are expected to relate to perceived exposure to fake news, we further suggest that such perceptions can also shape how people attribute responsibility for fake news. When people believe they encounter fake news from the news media, they can blame various social actors. Some may assume news media actively produce and circulate fake news. Others may believe that the news media simply report on the fake news phenomenon or even criticize the problem of fake news in society, rather than being responsible for producing it.
The attribution theory can help to explain what affects people’s attribution of fake news to news media. The theory proposes psychological explanations of how people judge the cause of and responsibility for an act or event (Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1995). A notable tendency in the attribution process is that people often make biased attributions depending on the type of events and actors. Relating to the current research, scholars have documented that individuals tend to make biased attributions in favor of their in-groups (Hewstone, 1990, for review). In political contexts, partisans are more likely to credit their party for positive political outcomes, whereas they blame an out-group party for negative consequences (Bisgaard, 2015; Zell et al., 2022). This group-based bias suggests that people’s attribution of fake news may depend on whether they see news media as favorable to their in-group’s positions. In that regard, partisans are more likely to see news media as an actor that threatens their in-group interest and status (Hartmann & Tanis, 2013). Thus, when they assess news media that counter their positions, they are more likely to see them as an out-group and blame them for problems like the fake news issue. Similarly, news media trust can affect blame attributions for fake news. People who distrust the news media may believe it does not adequately screen for false information and even fabricates stories. Such news media attribution may often be preceded by the perception of exposure to fake news. Therefore, the next hypothesis is as follows:
H5: Perceived exposure to fake news from news media positively relates to fake news attribution to news media.
The final hypothesis predicts serial mediation through hostile media perception, media trust, and perceived exposure to fake news in the relationship between political ideology and responsibility attribution for fake news to the news media. We expect progressive voters to blame the news media for fake news more than conservatives because they are more likely to see mainstream news media as an out-group, presumably because of in-group opinion leaders’ accusations of conservative bias in the news media. Thus, progressives would have stronger hostile media perceptions than conservative voters. Such perceptions of media bias can reduce news media trust, as prior research suggests (Fischer et al., 2005; Metzger et al., 2020). Further, media trust can be negatively associated with perceived exposure to fake news (Lee et al., 2023). Subsequently, as progressives perceive fake news in news media, they are more likely to attribute responsibility to the news media as a source of fake news. Therefore, the final hypothesis follows:
H6: Political ideology is indirectly associated with the attribution of fake news problems to news media through hostile media perception, media trust, and perceived exposure to fake news from news media. Specifically, compared with conservatives, progressives have a stronger hostile media perception, which is directly and indirectly associated with higher perceived exposure to fake news from news media via media trust, ultimately increasing the attribution of fake news problems to news media.
Figure 1 summarizes the hypothesized relationships examined in this study.
Figure 1. Summary of research hypotheses.
Method
The data used in this study were collected from an online survey conducted in the spring of 2021 by a South Korean survey company maintaining an online panel of about a million registered members. We set quotas for gender, age, and region based on census data. The company sent out about 16,000 random invitation e-mails to the panel. Once the predetermined quotas were met, participants categorized into specific groups were screened out. Panel members receive monthly cash compensation from the survey company for their participation.
A total of 1,531 Korean adults participated in the survey. Respondents who reported their political ideology as neutral were excluded from the final analysis because the calculation of hostile media perception requires respondents to hold a non-neutral political position. Therefore, the final study sample consisted of 1,118 participants with an average age of 45.90 years (SD = 13.93), ranging from 20 to 85. Gender was evenly distributed (52.3% male). A little more than half of the sample (55.0%) had some college education or a college degree, and the average monthly household income was between 3,500,000 and 3,990,000 won. Table 1 presents comparisons among the final study sample; the total sample including politically neutral participants; and the population in terms of age, gender, household income, and education.
Table 1. Sample Characteristics.
|
|
Final Study Sample (2021) |
Total Sample (2021) |
Population (2020) |
|
Age |
45.90 years old |
45.01 years old |
42.70 years old |
|
Gender |
|
|
|
|
Female |
47.7% |
49.50% |
49.98% |
|
Male |
52.3% |
50.50% |
50.02% |
|
Income |
3,500,000–3,990,000 won |
3,500,000–3,990,000 won |
4,286,962 won |
|
Education |
52.8% (some college or higher) |
52.8% (some college or higher) |
51.0% (college degree holders among those older than 24 years) |
Note. All population data are from Statistics Korea, a central government statistical agency. Age and gender data are from the 2020 registered population data set. Household income data are from a 2020 household trend report. Education data are from a 2020 Korean major indicator report.
