The Dialectic Polarization of Consensus Formation: 
An Analysis of Civic Studies Media Discourse in Israel

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In democracies, civic education aims at fostering a common civic identity that prepares citizens to embrace disagreements about basic values and settle conflicts in legitimate ways, an acute need following social, political, and media polarization. Using the Israeli media debate about civic education as a case study, this study illustrates how, in a deeply polarized society, the debate regarding civic education has become yet another tool for aggravating polarization and “othering” of the opposing side of the debate while bringing this polarization into the classroom. Using dialectic discourse analysis, this study strives to disclose the central discursive resources used by both liberal and conservative “camps” to appropriate central societal values toward their position on civic studies. It illustrates how each camp attempts to present itself as aligning with “neutral” political education by appropriating “nonideological” societal values to advance its approach toward civics.

Keywords: civics, civic education, political education, polarization, discourse analysis

A central goal of civic education in democracies is fostering a common civic identity (Torney-Purta, Schwille, & Amadeo, 1999) that prepares citizens to embrace disagreements about basic values and settle conflicts in legitimate ways (Crick, 2000), thereby establishing consensus. Civic education has been advanced in democratic countries to combat polarization, particularly since the 1990s, when Western democracies underwent profound changes, including large-scale immigration, which resulted in multicultural societies and globalization (Harvey, 2005). In addition, the 21st-century media environment has aggravated polarization (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015).

The State of Israel offers an interesting case study for understanding the relationship between civic education and polarization. Following growing polarization in the 1980s, civic education, through the introduction (and constant revision) of a civics curriculum, has been advanced as a platform for socializing pupils toward a common civic identity. Despite this goal, both the content and pedagogical framework for teaching civics have been the focal point of fierce public debate, often expressed in media. Divided primarily along ideological lines, liberal and conservative “camps” have engaged in determined debate, under the assumption that this curriculum will have a significant impact on the younger generation’s perceptions of the state’s identity.

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This study suggests that the debate over civic education in Israel has become yet another tool for aggravating polarization. In the public discourse regarding civics, we found that each side attempts to present itself as aligning with “neutral” political education by appropriating “nonideological” values to advance its approach toward the civics curriculum. Hence, this study discloses the central discursive resources used by both camps to appropriate central societal values toward their position. We found that both camps weaponize a subject meant to foster a common civic identity, aggravating polarization. To this end, we adopted a dialectic discourse analysis approach, which examines how similar discursive resources are appropriated to justify oppositional stances on an issue to justify a specific position as a central societal value (Friedman & Gavriely-Nuri, 2018).

The Concept of Polarization

Polarization has been defined as a process whereby the normal multiplicity of differences in a society increasingly align along a single dimension and individuals increasingly perceive society in terms of "us" versus "them" (McCoy, Rahman, & Somer, 2018). Cross-cutting cleavages are “flattened,” resulting in a single boundary dividing societies into two camps, with political identities becoming social identities. Polarization suppresses “within-group” differences and collapses otherwise multiple and cross-cutting intergroup differences into a single “us” versus “them” axis, negatively charged to define the “other” (McCoy et al., 2018). Severe polarization makes compromise, consensus building, and tolerance of the other tenuous. Oppositional “camps” come to perceive the other as an enemy to be vanquished, and coexistence is not perceived by citizens as possible (Lozada, 2014).

Media Polarization

The 21st-century global media environment has been shown to be deeply confrontational and divisive, impacted by the economic implications of changing media technologies (Picard, 2011). Media organizations have less economic incentive to invest in high-quality journalism, as sensationalist clickbait media stories have greater economic rewards (Munger, 2020). This process has been emboldened by increasingly partisan online news resources, often of dubious reliability (Wilson, Parker, & Feinberg, 2020). Such media sources give expression to the media model described as the “outrage industry,” which selectively amplifies extreme incidents and depicts opponents in an unflattering light (Berry & Sobierjai, 2013). The growth of social media has resulted in social recommendations of outrageous news items replacing the reputation of a news organization as a central factor in news believability. This, coupled with heterogeneity in media literacy, allows fake news to flourish, further contributing to polarization (Munger, 2020).

In addition, there is substantial evidence of fragmentation of media sources and patterns of media consumption increasingly aligning with political identity (Bakshy et al., 2015), driving members of opposing political groups into silos or “echo chambers” based on homophily (Dvir-Gvirsman, 2017). Furthermore, media framing and partisan media consumption contribute to the acceptance of the media’s ideological interpretations (Tsfati & Nir, 2017) as well as negative misperceptions of opponents (Han & Yzer, 2020).

