

Cosmopolitanism and Global Risk: News Framing of the Asian Financial Crisis and the European Debt Crisis

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This study examines how the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2009 European debt crisis were framed in Chinese newspapers in terms of cosmopolitan communities of global risk (Beck, 2011). The relevant news articles are sampled from the *People's Daily* for content analysis. The data uncover three types of cosmopolitanism: *voluntary contribution*, *conditional promise*, and *coercive involvement*. The results show that the sense of cosmopolitanism that China evoked during the European debt crisis was conditioned and less voluntary than it was during the Asian financial crisis. The results also reveal that cosmopolitanism did not necessarily transcend nationalism; instead, nationalism and national interests served as both driving forces and obstacles of cosmopolitanism.

Keywords: cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan communities of global risk, news frames

Introduction

With the permeation of globalization in recent decades, worldwide economic entities have become increasingly interdependent. Two typical examples are the Asian financial crisis that happened in 1997 and the debt crisis in Europe that began at the end of 2009. Both crises initially hit individual countries, but they soon transcended national boundaries and threatened to cause economic meltdowns all over the world (Hamid, 2012; Pempel, 1999). The Asian financial crisis started in Thailand with the collapse of the Thai baht. After that, the crisis spread to other Asian countries and territories, including South Korea, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Japan, where the currencies collapsed and the stock markets declined (Goldstein, 1998). A crisis that was initially considered to be "a few small glitches in the road" (Goldstein, 1998, p. 1), as former U.S. president Bill Clinton optimistically put it, eventually became an economic risk at the regional and global levels.

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The process of the European debt crisis seems similar to that of the Asian financial crisis. The beginning of the crisis can be traced back to 2009. In Europe, the debt crisis began in Greece and then spread to other important European countries, like Portugal, Italy, Ireland, and Spain (Thomas, 2012). Due to the financial and political relationships within the Euro zone, even countries with better economic conditions, like France and Germany, felt the effects of the crisis and faced downturns. Moreover, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) warned that the European debt crisis could have negative effects on U.S. banks and China's economic growth (Master, 2012; Tally, 2012).

These crises can be regarded as examples of global risks (Beck, 1999) that pose worldwide threats. According to Beck (1999, 2009, 2011), though it makes the world more vulnerable, the staging of a global risk in the media can facilitate a new cosmopolitan imperative and awareness. This imperative can turn what Anderson (1983) called "imagined nations" into imagined cosmopolitan communities based on the global risks in the current era. As such, it is worth examining the theory of global risk and communities of global risk in the context of China, because China played an important role in both the Asian financial crisis and the European debt crisis. During the Asian financial crisis, China was "the domino that did not fall" (Sharma, 2003, p. 252), and the nation resisted the devaluation of its currency to stabilize the Asian financial markets (Wang, 2000). During the European debt crisis, with most of the important economic entities still struggling to recover from the U.S. subprime mortgage disaster, China maintained a comparatively high economic growth rate. Economists and politicians have paid close attention to how China engaged in dealing with this global crisis (Bradsher & Alderman, 2012). However, two questions remain: Is it possible to discern the existence of cosmopolitan communities of global risk in the Chinese context? Or do nationalism and national interest distance China in its responses to global risk? A close examination of how the Chinese journalistic discourse framed the Asian financial crisis and European debt crisis will help us answer these questions and thus enrich the conceptions of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan communities of global risk.

Globalization and Global Risk

Flows of capital, technology, information, and goods in the increasingly globalized world have enabled people across the globe to be more interconnected than ever before (McGrew, 1992). When these interactions and interconnectivities reach a certain level, it seems inevitable that people will become more interdependent, regardless of national boundaries and the physical distance between them (Thompson, 2000). Tomlinson (1999) used the ideas of interconnectivity and interdependence to define globalization as "the rapidly developing and ever-densening network of interconnections and interdependences that characterize modern social life" (p. 2). The term *interdependence* refers to the simple idea that "something happening somewhere has effects elsewhere" (Thompson, 2000, p. 93). On the one hand, it celebrates the increasing integration and closeness among people; on the other hand, it implies that people and nations throughout the world are more vulnerable and sensitive than they used to be (Crescenzi, 2005; Keohane & Nye, 2001), and they may be influenced by risks that are physically distant from them (Beck, 2009). A crisis or disaster that occurs in certain cities, nations, or regions can possibly influence another part of the world and become what Beck (1999, 2009, 2011) termed "global risk." In this sense, we are living in a world risk society (Beck, 1999), in which people are connected to and dependent on each other.

