International Journal of Communication 16(2022), 1220–1238 1932–8036/20220005

Hybrid Self-Repairs in Everyday Misinformation Sharing

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Recent studies on counteracting misinformation have emphasized correcting others that people believe share misinformation. There is also an impression that misinformation only spreads through a single platform. This study, in response, unfolds the repair work that social media users perform to self-correct everyday misinformation they have shared through different settings. Based on interview data from Hanoi, Vietnam, the findings suggest the importance of personalized corrections targeted at people the sharers believe were directly affected by the misinformation, as reflected in online apologizing and deleting posts containing misinformation, together with phone-calling and talking in private and small group settings. The existing digital infrastructures and suprastructures where the users are located allow such hybrid repairs to misinformation to occur. In tandem, the findings demonstrate the collective responsibility and humility underlying interactions with everyday misinformation in a collectivistic ecosystem. These findings potentially offer insights to create algorithmic reminders that can personally stimulate the sharer to trace the misinformation to people and how.

Keywords: misinformation, disinformation, sharing information, correction, repair

The spread of misinformation, disinformation, and other forms of false information has led policy makers, nonstate actors, and researchers to seek ways to tame its social and political repercussions (O'Connor & Weatherall, 2019). In fact, many countries have enacted laws to combat these various types of misinformation (Funke & Flamini, 2018). Mass media and civil society fact-check the misinformation that public and political figures spread (Graves, 2018). Grassroots organizations in different parts of the world work from below to shield communities from false, biased information that affects lives. Additionally, technological companies are under increasing pressure to moderate false content, as its effects on political events, public opinions, and sociocultural shifts are inevitable (Espinoza & Fleming, 2020). Besides trying to equip ordinary citizens with the skills to differentiate between false and true information, such efforts seem to primarily emphasize the importance of correcting misinformation shared by other people and institutions.

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Date submitted: 2021-02-11

[1] I would like to thank the two reviewers for their constructive comments, as well as Kimberly Wade for proofreading the earlier version of this article. The research was funded by RMIT Vietnam Internal Research Grant 4—2019.

While crucial, disruptions to interpersonal relationships and social polarization are inevitable to arise from the correction process (Klein, 2020). The sharer of the original content and the corrector can be uncivil to one another as they may have differing predispositions. Instead of yielding objective truths, the corrections may be seen as impediments to relationships, as these corrections can be interpreted as hostile (Gorman & Gorman, 2017). In this sense, the focus on correcting others may fray the existing social fabric. Also, the existing studies on counteracting misinformation have heavily skewed to mediated communications, creating the impression that misinformation does not spread through in-person communications. In fact, both technologies and humans facilitate the spread of information, regardless of its truth or falsehood, through online and offline platforms (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018). Hence, the counteraction to repair the shared misinformation needs to occur on hybrid platforms rather than merely online or merely face-to-face interactions.

In that respect, this study aims to investigate the hybrid self-correction that social media users perform on determining that they have shared misinformation in everyday interactions. The users potentially combine different communication channels and counteraction methods. The use of everyday life as a context can expand the existing knowledge on misinformation sharing that has been widely situated in the political context of democratic countries. Paired with that, the everyday context offers the possibility to promote mindfulness in information sharing and technology use (Thatcher, Wright, Sun, Zagenczyk, & Klein, 2018), where users are willing to correct misinformation they have shared in an effort to maintain positive, healthy offline and online interactions. To achieve the aim, we chose Hanoi, Vietnam, as a case study. This selection, to some extent, also provides a perspective on the complexity of misinformation sharing in the everyday lives of people living in socialist-communist countries, which seems to have been modestly investigated and heavily focused on China. The section that follows elaborates further on the reason for choosing Vietnam as a case.

Context

Vietnam has shifted to a postauthoritarian society as the state becomes more open to foreign relations and contributes to solving geopolitical tension in the region since it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007. Major cities such as Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi were branded as symbols of modern entrepreneurial culture (Sakata, 2013). In fact, Hanoi was titled a "City for Peace" in 1999 and later designated a "Creative City" in 2019 (UNESCO, 2020, para. 1). In the same year, the capital city was a meeting place for President Donald Trump and the North Korean Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un, boosting its international geopolitical visibility (Hincks, 2019). Different from China, with which Vietnam shares a land border in the north, the Vietnamese government allows Facebook and Google to open businesses, with a hope that such an open-door policy will help the country become a digital hub in Southeast Asia (Cameron et al., 2019). As of January 2020, about 68 million out of 97 million Vietnamese had access to the Internet. Among the Internet users, 65 million are on social media, where platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and Zalo are widely used for both social and work-related activities (Kemp, 2020). Considering that, an abundance of available digital information has marked Vietnam's ongoing transition to become a more open society, as the state consistently creates infrastructures for transnational technological companies to operate in the country's emerging market (Cameron et al., 2019).