Media have powerful incentives to intensify polarization by attracting audiences through inflammatory negative views about opponents while maintaining audiences by delegitimizing other sources
of information (Benkler, Faris, & Roberts, 2018). Such media polarization results in a positive feedback system, as a polarized public spurs media elites toward even greater incentives for highly polarizing messages that fuel this division (Wilson et al., 2020).

In addition, media outlets have been found to increasingly rely on external contributors such as writers, academics, politicians, and other individuals who generate analysis and interpretation. As this trend incentivizes politically aligned topics and perspectives, it can contribute to further polarization (Hagar, Wachs, & Emőke-Ágnes, 2021).

**Discursive Strategies in Media Discourse Toward Polarization**

Previous studies have shown that numerous discursive strategies serve polarization in the media. Such strategies are generally based on "othering," which has been defined as "discursive processes by which powerful groups define subordinate groups into existence in a reductionist way which ascribe problematic and/or inferior characteristics to these subordinate groups" (Jensen, 2011, p. 65). Othering can include deep grievances about perceived injustice (Crammer, 2016), the use of polarized exemplars (Levendusky & Malhotra, 2013), or emphasis on the moral superiority of "us" over a discredited "them" (van Dijk, 2006).

Such polarizing discourse often refers to central societal values. Political actors tend to refer to value-laden terms (e.g., "freedom," "liberty," and "civilization") to polarize between Us and Them (Oddo, 2011). In addition, actors can employ "traditional values" to polarize an issue and portray the opposing stance as a threat to society (Edenborg, 2021). Similarly, arguments about migrants’ inability to adopt "cultural values and norms" has been used to portray migrants as other (Seidelsohn, Flick, & Hirseland, 2020, p. 223). In sum, the appropriation of central societal values has been a frequently used discursive strategy to polarize between Us and Them, a strategy that is explored in this study.

**Civics—An Antidote to Polarization?**

The 1990s heralded significant changes in Western democratic countries following large-scale immigration, which created multicultural societies, and economic and cultural globalization (Harvey, 2005). Such developments heighten polarization, which is reflected in increased support for parties that had previously been on the margins, at the expense of center parties (Calje, 2019). Additionally, young people have been showing decreasing rates of political, civic, and social engagement (Kahne, Lee, & Feezell, 2012) due to fear of negative backlash (Weinstein, Rundle, & James, 2015). These polarized societies have been suffering from crumbling cohesiveness, face the challenge of rebuilding a common identity that embraces differing opinions, which also indicate an urgent need for civic education.

Civic education is an ongoing educational process that nourishes the customs, skills, perceptions, goals, and values required for preserving and developing a given political arrangement (Foster, 1995). In democracies, it includes teaching legitimate and effective ways of participation in the political process, developing critical thinking, which enables citizens to identify social and political developments (Avnon, 2013), and fostering a common civic identity (Torney-Purta et al., 1999). It also prepares citizens to embrace disagreements about basic values and settle conflicts in legitimate ways (Crick, 2000), thereby
establishing social and political consensus despite polarization. Kerr (1999) distinguishes between countries that take a neutral-value approach (the United States, Canada, The Netherlands) and countries that define specific values that constitute a basis for civic education (Japan, South Korea). The former tend to represent social pluralism, preferring to leave values either to the individual or local level. The second group may succeed better in instilling preferred values but take the risk of bias (i.e., harming the freedom to formulate one’s own stance), and in some cases, imposing a value that collides with that of the community/family.

This distinction corresponds with another discrepancy within the field of education, illustrated by Lamm (2000), who differentiates between political education and ideological education. Political education refers to activities that occur within the educational framework whose goal is developing intellectual skills and moral sensitivity that enable the student to formulate a political stance. In contrast, ideological education aims to use the curriculum to instill a specific political stance. Lamm (2000) maintains that political education is more appropriate for Western democracies, and perceives civic education as political education in the sense that no specific ideology underlies it.

However, Gusacov (2020) challenges this distinction, arguing that the idea of political education as suggested by Lamm (2000), and civic education’s underlying premise of value neutrality, is rooted in an ideological worldview, that is, Mill’s (1859) liberal-pluralist thought and the Rawlsian (1993) idea of a deliberative democracy. Gusacov (2020) claims that the aspiration to make students politically engaged, alongside developing their critical sense toward authorities, is not genuinely neutral, but rather rests on a liberal perception of the “good citizen” (p. 169). Thus, in terms of goals and premise, civic education in democracies always has an ideological component, and thus may not be suitable for groups that do not share democratic values. In certain countries, even political civic education, which is intended to be value neutral, and whose purpose is to create a common identity, can be inherently polarizing. Furthermore, countries that adopt ideological education and define specific educational values experience civic education as highly controversial and polarizing due to differences in worldviews, as illustrated in this study.

