

“Our Only Weapons are Good Arguments and Dissemination”—The Austrian Identitarians Taken at Their Word

JUDITH GOETZ[♦]

University of Innsbruck, Austria

This article takes the Austrian Identitarians as an example to investigate (modernized) right-wing extremist use of language, making codes of the Far Right *decipherable*. The Identitarians' strategies for influencing public discourse will be analyzed in regard to a *culture war of the extreme Right*, propagated by the Identitarians themselves. To facilitate a deeper understanding of Identitarian language and discourse strategies, the concept of *metapolitics* will be clarified. Taking critical discourse analysis as a starting point, the group's self-descriptions in 2017 and 2021 from its website will be analyzed; the modernization of language as well as the strategy of reinterpreting certain terms and ideas will exemplified by the terms "remigration" and "Great Replacement." Following Victor Klemperer's linguistic and social criticism, the analysis shows that Identitarians' use of language functions as a "ferry" into political and media discourses, where it takes root in public awareness.

Keywords: Identitarians, Identitarian movement, right-wing extremism, language, discourse strategies, metapolitics

The Restoration of Right-Wing Speaking and Thinking

In their book *Gefährliche Erbschaften (Dangerous Legacies¹)*, Margret Jäger and Siegfried Jäger (1999) warned of the "insidious restoration of right-wing thinking" (p. 10). After the "national turn" (i.e., the reunification of Germany), a gradual softening of the "taboo of far-right speaking and thinking" had begun, as they put it; "old New Right ideas" entered the center of society and "far into the so-called bourgeois parties" (Jäger & Jäger, 1999, p. 10). According to Jäger and Jäger (1999), this was possible because certain discourses of the supposed center of society such as those related to political correctness, migration policies, or multiculturalism offered the extreme Right opportunities for exploiting the center's radicalization potential. Nearly 20 years later, we have to realize that this *restoration process* seems to have been completed for some time and that the vocabulary of the Far Right has long entered public debates in the media and the political sphere. Furthermore, extreme Right groups and parties are occupying and redefining certain discourses and terms thus pushing the boundaries of what can be said further to the

Judith Goetz: judith.goetz@uibk.ac.at

Date submitted: 2020-06-11

¹ All translations were made by the author.

Right. Therefore, *völkisch* and racist ways of thinking and speaking are not only to be found on the right-wing fringes of society but also widely disseminated in the media and everyday life, making these attitudes increasingly threatening (see Butterwegge et al., 2002; Sora, 2017; Wodak, 2016).

In this article, the Identitarians in Austria are taken as an example to first investigate (modernized) right-wing extremist² use of language, in particular, the reinterpretation of certain terms so that the codes of the Far Right are made *decipherable*. Second, the Identitarians' strategies for influencing public discourse will be analyzed in the context of a *culture war of the extreme Right*, propagated by the Identitarians themselves. To facilitate a deeper understanding of Identitarian language and discourse strategies, the concept of *metapolitics* will be clarified. The main part of the analysis is focused on the group's self-descriptions in 2017 and 2021 from its website as well as the exemplary terms of "remigration" and "Great Replacement."

The Role of Mainstream and Alternative Media in Austria

"Journalism can make an important contribution to educating people about right-wing extremism. But it can also help to promote right-wing extremist successes—out of indifference or against its actual intention," writes the Austrian political scientist Bernhard Weidinger (2021) in his text "Unintentional Complicity" (p. 70). The importance of mainstream media for the dissemination of right-wing extremist ideologies and the adoption of right-wing extremist terminology should not be underestimated (see e.g., Alvares & Dahlgren, 2016; Ellinas, 2010; Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 2019; Goetz, Sulzbacher, & FIPU, 2021; Marschner, 2018; Simpson & Druxes, 2015; Taylor, 2003). Right-wing extremists have mastered the art of producing scandals for some time to receive (uncritical) media and social attention. In addition, confrontational settings in TV talk shows guarantee audience ratings, resulting in media coverage of right-wing extremists instead of reporting on them (Weidinger, 2021).

To present their media channels as an alternative to traditional media, right-wing extremists try to discredit the latter with derogatory terms such as "system media" or "*Lügenpresse*" (lying press) and spread the story of the increasing loss of trust in both public and established private media (Goetz et al., 2021). Under the guise of supposed media criticism, accusations are made by right-wing extremists that quality media support propaganda in a coordinated fashion, insinuating that they represent and reproduce the opinion of the "ruling class" in the sense of a unified opinion. Furthermore, they are accused of consciously omitting or concealing certain information in the spirit of the system, a kind of censorship of what may and may not be said. Also, the allegation of *political correctness* implies that certain topics will be avoided due to political reasons (Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 2019; Haanshuus & Ihlebæk, 2021)

² When using the term *right-wing extremism*, I refer to Holzer's (1993) critical concept; the basis for his definition is the ideological background of right-wing extremism, most importantly antiegalitarianism. Unlike traditional theories of extremism, it does not see society as resembling a horseshoe with two extremist ends and a seemingly neutral middle. At the core of right-wing extremist thinking, there is thus the rejection of the idea of equality of all human beings, a reference to the principle of nature/naturalness as well as undemocratic and anti-pluralistic attitudes. This ideology provides the theoretical background from which policies of the extreme Right are inferred.

In addition, right-wing extremist groups and parties have their own media outlets to spread their political agenda. Thus, the abundance of extremely right-wing periodicals in Austria is in the double-digit numbers; their number has especially increased in parallel with the Europe-wide shift to the Right. In addition to outlets related to the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs [FPÖ]) and FPÖ party organs, there are also periodicals that are important for the Identitarians, like the right-wing extremist magazine *INFO-Direkt* (Goetz et al., 2021). The common denominator of the content orientation of the various right-wing publication organs in Austria results from a right-wing extremist, antidemocratic basic message with recurring, clearly racist, and anti-Semitic as well as anti-feminist undertones, partly also with pro-Russian and/or conspiratorial-mythical ideas. For the most part, the endangerment of the (ethnically and biologically determined) Austrian or German culture and community by outright enemies of the people, such as migrants, certain politicians, and journalists, is imagined and highlighted with discriminatory and dehumanizing (metaphorical) language.

In terms of right-wing extremist modernization strategies, the respective media have also recognized the need to switch to online formats to increase their reach. Due to the numerous possibilities of the Internet and despite losses due to deplatforming,³ other communication channels such as social media accounts (on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube) and Telegram groups are becoming increasingly important as platforms for information and discussion. These also serve to disseminate right-wing extremist journalism by sharing and discussing articles from the named media in the corresponding chat groups or, in some cases, the media themselves operate corresponding channels to quickly supply their subscribers with the latest texts (Goetz et al., 2021).

