Deglobalization and Public Diplomacy

JUAN-LUIS MANFREDI-SÁNCHEZ[1]
University of Castilla-La Mancha, Spain

Deglobalization is a current phenomenon. The downturn in global trade, the rise of populism and nationalism, and the new barriers to cosmopolitanism have led to the need to redefine the dynamics and scope of public diplomacy. Using Cull's taxonomy, it is possible to observe how deglobalization is affecting different public communication strategies, deinstitutionalizing the profession, and jeopardizing best practices. Accordingly, this article attempts to explain why, because of growing mistrust and suspicion, these are complicated times for public diplomacy, whose ethos has been distorted by the political structures of deglobalization, and to confirm a basic trend: the growing relevance of global political communication for international relations.

Keywords: public diplomacy, deglobalization, political communication, leadership, trust

Deglobalization is a relevant phenomenon in international studies. Commercial exchanges and investment peaked in 2010, and the cycle has not repeated itself to date (Jean, 2018). After the COVID-19 pandemic, the restructuring of the global economy is a fact, as well as is global supply chain reconfiguration (Altman & Bastian, 2019). The economic deglobalization phenomenon is also having a political impact (Altman, 2009). The role of trade as a strategic political decision-making tool has been enhanced. Trade is being securitized. In the social sphere, deglobalization is evidenced by the emergence of movements of a different nature, some of which have prospered by transforming themselves into political parties or projects integrated into the institutional system. Those dissatisfied with globalization have nothing in common, except for their dissatisfaction, which has many forms of expression. The list is long: nationalist parties in central governments (Hungary and Poland), separatist parties in subnational governments (Scotland and Catalonia), conservative populists (Donald J. Trump, Boris Johnson, and Jair Bolsonaro), left-wing populists (the Greek Syriza in 2015, the party Podemos in Spain, and López Obrador in Mexico), and Euroskeptics (United Kingdom Independence Party in the United Kingdom, the Rassemblement National in France, and the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany), among others. Other social movements, such as those combating climate change or supporting the feminist cause, have made their way onto the international political agenda with a repertoire of action aimed at international communication. Norris and Inglehart (2019) note that the phenomenon of misalignment of the elites is now widespread and leitmotif.

Juan-Luis Manfredi-Sánchez: juan.manfredi@uclm.es
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In this context of change in international politics, the following research question is posed: How has deglobalization affected public diplomacy? Public diplomacy was professionalized in the second half of the 20th century, thanks largely to the leadership of the United States. The cultural and communication factor, which is the cornerstone of the power of attraction, seduction, and legitimization (Nye, 2004), has attained theoretical relevance and consistency in public communication research (Gilboa, 2008). But that order has dwindled, and its principal elements are now being challenged. Since the political and economic paradigm in which public diplomacy is grounded has been modified, it has had to change and adapt to the new world order. The new actors, whether they be China, Saudi Arabia, or post-Brexit UK, are now deploying their own mechanisms of influence and legitimization.

This article is structured as follows. First, an analysis is performed on the impact of international communication, political leadership, and the news system on the new configuration of power. Second, the five dimensions of public diplomacy (Cull, 2019) are reviewed, along with national reactions to the paradigm shift and consolidation of new practices far removed from the traditional kind. And, last, the article concludes with theoretical contributions and reflections on the new age of deglobalization. Insofar as the euphoria over the processes of global economic growth and political convergence has fizzled out, antidiplomatic impulses (Cooper, 2019) and politics of impatience (Bødker & Anderson, 2019) are all set to become new objects of study in public diplomacy research

The Basis of Deglobalization

Deglobalization consists of a regression in the international flows of trade, services, capital, and people, which is evidenced by "trade protection, the limitations of movements of people, the regulation of capital flows and the attempts to restrict information access" (James, 2017, p. 1). It is not a consistent phenomenon, but can vary in its expressions, scope, and impact. The inclusion of globalization in international relations theory has been irregular, when not incompatible with the prevailing doctrine (Bost & Leriche, 2018; Kacowicz & Mitrani, 2016).