The liberal-individualistic political outlook is focused on the individual, as the state is not identified with a specific ethnic nation or culture. Citizens have no aspiration regarding a shared “good,” but rather, a common interest to preserve the state’s neutrality to protect them (Rawls, 1993). Therefore, the patriotic loyalty that the liberal view aims to nourish is not toward the ethnic-national community but rather toward democratic civic ideas (Knight-Abowitz & Harmish, 2006). Therefore, although this approach is often identified with political education, it does have clear ideological elements.

The national-republican political outlook rests on the premise that each individual is interested in belonging to a political community and therefore, emphasizes the contribution to the community and participation in designing the “common good” (Shafir & Peled, 2002, p. 5). Republican civic education focuses on teaching the shared national canon and seeks to emphasize the personal commitment of citizens toward the community and country (Yariv-Mishal, 2013), thus clearly aligning with ideological education as commitment to the country can have ideological and ethnic components. Hence, it is no surprise that

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1 Lamm (2000) provides a specific interpretation of the term “political,” while, all other references to it throughout the article use the common meaning that contrasts it with “neutral.”
differing ideological perceptions of the "good citizen" affect the educational process (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004), turning it into an arena for political battles (Yuval-Davies, 1999).

In sum, civic education presents three interrelated challenges: What type of knowledge should be taught? What values should be instilled? And what is a good citizen? This holds true for every country, and especially for Israel, which is characterized by deep cleavages, and where no formal constitutional agreement exists regarding the basic values that define the state.

The Case Study of Israel: Civic Studies in a Highly Polarized Society

Israeli society has been characterized by five main cleavages that have divided Israeli society, namely, the national (Jews/Arabs), the religious (religious/secular), the ethnic (Ashkenazi/Mizrachi), the ideological (dovish-leftists/hawkish-rightists), and the economic (rich/poor; Horowitz & Lissak, 1989). Starting in the mid-1980s, Israeli society has undergone a process of polarization due to processes that challenged its solidarity, including the liberalization process, the election of Knesset member Meir Kahana, leader of the racist Kach Party, and the conflict over the Oslo peace process, which led to the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by an Israeli-Jewish citizen (Peled & Herman, 2019). Over the years, there has been evidence of polarization processes within each of these cleavages. For example, there has been growing "Palestinization" within the national cleavage, expressed by the Arab public’s growing identification with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and alienation toward the State of Israel (Ghanem & Khatib, 2017). Furthermore, the aforementioned cleavages have become more closely linked with the ideological cleavage regarding the future of the territories, resulting in the erosion of the political culture of accommodation (Bareli & Kedar, 2011).

The infrastructure for civic education in Israel was laid when a liberal minister of education appointed a committee (1995) headed by Mordechai Kremnitzer. Civic education in Israel was presented by the planners as oriented toward political education (Cohen, 2013a). The committee called for the internalization of democracy as a regime that centers on sovereign individuals living in a society whose goal is to protect individual rights alongside protecting the rights of minorities. Since Israeli society includes groups that do not identify with democratic values, the civic education program does not align with these groups’ values despite its presentation as value neutral. For example, the ultra-orthodox population in Israel does not share the principle of personal autonomy or the critical approach toward authority figures in their community (Zicherman, 2014), and is not interested in participating in public debates (Kymlicka, 1997). Additionally, since the 1990s, the national-religious camp has been undergoing an illiberal turn and adopting an increasingly ethno-nationalist approach (Hermann et al., 2014). It should be noted that in Israel, most of the civic education reforms throughout the years were implemented in one aspect of civic education—the subject of civics, which has been a mandatory separate subject since the 1970s (Klevitsky, Illouz, & Dahari, 2010).

Significant debates surrounding the civics curriculum have often been based on conflicting perceptions of democracy. The Israeli conservative camp perceives democracy primarily as a regime in which competitive elections are held regularly; therefore, it claims that civics should concentrate on procedures and institutions. The conservative camp is not explicitly against instilling the values of civic education but claims that such concepts should be taught in extracurricular formats and in other subjects (Neubauer-Shani, 2022).
In contrast to other contexts, the national-republican approach advanced by the conservative camp in Israel perceives itself as aligning with political education due to its adoption of the “democracy as a regime” approach while emphasizing the national collective rather than the individual while somewhat overlooking the individual’s liberal rights. In addition, it supports instilling particularist Zionist values rather than liberal-democratic values through the civics curriculum, although assigning them secondary importance (Neubauer-Shani, 2022).