Despite current efforts to eradicate corruption and violations of human rights (British Council, 2020), international communities still label Vietnam as a country where freedom of expression and respect of human rights are scant. Journalists, activists, and artists believed to maneuver against the State's interests are commonly detained (Freedom House, 2020). Spreading online misinformation in Vietnam is finable between US$400 and $800, approximately three to six months of basic salary in the country (Nguyen & Pearson, 2020). The government has aimed to educate citizens as to the danger of misinformation through a YouTube video that has been translated to 15 languages. Ordinary citizens are generally supportive of the campaign to mitigate the spread of misinformation (Vietnam News Agency, 2020). Meanwhile, journalists, activists, and artists have criticized that the existing approach to combating misinformation has increased digital censorship in the country (Sarkar, 2019).

Confucianism and collectivistic values broadly mark everyday life in Vietnam (Nguyen, 2019), as reflected in the people's preference for conflict avoidance, saving face, and the presence of high-power distance among different ages. Maintaining social harmony and putting groups and families over individual interests are a basis for interactions in social and political settings (Koh, 2006). Like most countries in Southeast Asia, ordinary citizens view the government as a benevolent brother, leading to high trust in the existing governing system (Kingston, 2017). Political content rarely becomes a serious concern, as many Vietnamese tend to worry about pollution, corruption, medical care, and education (VNExpress, 2019).

Conceptual Framework

This study adapts Goffman's (1956) concept of repair work. The concept illuminates one's efforts to amend falsehood in conversations, correct improper behaviors in social settings, explain misunderstandings, and ameliorate the damage arising from unanticipated responses to breakdowns in communication such as mispronunciations, incorrect responses, inappropriate gestures, and other unexpected actions occurring in everyday interactions (Goffman, 1983). It is an intentional effort to keep interactions in order, as one believes that leaving the breakdown unrepaired will exude incredibility and ignorance to others involved in the given situation. A repair thus embodies one's endeavor to adhere to social norms in the effort to prevent the breakdowns from disrupting interactions (Goffman, 1967).

The usefulness of the concept for explaining communication breakdowns resulting from interrelationships between technology, human, and social situations is emerging (Denis & Pontille, 2019), primarily when the use of information and communication technologies becomes more and more central in everyday settings and myriad communication breakdowns arise from it. People, regardless of social roles or occupations, often attempt to repair them to maintain normality, functionality, and social harmony in certain settings where the breakdowns occur (Berger & Luckmann, 1966), as believing that it is socially inappropriate or wrong not to repair the communication breakdowns they unintentionally make in everyday settings (Hayashi, Raymond, & Sidnell, 2013).

This study adapts the concept to the context of how social media users self-correct everyday misinformation they unintentionally share. For clarity, misinformation is different from disinformation on the basis of the sharer's intention (Fetzer, 2004). Disinformation originates from a premeditated intention to deceive and harm others through spreading false information or to meddle with a functioning system in the

favor of another entity (Bennett & Livingston, 2018). The falsehood in the disinformation is intentional from the start, in which individual, state, and nonstate actors may share it to the public for economic and political gains (Benkler, Faris, & Rovberts, 2018). In that sense, left unaddressed disinformation embedded within echo-chamber effects and identity politics potentially makes societies more contested as polarizations widen (National Intelligence Council, 2021).

In comparison, the intention to deceive others may be absent in misinformation as the content may then be found false or true. When a user shares information thought to be accurate and later realizes that it includes falsehoods, then that information becomes misinformation (Fallis, 2014). In this circumstance, the user has no intention to harm others or even believe that they are doing the right thing given the gravity of the situations they are in. Thus, unintentionally share the misinformation with others (Metzger, Flanagin, Mena, Jiang, & Wilson, 2021). This study primarily focuses on this form of misinformation, which resembles a breakdown in information sharing in everyday contexts. The sharer becomes aware of the falsehood in the information they have publicly shared and later finds it necessary to repair the resulting breakdown.