The second economic aspect is the trade war. The United States has abandoned the negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPSEP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Equally important are the decisions on economic policy implemented by the European Union to defend its domestic market. In this connection, the EU's Competition Commission holds that major U.S. technological companies operate under a monopoly and has fined them for their anticompetitive practices. Likewise, the bilateral dispute between Japan and South Korea has led to both countries being excluded from the list of preferential trade partners. Political and memory conflicts are penalized with trade restrictions on industrial materials, semiconductors, and other high technologies.

The third aspect has to do with the complexity of international business (Witt, 2019) and the relationship between diplomatic and corporate factors (Li, Meyer, Zhang, & Ding, 2017). The supply chain and the transport of end products are central to international business. Bruno Le Maire, the French Minister of Finance, and Wilbur Ross, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, have expressed similar opinions from very different analytical and ideological standpoints. In particular, the COVID-19 pandemic has confirmed the dependence of Europe and the United States on medical products manufactured in China and India.

Reshoring is now on the agenda of 80% of multinationals (Everett, 2020). There will be a greater geographical diversification of supply sources, which may damage China's position in the global market. Cost increases deriving from overdependence may have reached their limit. Black swans, green swans, and gray rhinos, among other designations for global phenomena, pose problems for global business.

A fourth aspect, which is becoming increasingly more relevant is the so-called Greta Thunberg effect (Schwab, 2019). The need to incorporate environmental, social, and good-governance criteria in corporate management has had an impact on operations, the progressive abandonment of fossil fuels and consumer behavior (Manfredi-Sánchez, 2019). An expression of this effect is the European Commission's New Green Deal. Outside the European Union, the volume of imports can be reduced by levying a border carbon tax or by penalizing the use of fossil fuels in the production of goods.

There are many examples of the political consequences of economic deglobalization, which are relevant for the study of public diplomacy. The most recent include the veto on 5G technology made in China, the commitment of the post-Brexit UK to Chinese technology, the investment and business restrictions imposed on Huawei as a reprisal for its purported industrial espionage or the blocking of merger operations and acquisitions concerning critical technology. The reemergence of economic nationalism, protectionism, and currency manipulation affect political leadership and international communication, as well as the relationship with foreign publics.

Economic globalization is sustaining the political and cultural paradigm shift. As Keohane and Nye (2000) contend, "The linkages occur through flows and influences of capital and goods, information and ideas, and people and forces, as well as environmentally and biologically relevant substance" (p. 105). Marber (2005) stresses that, following commercial exchanges, international political relations are of a cultural nature, including leisure, consumption and food. In particular, the standardization of audiovisual culture, even before the advent of online distribution platforms, was, and still is, a recurrent theme in the literature (Cunningham & Craig, 2016). The economic policies that these political initiatives propose share the same diagnosis: globalization undermines national interests and destroys the jobs of "our people," it being thus necessary to scale down trade agreements with barriers (customs, duties, etc.) to boost the local economy or to renegotiate agreements with third parties. This is by no means a new issue in the literature on international politics (Ferguson, 2005). It is a different narrative: Globalization is understood as a threat, and liberal internationalism has difficulties in conveying its message to a wider audience (Ikenberry, 2018), while democracy as a political system is in dispute, when not in decline (Diamond, 2015). Ronfeldt and Arquilla (2020) claim that "because noopolitik is ultimately about whose story wins, narratives will have to be carefully crafted to suit the context" (p. 13). Thus, to combat the deglobalizing current, these authors suggest taking up the cause of the "global commons" (sustainable development, public health, social equality, and even the scope of capitalism) as a pivotal issue (p. 51).

The pandemic has laid bare the problems of political globalization (Van de Pas, 2020). COVID-19 has revealed the inner workings of the World Health Organization (WHO). Without an effective regulatory capacity and with a dwindling operational capacity, its power of influence on the resolution of the public health crisis has been conspicuous by its absence. The diffuse reaction to the pandemic has delayed the development of a vaccine, economic stimulus policies, and travel-related control measures (Anderson,

Heesterbeek, Klinkenberg, & Hollingsworth, 2020). In the media ecosystem, the use and misuse of information as an internal and external political tool has become the norm, whether to reinforce a nationalist/nativist message (Bennett & Livingston, 2018) or to promote an alternative international order (Miskimmon & O'Loughlin, 2017; Pomerantsev, 2014). In both cases, the literature reflects the decline in the value of trust in institutions. In particular, the new media ecology is transforming diplomatic practice and the very organization of ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs; Manor & Crilley, 2020).