Measures
Political Ideology
Political ideology was measured by asking respondents to report their own political ideology on a 7-point scale (1 = very conservative, 7 = very progressive, M = 4.44, SD = 1.80). For the analyses, political ideology was dummy coded such that conservative respondents were coded as 0 and progressive respondents as 1. Respondents who identified their political ideology as neutral were excluded from the analyses.
News Media Use
News media use was measured using four questions. Respondents were asked to report how often they consumed political news last week in four different channels (i.e., newspaper, TV news, portal, and social media) on a 7-point scale (1 = never, 7 = always). Newspaper and TV news use included online access through the websites. A composite measure of news media use was built by averaging answers to four questions (α = .59, M = 4.64, SD = 1.32).
Hostile Media Perception
We defined hostile media perception as partisans’ beliefs that the news media is biased against their positions or groups (Perloff, 2018). Based on prior measures (Hoffner & Rehkoff, 2011; Schulz et al., 2020), hostile media perception was constructed. First, we asked respondents to evaluate the political leanings of political news reporting in general on a 7-point scale (1 = very conservative, 7 = very progressive, M = 3.60, SD = 1.53). The responses from conservative participants were retained, and those from progressives were reverse coded so that higher values indicate stronger perceptions of news media bias against their political ideology (M = 4.38, SD = 1.53).
Media Trust
In line with prior research (Metzger et al., 2020; Meyer, 1988), we measured perceptions of news media trust by asking respondents to agree or disagree with statements about the fairness, accuracy, and trustworthiness of news reporting on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Then we averaged all three items to create a composite measure of news media trust (α = .93, M = 2.97, SD = 1.33).
Perceived Exposure to Fake News
Perceived exposure to fake news was measured with three questions. On a 7-point scale (1= never, 7 = very often), respondents were asked to report how often they saw fake news during the last month in newspapers, TV news, and portal news sites. Answers to three questions were later averaged to build a composite measure of perceived exposure to fake news (α = .82, M = 3.85, SD = 1.58). The measure is similar to perceived exposure to mis-/disinformation by Jones-Jang et al. (2021). They used a two-item measure asking respondents how much they had seen fake or misleading news stories and unverified rumors about politics and the election. Our measure is not actual exposure to fake news. Rather, it captures perceived exposure to fake news, which people can interpret differently (Nielsen & Graves, 2017).
Fake News Attribution
As a concept, fake news attribution is distinguished from perceived exposure to fake news. Fake news attribution is intended to capture attribution of responsibility for fake news to news media. On the other hand, perceived exposure does not necessarily involve blaming the news media for fake news because people may believe they see fake news when the news media simply reports or even corrects fake news spread by sources such as politicians and citizens. Employing the method by Tong et al. (2020), we asked respondents to answer who mainly produces fake news in the country in an open-ended question format. The responses were coded to classify blame attribution of fake news. Three people coded the attributed actors from responses and categorized them into either news media actors or non-news media actors. Media actors included general references such as the press, news media, reporters, and journalists, as well as mentions of specific news organizations and outlets. Nonmedia actors included political actors such as politicians, political parties, government agencies, the public, citizens, and social media platforms. To test hypotheses concerning blame attribution to news media, media actors were coded as 1 (n = 352, 31.5%), and others were coded 0 (n = 766, 68.5%). As expected, progressive respondents made more news media attributions (34.3%) than conservative (27.0%, χ2 = 6.58, p < .01). In addition, people who support the Korean president from the progressive party (38.8%) blamed the news media more than those who oppose the president (26.8%). To calculate intercoder reliability, about 10% of responses (n = 158) were randomly selected from the sample (n = 1,531), and the calculation yielded satisfactory reliability (Cohen’s κ = .95).