While one may argue that the everyday is trivial, it is in fact where habitual, cultural, social, and ideological expressions are located (Scott, 2009). Beyond the contested and opinionated environments as a context for recent mis/disinformation studies, when left uncorrected, everyday misinformation potentially brings danger if unaware users consult it as a foundation for decision making. Accurate or not, much of the information that influences political discourses and ideological diffusions begins with and is shaped and reshaped through everyday interactions (Zayani, 2015). As such, paying attention to the everyday context holds the promise to more fully understand the nuances surrounding misinformation that ordinary users share through diverse communication channels (Rohman, 2021).

In this light, sharing misinformation is a breakdown that the users deem as needing repair because they foresee potential harm if left uncorrected. The repair demonstrates user agency by attempting to control the damage caused when misinformation reaches wide audiences. The repair exerts the agency that the users exercise to control the damage that is already done as the misinformation reaches wider audiences. This agency comprises different actions that the users believe may rectify undesirable consequences arising from the shared misinformation (Giddens, 1984). In essence, the users become aware of the falsehood in the misinformation after sharing it, but have no intention to deceive others (Karlova & Lee, 2011). Hence, they perform remedial actions such as deleting, editing, or clarifying the information that is later found to be inaccurate, false, or irrelevant. These forms of online repairs are possible to perform given the convenience that the Internet-based technologies offer to retract, retrieve, and reuse the online artifacts that had been shared prior (boyd, 2010).

Relevant Studies

Studies pertaining to counteracting misinformation seem to polarize at individual and institutional levels. Counteracting misinformation spread by individuals is characterized by a cognitive, psychological approach. It views that individuals are likely to correct misinformation if it potentially affects themselves and people they know (Tandoc et al., 2018). While insightful, this approach tends to minimally consider the

role of emotions and cultural factors in shaping an individual's inclination to counteract misinformation. At the institutional level, attempts to preserve truth in information have appeared in abundant studies about fact-checking (Walter, Cohen, Holbert, & Morag, 2020), which seem to be a trending practice amid existing criticisms about who checks the fact-checkers (Moshirina, 2020). Additionally, studies at both individual and institutional levels have modestly paid attention to offline interactions as a conduit for misinformation spread given these studies primarily focus on online platforms. However, the gulf between online and offline platforms amid their interconnection to one another should not be overlooked (Bolter & Grusin, 2000). In fact, everyday misinformation tends to spread through hybrid platforms rather than merely online or offline or merely in a public or private setting.

State and nonstate actors have also contributed to curbing the spread of misinformation, though with various motivations driving the efforts. State actors in Asia, where misinformation manifests in many different terms and forms, have enacted laws to criminalize the spreaders, which can be misused for silencing dissent (Kaur et al., 2018). Nonstate actors in the Philippines have relied on volunteers to counteract social media misinformation (Stevenson, 2018), while Indonesian activists fact-check misinformation to prevent communal violence from widening (Rohman, Pang, & Pitaloka, 2020). Given limited resources, the grassroots attempt of nonstate actors is often outpaced by sophisticated technologies employed by purveyors of misinformation and elaborate socioeconomic and political exploitation surrounding its spread.

Broadly, four approaches have marked the battle against misinformation. First, a human-based approach stresses enabling people to authenticate information (Tandoc et al., 2018), debias individual predispositions (Barton, 2019), and think critically (Bulger & Davison, 2018). In relation to this approach, second, law makers and civil societies try to hold technology companies accountable for their negligence in disarming misinformation (Denardis, 2020), creating a need for a machine-based approach. This approach stresses equipping algorithms, artificial intelligence, and other emerging technologies with the capability to recognize misinformation and possibly kill it before metastasizing (Bakir & McStay, 2018). The last approach, fourth, is a combination of all the other approaches. This hybrid approach advocates for a holistic strategy to counteract misinformation, as its repercussions have deteriorated many aspects of human life (Lazer et al., 2018).

The aforementioned studies seem to focus on the correction of misinformation shared by others. Hence, efforts to self-correct misinformation remains understudied. In addition, such studies have also primarily paid attention to online counteractions, discounting the fact that misinformation still pervasively spread via in-person communications and there is a market for its production and distribution (Gorbach, 2018). The necessity of a hybrid approach will become clearer when it is revealed that Internet-based misinformation is discussed during offline interactions, particularly in situations when socioeconomic status limits access to online platforms.