Beck and Sznaider (2006) identified four axes of conflict crisis in a world risk society: ecological interdependency crises, economic interdependency crises, terrorist interdependency crises, and moral interdependency crises. These four types of risk, under some circumstances, can “sharpen global normative consciousness, generate global publics and promote a cosmopolitan outlook” (Beck & Sznaider, 2006, p. 11). According to Beck and Sznaider, all of these risks share the same characteristic of not coming from purely environmental factors; instead, they are related to human activities and conceptions. Because of the high level of interdependency among different parts of the world, these ecological, economic, terrorist, or moral risks can spread from one place to another and thus link the world together to face them. Beck (2009) used the phrase “two sides of the belief in world risk” to describe “the traumatic experience that everyone is vulnerable and the resulting responsibility for others, also for the sake of one’s own survival” (p. 57). In other words, negative consequences and the responsibility for solving global problems are two key issues related to global risk.

However, we should note the differences between different risky phenomena. For instance, in the case of ecological or environmental risks, it is difficult for people to find particular persons or nations to blame. Comparatively, economic or financial risks are often individualized and nationalized (Beck, 2011; Beck & Sznaider, 2006). Thus, it is necessary to conduct an analysis that emphasizes a specific type of risk. This study examines the Asian financial crisis and European debt crisis as major examples of economic risks. The aim is to determine whether they were constructed as a global risk rooted in global networks or portrayed as “something that lies within the responsibility of individuals or nations” (Beck, 2011, p. 1350) in the Chinese media.

Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Cosmopolitan Communities of Risk

One of the main interests surrounding global risk is whether it leads to greater cosmopolitanism in an increasingly globalized world. According to many researchers, the key issue of cosmopolitanism lies in the way that it deals with differences (Beck & Grande, 2007; Held, 2010). As it changes the relations among people living in different parts of the world, globalization may challenge the traditional ways in which people see themselves and others. This was illustrated, for instance, in Said’s (1979) work on Orientalism and otherness. In its ideal form, cosmopolitanism is a particular type of awareness that “elaborates a concern with the equal moral status of each and every human being and creates a bedrock of interest in what it is that human beings have in common” (Held, 2010, p. x), regardless of their nationality, culture, or religious affiliation. Although cosmopolitanism does not deny the differences among people, it encourages people to see one another as equals (Beck & Grande, 2007).

Another issue of cosmopolitanism is whether it can transcend national boundaries and challenge nationalism. Nationalism denies differences within national boundaries while simultaneously constructing and reinforcing differences from those outside of the national borders (Beck & Grande, 2007). The idea of nationalism is crucial in sustaining a nation-state, which is facilitated and driven by the desire for self-determination, keeping and gaining geopolitical and geoeconomic advantages, securing national borders, and so forth (Held, 2010). It has been, and probably will continue to be, debatable whether globalization will cause the decline of the nation-state (e.g., Cable, 1995; Holton, 1998; Mosley, 2005; Ohmae, 1995).

To participate in this debate, we should reconsider the idea of cosmopolitanism. In previous studies on cosmopolitanism in terms of disasters and tragedies (e.g., Chouliaraki, 2006; Robertson, 2008), the cosmopolitan perspectives are closely related to morals and human values, which persuade people to both mourn with and help distant sufferers. However, according to Beck (2004), cosmopolitanism has a different logic in the case of global risk. He distinguished ideal cosmopolitanism from the term *cosmopolitanization*, which refers to passive, latent, and unconscious cosmopolitanism. In a world of risk, people embrace cosmopolitanism and thus generate a sense of an imagined cosmopolitan community of risk (Beck, 2011), not because they have the moral status to see all the people in the world as equal but for their own survival, concerns, and interests (Beck, 2004; Beck & Sznaider, 2006).

In this sense, as some researchers have argued, nationalism will not be simply negated or transcended by cosmopolitanism (Levy, Heinlein, & Breuer, 2011; Smith, 1991). The sharing of the idea of global threats links countries together to deal with problems without necessarily tearing down national boundaries (Beck & Sznaider, 2006). This research endeavors to contribute to the theory of cosmopolitan communities of global risk by considering the complexity of time-space-specific risks by examining how China, which is considered to be a country with a strong sense of nationalism (Chow, 2004; Tang, 2001), responded to the Asian financial crisis and the European debt crisis. With political and economic reforms accompanied by a deeper engagement with globalization, China "began to distance itself from ideological orthodoxy and adopted open and reformist policies," thus moving itself "closer to the capitalist world" (Chan, 2002, p. 226). This phenomenon attracted researchers to examine cosmopolitanism and China from different aspects, such as the media (Donald, 2005; Yang, 1997), identity (Chan, 2005), education (Fong, 2007), "cosmopolitan cities" (Wu, 2004) and rural ones (Abbas, 2000), and the Chinese diaspora (Callahan, 2002, 2003). These researchers have argued that cosmopolitanism was struggling with the influential nationalism discourse in Chinese society, while nationalism was legitimizing the power of the Chinese Communist Party (Hughes, 2006). However, more research should be done to analyze China and global economic risks in terms of cosmopolitanism. According to the World Bank, the ratio of China's *exports of goods and services* (as a percentage of gross domestic product) increased from 22% in 1997 to 31% in 2010 (The World Bank, n.d.), revealing the marked increase in China's dependency on the rest of the world one decade after the Asian financial crisis. Thus, it is interesting to examine whether China was more willing to engage in a cosmopolitan community of global risk during the European debt crisis, when the country was more closely linked to the world market, than it was during the Asian financial crisis, when its economy was not as open.