Control Variables
Four basic demographic variables—age, gender, education, and household income—were controlled. Political interest and political knowledge were also used as control variables. Political interest was measured by asking participants to rate their interest in politics in general on a 7-point scale (M = 4.83, SD = 1.40). The index of political knowledge was created by adding the number of correct responses to four political knowledge questions (M = 2.53, SD = 1.22).
Results
The first hypothesis posited that progressives would perceive more fake news from the news media (H1a) and attribute fake news problems to the news media more than conservatives (H1b). To test H1a, we ran a multiple regression analysis. As shown in Table 2, political ideology was not significantly associated with the perceived exposure to fake news from news media (β = .022, n.s.). Thus, H1a is not supported.
The second part of the hypothesis predicted that progressives would be more likely than conservatives to attribute fake news problems to the news media. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a binary logistic regression analysis (see Table 3). Results showed that progressives were more likely to attribute fake news problems to news media than conservatives (b = .307, SE = .145, p < .05). Compared with conservatives, progressives had 35.9% higher odds of attributing fake news problems to news media (OR [exp (b)] = 1.359, 95% CI [1.024, 1.804]). Therefore, H1b is supported.
Table 2. Explaining Perceived Exposure to Fake News.
|
|
Perceived Exposure to Fake News |
|||||
|
|
b |
SE |
β |
b |
SE |
β |
|
Constant |
1.681 |
.365 |
|
2.094 |
.408 |
|
|
Age |
−.007 |
.003 |
−.059* |
−.007 |
.003 |
−.060* |
|
Gender |
−.189 |
.088 |
−.060* |
−.199 |
.088 |
−.063* |
|
Education |
.005 |
.047 |
.003 |
.005 |
.047 |
.003 |
|
Income |
.010 |
.012 |
.022 |
.009 |
.012 |
.021 |
|
Pol.int |
.148 |
.034 |
.131*** |
.148 |
.034 |
.132*** |
|
Pol.know |
.024 |
.039 |
.018 |
.024 |
.039 |
.019 |
|
Media use |
.433 |
.035 |
.362*** |
.341 |
.054 |
.285*** |
|
Pol.ide |
.072 |
.090 |
.022 |
−.622 |
.321 |
−.192 |
|
Hostile media perception |
−.001 |
.030 |
−.001 |
.004 |
.030 |
.004 |
|
Media trust |
−.122 |
.034 |
−.103*** |
−.120 |
.034 |
−.101*** |
|
Pol.ide |
|
|
|
.049 |
.066 |
.233* |
|
Adj. R2 |
.201 |
.204 |
||||
|
F(df) |
F(10) = 57.91*** |
F(11) = 53.56*** |
||||
edia use
Note. *p <. 05, **p <. 01, ***p <. 001; N = 1,118. Pol.int = political interest, pol.know = political knowledge, pol.ide = political ideology. Gender was dummy coded (0 = male, 1 = female); political ideology was dummy coded (0 = conservatives, 1 = progressives).
The next hypothesis examined whether news media use moderates the relationship between political ideology and perceived exposure to fake news from news media (H2a), as well as the relationship between political ideology and fake news attribution to news media (H2b).
Table 3. Explaining Fake News Attribution to Media (Logistic Regression).
|
|
Fake News Attribution to Media |
|||||
|
|
b |
SE |
exp(b) |
b |
SE |
exp(b) |
|
Constant |
.749 |
.580 |
2.114 |
.674 |
.616 |
1.962 |
|
Age |
−.017 |
.005 |
.983*** |
−.017 |
.005 |
.983** |
|
Gender |
−.059 |
.139 |
.942 |
−.057 |
.139 |
.944 |
|
Education |
−.063 |
.075 |
.990 |
−.062 |
.075 |
.682 |
|
Income |
−.011 |
.020 |
.990 |
−.011 |
.020 |
.989 |
|
Pol.int |
−.048 |
.055 |
.953 |
−.047 |
.055 |
.954 |
|
Pol.know |
.057 |
.062 |
1.058 |
.056 |
.062 |
1.058 |
|
Media use |
−.025 |
.059 |
.975 |
.004 |
.099 |
1.004 |
|
.307 |
.145 |
1.359* |
.411 |
.322 |
1.508* |
|
|
Hostile media perception |
.026 |
.047 |
1.027 |
.026 |
.047 |
1.026 |
|
Media trust |
−.321 |
.056 |
.725*** |
−.322 |
.056 |
.725*** |
|
Perceived exposure to fake news |
.117 |
.048 |
1.124* |
.117 |
.048 |
1.125* |
|
Pol.ide |
|
|
|
−.006 |
.018 |
.994 |
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; N = 1,118. Pol.int = political interest, pol.know = political knowledge, pol.ide = political ideology. Gender was dummy coded (0 = male, 1 = female); political ideology was dummy coded (0 = conservatives, 1 = progressives).