Conversely, the liberal camp perceives democracy as a liberal worldview and therefore, emphasizes values and principles over procedures and institutions. Claiming to advance universal values, the liberal camp perceives the Jewish and the democratic components of the State of Israel as contradictory to a certain extent (Smooha, 2002), and therefore, it accords national values a secondary role (Fuchs, Blander, & Kremnitzer, 2015). This camp corresponds with the above illustrated liberal-individualistic approach, which also emphasizes the individual’s rights while devaluing nationality. This approach aligns with political education in the non-Israeli context although, here too, there are clear ideological aspects. Maman (2014), who studied the processes of establishing civic education in Israel under circumstances in which there is no consensus regarding the underlying values of the state, illustrated that this process has significantly aggravated political controversies and brought them into the classroom.

Starting in 2001, with the launch of the new curriculum of civics in the spirit of the Kremnitzer report, ministers of education were characterized by distinctive ideological worldviews, which they promoted through civic education policy. This battle led to both an intensive usage of civics as a central educational tool and frequent changes in the curriculum. Moreover, as each minister wanted to underscore certain aspects, additions to the existing curriculum resulted in incoherence (Cohen, 2013b). As illustrated in this study, even though the planners of the civic education reform intended to bring nonpartisan political debate into the classroom (political education, in Lamm’s [2000] terminology), civic education in Israel has become ideological education that changes according to the education minister’s worldview (Maman, 2014).

However, both camps perceive themselves as aligned with a political education approach; the conservative camp views democracy as a regime, holding that including Zionist values in the curriculum does not reflect specific ideological values but rather the national consensus. The liberal camp supports instilling values and principles in the curriculum, but perceives the liberal-democratic principles as universal, and therefore, not based on any particular ideology. In fact, both camps actually attempt to instill very specific values.

Although civic education was adopted in Israel, as well as in other Western countries, to combat polarization, civic education in Israel appears to aggravate polarization in two ways: First, by inculcating in students that their critical autonomy is not accepted by all sectors, as discussed above. Second, the ideological impact of the minister of education on the curriculum leads to protests by the opposing camp demanding to “balance” the curriculum. Oppositional groups protest the curriculum through media engagement, accusing the dominant approach of irreversible harm to the educational process of future citizens. This kind of rhetoric brings about a similar reaction on part of the opposing camp, which, in turn, resonates the controversy through the public sphere, thereby, further polarizing society. This dynamic turns civics into a polarizing subject, exacerbating social rifts.
Case Study: A Brief Survey of Developments

Following the Kremnitzer (1995) report, a textbook To Be Citizens in Israel (Ashkenazi, 2001) was published, which emphasized liberal democratic discourses of citizenship. Furthermore, in 2008, Yuli Tamir, liberal minister of education, decided to double the hours allocated to this subject from three to six weekly hours. During her term in office, the general inspector of civics, Esti Brand, was dismissed and replaced by the liberal-oriented Adar Cohen. Additionally, Tamir appointed Yedidia Stern as chairperson of the Ministry of Education (hereafter, MoE) subject committee. Following these developments, in 2009, the conservative think tank, the Institute for Zionist Strategies published a position paper that claimed that the textbook published in 2000 damages “patriotic and Zionist education and the commitment of the students to the existence of the state of Israel as a Jewish nation-state” (Geiger, 2009, p. 2).

The revised curriculum of 2011, launched under a new right-wing government, marked the beginning of a new phase in the debate. This revision—a routine procedure that takes place once a decade—was led by a new chairperson of the subject committee, Asher Cohen, a conservative political scientist. Two textbooks were tailored to fit this curriculum, both of which found themselves in the eye of a public storm. The first revised textbook entitled Setting Out on a Civic Path (Gildai, Nave, & Matskin, 2011) gave significant attention to human rights, claimed a contradiction between Jewish tradition and democratic values, and pointed to the right-wing’s violence in Israel. The director-general of the MoE removed the book after the subject general inspector had already approved it, later dismissing the general inspector under charges of unprofessionalism. He was replaced by another liberal general inspector, Yael Gur’on.

The second textbook, authored by Avraham Diskin (2011) defines democracy as a form of government, and assigns the topic of the Jewish state the most attention in terms of scale and scope compared with the other topics, thus implementing the central ideas of the conservative approach. However, this book is hardly used by civics teachers (Neubauer-Shani, 2022). In 2015, Cohen was asked to resign, because of his candidacy in the primary elections of the Jewish Home Party although he was not elected as a Member of Knesset. Cohen was replaced by Assaf Malach.

Two occurrences followed the publication of Diskin’s book: In 2015, the general inspector initiated a “Term Indicator” document for teachers to use when preparing students for the matriculation exam, which included a list of basic terms according to central curriculum topics. Following demands of the subject, the document was revised five times because of pressures from both conservative and liberal camps (Neubauer-Shani, 2022). A year later, the MoE issued a new textbook replacing that published in 2000, both of which perceived democracy as a worldview. This new edition of To Be Citizens in Israel (Ashkenazi, 2016) was criticized for taking a favorable bias toward the Jewish ethnic nation-state model at the expense of the state’s democratic character.