Deglobalization: Complexity and Uncertainty

The configuration of power in international relations is currently facing two challenges: complexity and uncertainty (Rathbum, 2007). Both have an impact on diplomacy owing to the growing number of actors, structures, and resolutions that hinder linear decision making. The phenomenon is evidenced by the functioning of institutions whose budgets and infrastructures are often boycotted by their own states. Thus, between 2016 and 2020, the European Union has gone to great lengths to resolve the Brexit dilemma while neglecting other priority issues, such as the Ukraine and the regional instability in the Mediterranean. The United States has cold-shouldered its NATO partners and has hindered the reaching of agreements in the World Trade Organization. The rise of the extreme right in France has given a boost to the Jupiterian leadership of Emmanuel Macron, eager to leave his mark on the European project. In the United Nations, the Syrian Civil War is a permanent bone of contention. On another note, the dilemmas of global politics are uninterruptedly interconnecting actors, agendas, and challenges. The Agenda 2030, climate change, cybersecurity (Riordan, 2019), the difficulties faced by the European Union when attempting to avoid the financial contagion of the 2008 crisis (Bardoscia, Battiston, Caccioli, & Caldarelli, 2017), and biopolitics are all wicked problems.

Without any willingness to cooperate or to identify shared expectations, political hyperleadership has become a breeding ground for populism and nationalism, both political expressions of deglobalization. Political leaders are not interested in spearheading a global response to those wicked problems if this comes at a price in terms of domestic politics. By coining the term "reputational security," Cull (2019) is advocating for a defensive interpretation of international communication (pp. 166–167). So, it is not about intervening in the global agenda—a luxury within the reach of few countries or international actors with trade capacity or tourist destinations—but about using public diplomacy to make room in the global imaginary for a catalog of political demands, the defense of a set of values, or the connection with partners with risk sharing. In the current context of political leadership, "reputational security" represents a change in the ethos of traditional public diplomacy. The priority is the security, legitimacy, or defense of territorial integrity.

The theoretical basis of the liberal order has been stripped naked. Indeed, deglobalization generates externalities and encourages the absence of cooperation and the commitment to policies favoring free riders. As international political leadership is being challenged, communication and diplomacy tools are being placed at the service of national projects at the expense of joint initiatives. Moral principles, legal standards, decision-making processes and behaviors are adjusted to national interests, recuperating the "two-level game" thesis (Putnam, 1988, p. 433). When in doubt, political leaders tend to underestimate the development of global events, neglecting them in favor of the concerns of their interest groups and constituents. External projection is solely a mechanism for managing and validating domestic leadership.

The Brexit phenomenon has produced an extensive literature on unsatisfied national identities (O'Toole, 2018). The intellectual legacy of Trumpism explains the effects of uncertainty in contemporary diplomacy (Gravelle, 2018). Furthermore, the hypothesis on the reversibility of globalization has been taken up the world over, at least with respect to its economic dimension (Bello, 2004; Sapir, 2011).

Complexity increases uncertainty, a characteristic inherent to international relations (Bas, 2012). The authority and effective capacity to exercise power has become dispersed (Flockhart, 2016). Traditional wars have mutated into trade and connectivity wars (Leonard, 2016). Private behaviors and comments are aimed at a global audience on social networks. The international order lacks adequate tools to meet the new technological challenges. Political change is slow, nonhierarchal, and nonlinear, while the technological kind is immediate and has a global reach. In public diplomacy, the digital transformation is affecting the functionalities of MFAs, international standards and law, the assessment of overseas activities and the management of information and knowledge (Manor, 2019). Technological development and digital globalization have contributed to the salience of issues of public diplomacy. All the actors involved have tools for furthering their interests. Governments have lost their monopoly on satellites and infrastructures. The media have globalized their agenda and production to engage global audiences. And, moreover, individuals empowered by their mobile devices have proven Anholt's (Adams, 2014) prediction to be correct: "There is only one global superpower these days: the public opinion of 7 billion people. The question is how to marshal that power" (para. 7). The new technology-based "salience" is developing independently of traditional public diplomacy tools employed by governments and institutions (the Olympic Games, museums, exchanges, audiovisual productions, etc.). This has an impact on audiences, who can now opt for selective exposure (Hayden, 2012), and on the professional exercise of diplomacy (Collins & Bekenova, 2019). Be that as it may, the new technology-based "salience" provides an opportunity to open new spaces for direct dialogue with the citizenry and for interaction with other stakeholders (cities, nongovernmental organizations, media outlets, celebrities, etc.). Thus, technology is fostering a paradigm in which public diplomacy does not only distribute information, but also aspires to establish social relationships. How this affects diplomatic culture in practice deserves another in-depth study, given the risk adverse culture characterizing MFAs (Copeland, 2013).