First, we examined whether the relationship between political ideology and perceived exposure to fake news from news media varied depending on the amount of news media consumption. As shown in Table 2, the interaction effect was significant (β = .233, p < .05), which supports H2a. We probed the moderation effects using PROCESS macro (Model 1; Hayes, 2022) and found that when news use was low, there was no significant difference between conservatives and progressives in terms of their reports of perceived exposure to fake news from news media (b = −.138, SE = .130, 95% CI [−.393, .116]). Likewise, among average news users, there was no significant difference in perceived fake news in the news media by political ideology (b = .085, SE = .090, 95% CI [−.092, .264]). However, among high news users, progressives reported higher levels of fake news exposure in the news media than conservatives (b = .271, SE = .126, 95% CI [.024, .518]). Both conservatives and progressives were more likely to perceive fake news from news media as news consumption increased (β = .362, p < .001), but the increase was substantially larger among progressives than conservatives. H2b predicted a significant moderating role of news use in the relationship between political ideology and fake news attribution to news media, yet, as shown in Table 3, there was no significant moderation effect, indicating that the relationship between political orientation and blaming the news media for fake news was not different across levels of news media use (b = −.044, SE = .029, n.s.). Therefore, H2b is not supported.
The third hypothesis predicted that progressives would exhibit stronger hostile media perception than conservatives. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a multiple regression analysis, and the results are presented in the left column of Table 4. As expected, political ideology was positively associated with hostile media perception (β = .201, p < .001), indicating that, compared with conservatives, progressives perceived news reporting as more hostile to their positions. Thus, H3 is supported.
H4 examined whether political ideology would be indirectly associated with the perceived exposure to fake news from news media through hostile media perception and media trust. We predicted that progressives would perceive stronger hostile media bias, which would be associated with increased perceptions of fake news from news reporting, both directly and indirectly through reduced media trust. We tested the sequential mediation hypotheses using PROCESS macro (Model 6; Hayes, 2022) with 5,000 bootstrap samples.
Table 4. Explaining Hostile Media Perception and Media Trust.
|
|
Hostile Media Perception |
Media Trust |
||||
|
|
b |
SE |
β |
b |
SE |
β |
|
Constant |
3.507 |
.336 |
|
4.201 |
.299 |
|
|
Age |
.000 |
.003 |
−.004 |
.000 |
.003 |
−.003 |
|
Gender |
.081 |
.092 |
.026 |
−.066 |
.079 |
−.025 |
|
Education |
.051 |
.050 |
.032 |
−.058 |
.042 |
−.042 |
|
Income |
.007 |
.013 |
.017 |
.010 |
.011 |
.028 |
|
Pol.int. |
.066 |
.036 |
.061 |
−.052 |
.031 |
−.055 |
|
Pol.know |
.180 |
.041 |
.143*** |
−.055 |
.035 |
−.050 |
|
Media use |
−.130 |
.037 |
−.112*** |
.109 |
.031 |
.108*** |
|
Pol.ide |
.633 |
.092 |
.201*** |
.100 |
.080 |
.037 |
|
Hostile media perception |
|
|
|
−.270 |
.026 |
−.310*** |
|
Adj. R2 |
|
.069 |
|
|
.110 |
|
|
F(df) |
F(8) = 24.790*** |
F(9) = 25.896*** |
||||
Note. **p < .01, ***p < .001; N = 1,118. Pol.int = political interest, pol.know = political knowledge, pol.ide = political ideology. Gender was dummy coded (0 = male, 1 = female); political ideology was dummy coded (0 = conservatives, 1 = progressives).