The liberal camp’s struggle escalated to a petition filed with the Supreme Court in 2016 against the minister of education demanding the removal of the Term Indicator. The court then served a court order, which is to be enforced unless the ruling to whom it applies—the MoE—could show cause why it should not apply, demanding a clear explanation for its refusal to remove the Term Indicator. The general
inspector who initiated the Term Indicator has since taken a leave of absence. Her replacement, a tender-based appointment, is a national-religious candidate who to date has not changed the Indicator. Thus, the battle between liberal and conservative camps continues in both court and various public forums, including the media, illustrating the extent to which ideological education has dominated the debate about studies on civics.

**Research Purpose**

As illustrated, a central goal of civic education is fostering a common civic identity that prepares citizens to embrace disagreements about basic values and settle conflicts in legal, legitimate ways (Torney-Purta et al., 1999), thereby establishing consensus despite polarization. However, the debate regarding the content and pedagogical framework of civic education has become yet another tool for aggravating polarization and othering of the opposing side of the debate while bringing this polarization into the classroom. In the public debate regarding civics, we found that each side of the debate presents itself as aligning with “neutral” political education by appropriating “nonideological” societal values to advance its approach toward the civics curriculum. Both camps weaponize a subject that is meant to foster a common civic identity. Therefore, this study strives to disclose the central discursive resources wielded by both camps to appropriate central societal values toward their position on civics.

**Method**

To this end, we adopted a dialectic discourse analysis approach, which examines how similar discursive resources are appropriated to justify oppositional stances on an issue to justify a specific position as a central societal value (Friedman & Gavriely-Nuri, 2018). This approach illustrates how oppositional discourses feed off and inform one another, in a sense, enabling one another to exist. The dialectic approach informs how self and other are constructed, differentiated, and mediated through oppositional discourses. The approach is dialectic in the sense that, as Hegel (1977) argues, “other” (or in our case, an oppositional argument) is never only immediately present but is also mediated through the awareness of “I” (in our case, the thesis argument). Indeed, there can be no perception of “object” or “other” without an awareness of “I.” As illustrated in this study, the codependence of oppositional positions is facilitated through the attempted appropriation of similar discursive resources. This approach has been previously used to illustrate how similar arguments can be used in service of both the normalization and estrangement of Israel’s control of the West Bank (Friedman & Gavriely-Nuri, 2018) and the securitization and de-securitization of asylum seekers (Friedman, 2022). By using similar discursive resources, each side contributes to the polarization of the issue in the name of central societal values.

As media potentially serve as a Habermasian (1989) public sphere, in which citizens engage in critical-rational debate to advance the needs of society with the aim of reaching consensus, this study examines non-news articles—op-eds, editorials, analysis articles, and expose interviews with experts—to understand how media debate ostensibly uses “consensual principles” to aggravate polarization. This study involves the analysis of articles dealing with civics, specifically examining various key junctures at which the issue was at the forefront of public debate between the years 2011 and 2020, including:
April 2012: Disqualification of civics textbook authored by the political scientist Dr. Bina Gildai.
July–August 2012: Dismissal of general inspector of civic studies, Adar Cohen.
January–May 2016: Publication and distribution of new civics textbook.
July 2016: Appeal to High Court of Justice regarding Term Indicator.
April 2018: General Inspector Yael Guron takes a leave of absence.

When analyzing the media debates surrounding these events, we collected and examined articles from online versions of leading newspapers in Israel, which represented a range of ideological positions:

- **Makor Rishon**: A broadsheet, elite newspaper, representing the National-Religious public.
- **Israel HaYom**: A right-wing, populist website and newspaper, during this period supportive of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
- **YNET**: A centrist website, the most popular news portal in Israel, connected to the populist newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth.
- **Haaretz**: A liberal broadsheet-style website and newspaper, highly critical of nationalist policies.

Conducting an online search of these websites during these peak periods, we extracted 34 relevant articles.

**Discursive Resources: Two Sides of the Same Coin**

This section uses a dialectic discourse analysis to illustrate that despite their oppositional, often ideologically motivated approaches to civics, liberal and conservative camps often use similar discursive resources presented as consensual to justify their positions.