In that sense, the hybrid self-repair work to everyday misinformation approaches corrections to the information that users later find to be false are embedded in social and cultural settings, in which seeking and using information as well as sharing and correcting misinformation may take place in the intersection of public and private communication platforms (Malhotra, 2020). Thus, in addition to empowering users to

be capable of spotting misinformation circulating within different contexts (Vraga, Tully, & Bode, 2020), enabling users to be mindful when interacting with information can help reduce the risk of unintentional misinformation sharing in hybrid environments (e.g., on/offline, public/private).

With the foregoing discussion in mind, this study asks two interrelated questions:

RQ1: What is the repair work social media users perform after realizing they have shared misinformation, which they shared without the intention to disinform but which is deemed harmful if left unrepaired, in everyday settings?

RQ2: How do social media users perform the hybrid repair to self-correct the misinformation they have shared in such settings?

Method

To answer the above research questions, we initially interviewed 100 ordinary Hanoians (58 women), ages >18, from May to October 2019. Out of these interviewees, 61% were between 18 and 32 years old, 78% were college graduates, 52% stated working for private organizations, 48% had between VND 4–6 million monthly expense or approximately US$172–$258, and spent about VND 50,000/month, approximately US$2, on Internet connection. Since the interviewees were mainly college graduates and resided in urban areas, the findings are not representative of the behavior of the whole Vietnamese society. That being said, the concepts and patterns arising from this study were potentially transferable to other contexts with similar characteristics (Denzin, 2009).

The interviewees must have encountered information they considered false on an online platform at least once to participate in this study. The interviews were conducted in the Vietnamese language, lasted between 40 and 75 minutes, and took place at public places that both interviewers and interviewees agreed upon. Two interviewers began recruiting the interviewees from their own social circles (e.g., coworkers, friends, and extended families) and then asked these interviewees to recommend subsequent interviewees. All interviewees consented to being audiotaped. For privacy, their names are anonymized in this article.

The key interview questions were (a) Have you ever shared information that later you found to be false? If the interviewee answered yes, then (b) Please provide details pertaining to that information and what communication platforms you used to share it; and (c) What did you do after finding out that it was false? Sixty-one of 100 interviewees reported that they had self-corrected false information they had shared on social media. Given the focus of this study, only these 61 responses were analyzed further to illuminate the users' self-repair work to everyday misinformation.

The research team met weekly to share and discuss the preliminary insights resulting from the ongoing interviews. We identified some of the commonalities and differences that the interviewees shared with the interviewers in the week prior, as well as potential insights that we intended to explore further. One interviewer shared their insight with the other, resulting in an initial understanding of how interviewees interact with information, what they did after realizing they had shared false information, and the

communication channels they usually used to correct that information. This weekly meeting helped to ensure the consistency of data analysis (Yin, 2011).

To start the analysis, we read through all the interview data. Informed by the mentioned conceptual framework and existing studies on misinformation counteractions, we first analyzed the literal insights spread across the interview transcripts (Schreier, 2012) such as what repair work users performed to self-correct misinformation and what communication channels they used to do so. Then, we looked for nonliteral insights of the repair work, the use of channels, the users' relationships with others, and the context of the situations. At this stage, the findings were deduced from group discussions, where we shared our understanding of the insights and deliberated their relevance to answering the research questions. This inductive approach allowed us to remain open to new insights emerging from the data and iteratively discuss them (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). As reported in the proceeding sections, the analysis resulted in broader insights and patterns that are potentially transferable beyond the idiosyncratic context of this study (Glaser, 1978).

Findings

Self- and Other-Oriented Apologies as Constitutive Elements of Hybrid Repair Work

Self- and other-oriented apologies characterized the repair work the users performed on realizing that the information shared on social media contained falsehoods. The apologies were accompanied by a correction found after receiving new information the users considered true. In addition, warning about the consequences of hastily sharing information on social media commonly accompanied the apology, as the following excerpt exemplifies:

> I shared an article about a not-for-profit organization asking for donations to help disadvantaged areas on my Facebook account. I also asked friends to help [the organization]. After a while, I heard that the organization was not truly working on the issues as I previously thought. After learning the truth, I apologized to my friends and warned others about the potential scam. (P075)

This user apologized once she realized the falsehood in the information she had shared. She evaluated the prior information against new information, resulting in a new definition of truth. She identified a discrepancy between her original intention to help the not-for-profit organization raise funds and the fact that the organization was not as it represented itself to be. She became aware of the breakdown in her attempt to spread the information to a wider audience. This breakdown originated from the inconsistency between what she originally believed and the reality that later emerged after she found new information about the organization. Hence, she believed that apologizing and warning other users would repair the breakdown she had caused by sharing information without carefully examining it.