Right-Wing Extremism and Language

The analysis of the complex interaction of various societal factors needs to go beyond a simplifying focus on economic crises or (reasonable) fears. Media coverage of the extreme Right has occasionally been accompanied by (moral) outrage and horror at linguistic lapses and radicalized use of language; the continually increasing extent of "hate speech," "cyber hate," and "the language of hate" has also been discussed by the public and the media (Brindle, 2016; Heinze, 2016; Howard, 2017; Jakubowska-Branicka, 2016; Whillock, 1995). Yet, these analyses usually do not go beyond stating that the Internet, in particular, has created new communication opportunities, which right-wing groups use for their purposes, as well as new forms of expression that allow for conveying with impunity inhuman attitudes in an embellished, uncensored manner (see e.g., Marschner, 2018; Mintz, 2012; Napoli, 2019). The analysis (scientific as well as political) of the extreme Right's language usually also concentrates on "aspects of style and/or argumentation," as Georg Schuppener (2010, p. 10) stresses, and neglects the relationship of language and right-wing extremism itself. According to Schuppener (2010), however, it is "undeniable that there are special characteristics of the lexis used by right-wing extremism" (p. 10), meaning that there is something like specifically Far Right language or at least vocabulary.

³ When numerous group and individual accounts were banned on Facebook and Instagram in 2018 and on Twitter, YouTube, and TikTok in 2020 due to violations of community standards and hate speech, the reach of their propaganda was massively restricted.

Culture War of the Right

In Austria, the Identitarians were founded in 2012 after their French role model *Génération identitaire*, the youth section of the nationalist *Bloc identitaire*. Since then, the group has become an important player of extra-parliamentary right-wing extremism in Austria. It has numerous regional divisions and receives significant media and public attention due to regular, attention-grabbing actions. The Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance classifies the Identitarians as right-wing extremists with neofascist tendencies. The group's major characteristics are an action-oriented focus, a corporate identity, the adaptation of elements of youth and popular culture, as well as compatible concepts of a modernized, *völkisch* (pan-German) nationalism. Thereby, the Identitarians combine their campaigns for an ethnically closed nation-state with a nationalist critique of capitalist globalization, an imagined Islamization, and mass immigration. Mainly, they reference not only theories and approaches of the so-called New Right but also of fascist theorists. Instead of the Austrian Identitarian movement, I will speak of *Identitarians* to break the strategic narrative of self-designation as a *movement*.

The concept of metapolitics plays a vital role in a deeper understanding of Identitarian language and discourse strategies. It was developed by Alain de Benoist, a French theorist of the New Right who tried to adapt Antonio Gramsci's (1929–1935) concept of a *cultural hegemony*, which he had developed in his *Prison Notebooks* to describe how a political group, especially the state, consolidates its power not primarily through violence but through the production of socially acceptable ideas and the control of culture to the notion of a cultural revolution of the Right (Bar-On, 2021; Boehnke, 2019; Brumlik, 2020; Bruns, Glösel, & Strobl, 2016; Kökgiran & Nottbohm, 2014; Marschner, 2018; Simpson & Druxes, 2015). Its central pillar is the exertion of influence on the pre-political sphere of civil society with the aim of introducing Identitarian *cultural values* to transform societal thinking in the long run, thereby finding answers to fundamental social questions that suit their purposes. The executive, legislative, and judicial areas of the political field are considered as "hardware," whereas metapolitics is considered in the sense of "culture, language, ideas, slogans and morality" (Identitäre Bewegung Allgäu, 2017, p. 49) constitute the related "software." In leaked internal papers, the regional chapter *Identitäre Bewegung Allgäu* describes the Identitarians openly as a

meta-political power which tries to introduce ideas, slogans, and images into the field of meta-politics. Action helps us to create the media hype and the viral spread for disseminating our slogans and images as quickly and as widely as possible. (Identitäre Bewegung Allgäu, 2017, p. 49)

The reference to metapolitics is openly claimed by the Identitarians themselves. According to de Benoist (1985), societally relevant concepts like Volk or nation are to be given new meaning, thereby changing and updating the hegemony and therefore dominant view of things and, in the long run, introducing those new notions firmly into social awareness. In this context, it is not only language that plays an important role as a channel for implementing the strategy of a redefinition of values on the cognitive level but also the concepts themselves. In this sense, Bruns et al. (2016) summarize, "It is the Identitarians' aim to influence the public discourse, to make their way into people's minds and thus to obtain an approval and a long-term success which do not rely on short-term action and media coverage" (p. 225).

Methodology

Using the Identitarians as the focus of analysis is an obvious choice because their metapolitical struggle for *obtaining cultural hegemony* is led mainly by means of linguistic practices and also because existing analyses of this right-wing extremist organization have hardly taken this phenomenon into account.⁴ The analysis of this article is based on the critical discourse analysis as developed by Siegfried Jäger (1995, 2012) and Jäger and Jäger (1999). Inspired by Michel Foucault, the authors question the generation, dissemination, function, and effect of valid knowledge, which is imparted by means of discourses—understood as a social practice—at the center of his approach. In these authors' understanding, discourses themselves are factors of power as they contribute to the structuring of relationships of power and dominance.

The material for analysis was the self-descriptions and the Identitarians' political agenda presented on their website in May 2017 under the menu items "Unsere Forderungen" ("Our demands"; Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2017e), "Unser Weg" ("Our way"; Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2017f); "Identität" ("Identity"; Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2017c), "Der große Austausch" ("The great replacement"; Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2017b), "Die Asylkrise" ("The asylum crisis"; Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2017a), and "Die Integrationslüge" ("The lie of integration"; Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2017d). These texts were compared with the texts published on their website in April 2021: "Aktiv für die Heimat! Die patriotische Jugendbewegung Österreichs stellt sich vor" ("Active for our home country! The patriotic Austrian youth movement introduce themselves"; Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2021a), "Unser Weg" ("Our way"; Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2021c), "Unsere Forderungen" ("Our demands"; Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2021d), and "Liebe zum Eigenen" ("Love for one's own"; Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2021b). These time intervals were determined to examine the organization's Internet presence roughly five years after its foundation in 2012 and to contrast it with approximately the same interval (four years). The sampled articles were chosen because they are primary texts by means of which the group has tried to sum up their key concerns in a condensed form, and which have at the same time served as the activists' common political basis. These specific sections are therefore about offers and the relationships among genre, function, and content, and the way in which these relate to the audience. This text material is in all likelihood directed at interested persons and the wider social public. Thus, it can be analyzed as an example of strategic external communication, being informative on the Identitarian use of language and on the dissemination and persuasion methods for spreading their political program. In contrast, publications in well-known media of the extreme Right are directed at readers who already follow right-wing extremist ideology and have the purpose of discussing internal questions, thus serving an internal communication role.