**We Are Consensual, They Are Ideological**

Consensus formulation has been depicted as essential to democracy, according to both the Rawlsian (1993) principle, which argues that supporters of different normative doctrines must agree on particular principles of justice, morality, and ideology that underwrite a political community’s basic institutions, and the Habermasian (1989) concept of consensus-formation as a central goal of critical-rational debate in the public sphere. Specifically, civics is expected to inculcate pupils with an understanding of consensual societal institutions and values (Lipshits, 2019). The heated media debate regarding the nature of civics situates the issue, according to Hallin’s (1984) model advanced in his seminal work dealing with media coverage of the Vietnam War, within the realm of the sphere of legitimate controversy—that is, media presentation that promotes pluralistic debates. However, as illustrated below, each side positions its perspective as though it were within the realm of the sphere of consensus—that is, within the sphere of broadly shared national values (Durham, 2008) and thus, as nonideological. The rhetorical strategy of presenting a political stance as reflecting a consensus has been used as a central strategy for numerous political purposes, including the justification of war (Ferrari, 2007) and the rationalization of policy changes (Friedman & Kampf, 2019). As illustrated below, this strategy is used to claim that a specific approach to civics reflects the general national consensus. Despite each camp adopting a different approach to the nature of democracy, each argues that its approach represents the Israeli consensus, while the opposing side is positioned as representing an extremist or “political” position.
As such, each side uses "straw man" rhetorical strategies, depicting the opposing position in extreme, inaccurate ways to advance its position.

In this vein, representing the liberal approach, Professor Anat Zohar (2011), argues that the civics education committee headed by Mordechai Kremnitzer, was based on "a broad social consensus and was ratified by various Ministers of Education, from the left-wing and right-wing" (para. 3). A statement by the Coalition for Democracy in Education, presented in an article by Yarden Skoop (2016), further develops this argument by criticizing the conservative approach of lacking such a consensus:

Civics which is common to all streams must be constructed cooperatively and through consensus. The fact that this book was written by representatives of one stream, through the exclusion of other streams, results in a foundational change to civics: from an attempt to clarify the various interpretations with respect to the Jewish and democratic character of the state, there is a transition to a non-consensual dictate with respect to the character of the state. (para. 25)

This position presents the liberal approach as consensual both through the process by which the program was constructed and through its encouragement of divergent interpretations of the state’s character, while the conservative position is presented as anti-consensual in both its formulation and negation of variant interpretations of the state’s character. Thus, the liberal camp positions itself as consensual, while the conservative camp is portrayed as exclusively representing a nationalist-religious approach.

The conservative camp mirrors this argument to position itself as consensual and the liberal camp as extremist. For example, columnist Kalman Libskind (2011) claims that the conservative approach “implements the Zionist outlook that most citizens of Israel hold” (para. 6), while Arale Weisberg (2011) positions the debate as being “between Zionism and post-Zionism” (p. 10)—associating the conservative view with the consensual value of Zionism while connecting the liberal position with the perceived radical position of post-Zionism. Asher Cohen, interviewed in Weisberg’s article, further advances this consensual positioning by claiming, “It is not a debate between right-wing and left-wing. Many of those who think like me [the conservative position] are clearly left-wing” (Weisberg, 2011, p. 10). Thus, the conservative camp advances its claim of representing a clear consensus that spans both the right- and left-wing approaches.

Alongside the conceptualization of the conservative camp as consensual, various "straw man" arguments are used to present the liberal camp as representing an extremist ideology. For example, columnist Gabi Avital (2016) depicts the liberal camp’s approach as giving voice to “the sanctification of the most extreme liberal democracy imaginable,” focused exclusively on “human rights and minorities, judicial activism, post-Zionism, and specifically a state for all of its citizens in stark contrast to the Declaration of Independence” (para. 3). By equating the liberal approach with terms perceived as taboo to the Israeli mainstream public, such as "post-Zionism" and “a state for all of its citizens,” (Avital, 2016, para. 3) while claiming it negates the Declaration of Independence, the author positions the liberal approach as falling far outside the Israeli consensus.
Furthermore, to advance the dichotomy of each side presenting itself as consensual and the opponent as ideological, politicization arguments are used—that is, the self is labeled as "professional," while the other is "political." Politicization has been conceptualized as the process in which abstract concepts, entities, or facts are named as political in nature, serving political, rather than professional, needs (Palonen, 2003). Specifically, the concept of "politicization" of public service is to be understood within the context of the values of objectivity and professional distance associated with a public service, indicating an erosion of such distance, as professional personnel are deemed to serve the political needs of the politicians who appointed them (Mulgan, 2007). In this study’s corpus, the accusation that professionals have abandoned this distance (specifically, various professional roles within the MoE) is a central argument used by representatives of both camps.