Public diplomacy needs to "embrace complexity" (Boulton, Allen, & Bowman, 2015) to assume the transformation of international politics and "the weaponization of everything" (Mousavizadeh, 2015, para. 4). In the field of international political communication, complexity is called many things. The original "empire of ideas" (Hart, 2013) has been devalued, and a sort of "dark variant of soft power" (Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 2020, p. 57) has established itself. Terms such as "weaponized narrative" (Allenby & Garreau, 2017), "geopolitics of information" (Rosenbach & Mansted, 2019), "modern political warfare" (Robinson et al., 2018), and "LikeWar" (Singer & Brooking, 2018) are regularly employed.

Deglobalization and Public Diplomacy

The growth of public diplomacy as a professional activity and academic discipline is linked to the social and cultural dimension of "globalism" identified by Keohane and Nye (2000). This can take the shape of a "soft presence," such as tourism or migrations, sports, culture, and heritage, the exporting of broadcast products and services, international news, science and technology, education, and development

cooperation, to mention just a few of the most relevant fields (Olivié & Gracias, 2020). These indicators have not dropped because of the economic downturn or the decline in trade, but because they have been transformed in accordance with national responses to the paradigm shift. In a context in which international relations have become a zero-sum game, international communication serves to defend the position of a country on the world stage, to preserve the prepolitical values of a community, and to project an external image in consonance with the messages conveyed to a domestic audience. Deglobalization assumes the principles of an anarchic society in which the tools intrinsic to public diplomacy are put to an unfair use. Journalistic information is converted into propaganda. Social media campaigns contribute to disinformation. Culture is employed to break and reconstruct historical links suiting the present. The financing of think tanks, political parties, and trade unions is kept under wraps. Professional sports are employed to showcase local best practices through the live broadcasting of isolated events and the finals of sports competitions. And journalists are sacked or marked out under the pretext of security or integrity.

In short, deglobalization has extended the use of international political communication at the expense of the "misuse" of public diplomacy. Without consensuses, the transparency and democratic ethos of public diplomacy have been gradually replaced by propaganda (Bjola & Pamment, 2018). The ethos of public diplomacy refers to a common project, based on listening to and dialoguing with international audiences. Thus, deglobalization has affected the "components of foreign public engagement" (Cull, 2019, p. 3), with new tendencies that are undermining the foundations of public diplomacy: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and international broadcasting. Propaganda, nation branding, and other managerial approaches to public diplomacy do not form the core of such activity. Cull's taxonomy has been chosen because it offers five pillars of analysis in the area of international communication practices and strategies. The action repertoire orders the "conceptual arsenal" (Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 2020, p. 4).

Listening is the "foundational form of foreign policy through public engagement" (Cull, 2019, p. 4). The cornerstone of this activity is public trust. International trust is built by defending a specific position, discursive coherence and the veracity of technical information. Trust is neither won with a major advertising campaign nor by employing public relations techniques (Sevin, 2015). It is rather the result of both the systematic participation in international forums and activities with a coherent message, and an international policy consistent with the principles and values of the country and context in question (Mogesen, 2015). A long-term approach is incompatible with the "politics of impatience" (Bødker & Anderson, 2019, p. 5957) characterizing populist political communication.