In the first step, the material was classified into the categories that had emerged from the data: Self-representation, demands, analyses, ideological positions, and documentation of political activism/campaigns. Political messages in all the categories were then identified. In the next step, following Jäger (2012), the material was classified into subtopics such as patriotism/love for one's country,

⁴ A few exceptions are the excellent text by Kökgiran and Nottbohm (2014), one chapter in Bruns et al. (2016) or Goetz et al. (2017).

migration/asylum, population policy/"exchange of populations"/Great Replacement, remigration, *Leitkultur* (dominant culture), family-friendly policy, and ethnopluralism. Based on these topics, key arguments and political messages as well as their ideological and linguistic integration were highlighted and the discursive positions representative of Identitarians' ideology determined. Additionally, the comparison between the two different self-representations in 2017 and 2021 made it possible to detect changes in discourses as well as in the use of language.

Special emphasis was placed on the linguistic application of their arguments and related strategies of discourse, for example, the use of newly coined, seemingly harmless terms or the reinterpretation of discourses. When writing about the effectiveness of right-wing extremist propaganda in Germany in the late 1980s, Jäger (1995) stated that their "substance assumed an existing knowledge in the minds of those addressed that is prerequisite for absorbing new knowledge" (p. 290). When applying Jäger's thoughts to current analyses, the wide dissemination of racist, antiegalitarian, and undemocratic attitudes within society can be seen as an example of such an "assumed knowledge" forming the basis of current right-wing extremist efforts. According to Jäger (1995), elements of this "assumed knowledge" are then used to "transport certain ideologemes into people's minds and to firmly embed them there" (p. 319). In my hypothesis, this analysis will show (following Jäger, 1995) that the Identitarians' specific use of language—and the strategy of a reinterpretation of certain terms and thought patterns in particular—also has the function of a "ferry" into political and media discourses and therefore into people's awareness. In a metapolitical sense, existing concepts are connected with new dimensions of meaning, which in turn can take root in social discourses and public awareness. I suggest that this dissemination of Identitarian (i.e., reinterpreted) terminology in the wider public is an indication of the degree to which it has been normalized in society on the one hand, and of the success of the culture war of the Right on the other.

Fields of Discourse: Migration and Population Policies

One look at the selected material quickly reveals the dominance of two subject areas: Discourses around migration and population policy. Both form a central part of these actors' political agenda and are closely intertwined with each other. Current Identitarian discourses, however, are less positioned against the mainstream but rather constitute parallel discourses; this is due to the fact that "there are more and more overlaps and ideological intersections between topics of the right and of the societal center" (Butterwegge et al., 2002, p. 7).

The selected self-representations and their underlying political agenda are characterized by threat scenarios, in 2017 just like in 2021. In 2017, the website text not only painted a bleak picture of the future but also conjured up the *final stage* of a threat, which—as an implicit message—still could and had to be stopped:

The so-called asylum crisis is not a new phenomenon but the final stage of the policy of the Great Replacement, which has been implemented by our politicians for decades. At the end of this process, there will be no Europe as we know it, no peace and no order but instead a chaos like currently in large parts of Iraq and Syria. (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2017a, para. 4)

Four years later, this text has been taken from the website. Similar, although less alarmist messages, however, can still be found:

The failed experiment of multiculturalism threatens to destroy this diversity (of local regional customs, dialects, and traditions) and to rob us of our homeland. The multicultural society is tough, fast and cruel, and it has little solidarity. Therefore, we advocate a sustainable population policy and an end to mass immigration. (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2021b, para. 3)

With the critique of multiculturalism, the Identitarians refer to the idea that different ethnic groups of a population live together while maintaining their cultural characteristics such as language or religion in the sense of cultural diversity. Those short paragraphs already contain numerous rhetorical references of the extreme Right: References to a "we" in a *völkisch* definition ("as we know it," "our homeland"), which need the racist construction of a "foreign other," problem definitions in an upward ("our politicians") or outward ("the others") direction, the merging of migration, asylum, and security policy, the combination of the topics of immigration and threat ("failed experiment of multiculturalism," "destroy this diversity," "rob us of our homeland"). The reference to the Great Replacement, a myth that has become influential in various versions worldwide, states the existence of a secret plan to exchange White-majority populations with Muslim or non-White immigrants. Manipulators in the background are said to be globalists or cosmopolitan elites, who tried to weaken the Occident's defenses by means of feminism and anti-racism. Ever since this replacement myth began, its spread has also been used to justify deadly attacks, which I will refer to later on. The 2021 text does not contain the term "Great Replacement" but speaks in a significantly softened manner about the "multicultural society," "sustainable population policy," and "mass immigration." The description of the multicultural society as "tough, fast and cruel" and having "little solidarity" is not backed by any arguments; by contrasting it with the group's own "population policy" which is "sustainable," a judgment is passed that has the purpose of evoking horror scenarios and of presenting the Identitarians as an alternative. The "exchange of populations" (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2017b, 2021a) and the purported fact that "we Austrians" will become extinct (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2017a, 2021b) are traced back not only to immigration but also to the claim that "we get too few children" (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2017a, para. 3, 2021d, para. 3). Only "a children and family-friendly policy" acknowledging the "merits of mothers" could guarantee that "our people will still exist in the future" (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2017e, para. 3, 2021d, para. 3).

These passages show how the Identitarians' gender perceptions are modeled in a deeply biologicistic way as dichotomous and complementary archetypes; they refer to women first in terms of motherhood and reduce their role in preventing the imagined "exchange of populations" most importantly to their childbearing potential. "Conjuring up a 'demographic apocalypse' thus serves the purpose of re-establishing a conservative concept of family and of pushing through reactionary practices of population policy" (Butterwegge, 2002, p. 209). This doomsday mood offers another advantage: It presents the Identitarians with the opportunity of portraying themselves as victims and as heroic saviors at the same time. Furthermore, it becomes obvious that right-wing extremists like the Identitarians currently have ceased to harbor immediate aspirations for power (e.g., they do not participate in elections) but are preparing for the fight for Europe's future (see Heller & Maegerle, 2001, p. 116). This fight has taken place at various levels

of language and its use; the topic areas shortly described above constitute the discursive fields within which the Identitarians have tried to establish their culture war of the Right.