The media discourse of each side of the debate claims that its approach is "professional," while the other’s is "political." For example, the headline of education affairs analyst, Or Kashti’s (2016) article, "The New Civics Book: To be Citizens Under the Auspices of Naftali Bennett" (using intertextual wordplay with the name of the textbook), argues that changes to the new textbook are politically motivated as the headline refers to Israel’s right-wing education minister at the time. In this article, the author claims the new textbook "subjugates the state education system to a party-based agenda" (Kashti, 2016, para. 5). Continuing this approach, Anat Zohar (2011), argues that the latest changes to the civics textbooks and committee personnel are based on "political and not professional decisions" (para. 9) Such decisions reflect a specific "political gust of wind" (para. 2) and are based on "irresponsible zigzags" (para. 9) that contradict the need for "stability over time" (para. 8), emphasizing the universal and timeless nature of civic studies, which have been compromised by the specific ideologies of governments and their appointed professionals. The media discourse advanced by the conservative approach makes similar accusations of the liberal camp. For example, Dror Eidar (2014) argues that the liberal approach constitutes "left-wing indoctrination" (para. 1), while Kalman Libskind (2011) claims the liberal position represents "an extreme minority in the left and in academia" (para. 9).

In sum, both liberal and conservative camps view their own perspective as "professional," while the opposing side is deemed "political." This argument serves each side of the debate to appropriate consensus values to its side of the argument while positioning the opposing approach as extremist.

We Encourage Autonomous, Critical Thinking, They are Anti-Pluralistic, Anti-Critical Debate, and Dogmatic

Civic education encourages students to form autonomous political opinions through critical thinking, independent of dogmatism. In the media debates on the issue, autonomous critical thinking is conceived as a central value for both camps. Thus, representatives of both sides attempt to portray the opposing camp as anti-pluralistic, anti-critical debate, and dogmatic. The accusation against political opponents as being anti-pluralistic and dogmatic has been used as a rhetorical strategy to claim moral high ground and to downgrade them as

2 The accusation of being "political" is used in a different sense than the term "political education," which ostensibly attempts to enable students to form their own independent political opinions. Here, the accusation would be more closely aligned with ideological education.

3 This is a translation of the Hebrew idiom "mashav ruach," which indicates a temporary mood.
The accusation of dogmatism and anti-pluralism is echoed by the conservative camp as well. For example, Dror Eidar (2014) claims that the position advocated by Adar Cohen, at the time general inspector of civic studies in the MoE, represents “the indoctrination of the left” (para. 1). Further claims of dogmatism are advanced by Assaf Malach (as cited in Kashti, 2015), who claims the liberal camp practices “the democratic religion,” which is “dogmatic” in nature (Kashti, 2015, para. 6). This accusation is extended to debates about different approaches to the nature of democracy, as “no disagreement is allowed to take place,” which would argue that democracy is “a type of government and not a culture.” Anyone taking this stance is labeled “a racist, a fascist, and anti-democratic” (Avital, 2016, para. 5). Thus, representatives of the conservative camp claim they are labeled as extremist to stifle pluralistic debate and the development of autonomous critical thinking. In sum, both liberal and conservative approaches argue that the opposite side adopts an anti-pluralistic stance by dogmatically repressing any approach that is different than its own. Each camp attempts to appropriate and claim exclusive ownership of the value of autonomous critical thinking, a central principle of civic education. However, each side wields this value to advance its ideology.

Collective Memory and Nostalgia as Legitimizing Strategies

The concept of collective memory was first theorized by Maurice Halbwachs (1952/1992) as shared recollection serving to establish society’s coherence and to cultivate ties among its members. Following Halbwachs, numerous thinkers have established that collective memory serves to consolidate the identity of any social community by constructing a shared version of the past (Wertsch & Roediger, 2008). In addition, collective memory is functional (Zelizer, 1995), often serving to legitimize current actions (Sturken, 1997). In the media debate about civics, both liberal and conservative camps attempt to legitimize their approach by invoking collective memory of a specific national identity by making use of nostalgia. In our case, specific ideological approaches to civics are advanced by referring to specific “golden ages” through collective memory.

The liberal camp tends to wax nostalgic about the 1990s, constructing a harmonious collective memory of periods of left-wing rule (specifically, 1992–1996 and 1999–2000), when there was hope for resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict while Israel was shifting from an ethno-nationalist society toward a liberal democracy (Peri, 2007). Amnon Rubinstein, the minister of education who oversaw reforms to the civics curriculum that reflected the values of liberal democracy at the time (Neubauer-Shani, 2022), himself engages in nostalgia for this period:

The principles for civics determined during my tenure as Minister of Education, created a consensus between all sectors of society—Jews, Arabs, National-Religious, and completely secular Jews. But that was 1995, a very different period than the one we are living in today. (Rubinstein, 2016, para. 15)
Rubinstein (2016) argues that civics in the 1990s put an emphasis on “the dignity of man” (alluding to the Basic Law that he also was involved in legislating), “equality,” “the sanctity of life,” and “individual freedoms,” emphasizing the stark difference between this idealized reality and the current situation (para. 9). Rubinstein casts this period and its values as distant from the zeitgeist of 2016. Interestingly, this exercise in nostalgia relates to the aforementioned positioning of the liberal approach as consensual as Rubinstein recalls that in "the good old days“ both the left and right wings accepted the liberal approach to civic studies.