First, results showed that political ideology was not indirectly associated with perceived exposure to fake news from news media via hostile media bias (indirect effect = .008, 95% CI [−.036, .053]). In addition, political ideology was not indirectly associated with perceived exposure to fake news from news media via media trust only (indirect effect = −.001, 95% CI [−.040, .040]). The only significant indirect effect of political ideology on perceived exposure to fake news from news media was through hostile media perception and media trust sequentially (indirect effect = .021, 95% CI [.008, .036]). Therefore, H4 is only partially supported.
H5 espoused a positive association between perceived exposure to fake news from news media and fake news attribution to news media. Results shown in Table 3 indicate this hypothesis is supported (b = .117, SE = .048, p < .05). When perceived exposure to fake news from news media increased by one unit, the odds that people blamed news media for fake news issues increased by about 12.5% (OR [exp (b)] = 1.125, 95% CI [1.024, 1.235]).
The last hypothesis predicted that political ideology would be indirectly associated with the attribution of fake news problems to news media through hostile media perception, media trust, and perceived exposure to fake news from news media. To test this series of indirect effects, we ran PROCESS macro (Model 6; Hayes, 2022).
Among potential indirect routes, two indirect effects turned out to be significant, and these paths included hostile media perception and media trust as sequential mediators. Specifically, results showed that political ideology was not significantly associated with fake news attribution to news media through hostile media perception only (indirect effect = .017, 95% CI [−.043, .080]) nor media trust only (indirect effect = −.032, 95% CI [−.090, .018]). In addition, political ideology was not indirectly associated with the attribution of fake news problems to news media via perceived exposure to fake news from news media only (indirect effect = .008, 95% CI [−.013, .034]). Likewise, the indirect effect of political ideology on fake news attribution to news media through hostile media perception and perceived exposure to fake news from news media was not significant (indirect effect = −.000, 95% CI [−.006, .005]). The same was true for the indirect link from political ideology to fake news attribution to news media through media trust and perceived exposure to fake news from news media (indirect effect = −.001, 95% CI [−.005, .001]).
In contrast, the sequential indirect effect of political ideology on fake news attribution to news media through hostile media perception, followed by media trust, was significant (indirect effect = .055, 95% CI [.031, .087]). At the same time, the other significant sequential mediation of political ideology on the attribution of fake news problems to news media was via hostile media perception, media trust, and the perceived exposure to fake news from news media (indirect effect = .002, 95% CI [.000, .006]).
Figure 2. Summary model of the significant relationships among political ideology, media perceptions, and fake news attribution.
Note. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients, except for the paths explaining attribution of fake news problems to news media, for which unstandardized logistic regression coefficients and standard errors are reported.
Taken together, compared with conservatives, progressives perceived stronger hostile media perception, which reduced their trust in news media in general. This decreased media trust was positively associated with the attribution of fake news problems to news media directly as well as through the increased perception of fake news exposure from news media. A summary of the significant relationships among the study variables is presented in Figure 2.
Discussion
This study examined political and media factors that may affect perceptions of exposure to fake news from news media and the attribution of fake news to news media. Given the political and partisan nature of public debates about the fake news problem, we expected that rival political elites’ communication about news media in general and fake news in particular would relate to partisan voters’ perceptions and attributions of fake news. Our data from South Korea, where progressive and conservative elites provide contrasting discourses about news media and fake news, supported the thesis.
First, the results show that political leaders’ public accusations of fake news are closely related to their supporters’ associating fake news with mainstream news media. Progressive citizens were more likely to blame the news media, and those progressives who consumed news more often tended to believe they encountered fake news from the news media more often than their conservative counterparts. The findings imply that news media may serve as an important source of information through which voters can learn about opposing positions of rival partisan elites on fake news issues. As research on mass opinion formation suggests (Cohen, 2003; Zaller, 1992), Koreans seem to have received partisan elite cues from the news media and aligned their views on fake news issues with those of in-group leaders. On the other hand, the prediction that progressives would perceive greater exposure to fake news from news media was rejected (H1a). This result might have occurred because perceived exposure may not activate partisan predispositions enough to distinguish progressive and conservative participants’ perceptions. Unlike blaming the news media (H1b), perceived exposure to fake news lacks a clear attribution of the problem to the news media. People may believe they encountered fake news from the news media, but they may differently attribute responsibility. Some may believe politicians and other news sources spread fake news through the news media, not that the news media fabricated stories, yet they may still believe they see fake news in news media reports.