Although this research devotes a great deal of attention to nations, we should not neglect the possibility that other actors, especially individuals, could also be key in enacting cosmopolitanism. Beck urges researchers to avoid *methodological nationalism* (Beck, 2006; Beck & Sznaider, 2006)—the idea that the individuals, groups, and societies in a nation should be considered as a whole, under the big umbrella of the nation-state. Rather, researchers should adopt a methodological cosmopolitanism (Beck, 2006; Beck & Sznaider, 2006) perspective—which includes the diverse voices, ideas, and experiences of individuals and social groups—to understand how they may affect global responses to risks. This research addresses this concern by closely examining how the press portrayed China's reactions to two economic crises at the national and individual levels.

News Framing of Global Risk: A Comparative Perspective

To compare China's understandings of the two crises in terms of cosmopolitanism, this study focuses on the media's framing of global risk. According to Beck (2009, 2011), the ways in which people perceive global risk as well as the development of cosmopolitan communities of global risk depend heavily upon the power of mass media. As Cottle (2009) put it, "how a transnational 'cosmopolitan vision,' can be forged on the basis of growing recognition of today's global 'civilizational community of fate' (Beck, 2006) depends increasingly on how global crises are staged in the world's news media" (p. 510). In other words, the media can facilitate the staging and enactment of global risks and thus extend their global reach and the global responses (Cottle, 2009). In this sense, what David Harvey (1990) called time-space compression can be achieved, and people can experience and re-experience distant crises by watching TV, reading newspapers, and surfing the Internet. On the other hand, the crucial role that media play in constructing global risk also facilitates the marginalization of certain issues or the removal of issues from the agenda (Beck, 2011). To some degree, it is the media that decide whether a risk is global, to what extent the risk will influence a nation, how much salience to attach to the risk, whether to report the risk to the public, and when to stop reporting it. Studying the ways in which media portray the issues of global risk is a suitable approach to the concept of cosmopolitan communities of risk.

To explore this concept, this study borrows theoretical and methodological tools for framing an analysis from the journalism and communication research. For Entman (1993), to frame an issue is "to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (p. 52). Many studies have investigated the constructive power of news frames in discursively constituted social issues as well as the influence of different news frames on audiences (e.g., de Vreese & Kandyla, 2009; Entman, 1991; Scheufele, 1999; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). The various risks, crises, and disasters that hurt humans and their interests are crucial themes of media coverage (Chouliaraki, 2006; Cottle, 2009; Robertson, 2008; Sood, Stockdale, & Rogers, 1987). Using framing theory, we may approach how the media creatively construct risks from different aspects with different emphases, thus staging global risks for their audiences.

This study applies Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) identification of five main news frames—responsibility, economic consequences, conflict, morality, and human interest frames—to examine the news framing of the Asian financial crisis and the European debt crisis. Many previous studies have demonstrated that the media have frequently used these frames in news articles related to various crises and risks (An & Gower, 2009)—such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Li, 2007), SARS (Beaudoin, 2007; Luther & Zhou, 2004), and climate change (Dirikx & Gelders, 2010)—to help people understand certain crises within preset structures. These studies repeatedly highlight the common concerns and emphases of the media in relation to the staging of risks in the news, including the following: the attribution of responsibility (the responsibility frame), the evaluation of economic consequences (the economic consequences frame), the description of conflicts between individuals or groups (the conflict frame), the mention of moral or religious prescriptions (the morality frame), and the expression of human emotions and feelings (the human interest frame) (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000).