In that sense, the apology was both self-oriented and other-oriented. The self-oriented apology demonstrated an admission for the mistake made through sharing the misinformation. This apology reflected her ability to accept truth offered by new information, where she might intentionally look for it or

unintentionally encounter it; and her capability to use it to correct the misinformation that she had already shared on Facebook. In other words, her humility to admit that the information she shared was false and to rectify it embodied her agency to mitigate potential damage resulting from the spread of misinformation.

In comparison, the other-oriented apology was social in nature. In the above excerpt, the apology was intended for friends and followed by a warning about the potential scam. The apology sought understanding from others and to alert them so they could avoid experiencing similar breakdowns. Despite the lack of actual damage resulting from the misinformation, she had reason to believe that it had the potential to mislead others and was the source of motivation for the apology, indicating that there was an inclination to be responsible as well as fear of being sanctioned if the misinformation harmed anyone. Such external considerations for apologizing imbued her effort to personally end the spread of misinformation she unintentionally shared.

Though some users preferred to repair breakdowns with apologies, others preferred to simply delete misinformation they shared. One user provided the following:

> I shared information about a fire incident at the Rang Dong factory. I heard from my relatives who lived around it that the affected area was quite massive. So, I posted that information on Facebook so that people could be more careful. But, after reading information from another source that I believed was more reliable, I knew my information was wrong. Then, I immediately deleted the post. (P082)

This user felt a sense of urgency to warn others about the fire. The urgency originated from the view that immediately sharing information would alert others as to the severity of the fire. As such, amid good intentions, haste caused him to overlook the falsehood in the information he shared. His urge to warn others about the danger hindered his chance to carefully examine that information and search for further information from different sources. In such emergency situations, fear and panic may be underlying reasons for hastily sharing misinformation.

He thus believed that immediately deleting the misinformation was critical, given the gravity of the matter and the need to prevent others from acting on the misinformation. Deleting the post was his attempt to mitigate potential breakdowns after realizing his mistake. Neither apology nor correction was present in his repair because he understood that he had permanently removed the post, hence ending the circulation of the misinformation. The possibility that others might have already read his post was not in his purview as the preconception that the deletion was the ultimate, effective way of ending the misinformation. In that respect, the immediate deletion reflected another sense of urgency in the attempt to break the spread of misinformation. He deleted the post after learning new information that canceled the falsehood embedded in the old one.

In other occasions, the online repair consisted of apologies, deletions, and corrections. For example:

> I used to work in marketing. Initially, I didn't know much about the health products I was selling. Because I was an employee, I kind of blindly trust in [the quality of] those products. . . . I shared information about these products on my Facebook and some chat-groups so that many people could know about them. I even tell the people I know to buy the products. . . . Later, I figured that the products I was trying to sell could do more harm than good to people's health. After knowing that, I apologized to everyone on Facebook for sharing false information and provided the correct information. I then immediately deleted my Facebook post. (P070)

This user demonstrated an online repair consisting of apologizing, correcting, and then deleting misinformation. Unlike the previous excerpts, the breakdown for this user occurred on multiple communication channels. In the above comment, changes in time and situation allowed the user to realize the falsehoods in the information he had shared. The changes motivated him to confront his own bias toward the content of the information he had shared. Learning more about the company made him aware of the harm that the products he sold could cause. Hence, he firmly believed that repairing the prior actions he performed in relation to his past marketing job was necessary. The apology and deletion signified his attempts to amend the misinformation he had shared widely.

The above online repair indicated humility to admit the mistake made through sharing false information and intention to control the potential harm it might have caused. As such, the repair work was self-driven and voluntary as pressure from other users was absent in the decision to apologize. However, the deletion, apology, and correction were others-driven as they stemmed from the intention to keep the misinformation from harming others. The deletion prevented other users from accessing the misinformation that had been shared, while the correction offered affected users a more truthful version of information that had been previously shared.

Given the context of Vietnam being strongly affected by collectivism and having strict laws against misinformation spread, the apologies seemed to be an expected follow-up. They were rooted in the intention to meet cultural expectations to protect others within social circles and to avoid formal sanctions that might have arisen if the misinformation harmed others. Protecting others, and the user's own reputation from the ramifications of misinformation seemed to be an expression of being a responsible member of a collectivistic society. The fact that the government can legally charge misinformation spreaders instilled fear of leaving the misinformation the user unintentionally shared uncorrected. In this sense, the apologies to some extent were informed by both cultural and legal matters regarding the spread of misinformation.