Second, the data supported the thesis that political elites’ criticism of news media bias in general might affect ideologues’ associations of fake news with mainstream news media. Progressive voters, presumably because of their in-group opinion leaders’ accusations of conservative bias of news media in the country, were found to have stronger hostile media perceptions than conservative voters. Hostile media perceptions were further associated with lower news media trust, which, in turn, was related to greater perceived exposure to fake news from the news media and to blaming the news media as a source of fake news.
The overall findings suggest partisans’ fake news association may involve more complex processes than expected. Most of all, a media system and elite media discourse in a country may affect public attribution of fake news to mainstream news media. In Korea, where the progressive force has long been at odds with mainstream conservative news media, progressive elites publicly expressed stronger concerns about news media performance and raised fake news problems in particular. In such a discursive environment, progressive voters may form more negative views about news media, which can be connected with blaming news media as a source of fake news problems.
In summary, the data indicate that partisan opinion leaders’ discourse about news media and fake news can influence their in-group public’s perceptions of fake news. The results support previous studies that reported elite influence on followers’ news media (Ladd, 2012; Watts et al., 1999) and fake news perceptions (Collier & Van Duyn, 2023). Partisan leaders’ media criticism not only reduces media trust but can also limit their informative or persuasive influence (Peterson et al., 2024). Our findings further warn about the potentially negative influence of elites’ media criticism on news media’s functions by increasing the public’s association of fake news with mainstream news media.
At the same time, this research reinforces the need to consider the unique national context in the public perceptions about news media and fake news. While in Western contexts, conservative parties and leaders often more strongly accuse the news media and raise concerns about fake news, in Korea, progressive elites have been more actively monitoring the news media and their performance, which can affect people’s perceptions of fake news. Future research should examine the political and media contexts across different countries that foster elites’ media criticism and its downstream effects.
Overall, the current research extends the literature on elites’ news media attacks and voters’ perceptions of fake news. Our study demonstrated two potential routes of elite influence through which partisan voters may associate fake news with mainstream news media—elites’ more recent criticism of fake news and persistent criticism of news media’s bias. The former route operates as leaders from rival partisan camps raise the issue of fake news to varying degrees. As progressive leaders emphasize fake news problems and call for ways to address them, their supporters are more likely to receive such critical cues from recent news reports and associate fake news with mainstream news media. This leader-public alignment is likely stronger when citizens are exposed to elite communication about fake news more often through news consumption, as indicated by the moderating roles observed in this study. The other route involves a longer process of forming general news media attitudes. The long-standing conflict between the progressive force and the conservative news media in the country has prompted progressive leaders to express greater concern about and criticism of the conservative media structure. The progressive elites’ news media discourse seems to have engendered stronger hostile media perceptions among their followers, which, in turn, are linked to lower media trust and, subsequently, to perceptions of fake news and its attribution. Thus, this study confirmed that hostile media and trust perceptions serially mediated the relationship between political ideology and perceptions of fake news and its attribution.
This study has several limitations, which suggest directions for future research. First, the cross-sectional nature of the data precludes strong causal inference about the relationship among political ideology, media perception, trust, and fake news attribution. Although the theoretical framework implies that partisan elites’ communication shapes media distrust and subsequent attribution of fake news to news media, longitudinal or experimental designs are needed to more directly test these causal pathways. In addition, we did not assess elite positions and arguments about news media performance and fake news reported in the news media. Thus, this study cannot directly test the influence of elite communication on mass opinion formation. Rather, the analyses capture individual-level perceptions that may reflect broader elite communication environments and partisan discourse contexts. Therefore, claims about elite influence should be interpreted with caution and as inferential rather than directly demonstrated. Content-analytic approaches examining how prevalently, and in which ways, mainstream media are portrayed as a source of fake news would provide a valuable complement to perception-based analysis. Integrating content analysis with audience perceptions would allow future research to more directly test the link between communication environments and public attribution of fake news to mainstream news media.
Lastly, the broader communication and policy context surrounding fake news in Korea has evolved since the period of our data collection. Subsequent public debates and legislative discussions appear to have increasingly incorporated major online video platforms, including YouTube, as potential sources and conduits of fake news. Future studies should directly test how such shifts in elites’ policy discourse reshape citizens’ attribution targets.
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