Thus, first, an examination of the use of different frames may provide a general picture of how China's press constructed the two crises from different angles. Second, examining the framing of global risks in the news using Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) five frames may enrich the understanding of cosmopolitan communities of risk by evaluating the levels of cosmopolitanism, determining the driving forces or obstacles of a cosmopolitan community, and identifying the important players in the cases of global risk. Previous studies generally considered the five frames as parallel, while little research examined the ways in which they relate to each other. Beck's (2011) perspective on global risk and cosmopolitanism provided some new thoughts, such as the idea that the crucial ingredient of a cosmopolitan community of global risk is, as mentioned above, that different nations and individuals assume the responsibility of eliminating the risks together, regardless of the triggers and motivations behind the risks. This ingredient, which may be found in the news articles using the responsibility frame, can perhaps be regarded as the output or independent variable representing the level of cosmopolitanism. Thus, we can evaluate cosmopolitanism by closely examining the media's usage of the responsibility frame.

Moreover, Beck's (2004, 2009) argument about positive and passive cosmopolitanism indeed established some causal relationships between cosmopolitanism and its driving forces. In the assumption of passive cosmopolitanism, the negative consequences of global risks on people, which are possibly illustrated in news articles using the economic consequences frame, cause the cosmopolitanism. But is this truly the case? Are there any other factors that matter? Is it possible that morality still plays an important role? How do the conflicts between nations affect the construction of cosmopolitan communities? Do individuals' interests stimulate the enactment of cosmopolitanism? Through the use of Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) theory of the five main frames, we may address these questions. Furthermore, in this research, the five frames are not parallel or unrelated to one another. I analyze news articles that use the responsibility frame to evaluate the cosmopolitanism of China and the other important players that the articles identify in the two crises, and I investigate the driving forces for and obstacles to the development of cosmopolitan communities by analyzing the news articles' use of the economic consequences frame, the conflict frame, the morality frame, and the human interest frame. The general research unit of this study is the news frame rather than the nation; this not only avoids methodological nationalism (Beck, 2006) but also makes it possible to identify whether individuals can be important players, in light of those framing studies that have demonstrated that frames can be used at the individual, national, or international level (Chyi & McCombs, 2004; Guo, Hsu, Holton, & Jeong, 2012; Kwon & Moon, 2009; Verloo, 2005). Based on the above arguments, this study attempts to answer four research questions:

RQ1: What are the differences and similarities in the use of frames in the news articles in People's Daily about the Asian financial crisis and the European debt crisis?

RQ2: How did People's Daily portray nations and individuals in terms of their importance in its framing of the Asian financial crisis and the European debt crisis?

RQ3: How did People's Daily portray China's and other important players' enactments of cosmopolitanism in its framing of the Asian financial crisis and the European debt crisis?

RQ4: What do the articles frame as the driving forces of and obstacles to the cosmopolitan communities of risk in the two crises?

Method

Sample

This study uses content analysis to compare the framing of the Asian financial crisis and the European debt crisis. Taking into account the complexity of the Chinese media, I am more interested in identifying the state-oriented and dominant journalistic discourse. Thus, the following criteria were used to select the newspaper sample: (1) the target newspaper should be among the most circulated and popular newspapers; (2) it should be a national and state-oriented newspaper that acts as an agenda setter for the Chinese government; and (3) its news articles should be accessible. Following these standards, *People's Daily* was selected for content analysis in this study.

According to the International Federation of Audit Bureaux of Circulations (2012), *People's Daily* is one of the China's most circulated daily newspapers. Established in 1948, *People's Daily* is a national newspaper in present-day China, and it is considered the key organ and mouthpiece of the central government (Wu, 1994). It acts as one of the primary agenda setters for the central government and the Chinese Communist Party (Luther & Zhou, 2004; Wu, 1994). Consequently, the news stories published in *People's Daily* can be regarded as the official stories, shaped by the ideas and perspectives of the government. By examining how *People's Daily* framed the two crises, we can understand the politically dominant perspectives in China regarding global risk.

The time frame for the study of the Asian financial crisis encompasses the long period of the crisis, from July 1997 to December 1998. The news articles related to the Asian financial crisis were collected from the e-database for *People's Daily*. The keywords of the search included relevant terms, such as "financial crisis," "Asian crisis," and "Asian financial crisis." Next, only the most relevant news articles were selected according to the following criteria: (1) The article mentions "financial crisis," "Asian crisis," or "Asian financial crisis" in its title; (2) the article mentions the countries involved, their political leaders, or their currencies in the title, and mentions the crisis in the content; and (3) at least half of the story is about the crisis. Those articles that satisfied at least one of these three criteria were selected for the sample. In total, 139 news articles were selected.

The time frame for the study of the European debt crisis also encompasses the important and peak period of the crisis, from its eruption in December 2009 to December 2011. Those news articles from *People's Daily* related to the European debt crisis were collected via China's full-text database for core newspapers. The keywords of the search included the terms "European debt" and "European debt crisis." All articles in which these keywords are mentioned were selected. In the next round of the search, the same criteria outlined above were applied to collect news articles about the European debt crisis. In total, 123 news articles were selected. Thus, the study sample comprises 139 news articles about the Asian financial crisis and 123 about the European debt crisis.