"Failures of listening" (Cull, 2019, p. 27) have become commonplace. On-demand disinformation mixes the agenda of objective affairs (electoral processes, business) with the emotional state of the populace. These weaknesses are leveraged to exacerbate social polarization through offer and demand. As to offerings, active manipulation involves the generation of content for a predefined purpose. The case of Cambridge Analytica is in keeping with deglobalization: Technological innovation is at the service of prepolitical ideas and the destruction of trust in political and journalistic institutions. Fake news, hoaxes, and leaks have increased exponentially and have generated a "liar's dividend" (Chesney & Citron, 2019, p. 151). Their perverse effect on public diplomacy has led to the erosion of institutions and the irrelevance of messages among so much low-quality information. Regarding demand, passive manipulation consists of reinforcing cognitive and cultural biases. The lack of control over privacy, traded as if it were a commodity,

affects the setting of a news agenda aimed at and shared by international audiences. Disinformation exploits mistrust by tagging content as "alternative" and sets its own agenda or promotes value judgements associated with news (priming). This misinformation tactic, multiplied by algorithmic power, undermines trust in institutions and political leaders. In public diplomacy, this phenomenon can be observed in the intervention of Russian hackers and bots in electoral processes (Hall-Jamieson, 2018), the dissemination of xenophobic content in Germany (Krüger, 2016), and the use of supremacist and isolationist content by the U.S. alt-right (Marwick & Lewis, 2017). Consequently, public diplomacy has difficulties affecting public opinion with sound information. The response of the European institutions has been the Action Plan on Disinformation (European Commission, 2019).

Social networking sites allow for direct contact with local audiences and, moreover, for engaging global ones. Fragmented and decontextualized messages, plus practices inherent to digital culture (memes, emoji), are consistent with the fundamentals of a posttruth political culture (Crilley, 2018). When public diplomacy is based on tweets (Figure 1) and memes (Figure 2), the mainstream media lose value as channels for conveying messages.

The use of new media has short-circuited relations with the press, which have become to be considered as part of the establishment—including diplomats, professors, think tanks, security advisors, security forces, and the military—whose opinions are not shared by audiences. In relation to the treatment of the press, the pattern is repeated: Participation on social media, where short, emotional messages are conveyed, goes hand in glove with a growing contempt for the mainstream press (Waisbord & Amado, 2017). Journalists can contradict presidents, highlight inconsistencies, and intervene with awkward questions, but this has a perverse effect insofar as presidential populism is contributing to the "steady erosion of independent journalism and deterioration of democratic politics" (Crilley & Gillespie, 2019, p. 273).

Advocacy is "an actor's attempt to manage the international environment by presenting a particular policy, idea, or the actor's general interest to a foreign public" (Cull, 2019, p. 4). Personality and celebrity cults (Wheeler, 2013) hinder this capacity, because foreign policy focuses on executive power and underestimates diplomatic efforts. Pop and entertainment politics have found room in a governmental communication apparatus that uses public resources to exert a decisive influence on political and social structures. As to public diplomacy, spectacle has made its way into political discourse. Boris Johnson promised—without delivering on it—to project a clock permanently on Downing Street to mark the countdown to the UK's definitive exit from the European Union. Similarly, he parodied a famous scene from the film *Love Actually* during the December 2019 election campaign. Justin Trudeau's apparel at international events is more akin to the show business world than to usual protocol. The same can be said of the tweets posted by Salvadorian President Nayib Bukele, who describes his international activity as if it were a novel. The hugs and multitudinous events of López Obrador, after the COVID-19 pandemic had already been declared, pretend to be natural, while Putin's sports activity is habitually covered on Russian broadcast media, and the impact of digitization has just accelerated this trend. This tactical decision rests on an emotional connection that is directly established with audiences, without intermediaries. This attitude gives rise to a problem of interaction (presidents access and post replies on Twitter to interact with their audiences) and information filtering (presidents receive and read the same fake news circulating on social media).

The leveraging of social media by international leaders has intensified the rhetorical shift. Now is a "time of hyperboles" (Gallardo-Paúls, 2018) uttered on social media and in memes and other instant messages. The exchange of memes on official accounts between the United States and Iran reflects this broadcast reality, which employs references to pop culture to convey international political messages. And the same can be said of the account of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which resorts to colloquial language when addressing issues like the Crimea.