Targeted Hybrid Self-Repair Work Through Multiple Communication Channels

In combination with the online apologies, corrections, and deletions noted earlier, targeted corrections via private and public communication channels constituted the hybrid repair work. Realizing that they had shared misinformation, the users believed that providing public online corrections alone was inadequate and also sought to perform private repairs. A user expressed the following:

> I shared [the information] with other parents at my child's school right after I heard that Vinamilk broke the food regulation by using under-standardized ingredients. . . . When a story affects many people, I want to share it so that everyone knows. . . . After having more accurate information [about the milk case], I correct the false information I had already shared. It is also my responsibility for doing so. The false information could affect many people. I felt responsible for correcting it. . . . I used social media to correct it . . . and called others directly affected by it. (P005)

Similar to the incident detailed in the Rang Dong Fire example above, this user reported a sense of urgency to warn others of the potential harm that could come from consuming Vinamilk. This popular local milk brand is widely consumed by children in Vietnam. Given that, she felt it was critical to alert parents to the company's potential negligence in ensuring the milk's safety. First, she shared the news offline with other parents during face-to-face exchanges she met at her children's school waiting room and car park. Then, she went online to alert other Facebook users by sharing a news story. She regretted her actions on learning that the news she shared was false. She deemed that it was her responsibility to rectify the breakdown through hybrid means, just as she had shared the misinformation.

In tandem with online repair work, she performed offline repair work by making phone calls to some of the affected people. While the phone calls were intended to cancel the truth initially assigned to the earlier information, the course of the phone conversations initiated to apologize were fluid. It resembled a social call where one topic was naturally addressed after another. The correction of the misinformation was eventually addressed but was not performed in such a way that it could be interpreted as the motivating source for the phone call. Further, other information pertaining to the Vinamilk matter was exchanged, allowing for those involved in the repair work to follow the development of the case and diversify information sources that they considered more reliable. The existing interpersonal relationships among those involved in the repair work mitigated the potential for frays in the social fabric that correction could cause, as well as facilitated exchanges of subsequent information.

When performing a hybrid repair, some users identified specific recipients of misinformation through one-to-one chats via various communication platforms to perform targeted corrections. The following excerpt suggests such targeted corrections:

> It [the misinformation] was related to the Rang Dong factory incident. Some media have reported that the water was mercury-contaminated, while others said it wasn't. There were also speculations that some people were trying to hide how polluted it was. Too many different and conflicting information sources. . . . I sent information to my Facebook friends that the water was not polluted. After I found out that my information was wrong, I immediately corrected it with a group of people I sent it to. I know my information is wrong because I did not read the official news release. Hence, provided everyone with accurate information after fact. (P093)

The targeted correction began with an attempt to retract the misinformation he had shared with others in his social circle. He attempted to label some content as true and some content as necessitating

correction. In the one-to-one communication detailed above, he attempted to detach the truth from the falsehood, facilitating exchanges of further information which potentially led to a complete understanding of developing events such as water contamination and fire accidents. The repair with a targeted correction stimulated these users to evaluate old information and search for new information, thereby facilitating an interaction that led to a more accurate understanding of the event. Additionally, he sent targeted corrections to small chat groups to which he had also shared the misinformation.

In fact, a preference for private communication channels such as personalized texts in one-to-one or small group chats became apparent for repair work involving targeted corrections. Another user shared an experience performing a targeted correction after unintentionally sharing misinformation on multiple social media platforms:

> I'm quite a fan of Korean dramas. There was an article that said Kim Hyun-Joong beat and insulted his girlfriend. He then was boycotted by the K-drama community and many of his contracts were cancelled. I believed the story that his girlfriend told at that time. So, I shared it [on Facebook] with my friends and on Zalo [a leading Vietnamese messaging app]. But, after investigating the story further I found that it was just his girlfriend's plan to ruin his career. I deleted my post. I also talked to my Zalo friends after finding the truth. I told them to check it again and stop sharing that false article. (P68)

A personalized attempt to target corrections of misinformation characterized the hybrid repair. Unlike public corrections that often manifested as apologies and deletions of social media posts, personalized corrections materialized in private, one-to-one communication channels or private, small chat groups. In the above excerpt, the user reported using the Zalo messaging app to reach specific users she believed to be affected by the misinformation she had shared. As noted earlier, this one-to-one correction attempt potentially resulted in a construction of truth based on users' preexisting knowledge on the subject, interpersonal relationships, and sharing of information sources.