The conservative camp engages in a similar collective memory exercise in which it presents nostalgia for the Israel that (in their collective consciousness) existed before the various changes that took place in the 1990s. Assaf Malach (2019), who serves as chair of the Civics Committee in the MoE, writes that the latest changes to the Teachers’ Guide is intended “to return the emphasis [of civic studies] to the pillars of modern democracy” (para. 6). Malach (2019) argues that civics should revert to the ideological basis of the State of Israel before “the constitutional revolution initiated by [Head of the Supreme Court] Aharon Barak in the nineties” (para. 9). He continues, "When we read the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel—the realization of the vision of generations of the redemption of Israel—it is certainly very different from human rights discourse" (Malach, 2019, para. 9). Thus, Malach uses the collective memory of the Declaration of Independence to nostalgically invoke a mythic period before human rights discourse and the constitutional revolution harmed civics education. In sum, each camp legitimizes its approach by harkening back to an era of past glory, which gave expression to the true character of the state. In sum, this section illustrates that, in addition to appropriating values central to the principles of civics to polarize the issue—specifically, taking possession of the values of consensus building and the encouragement of autonomous, critical engagement—media contributors use the discursive resource of collective memory to advance a polarizing approach to civics. This illustrates that discursive resources that are ostensibly disconnected from the principles of civic education can be wielded to further polarize the issue.

Discussion

One would hope that debating controversial issues may bring about an agreeable compromise, which would enable moving forward toward consensus. However, as each side appropriates similar discursive resources to justify its approach, each side is essentially stating that its position represents the consensus, thus delegitimizing the opposing side and perpetuating further polarization on an issue whose essence is the establishment of a common civic identity. The issue of civic education, whose purpose is to foster a common civic identity and establish a political consensus, itself becomes polarized as the multiplicity of differences among approaches is aligned along a single dimension in terms of Us versus Them, a phenomenon illustrated by McCoy and colleagues (2018) in other contexts. The debate surrounding civics flattens deep, overlapping cleavages in Israel, serving to further divide society into oppositional "camps," in which political identities overlap with social identities. Furthermore, the appropriation of central societal values illustrates that each side incorporates aspects of ideological education regardless of claims of “professionalism” over politics. Despite fluctuations in the dominant discourse, depending on the political character of the government at the time, the discursive strategies illustrated in this study serve to fortify each camp in its position with no intention of recognizing the other side’s perceptions, resulting in a fixed discourse that prevents any possible synthesis of oppositional positions (Friedman & Gaviely-Nuri, 2018).
To move beyond a fixed discourse, we suggest establishing an informal academic forum of political scientists and law scholars, who are central players in this arena and constitute many of the non-news pieces’ authors. This platform will enable them to debate the issue professionally without the participation of politically appointed bureaucrats, who do not have significant knowledge of the relevant literature. We suggest that such a forum adhere to the principles of deliberative democracy, which proposes normative models by which citizens scrutinize issues, thereby considering an array of differing viewpoints while attempting to reach consensus (Burkhalter, Gastil, & Kelshaw, 2002). Specifically, we suggest applying Gastil’s (2008) conceptualization of public deliberation as entailing two intertwining processes: (1) An analytic process, which ensures substantive deliberations, comprised of establishing an information base, prioritization of values, and consideration of a broad array of perspectives. (2) A social process, which ensures the application of the communicative norms of mutual respect, inclusiveness, and facilitation of speaking opportunities. By using such principles, such a forum could depolarize the discourse, enabling a more consensual approach to civics to be adopted by opinion shapers, which could bring about a positive change in the curriculum.

Limitations and Future Directions

While the study of legacy media discourse presents clear findings, this study did not deal with social media, which constitutes an essential venue for democratization of the public sphere. A study focusing on the debate within Facebook groups, such as the group of Israeli civics teachers, would surely enrich our understanding of the polarization of civics by offering the unique contribution of teachers themselves to the debate.

In addition, this study focuses on a single case, which has the specific features of a society with significant polarization, social sectors that do not identify with democratic principles or the purpose of civics, as well as civic education being defined as a mandatory matriculation exam subject. The combination of these features is unique to Israel as democracies generally do not teach civic education as a separate subject. However, we suggest engaging in a cross-cultural study, which compares the media discourse regarding civic education in countries characterized by both polarization and by groups that do not identify with democratic principles.

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