Figure 1. Trump's use of popular television claim. Source:
*https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1058388700617498625?s=20.*

Figure 2. Soleimany's answer, using same TV series claim.

Hyperbole fosters an aggressive discourse and a greater use and rejection of information. The political information cycle accelerates and blurs the boundaries between instantaneous messages (memes) and confirmed news, between information professionals and propagandists. In this context, the challenges include information leaks, the attribution of relevance—a journalistic criterion—and the contextualization of political information (Casero-Ripollés, 2018). Fuchs (2018) considers that Twitter has fueled nationalism and social polarization. The actions of the government of the UK or Trump's presidency are based on the same universe of political emotions that belittle the course of international events, because they only have their own interests in mind.

In terms of contest reality, Scotland, Kosovo, and Quebec have innovated in the repertoire of digital diplomatic actions. Social media esthetics allows these polities to have a voice in the global agenda. By means of the intensive use of emotional messages and arguments, they direct their campaigns at their nationalist or secessionist audiences, which then share them with international ones. Noteworthy is the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affair's use of social networking sites after the Crimea crisis. The "Crimea Spring" festival (March 2019) stage-managed flash mobs of 10,000 and 2,000 people in Moscow and Yalta, respectively, to commemorate the annexation. On Instagram, the Crimea was showcased as a paradisiacal holiday destination, where the beau monde relaxed and partied. The leveraging of emotions drives the dissemination of messages, since domestic audiences feel involved in national projects and amplify the message. It is a deglobalizing trend

because it bolsters nationalist positions and reduces the pluralism symbolizing these societies. This initiative is characteristic of political deglobalization in an identity-related dimension.

Cultural diplomacy is "an actor's attempt to manage the international environment through facilitating the export of an element of that's actor's life, belief or art" (Cull, 2008, p. 5). Cultural relations or exchanges broaden the concept and allow for focusing not only on specific goals but also on outcomes. In the broadest sense, culture encompasses diverse expressions, including language, sports, audio-visual culture, heritage, the fine arts, museums, and science, among others.

The deglobalizing effect has given rise to several tense scenarios. Cultural centers and institutes are reformulating their strategies to adapt to the challenges of uncertainty (British Council, 2018), to promote public and private collaboration (British Council, 2018), and to weave networks of relational and collaborative action (Zaharna, Arsenault, & Fisher, 2013). There is a need to introduce economic key performance indicators (KPIs), even though the ultimate purpose of cultural institutes is not commercial (Lien & Lo, 2017). This economic function undermines the friendly nature of cultural institutes, converted into nation, rather than public diplomacy, branding tools. To the financial cutbacks should be added the digital transformation of foreign language courses and the content industry, which, because of their refinement, are replacing the opening of centers abroad. In this respect, the Confucius Institute, a Chinese public diplomacy tool, has not been free from controversy. Sahlins (2015) calls such institutes academic malware, while McCord (2014) considers that they pose a threat to academic freedom. The leveraging of the Chinese presence and reputation through cultural and education activities has been described as a sharp power technique (Walker & Ludwig, 2017).

Secondly, the nationalist tensions resulting from deglobalization have discovered in the management of historical memory an ideal tool for promoting an aggressive cultural relations model. The culture of memory is one of the substantial changes in the management of international political communication (Ociepka, 2018). Memory summarizes the political history of countries, reinforces collective identities, and produces internal coherence in view of the complexity of international reality. Memory is not based on hard facts, but on the perception of historical events. The Katyń Forest Massacre is a constant source of tension between Russia and Poland due to the nationalist interpretation of acts of war (Drzewiecka & Hasian, 2018). This issue links to strategic narratives (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, & Roselle, 2017). This is also the case with international award nominations and ceremonies relating to different artistic expressions. The 2019 Nobel literature laureate Peter Handke reopened old wounds in the international community by his express support of Serbia in the 1990s wars in former Yugoslavia. The Sajarov Award, granted by the European Parliament, tends to be an apple of discord with other countries. The long list includes Raif Badawi (Saudi Arabia), the Venezuelan opposition to the Chávez regime, Oleh Sentsov (the Ukraine), and Ilhan Tothi (a member of the Uyghur minority in China), to mention just a few of the most recent winners.