New Language, Old Meaning

A look at the verbal output of Identitarians shows that their use of language differs from that of traditional right-wing extremism in several aspects. They seem to have found a modern language for articulating and implementing their political issues. This impression is not without reason as the supposed overcoming of historically tainted vocabulary is one of their key characteristics. For some time now, the term "culture" has replaced "race" in certain variants of Far Right thinking. The construction of differences among people, once within a racist matrix, is now continued with reference to cultural differences—using an essentialist concept of culture with an ethnic/*völkisch* definition (see e.g., Weber, 1997). In this respect, the Identitarians' website states the group recognized "other cultures as different" and attributed "a value in itself to human diversity," not wanting a "global culture nor a global state where everyone thinks and lives alike" but instead "the preservation of true originality—of individuals as well as of peoples" (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2021c, para. 5). And elsewhere the website states,

Therefore we demand a world of cultural diversity, of which our homeland is also an integral element. In order to preserve our identity, we demand of our politicians and parties a patriotic policy with a commitment to their home country, to liberty and tradition. (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2021c, para. 2)

This notion is also a point of contact for the concept of ethnopluralism, which was mainly disseminated by Alain de Benoist (1985) in the so-called New Right and has become popular among Identitarians and does not see people as individuals but as members of certain ethnically/*völkisch* defined collectives (cultures), which are to live in their designated territories (Bruns et al., 2016; Goetz, Winkler, & Sedlacek, 2017) The related theoretical framework rejects the universal principle of equality and emphasizes the "diversity of peoples"—a diversity that is said to be determined by historical-cultural as well as sociocultural factors. Whereas in 2021 an explicit reference to the term "ethnopluralism" was completely missing, this ideological superstructure was referred to much more explicitly in 2017:

By recourse to both aspects of ethnocultural identity, we emphasize our right of difference and uniqueness. [. . .] We want our own identity to be part of this diversity even in a hundred years' time, and Europe to be the continent where Europeans live. [. . .] Therefore we Identitarians fundamentally oppose mass immigration, Islamization and the Americanization of our continent. (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2017c, para. 3)

Like other right-wing extremists, the Identitarians fear "Americanization" in the sense of an expansion of the economic and cultural influence of the United States, destroying national values and traditions and causing unbridled migration. "Following this, the culture of a community is [understood] in a static manner as a medium for constructing and preserving identity and homogeneity" (Weber, 1997, p. 43). This has mainly two consequences for right-wing extremist thinking: First, by imagining culture as unchangeable, the idea of culture itself is naturalized; second, maintaining a "homogeneous" culture

becomes possible only by preventing any mixing and fusing. This is shown again by the fact that the "rejection of the principle of human equality [promotes] a sense of identity in all factions of the extreme right" and that "the ethnic association of social conflicts" remains "a means for asserting racist concepts of society" (Häusler, 2002, p. 74).

In summary, it becomes obvious that the Identitarians use new and therefore less tainted terms for expressing old concepts with the objective of modernizing right-wing extremist discourses. These concealment methods or "concealment terms" ("Schleierworte" in the original Klemperer, as cited in Jäger & Jäger, 1999) facilitate a pretended distancing from ideas that are recognized within society as being problematic while at the same time presenting themselves as the more harmless and less "radical" alternative to notorious right-wing extremism.

A Different Language

In a video clip entitled *Zukunft für Europa—Identitäre Bewegung* ("Future for Europe—Identitarian Movement") published on YouTube in January 2016 by German Identitarians, a leading Austrian activist also gets a chance to speak: "Our aim is not the participation in discourse but its end in its current consensual form. We don't just want to have a say, we want a different language" (Identitäre Bewegung Deutschlands, 2016, 00:01:54–00:02:03). This demand for a "new language" becomes particularly clear in the Identitarians' relatively successful strategy of injecting certain meanings into old terms and introducing them into existing political and societal discourses, thus changing those to their own ends. Instead of deportations of migrants and refugees, Identitarians demand "remigration" in their political agenda (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2017e, 2021d). At first glance, this seems a neologism created as an alternative to a "tainted" term; however, it can be debunked as a strategy of reinterpretation. After all, this term has been established mainly by researchers in the field of exile during National Socialism (NS), originally denoting the return of persons who had to flee from NS. The adaptation of the term remigration for Identitarian purposes has significant effects. First, this puts incomparable historical events into one basket, ultimately trivializing NS in the process. Second, it leaves out the fact that while those people did return to post-National Socialist countries, the war had ended. Other than in the case of deportation, exiles also remigrated voluntarily. The figure of speech created even evokes positive associations for those acquainted with the term: After the terrible time of the Second World War, people who had been able to flee and survive in exile could (finally) return to their formerly familiar surroundings. In its Identitarian adaptation, however, exile and the important chance of surviving a war through admission to another country as linked dimensions of meaning are separated, followed by a resignification, a re-connotation, and therefore reinterpretation of the previously "uncontaminated" term. In contrast to new terms, the method of reinterpreting already known terms makes "the new sound familiar and thus more credible" (Jäger & Jäger, 1999, p. 23). Meanwhile, remigration as an Identitarian demand has found its way into current political discussions and the media, being used as a synonym for mass deportations. The daily newspaper *Oberösterreichische Nachrichten* ("Rechtsextremer Tumult auf dem Hauptbahnhof," 2017), for example, covered the already mentioned action at Linz main station as follows: "On Friday at around 5 p.m., six activists of a right-wing extremist group got to the roof of Linz main station and uncovered a banner there. 'Integration is a lie! Remigration now!' it said" (p. 38). In the weekly paper *Falter*, Benjamin Breitegger (2017) wrote about "Identitarians who took to the streets

in favor of 'remigration'" (p. 18), and the daily newspaper *Kleine Zeitung* ("Störaktion verhindert," 2017) covered a disruption of the Carinthian Parliament where Identitarian hecklers tried to throw "leaflets with the slogan 'Remigration' into the plenary hall" (p. 22). The daily paper *Der Standard* also reported about the Identitarian congress in Graz in early 2017 "under the motto 'Remigration & Leitkultur' [Remigration & Dominant Culture]" (Sulzbacher, 2017, para. 1). Additionally, the term "Remigration" has already been adopted by some politicians of the Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany). In none of the quoted examples was the term explained or even critically analyzed but disseminated without further comment, thus creating the virality so desired by Identitarians.

The transformation of meanings, resignifications, and the exchange of specific terms like remigration instead of deportation in the established discourse are obviously part of the linguistic practices of the Identitarians, who pursue the target of starting a new discourse completely under their influence. As Jäger and Jäger (1999) show, Klemperer already stated for NS that it was one element of fascist ideology to give "individual words and phrases new meaning or nuances of meaning" or even "completely new valuation" up until a "complete revaluation" (Jäger & Jäger, 1999, p. 22). While it is near impossible to just cancel or reinterpret specific, persistent discourses, the resignification of individual terms is an indispensable element for the project of discourse reinterpretation and the creation of a completely new discourse.