She also sent a targeted correction to friends who shared a similar fascination to the K-drama and followed actors' stories beyond the screen such as fan services and celebrity gossip. A small group chat became a container for the correction and sharing other related information. The truth emerging from this private chat hence was a by-product of group interactions, use of multiple information sources, and contextualization of the story being corrected. Such a targeted, small group correction facilitated an organic effort to expand the depth and breadth of information sharing within the group and to remind others of the importance of examining information in different news articles before sharing them widely. In this circumstance, the hybrid repair on misinformation consisted of private and public communication channels. Private communication channels tended to be selected when it came to correcting misinformation that the user unintentionally shared with others within close social groups and shared similar interests such as K-dramas.

It seemed that targeted corrections via multiple communication modes and channels constituted the hybrid repair work the users performed to self-correct everyday misinformation they unintentionally shared. While there would of course be a pocket of users in Hanoi who were less motivated to self-correct,

those who were motivated, as the findings implied, intended to prevent the misinformation from harming others, in addition to maintaining their personal reputation. In doing so, while public communication channels remained useful, these users preferred private communication channels for reaching others they deemed affected by the misinformation they shared. In this sense, while sharing misinformation was unintentional in nature, the hybrid self-repair work was intentional and took place in both private and public settings.

Discussion

The findings suggest that the hybrid repair work users perform to self-correct misinformation they share on social media encompasses digital infra- and suprastructures. The digital infrastructure manifests in a combined use of online and offline communication platforms for correcting misinformation. Online repairs can be performed on social media and messaging apps by sending public apologies and deleting the posts that contain misinformation. The offline repair performed through phone calls and in-person talks is an extension of the online repair. These types of online and offline hybrid repairs are feasible to perform as users are able to easily interact with these infrastructures, demonstrating their technological literacy and meaningful on/offline relationships with other users (Bolter & Grusin, 2000).

Paired with online and offline hybrid repair is the use of public and private communication platforms. Broadcasting the correction through a Facebook status update suggests a public attempt to correct the misinformation, allowing users to efficiently engage in one-to-many information sharing. In this sense, the correction is intended for many to see. To some extent, the correction itself can raise awareness of the misinformation for those who are only initially exposed to the correction. Further, this public, one-to-many correction has the potential to lead to a private, one-to-one conversation thread, particularly in a collective ecosystem that tends to put a high premium on saving face and maintaining social harmony like Vietnam (Nguyen, 2019).

One-to-one and small group chats are often preferred methods of private corrections. The correction is targeted at users believed to be directly affected by the misinformation. There exists meaningful depth and breadth in the users' existing relationships in such private communication channels, allowing for exchange of information with one another as new information is shared that cancels the misinformation (Mercier & Sperber, 2017). This way, the correction is from within the same group of users with similar worldviews, values, beliefs, and interests. Targeted corrections intend to alert other users to falsehoods in misinformation and provide new information deemed more trustworthy. In this regard, corrections within private communication channels composed of people with personal relationships and similar predispositions could lead to more acceptance of new information that cancels misinformation (Chatman, 2000).

Targeted corrections thus are more than just reactionary amendments, which manifest in the generic correction, apology, and deletion of misinformation through open, public platforms. Personalized, targeted corrections instead use closed, private platforms to correct misinformation to directly affected, specific users. In that understanding, social and cognitive proximities between users already exist, facilitating smooth information sharing and meaningful discussions (Olson & Olson, 2000). To some extent, the physical proximity as reflected in common places to interact with one another such as school waiting

rooms, car parks, and other locations within similar zip codes and neighborhoods can be immediate considerations for users to perform targeted corrections (Fisher & Naumer, 2006).

In tandem with the digital infrastructure enabling users to perform the hybrid repair is the digital suprastructure where misinformation spreads. In this study, it refers to the social condition that motivates users to voluntarily self-correct misinformation they have shared. The notion of collective responsibility to safeguard their own community and others epitomizes that suprastructure. The feeling of collective responsibility resembles the idea of community identity (Puddifoot, 1995), in a way that users want to actively protect their own communities from being affected by misinformation coming from within (Rohman & Ang, 2019). This implies that rather than focusing on the existence of falsehoods in misinformation, users are more concerned about unintentionally spreading misinformation. Since the misinformation that users share is not often intended to harm others, in some instances the intention is to protect, the inclination to self-correct manifests organically. Fostering such an intrinsic inclination thus potentially minimizes the undesirable consequences of correcting misinformation such as online polarization, trolling, and other forms of incivility (Ecker, 2017).