The third element of tension is the privatization of cultural relations, now increasingly more governed by nation building than by esthetic or political criteria. Thus, there has been a proliferation of deglobalizing developments in the shape of franchises to link culture to specific territories. Professional sports have accelerated this function with the spread of events designed for global audiences (Abdi, Talebpour, Fullerton, Javad, & Jabbari, 2019). The impact of major sports events on international reputation is currently a topic of

academic debate (Samuel-Azran, Yarchi, Galily, & Tamir, 2016). By the same token, museums have been converted into global brands adapted to local or regional cultures. In the Gulf States, cultural heritage franchising is now the norm (Erskine-Loftus, Al-Mulla, & Hightower, 2016). There is no intrinsic discourse on culture or identity, but a certain regionalization of cultural and fine arts consumption patterns.

A fourth indicator of deglobalization and its impact is the spread of cultural appropriation as an expression of nationalism. The many controversies surrounding the essentialist use of artistic symbols, legacies, and expressions can be explained by the recognition of an inherent culture that cannot be enjoyed by others. Versus public diplomacy, whose purpose is to establish an open dialogue with an audience, cultural appropriation focuses on reception, on an intrinsic identity unlinked to globalizing processes.

Exchange diplomacy is "an actor's attempt to manage the international environment by sending its citizens overseas and reciprocally accepting citizens from overseas for a period of study and/or acculturation" (Cull, 2008, p. 33). This public diplomacy tool is the paradigm of face-to-face relationships, even though it has public support and funding. It is an individual and experiential activity that aspires to change the perception that foreigners have of a country, to educate elites in a series of values and to weave lasting personal networks. The deglobalization phenomenon is having an impact in this regard inasmuch as the free movement of persons is subject to all types of pressures: student visas or quotas, or simply banning those from certain countries. Although this measure has a greater impact on the scientific community than on students. In the United States, the executive order of the U.S. president (January 27, 2017) barred citizens from seven majority Muslim countries, irrespective of their religion, profession, or professional track record, from entering the country (Yong, 2017). In Turkey, Human Rights Watch has reported on the pressure exerted on academics and students to sever ties with foreign countries. Brexit has given rise to uncertainty in the scientific community because, as a result, the UK has abandoned some Horizon 2020 programs. To counter this, the country had hastily approved the Global Talent Program (GTP) to attract and retain scientists outside the community program. After the COVID-19 pandemic, it is possible that the veto will be extended to countries or regions that have been heavily exposed to the virus so to avoid further contagion, such as a ban on student mobility for public health reasons. This measure will have consequences for Erasmus Programme exchange students coming from or going to Spain and Italy, the two main focal points of the pandemic in Europe.

Deglobalization is having a special impact on higher education, which is becoming more regionalized. The world's major universities have opened campuses or have partnered with local actors to provide their services in other countries. New York University has its own campuses in Abu Dhabi and Shanghai. In Doha, there are campuses and degree programs accredited by Georgetown, Cornell, and Northwestern. The benchmark business school INSEAD has campuses in Abu Dhabi and Singapore. For foreign students, the life experience of studying abroad is being reduced to obtaining a degree from European or U.S. higher education institutions in their countries of origin. The COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent economic crisis may step up initiatives of this type, since the geographical mobility of many student will be much impaired.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the dangers of scientific globalization. Economic competition is behind the fact that technological advances or materials, whose exploitation produces patents, royalties, and other financial benefits, are not shared. However, this argument makes no sense in

a global public health crisis. Open science is incompatible with economic nationalism, barriers to the free movement of scientists, and vetoes imposed on the science developed in certain countries. China's commitment to applied knowledge in the shape of investment in R&D is challenging the Anglo-Saxon model.

International broadcasting refers to "engaging a foreign public not by arguing but by presenting (or claiming to present) an objective picture of the world at large" (Cull, 2019, p. 5). This is the aspect that has been most affected by deglobalization and the growing regionalization of news consumption. Mattelart and Koch (2016) consider that the systematic growth of major channels is a reaction to the "Americanization" of broadcasting markets. This includes the ownership of satellites and digital information suppliers and aggregators (Samei, 2016). James (2017) notes that information flows and the construction of alternative infrastructures, disconnected from global activity, are both signs of deglobalization.