Coding

I conducted an initial examination of whether Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) five news frames were applicable for analyzing the sample. A random sample of 15% of the 262 total news stories was selected and coded according to the frame used in each article. It was found that at least one of the five frames was the dominant frame of the selected articles, verifying that these frames could be used to code the sampled articles.

Two coders were trained to code the 262 news articles. First, they examined the frames of the articles: the responsibility frame (focus on the attribution of responsibility for causing and solving the problem), the economic consequences frame (focus on the economic consequences of the issue), the conflict frame (focus on the conflicts between individuals, groups, or nations), the moral frame (focus on the morality), and the human interest frame (focus on the individual feelings and experiences of the issue). It was feasible that more than one frame could exist in a news article. The two coders were asked to treat each frame as a binary variable and code the frames as either present or absent. Then they examined how the news articles were framed in terms of levels: the individual level (focus on individuals), the national level (focus on countries), and the international level (focus on the interactions among countries). When an article using the responsibility frame mentioned China, it also was coded with one of three attitudes—support, not mentioned, or oppose—to determine whether the article supported China taking responsibility for easing the crisis. The research used Scott's *pi* to check intercoder reliability. The main reliability coefficients were as follows: 0.83 for frames, 0.82 for the levels of news articles, and 0.82 for the attitudes of the news articles. All the reliability coefficients for the variables were acceptable.

Results

Use of Frames: Main Concerns and Main Players

To answer RQ1, I compared the use of different frames in the news articles about the two crises. As shown in Table 1, the news reporting of the two economic crises in *People's Daily* followed some similar patterns. The responsibility and economic consequences were the dominant frames used in the two cases. Additionally, in both cases, *People's Daily* was mostly concerned about who should take responsibility for solving the crisis. In the news articles concerning the Asian financial crisis, 59.71% of the news articles use the responsibility frame, and 46.76% employ the economic consequences frame. For the news articles about the European debt crisis, 62.07% adopt the responsibility frame, and 47.97% use the economic consequences frame. The number of articles that use the human interest frame or the morality frame was rather small. Overall, 17 articles mention the issue of conflicts, and 7 articles discuss human interests and emotions. None of the news articles employed the morality frame.

Table 1. Frames Used in News Articles About the Asian Financial Crisis and the European Debt Crisis.

Frame	Asian financial crisis (<i>N</i> = 139)		European debt crisis (<i>N</i> = 123)	
	Number of articles	%	Number of articles	%
Responsibility	83	59.71	72	62.07
Economic consequences	65	46.76	59	47.97
Conflict	8	4.46	9	7.32
Human interest	3	2.16	4	3.25
Morality	0	0.00	0	0.00

Note. Each news frame was analyzed separately. It was possible for a news article to use more than one frame.

To answer RQ2, I first examined the general picture of how the two crises are framed in the news articles in terms of the different levels. As shown in Table 2, overall *People's Daily* framed the two crises at the international level (64.03% and 65.04%, respectively) more so than at the national level (33.09% and 30.08%, respectively); the articles seldom focused on the individual level (2.88% and 4.88%, respectively). The interactions among different nations were the main concern of *People's Daily*. The data also indicate that the nation served as the most important unit in the framing of the two crises.

Table 2. Individual, National, and International Focus of News Articles During the Asian Financial Crisis and the European Debt Crisis.

	Individual		National		International	
	Number of articles	%	Number of articles	%	Number of articles	%
Asian financial crisis	4	2.88	46	33.09	89	64.03
European debt crisis	6	4.88	37	30.08	80	65.04

The data shown in Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate that individual faces, voices, feelings, sufferings, and actions received little media coverage in relation to the crises. In addition, most of the news articles framing the crises at the individual level use the human interest frame, frequently portraying individuals as the victims. For instance, the articles in *People's Daily* discuss how the white-collar workers in Thailand lost their jobs during the Asian financial crisis and how the Europeans had to keep their wallets closed during Christmas (Gu, Shi, Ding, & Wu, 2011; Yu & Liu, 1998). In an article titled "Greek Civil Servants Start Strikes," the journalist describes how the strikes hurt Greek society: "the serious debt crisis caused

the instability of the society, and that in turn made it hard for the nation to struggle against the crisis" (Zhang, 2011, p. 3). Here, the anonymous individuals are portrayed as a whole (society), and they are both the sufferers of and the reason for the chaos in the nation.