Through Language to Unity

What is more, the external communication of the now numerous regional groups has been characterized by a very similar use of language as the same terms and wordings are employed. For example, the Austrian Identitarians use the phrase "love for one's own" in their self-representation—thus paraphrasing Identitarian patriotism—just like the German branch. Whereas the Old Right saw nationalism as the *love for one's own people*, the Identitarian version sounds much more harmless and rather awakens the association of parents loving their children. The seemingly innocuous, shortened version contains an allusion to common right-wing thinking and has a double function: The phrase's full meaning is recognized by the extreme Right; at the same time, it seems sufficiently uncontaminated for an easy integration into mainstream discourses. For right-wing extremists, this strategy offers an opportunity for mutual recognition, whereas the wider public cannot easily decipher the real meaning below the term's surface.

Not least, this uniform use of language can be seen as part of a corporate identity strategy that promotes marketing for the product *Identitarian policies*, including moments of identification and participation. Adopting these terms not only promotes feelings of belonging to an *Identitarian we* but also opens up an opportunity for everyone to join in.

Unfortunately, the establishment of certain terms in public discourse has largely been successful due to the media, as can be shown in the example of their use of the term "Great Replacement" (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2017b). In June 2015, the Identitarians organized a march in Vienna; it was intended as the culmination of their campaign "against the Great Replacement" initiated in 2014. Almost all Austrian daily papers adopted the term in their coverage and thus contributed to its increasing recognition in public discourse. This uncommented reproduction not only increased the term's legitimacy by presenting the aim of *stopping the Great Replacement* as a seemingly legitimate political concern but was also directly in tune

with the group's campaign strategy of popularizing the term, described by a leading cadre (as cited in Wegner, 2015).

The anti-Semitic and racist conspiracy myth of the Great Replacement already discussed above, which imagines a secret plan to exchange White-majority populations with Muslim or non-White immigrants, goes back to Renaud Camus, a French philosopher of the extreme Right. His book *Le Grand Remplacement* [The Great Replacement] (Camus, 2011) was translated into German and published by the Far Right publisher Götz Kubitschek and his publishing house, Antaios Verlag. It was popularized by Identitarians through continuous reference as well as some media-savvy actions and helped the group, via a modernized language, to place their messages in public and to influence related discourses effectively. The clearly right-wing extremist terms "*Umvolkung*" [ethnicity inversion] and "*Überfremdung*" [infiltration] are replaced by the at least equally threatening, but historically less contaminated term "Great Replacement."

As one Identitarian leading cadre pointed out, this wording describes "in a communicable and yet forceful way what is really behind Islamization, infiltration, foreign violence etc" (as cited in Wegner, 2015, para. 6) and that it was predestined "to unite our camp as an image of the enemy" (Wegner, 2015, para. 6). Thus, the term offers an alternative to outdated racist expressions. In this context, its attraction reaches far beyond the Far Right. The Identitarians have shown an ability to reach spectra that other right-wing extremists had no access to, and this is what has made them so dangerous. The fact that the term has been adopted by several media outlets independent of media coverage of Identitarians shows how far its normalization and its slow but successful influence on discourse have come by now; it shows the effectiveness of Identitarian strategies. In March 2017, for example, *Spiegel Online* brought out a book review with the title "Bevölkerungsentwicklung: Die Angst vor dem großen Austausch" ("Demographic development: Fear of the Great Replacement"; Fleischhauer, 2017); in February 2016, the *Salzburger Nachrichten* published an article titled "'Der große Austausch' ist auch eine Chance" ("The Great Replacement' is also a chance"; Rech, 2016). The discussion is consistently different, while some of the articles reproduce the fear narrative, other contributions try to counteract it—albeit using the same terminology. The second interpretation confirms, for example, that there is a "great exchange" of people in Europe but that society should learn to see and use the opportunities that arise from it.

The War of Words Also Encourages Deeds

This example gives a vivid impression not only of how the Identitarians have managed to introduce their issues and vocabulary into the discourse but also of how they have become a natural part of those debates. Politicians of the Far Right like Viktor Orbán, Donald Trump, and Alexander Gauland have used or referenced this conspiracy myth in their statements. In August 2017, thousands of participants in the demonstration "Unite the Right" in Charlottesville, Virginia, chanted, "You will not replace us!" The next day, a neo-Nazi drove his car into an anti-fascist march, killing 32-year-old Heather Heyer. More followed: The terror attack on the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh in 2018, where a shooter killed 11 people; the attack on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, in March 2019, with 51 dead; in August 2019, a shooting in El Paso with 22 dead; as well as the terror attacks of Halle (two fatalities) and Hanau (nine fatalities), both in Germany. All these perpetrators left letters confessing their deeds, giving as their motivation the idea of an impending exchange of populations.

It is no coincidence that the Christchurch gunman titled his manifesto with exactly this phrase, "The Great Replacement"—after all, there were profound commonalities between the attacker and Identitarians. Like them, he referred to the racist concept of ethnopluralism, which calls for a global apartheid of clearly separated peoples to safeguard the survival of ethnicities. Another thing they have in common are the reasons associated with the imagined threat of demise: Low birth rates of the autochthonous population and the lack of combativeness in men. The Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance emphasized some years ago that "the Identitarian self-perception of being the 'last generation' able to avert the Occidents fall, and the related rhetoric of a 'last chance' suggest a potential of violent radicalization which has already manifested itself in isolated violent episodes" (Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstands, n.d., para. 2). According to this train of thought, violence has been presented as supposedly the "last solution" to the problem of an "imposed blending" and as purportedly legitimate "self-defense."

Thus, the Identitarian use of language illustrates a process of dehumanization, for example, by referring to refugees exclusively in terms of a threat with the dimensions of a (natural) catastrophe and crisis (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2017a). Ultimately, the Identitarian project as a whole has been oriented toward maintaining and expanding existing relationships of power and dominance; this necessarily involves violence since the suppression, exclusion, and discrimination of alleged *others* are an integral part of this aim. As it has been the Identitarians' objective to create an "ethnically relatively homogeneous society"—an aim that can be achieved only by the massive use of force in a society shaped by migration—this objective remains inhuman and highly dangerous. Accordingly, the term "remigration" does not mean anything but mass deportations—it has simply been an attempt to downplay this consequence with a harmless-sounding term. In this sense, the Identitarians' (2017b) statement "Our only weapons are good arguments and their dissemination" (para. 3) can be unmasked as wrong: The fanaticized language poorly conceals the implicit call for action. This process was described by Sailer-Wlasits (2014) in his commentary: "An altered language does not stop at the textual dimension but entails acts, at first seemingly only acts of language. The transition from rhetoric to action, however, is a flowing subcutaneous process with its own dynamics" (para. 4).