Worth emphasizing is the users' humility to apologize after identifying falsehoods in the information they have shared. This suggests a component of the hybrid repair work that involves expressions of remorse. The apology manifests the users' agency to alter the undesirable consequences potentially arising from their mistakes. Sharing false information can either bring social or formal sanctions to the users themselves or decrease the credibility of subsequent information the users may share. Put differently, the apology represents a repair to breakdowns resulting from sharing misinformation and an effort to mitigate the risk of losing credibility.

While such an inclination to self-correct everyday misinformation stem from the users' intention to maintain self-image (Waruwu, Tandoc, Duffy, Kim, & Ling, 2021), it may indicate the users' desire to organically create a safe and trustworthy hybrid environment, particularly when the existing mass media, digital, and social media platforms have been seen as fertile grounds for misinformation to spread. Although fact-checking and counteracting mis/disinformation efforts remain necessary, equipping users with a sense of humility to self-correct after realizing they have shared misinformation can put any efforts to mitigate mis/disinformation spread within the context of social integrity (Rohman, 2021). This will gradually recalibrate the notion of trust in others, the ability to constructively self-correct, and correct others, primarily when maintaining and sustaining social cohesion are part of the norms governing everyday interactions.

Conclusion

This study has demonstrated the hybrid repair work that social media users in Hanoi performed to self-correct misinformation they unintentionally shared in everyday life. Not only did the hybrid repairs involve online and offline platforms, they also comprised the use of public communication channels, as well as private, one-to-many and small group communication. These actions allowed the targeted corrections to specifically reach anyone the users believed to be affected by the misinformation. The notion of collective responsibility to primarily protect the users' own communities and others in general was one reason to voluntarily self-correct misinformation. Apology, deletion, and targeted outreach to the affected embodied

the users' social and cultural considerations for repairing the breakdown resulting from the misinformation shared through multiple communication channels and settings.

The present findings potentially have both technical and social implications. The insight pertaining to targeted correction can improve the existing algorithmic-based corrections to misinformation by targeting the corrections directly to the affected users, such as the small groups in which the sharer interacts, thus, complementing the generic false–true correction style that many fact-checkers have employed to label misinformation. Such an algorithm could remind the sharer of others they have forwarded the misinformation, facilitating the necessary repair work. This way, the sharer can choose to reach the affected users through one-to-one, one-to-small group, in-person, or a combination of these communication modes. The main point of this algorithm-personalized reminder is to stimulate the sharer to trace the misinformation to people and places in which they have shared it.

The findings on collective responsibility and humility implies social implications of self-correcting misinformation. The collective responsibility emphasizes the importance of being prudent when sharing information is a form of protection from the harm that misinformation can cause in societies. Users' humility to admit mistake and correct it is a prerequisite for ensuring that every user contributes to creating a reliable ecosystem for information sharing while opening spaces for forgiveness and acceptance to the fact that they all are susceptible to making mistakes. This understanding might reduce the inclination to be righteous and imposing when users feel the need to confront competing information while simultaneously facilitating culturally and socially appropriate counteractions when encountering information users deem false. As such, incorporating ideas of collective responsibility and humility into grassroots misinformation literacy programs is necessary to maintain everyday social cohesion without undermining the importance of preserving truth in information sharing.

Having said that, this study is limited given that it is located in a society characterized by collectivism and conflict avoidance. Thus, the findings might be less applicable to societies with stronger feelings of individualism and more transferable to societies where maintaining social cohesion is prioritized over debating truth. In addition, as the study is situated within everyday settings, the findings can only be partially relevant to explaining political misinformation sharing. While there is an underlying ideology in everyday information sharing, this ideology is less divisive compared with content relating to politics, race, and religion.

Such limitations can become starting points for comparative studies intersecting hybrid repair work, culture, and misinformation. Comparing users in the Global South and in wealthy, highly educated, and democratic countries can help to better understand how, for example, different political systems and cultural tendencies affect what are considered appropriate approaches to counteracting misinformation via different platforms—private and public communication settings. More importantly, we could come to better understand how users in different ecosystems balance the importance of sharing accurate information and maintaining social cohesion. Gathering data from diverse ecosystems is therefore promising to mainstream the idea of information mindfulness in response to the rapid use of hybrid platforms for purveying mis/disinformation around the globe.

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