The Chinese individuals' faces and voices are even more blurred. Their opinions, especially those that are in opposition to the national strategy toward the crises, are absent from the news articles. An examination of the news articles using the economic consequences frame reveals that these reports use general phrases such as "Chinese industry," "Chinese exports," and "national economic growth rates" when describing the influence of the crises. When individual losses or gains in the crisis are represented by national interests, and when the news articles lack specific names and conditions of individual people, they are reduced to what Chouliaraki (2006) described as "dots on the map" (p. 102) in news discourse rather than important, vivid, powerful, and capable players in the global risk.

Compared to individuals, nations and the interactions among nations dominate the media coverage and are portrayed as active players in the news articles using the responsibility frame, the economic consequences frame, and the conflict frame. Next, I examined how *People's Daily* portrayed the sense of cosmopolitanism that China and other important countries evoked during the two crises, by comparing how the involved nations were described in the different news frames.

***Cosmopolitanism Evoked: A Voluntary Contribution,
a Conditional Promise, or Coercive Involvement?***

To answer RQ3 and RQ4, I estimated the cosmopolitanism that China evoked during the two crises by examining the media coverage of China in those news articles using the responsibility frame. As shown in Table 3, although *People's Daily* maintained a supportive attitude in both of the crises (91.34% of articles about the Asian financial crisis and 86.67% of articles about the European debt crisis) toward China's taking responsibility for solving the crises with other nations, it discussed this issue with much larger media coverage in the case of Asian financial crisis than in the case of the European debt crisis. A close look at the content of these news articles was therefore necessary.

***Table 3. News Coverage of China in News Articles About Attribution of
Responsibility in the Asian Financial Crisis and the European Debt Crisis.***

	China to take responsibility						
	Support		Not mentioned		Oppose		Total
	Number of articles	%	Number of articles	%	Number of articles	%	Number of articles
Asian financial crisis	32	91.34	3	8.57	0	0.0	35
European debt crisis	13	83.33	2	16.67	0	0.0	15

First, I analyzed the articles about the Asian financial crisis and found that they focused predominantly on currency and other economic policies of the Chinese government. A typical article, titled "Our Country Was Highly Praised for Its Attitude Towards the Asian Financial Crisis," cites an expert from Harvard University, who stated that China's responsible attitude in not devaluing its currency—despite the pressure of other Asian nations' devaluation of their currencies, which threatened to weaken China's exports—helped to stabilize the Asian economy (Chen, 1998). The article also mentions that several experts praised China's economic revolution and declared that China would help the region recover from the crisis. A similar opinion was restated in other news articles using the responsibility frame (e.g., Cheng, 1998; Gu & Luo, 1998; Wei & Chen, 1998), which all illustrate an extremely positive attitude toward China's participation in the cosmopolitan community to deal with the Asian crisis.

But what are portrayed as the driving forces of and obstacles to China helping to solve the crisis, even at the cost of its own interests? The extremely low number of articles using the human interest and morality frames excludes religious, moral, and individual reasons from being the driving forces of or obstacles to China's sense of cosmopolitanism. The news articles using the economic consequences frame evince the insistence of *People's Daily* that the economic influence of the Asian financial crisis on China was very limited. For instance, an article titled "The Economy of Our Nation Stably Keeps Rising" describes China's economy as "healthy" and being "in a stable increase" during the Asian financial crisis, and attributes this to the "proper strategy of the Communist Party of China and the State Council" (Wei & Chen, 1998). Because the condition of the economy is closely related to the Chinese leadership, the state-oriented newspaper was reluctant to highlight the negative consequences of the crisis on the nation. That is, the cosmopolitanism that China evoked during the Asian financial crisis was described as a *voluntary contribution* to project an outgoing, international, capable, friendly, and responsible national image. This image was intended to not only give the Chinese people a sense of pride but persuade other nations to welcome a new member of the global economic system, taking into consideration China's eagerness to join in the World Trade Organization at the end of the 1990s (which could be seen, for instance, in *People's Daily's* reporting of an interview with Jiang Zemin, the former general secretary of the Communist Party of China [Yang, 1998]). A few news articles about Hong Kong also reveal something interesting. Although the articles frequently portray the bright side of Hong Kong's economy, they also mention that the Chinese government "spared no effort" to support Hong Kong in the Asian crisis (Li, 1998). Keeping this region, which had just been reunited with China when the Asian financial crisis started, stable and safe may have been another reason for China to voluntarily assume responsibility in the Asian financial crisis.