The Identitarians' Demise

Well before the ideological as well as financial connections between the Identitarians and the Christchurch attacker became known, the group's political relevance had significantly declined, and it hardly receives any media or political attention. Their campaigns had been unsuccessful, for example, the attempt to initiate a #metoo of the Far Right with the campaign #120db; their marches had been blocked by anti-fascists, and the small numbers of participants—in rallies as well as events—were proof of their low mobilization potential and their failing to form a true movement. Journalists had learned their lesson and did not (uncritically) cover almost every action of Identitarians anymore. After all, their types of action—dropping a banner here or disrupting an event there—had become repetitive and were no longer newsworthy. This trend was further strengthened by their lack of new ideas on how to gain more attention. In times when Far Right parties form part of the government, the need for an extra-parliamentary extreme Right seemed to have decreased. Furthermore, the Identitarians have been facing organizational difficulties in recent years, among them cancellations of bank accounts, discussions of

dissolving the associations, evictions of Identitarian centers, investigations into tax evasions or the formation of a criminal association, and others. The blocking of numerous group and individual accounts on Facebook and Instagram in 2018 and on Twitter, YouTube, and TikTok in 2020 due to violations of community standards and hate speech massively curtailed the reach of their propaganda. A comparison of the self-representations on the Austrian Identitarians' website in 2017 and 2021 shows increasing efforts to portray themselves as a "symbol of peaceful resistance" (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2021a, para. 1) and as an organization that tries to "create societal change by peaceful means" (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2021a, para. 1) or as "the country's largest patriotic NGO [nongovernmental organization]" (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2021c, para. 1). Also, the term "Great Replacement" is used less frequently, and even the campaign of the same name is called differently now. The fact that the phrase "exchange of populations" is taken up again in a well-known manner (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, 2021a, para. 1) can be seen as a discursive strategy of disseminating Far Right concepts while at the same time refraining from tainted language. The peaceful self-portrayal is intended to refute the criticism that has arisen with the obvious ideological links to terrorist attacks.

In the aftermath of the Christchurch shooting, the Identitarians' group took center stage in the media again. It managed to use the uncritical media coverage for its own purpose of disseminating its inhuman political propaganda. At the same time, the events caused large-scale distancing in the right-wing camp: First, the Austrian political party FPÖ discontinued its contact (under pressure), then a number of activists decided they did not want to be associated with Far Right terrorism, and toward the end of 2019, the Far Right publisher, Götz Kubitschek, announced that the Identitarians' brand had been "*contaminated to untouchability*" (as cited in Rafael, 2019, para. 6).

Thus, it can be stated that the project "Identitarians" has been on a decline for some time and seems to have failed. This notwithstanding, Martin Sellner, a leading cadre of the group, was unable to give up his dream of becoming a (civil) movement and founded "Die Österreicher" (The Austrians) as a follow-up project. As regards political content, this project hardly differs from the Identitarians, only its language and target group have slightly changed. Its members claim to be patriotic but not Far Right and hide behind ethnopluralism to avoid being perceived as racist. They do not campaign against the Great Replacement anymore but instead have begun to criticize an imagined "substitution migration" or "substitution." However, the decline of the Identitarians has less to do with the success of the far right's culture war or because such groups are no longer needed. In times of successful right-wing extremist parties in parliament, the need for extra-parliamentary right-wing extremist groups is decreasing. In addition, media interest has waned because the actions of the Identitarians no longer have the same novelty value as they did 10 years ago.

Conclusion

The main aim of this article has been to analyze Identitarian reinterpretations to demonstrate the "ferry function" of certain terms, which have been used to establish political messages within public discourse and societal awareness. To this end, the discursive fields—discourses of migration and population policy—within which the Identitarians have positioned their political agenda were delineated in the first step. Subsequently, I have pointed out the ideological facets (in particular, racism disguised as ethnopluralism) hiding behind the Identitarian use of language as well as the mechanisms by which the group has managed

to camouflage its real intentions. A closer analysis of the ways in which the catchphrases "remigration" and "Great Replacement" have been used in modernized Identitarian language has also shown, on the one hand, that Identitarians have very systematically tried to replace existing terms of societal discourse with their own, which often seem less tainted than the well-known terms of the extreme Right, and on the other hand, the Identitarians have used the method of resignification to appropriate existing terms and to change their meaning in the sense of a culture war of the Right. By continually repeating this terminology coined by them and charged with their own political agenda, and by using it in the context of political actions, they have managed to introduce it in the public discourse and the media, creating momentum and achieving dissemination without the group's further involvement. In particular, the expression "Great Replacement" demonstrates the fact that this concept has already reached the mainstream.

The struggle for the power of definition and interpretation mentioned at the beginning, however, is not yet complete. Further studies on discursive strategies of the extreme Right in general and the Identitarians, in particular, would be desirable. This includes, for example, their wish to reclaim their *own history* by means of *disposal* of the (NS) past, the labeling of racism as anti-racism, or the conspiracy-myth character of some statements as these elements are also part of the culture war of the Right fought on a metapolitical level. Currently, however, it looks like factors favoring right-wing extremism, for example, an increasing occurrence of undemocratic and antiegalitarian attitude patterns within society, seem to be moving the chances for a changed and differentiated discourse characterized by respect and solidarity rather to the distant future. At the same time, this indicates an urgent necessity for intervention and (discursive) countermeasures. First and foremost, this entails—for scholars as well as journalists, politicians, and activists—being able to recognize and decipher forms of expression of the extreme Right to point them out as such. It appears all the more important to unmask underlying patterns of thinking and not do favors to the Identitarians by reproducing their messages. Additionally, there seems an urgent need to develop ways to support the targets of such aggression in a spirit of solidarity, establish preventive measures, and discuss common strategies and approaches.

References

- Alvares, C., & Dahlgren, P. (2016). Populism, extremism and media: Mapping an uncertain terrain. *European Journal of Communication (London)*, 31(1), 46–57. doi:10.1177/0267323115614485
- Bar-On, T. (2021). The Alt-Right's continuation of the "cultural war" in Euro-American societies. *Thesis Eleven*, 163(1), 43–70. doi:10.1177/07255136211005988
- Boehnke, L. (2019). Rechter Kulturkampf heute: Identitätskonstruktion und Framing-Strategien der Identitären Bewegung [Right-wing culture war today: Identity construction and framing strategies of the Identitarian movement]. In L. Boehnke, M. Thran, & J. Wunderwald (Eds.), *Rechtspopulismus im Fokus: Theoretische und praktische Herausforderungen für die politische Bildung* [Right-wing populism in focus: Theoretical and practical challenges for political education] (pp. 89–114). Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer Fachmedien. doi:10.1007/978-3-658-24299-2_6

Breitegger, B. (2017, July 12). Ein fescher Faschist mit besten Kontakten nach Wien [A handsome fascist with excellent contacts in Vienna]. *Falter*, p. 18.

Brindle, A. (2016). *The language of hate: A corpus linguistic analysis of white supremacist language*. London, UK: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315731643

Brumlik, M. (2017). Das alte Denken der neuen Rechten: Mit Heidegger und Evola gegen die offene Gesellschaft [The old thinking of the new right: With Heidegger and Evola against the open society]. In J. Goetz, A. Winkler, & J. M. Sedlacek (Eds.), *Untergangster des Abendlandes* [Doomsters of the Occident] (pp. 167–186). Hamburg, Germany: Marta Press.

Bruns, J., Glösel, K., & Strobl, N. (2016). *Die Identitären: Handbuch zur Jugendbewegung der Neuen Rechten in Europa* [The Identitarians: Handbook on the youth movement of the New Right in Europe]. Münster, Germany: Unrast.

Butterwegge, C. (2002). Stirbt "das deutsche Volk" aus? Wie die politische Mitte im Demografie-Diskurs nach rechts rückt [Is "the German Volk" dying? How the political center is moving to the right in the demographic discourse]. In C. Butterwegge, J. Cremer, A. Häusler, G. Hentges, T. Pfeiffer, C. Reißlandt, & S. Salzborn (Eds.), *Themen der Rechten—Themen der Mitte* [Topics of the right—topics of the center] (pp. 167–214). Opladen, Germany: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Butterwegge, C., Cremer, J., Häusler, A., Hentges, G., Pfeiffer, T., Reißlandt, C., & Salzborn, S. (2002). *Themen der Rechten—Themen der Mitte: Zuwanderung, demografischer Wandel und Nationalbewusstsein* [Topics of the right—topics of the center: Immigration, demographic change and national consciousness]. Opladen, Germany: Leske + Budrich.

Camus, R. (2011). *Le grande Remplacement* [The great Replacement]. Paris, France: David Reinhard.

de Benoist, A. (1985). *Kulturrevolution von rechts. Gramsci und die Nouvelle Droite* [Cultural revolution from the right. Gramsci and the Nouvelle Droite]. Krefeld, Germany: Sinus.

Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstands. (n.d.). *Gewaltdisposition. Identitäre Bewegung Österreich (IBÖ)* [Violent disposition. Identitarian Movement Austria]. Retrieved from www.doew.at/erkennen/rechtsextremismus/rechtsextreme-organisationen/identitaere-bewegung-oesterreich-iboe/gewaltdisposition

Ellinas, A. A. (2010). *The media and the far right in Western Europe: Playing the nationalist card*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511676017

Figenschou, T. U., & Ihlebæk, K. A. (2019). Challenging journalistic authority: Media criticism in far-right alternative media. *Journalism Studies*, 20(9), 1221–1237. doi:10.1080/1461670X.2018.1500868

- Fleischhauer, J. (2017, March 20). Bevölkerungspolitik: Die Angst vor dem großen Austausch [Population policy: The fear of the Great Replacement]. *Spiegel Online*. Retrieved from www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bevoelkerungsentwicklung-der-grosse-austausch-kolumne-a-1139526.html
- Goetz, J., Winkler, A., & Sedlacek, J. M. (2017). *Untergangster des Abendlandes: Ideologie und Rezeption der rechtsextremen "Identitären"* [Doomsters of the Occident: Ideology and reception of the right-wing extremist "Identitarians"]. Hamburg, Germany: Marta Press.
- Goetz, J., Sulzbacher, M., & FIPI. (2021). *Rechtsextremismus: Band 4: Herausforderungen für den Journalismus* [Right-wing extremism: Volume 4: Challenges for journalism]. Wien, Austria: Mandelbaum.
- Gramsci, A. (1929–1935). *Prison notebooks* (J. A. Buttigieg, Ed.). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Haanshuus, B. P., & Ihlebæk, K. A. (2021). Recontextualising the news: How antisemitic discourses are constructed in extreme far-right alternative media. *Nordicom Review*, 42(1), 37–50. doi:10.2478/nor-2021-0005
- Häusler, A. (2002). Multikulturalismus als Bedrohung deutscher Identität [Multiculturalism as a threat to German identity]. In C. Butterwegge, J. Cremer, A. Häusler, G. Hentges, T. Pfeiffer, C. Reißlandt, & S. Salzborn (Eds.), *Themen der Rechten—Themen der Mitte* [Topics of the Right—topics of the center] (pp. 67–91). Opladen, Germany: Leske + Budrich.
- Heinze, E. (2016). *Hate speech and democratic citizenship*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Heller, F. P., & Maegerle, A. (2001). *Die Sprache des Hasses: Rechtsextremismus und völkische Esoterik—Jan van Helsing, Horst Mahler . . .* [The language of hate: Right-wing extremism and ethnic esotericism—Jan van Helsing, Horst Mahler . . .]. Stuttgart, Germany: Schmetterling-Verl.
- Holzer, W. I. (1993). *Rechtsextremismus: Konturen, Definitionsmerkmale und Erklärungsansätze* [Right-wing extremism: Contours, defining features and explanatory approaches.]. Wien, Austria: Deuticke.
- Howard, E. (2017). *Freedom of expression and religious hate speech*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Identitäre Bewegung Allgäu. (2017). *Internal papers*. Retrieved from <https://linksunten.indymedia.org/de/node/204949>
- Identitäre Bewegung Deutschlands. (2016). *Zukunft für Europa—Identitäre Bewegung* [Future for Europe—Identitarian Movement] [Video file]. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rPXI6tA31yI>