While *People's Daily* denied that the Asian financial crisis was a significant threat to China, it highlighted the negative impact of the crisis on other countries and portrayed this impact as the reason that those countries joined the cosmopolitan community of the Asian crisis. For instance, *People's Daily* illustrated that the United States was "forced to join in the active rescue" of the Asian crisis, because the nation was "concerned that the health of its own economy will be hurt" (Zhang, 1998, p. 3). The sense of cosmopolitanism that the United States evoked during the Asian financial crisis, according to *People's Daily*, was through a type of coercive involvement, which is consistent with Beck's (2004) idea about passive cosmopolitanism. Interestingly, *People's Daily* used a negative tone for the United States' *coercive involvement* by emphasizing the "political inconsistencies" between the United States and Asia as well as

by describing the nation as "looking on with folded arms before the crisis began to threaten the U.S." (Zhang, 1998, p. 3).

The analysis also reveals that *People's Daily* used the conflict frame to describe the obstacles that besieged the cosmopolitan communities of risk. Most of the news articles about the Asian financial crisis that focus on conflicts raise the issue of Japan's policy of currency devaluation. The authors of the news articles "Japanese Currency Devaluation: Who Are Happy, and Who Are Not?" (Yu, 1998) and "Japan's Currency Devaluation Hurt the Economies of Southeast Asia" (Cheng, 1998) accuse Japan of hurting its Asian neighbors to benefit its own national interest of increasing its exports. This finding again suggests that nations were the main players set by *People's Daily* in both of the economic crises. As framed by the newspaper, in contrast to China's responsible and selfless actions, Japan's selfish strategy harmed the stability of the Asian economy. Further, China's national interests, especially those that conflicted with the interests of other nations, were framed as the main obstacle to cosmopolitanism during the Asian financial crisis.

Next, I focused on the news articles about China and the European debt crisis. According to the analysis results, although China still evoked a sense of cosmopolitanism through its supportive attitudes toward the European nations, it followed a very different logic. During the European crisis, *People's Daily* described China's help as conditioned rather than voluntary. One news article, referring to the 2011 G-20 Cannes Summit, concludes that "China contributes greatly to the world economy's recovery and stability, and China will continue to help the Europe in its own way—Europe needs to show its responsible attitudes and sincerity" (Zhong, 2011, p. 21). Another article, titled "China and the Europe Get Along With Each Other," notes the "sincerity" of Europe toward China—or, in other words, the conditions of China's cosmopolitanism—in detail: "China demands Europe to grant market economy status to China, reduce anti-dumping and anti-subsidy suits against China, and open the door of EU market genuinely to Chinese companies" (Li, 2011, p. 3). Compared to the positive, selfless, and voluntary cosmopolitanism that China evoked during the Asian financial crisis, the sense of cosmopolitanism that China evoked during the European crisis was more like a conditional promise, with terms and conditions that benefited China's national interests. *People's Daily* also highlighted the presentation at the G-20 Cannes Summit of Hu Jintao, the former general secretary of the Communist Party of China, and supported his opinion that China would protect its national interests while being a responsible country (Wu, 2011). This assertion made nationalism the driving force behind cosmopolitanism when the terms and conditions are satisfied and made it the obstacle of cosmopolitanism when the conditions are not satisfied.

As in the Asian financial crisis, *People's Daily* seldom used the human interest frame or the morality frame to analyze the European debt crisis (see Table 1), which means that human interest and moral reasons were not portrayed as the major forces of or obstacles to cosmopolitanism in the European debt crisis. An analysis of the news articles using the economic consequences frame reveals their regionalization of the consequences in Europe (which, as a result, characterizes the European countries' joining the cosmopolitan community of risk as *coercive involvement*) and its reluctance to emphasize the negative effects of the European debt crisis on China. Even those articles discussing such consequences portray the impact as "limited," one that could be "covered" by the development of China's own industry or its exports to other areas of the world (Ji, Yu, & Bai, 2011). Although *People's Daily* did admit that

“today the world is so globalized that nations become interdependent in terms of interests . . . to help Europe is to help ourselves, because if the crisis continues, the world economy will be hurt as well” (Zhong, 2011, p. 21), the lack of media coverage of China being under threat from the European debt crisis made China’s enactment of cosmopolitanism to help solve the crisis seem less like *coercive involvement*. Interestingly, whereas *People’s Daily* strongly supported China’s protection of its national interests—regardless of whether such protection caused cosmopolitanism or resulted in a step back from the cosmopolitan community of the European debt crisis—the news articles about the European debt crisis use the conflict frame to ascribe the slow and inefficient strategies of the European countries to their overprotection of their own national interests (Wu, 2011; Zhang, Li, & Wu, 2011).