- Identitäre Bewegung Österreich. (2017a). *Die Asylkrise* [The asylum crisis]. Retrieved from <https://iboesterreich.at/die-asylkrise/>
- Identitäre Bewegung Österreich. (2017b). *Der große Austausch* [The Great Replacement]. Retrieved from <https://iboesterreich.at/der-grosse-austausch/>
- Identitäre Bewegung Österreich. (2017c). *Identität* [Identity]. Retrieved from <https://iboesterreich.at/identities/>
- Identitäre Bewegung Österreich. (2017d). *Die Integrationslüge* [The lie of integration]. Retrieved from <https://iboesterreich.at/integrationsluege/>
- Identitäre Bewegung Österreich. (2017e). *Unsere Forderungen* [Our demands]. Retrieved from <https://iboesterreich.at/unsere-forderungen/>
- Identitäre Bewegung Österreich. (2017f). *Unser Weg* [Our way]. Retrieved from <https://iboesterreich.at/unser-weg/>
- Identitäre Bewegung Österreich. (2021a). *Aktiv für die Heimat! Die patriotische Jugendbewegung Österreichs stellt sich vor* [Active for our home country! The patriotic Austrian youth movement introduce themselves]. Retrieved from <https://www.identitaere-bewegung.at/>
- Identitäre Bewegung Österreich. (2021b). *Liebe zum Eigenen* [Love for one's own]. Retrieved from <https://www.identitaere-bewegung.at/unser-weg/>
- Identitäre Bewegung Österreich. (2021c). *Unser Weg* [Our way]. Retrieved from <https://www.identitaere-bewegung.at/unser-weg/>
- Identitäre Bewegung Österreich. (2021d). *Unsere Forderungen* [Our demands]. Retrieved from <https://www.identitaere-bewegung.at/unser-weg/>
- Jäger, S. (1995). Rechtsextreme Propaganda heute [Right-wing extremist propaganda today]. In K. Ehlich (Ed.), *Sprache im Faschismus* [Language under fascism] (pp. 289–322). Frankfurt a. M., Germany: Suhrkamp.
- Jäger, S. (2012). *Kritische Diskursanalyse: eine Einführung* [Critical discourse analysis: An introduction]. Münster, Germany: Unrast.
- Jäger, M., & Jäger, S. (1999). *Gefährliche Erbschaften: Die schleichende Restauration rechten Denkens* [Dangerous legacies: The creeping restoration of right-wing thinking]. Berlin, Germany: Aufbau-Taschenbuch-Verl.

- Jakubowska-Branicka, I. (2016). *Hate narratives: Language as a tool of intolerance*. Frankfurt a. M., Germany: Peter Lang.
- Kökgiran, G., & Nottbohm, K. (2014). Semiologische Guerilla von rechts? Diskursive Aneignungs- und Umdeutungsstrategien der Identitären Bewegung Deutschland [Semiological guerrilla. From the right? Discursive appropriation and reinterpretation strategies of the Identitarian Movement Germany]. In G. Hentges, K. Nottbohm, M. M. Jansen, & J. Adamou (Eds.), *Sprache—Macht—Rassismus* [Language—Power—Racism] (pp. 327–348). Berlin, Germany: Metropol.
- Marschner, C. M. (2018). *Die Neue Rechte in den Neuen Medien—Wie die Identitäre Bewegung Social Media verwendet* [The new right in the new media—how the identitarian movement uses social media] (Master thesis, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria). Retrieved from <http://othes.univie.ac.at/50575/>
- Mintz, A. P. (2012). *Web of deceit: Misinformation and manipulation in the age of social media*. Medford, NJ: CyberAge Books.
- Napoli, P. (2019). *Social media and the public interest: Media regulation in the disinformation age*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. doi:10.7312/napo18454
- Rafael, S. (2019). Götz Kubitschek erklärt die "Identitäre Bewegung" für "bis zur Unberührbarkeit kontaminiert" [Götz Kubitschek declares the "Identitarian movement" to be "contaminated to the point of untouchability"]. *Belltower.News*. Retrieved from www.belltower.news/ende-der-ib-goetz-kubitschek-erklaert-die-identitaere-bewegung-fuer-bis-zur-unberuehrbarkeit-kontaminiert-92799/
- Rech, C. (2016 February 26). "Der große Austausch" ist auch eine Chance ["The Great Replacement" is also an opportunity]. *Salzburger Nachrichten*. Retrieved from <http://www.salzburg.com/nachrichten/meinung/standpunkt/sn/artikel/der-grosse-austausch-ist-auch-eine-chance-185556/>
- Rechtsextremer Tumult auf dem Hauptbahnhof [Right-wing extremist uproar at the main station]. (2017, March 4). *Oberösterreichische Nachrichten*, p. 38.
- Sailer-Wlasits, P. (2014, August 1). Missbrauch der Worte: Neue, alte Sprache des Hasses [Misuse of words: New, old language of hate]. *Die Presse*. Retrieved from https://diepresse.com/home/meinung/gastkommentar/3848387/Missbrauch-der-Worte_Neue-alte-Sprache-des-Hasses
- Schuppener, G. (2010). *Sprache des Rechtsextremismus: Spezifika der Sprache rechtsextremistischer Publikationen und rechter Musik* [Language of right-wing extremism: Specifics of the language of right-wing extremist publications and right-wing music]. Leipzig, Germany: Ed. Hamouda. Wiss.-Verl.

- Simpson, P. A., & Druxes, H. (2015). *Digital media strategies of the far-right in Europe and the United States*. Lexington, MD: Lexington Books.
- Sora. (2017). *Befragung zum NS-Geschichtsbewusstsein und zu autoritären Einstellungen in Österreich* [Survey on Nazi historical awareness and authoritarian attitudes in Austria]. Retrieved from <https://www.sora.at/nc/news-presse/news/news-einzelansicht/news/schon-43-fuer-starken-mann-776.html>
- Störaktion verhindert [Disruption prevented]. (2017, March 10). *Kleine Zeitung*, p. 22.
- Sulzbacher, M. (2017, January 27). Rechtsextreme Identitäre treffen sich in Graz [Right-wing extremist Identitarians meet in Graz]. *DerStandard.at*. Retrieved from <https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000051658872/rechtsextreme-identitaere-treffen-sich-in-graz>
- Taylor, J. M. (2003). *Constructing right-wing extremism in the media: The role of evaluation in three news genres*. Washington, DC: Georgetown Press.
- Weber, I. (1997). *Nation, Staat und Elite: Die Ideologie der Neuen Rechten* [Nation, state and elite: The ideology of the New Right]. Köln, Germany: PapyRossa-Verl.
- Wegner, N. (2015). Fünf Fragen zur Demo gegen den "Großen Austausch" [Five questions about the demo against the "Great Replacement"]. *Sezession.de*. Retrieved from <https://sezession.de/49945>
- Weidinger, B. (2021): Ungewollte Komplizenschaft. Über gängige Fallstricke in der medialen Bearbeitung von Rechtsextremismus [Unintentional complicity. On common pitfalls in the media treatment of right-wing extremism]. In J. Goetz, M. Sulzbacher, & FIPU (Eds.), *Rechtsextremismus: Band 4* [Right-wing extremism: Volume 4] (pp. 52–71). Wien, Austria: Mandelbaum.
- Whillock, R. K. (1995). *Hate speech*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
- Wodak, R. (2016). *Politik mit der Angst: Zur Wirkung rechtspopulistischer Diskurse* [Politics with fear: The impact of right-wing populist discourse]. Wien, Austria: Edition Konturen.