Discussion and Conclusion

This study’s comparison of the news framing of the Asian financial crisis and the European debt crisis finds that, despite the significant difference in timing and the many other differences between the two crises, *People’s Daily’s* construction of the economic risks followed some similar patterns. The attribution of responsibility and the estimation of the economic consequences were the newspaper’s major concerns, while individual and moral factors were seldom evident. In both cases, the news articles identified nations as the major players. They mainly portrayed individuals as the victims, and thus individuals were excluded from the players in the cosmopolitan communities of risk. The study revealed three types of cosmopolitanism that *People’s Daily* constructed in its news articles about risk: voluntary contribution, coercive involvement, and conditional promise. *Voluntary contribution* is the type of cosmopolitanism that is similar to what Beck (2004) described as ideal cosmopolitanism. Although the driving forces of this type of cosmopolitanism are not necessarily correlated with moral or religious factors, it is bound to a sense of responsibility and some very positive national images. *Coercive involvement* is what Beck (2004, 2009) called cosmopolitanization or passive cosmopolitanism, meaning a nation joining a cosmopolitan community of risk because its own survival is under threat. The crucial ingredient of this type of cosmopolitanism is the level of estimation and the anticipation of the threats. Finally, *conditional promise* is a type of cosmopolitanism with terms and conditions, or, in other words, a trading of cosmopolitanism for certain interests or benefits. Whether the conditions or terms are satisfied determines the level of the cosmopolitanism in such cases.

Despite becoming more closely related to the rest of the world in the decade after the Asian financial crisis, the sense of cosmopolitanism that China evoked during the European debt crisis was less active and voluntary than it had been in the Asian financial crisis, as expressed in one of its most important newspapers. One similarity between the two cases is that *People’s Daily* portrayed a very positive image of China as the helper in both crises, which was consistent with the desired national image of China acting as a responsible country (Ling, 2007). Additionally, neither of China’s senses of cosmopolitanism constructed in the two crises by *People’s Daily* was portrayed as compulsory or passive. As a government-oriented newspaper, *People’s Daily* was reluctant to mention the negative consequences of the crises for China. However, the differences between the portrayals of cosmopolitanism during the two crises were very apparent. In contrast to its voluntary involvement in the Asian financial crisis, China set terms and conditions for Europe, thus trading its involvement in the cosmopolitan community of risk.

Cosmopolitanism in a global risk community does not necessarily increase from low to high as a linear phenomenon, with a positive correlation to the globalization and interdependency among nations. Instead, it is time-space specific. In the case of the Asian financial crisis, China was portrayed as having voluntarily joined the community of risk for multiple reasons. The central government's motivation to stabilize Hong Kong's society after its handover in 1997, its desire to join world economic systems such as the World Trade Organization, its eagerness to increase the world's confidence in its currency, its political concerns with getting closer to its Asian neighbors, and its willingness to show the Chinese people how reliable and powerful their nation was, together facilitated a sense of ideal and voluntary cosmopolitanism, and the newspaper even questioned the sincerity of those countries that helped Asia (such as the United States) by highlighting the *coercive involvement* nature of their cosmopolitanism. However, during the European debt crisis, many of the conditions were different. China had become one of the most important economic entities in the world, and hence it was more confident and had more bargaining power. Compared to the Asia crisis, the Europe crisis was not only physically remote to China but politically, economically, and ideologically distant. China was eager to safeguard its own national interests by using the crisis as an opportunity to make Europe fully open its doors, and this resulted in the enactment of cosmopolitanism as a conditional promise.

In sum, this study found that nationalism and national interests were both the driving forces behind and the obstacles to China's cosmopolitanism. The correspondence of national interests with the goals of eliminating risk may have created a sense of cosmopolitanism and caused the country to take on the responsibility to help. However, when the national interests did not correspond with the goals, the sense of cosmopolitanism may have diminished. The identification of three types of cosmopolitanism, especially *conditional promise*, raises a critical question: Can we trade cosmopolitanism in global risk for profits, safety, political bargains, or national images? If we can, then cosmopolitanism becomes an important (inter)national strategy, the concept of which may serve as the basis for further studies on the collaborations and conflicts among nations in terms of politics, international relations, and the dynamics of globalization. But does the trading nature of *conditional promise* step too far away from the core idea of cosmopolitanism? Moreover, it is possible that the cosmopolitanism in other types of risk, such as climate change, may exhibit different characteristics. Researchers may consider addressing these questions in future studies.

The limitation of this study is that the only media source was *People's Daily*, which is a national and state-oriented newspaper. The articles in this newspaper share the government-oriented discourse of global risk, but this does not provide the full picture. It is possible that individuals and other social groups had alternative perspectives. Future studies might consider including market-oriented media, the Internet, individuals, and different social groups in the study of cosmopolitan communities of global risk to enrich the findings of this research.

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