These alternative systems have become television diplomacy tools for countering the hegemony of the major Western operators. Such a regionalization can be understood as one of the milestones of deglobalization. Setting the news agenda makes it possible to achieve representational force (Bially, 2005). Accordingly, international news is carefully filtered, priority is given to national leaders, alternative commentators to the mainstream Anglo-Saxon ones are sought, and a leading position is consolidated in the construction of international reality.

Indeed, state-sponsored broadcasting initiatives, which do not comply with the quality standards of the conventional news industry, have proliferated. There is no room for the values of objectivity and the journalistic ethos (freedom of expression, the protection of journalists, censorship, etc.) in broadcast media at the service of governments. In a paradoxical way, the supply of quality international news has ceased to be a value added for European public broadcasters. As observed by Cull (2019), "The broadcasters evolved toward being international actors in their own right with reputations distinct from that of their country of origin" (p. 108). The UK Foreign Office has not funded the BBC World Service since 2014, while the EFE news agency does not even appear in the Spanish government's foreign affairs strategy, despite the fact that it is the only native news agency for 500 million Spanish speakers.

The conglomerate led by Russia Today, Rossiya Segodnya, and Sputnik currently has a presence in 100 countries and broadcasts in 30 languages, with a yearly budget of €300 million. It employs the local narrative versus the fake news coming from international news actors (Yablokov, 2015). This division has favored its entry into major markets, where there is a shortage of Anglo-Saxon news products, such as the New Independent States (NIS) in the Russian Federation's orbit. The global expansion of Chinese news outlets has been characterized by an editorial line dictated by the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the country's government (Thussu, De-Burgh, & Shi, 2017). In Latin America, the Venezuelan TeleSur has sought to become a news benchmark in the region, but with little success to date (Lugo-Ocando, 2017). Of all the emerging initiatives, only Al Jazeera has attained a certain status concerning professionalism. With Qatar funding, it has managed to engage an Arabic-speaking audience and aspires to meeting quality news standards and to introducing new points of view as regards news, opinion and analysis (El-Issawi, 2016). The Qatari channel has united Arabic-speaking audiences, has connected diasporas and has set its own political and social news agenda (Cherribi, 2017).

In the field of fiction, geopolitical television stands out (Saunders, 2019). The aesthetic power of television fiction gives cultural and contextual meaning to current news and, at the same time, audiences naturally associate reality with fiction. Television series and broadcast content, with their characters, storylines or (lost) causes, have an impact on how global audiences understand international relations.

The new ways of becoming familiar with and understanding international politics adapt to each audience and platform. Their value added consists of "exploiting emotion, authority, or identifiable victims to establish frames in the same way as any other channel of engagement" (Cull, 2019, p. 103). Thus, the Chinese broadcast industry has produced two blockbusters for Amazon Prime and Netflix. The first is *The Three-body Problem*, an adaption of Liu Cixin's novel of the same name, with a budget of US$1 billion. As to Netflix, *The Wandering Earth* is a futurist recreation of Chinese science and technology, a sort of interpretation of the impact of the infrastructures created on the new Silk Road with a view to reordering the world. In the words of Maçães (2019), "*The Wandering Earth* is a movie about infrastructure, the only movie I know that deserves the label" (para. 7).

Beyond international broadcasting, new propaganda techniques are leveraging broadcast content with a strong presence on digital channels (Wooley & Howard, 2019). Methods such as sentiment analysis and bots are used to support or to undermine political relations and to spread fake news and other deglobalization malaises. Digital reality, combining low-quality news, fiction, and elements of digital culture, corresponds to the logic of hybrid conflicts (Gaufman, 2017) and a hybrid political news culture (Chadwick, 2017).

Conclusion

Deglobalization is modifying the context in which public diplomacy operates. Without trust, it will be impossible to construct a strategic and international public communication: "The backlash against globalization is fed by a climate of suspicion: experts, economists and international institutions are not trusted" (James, 2017, p. 6). The economic analysis points to a contraction in international operations or, at least, a certain regionalization of trade and industry. In the political sphere, current populism has given rise to domestic policies far removed from international issues, except when they can be exploited to reinforce local discourses. Owing to their skepticism toward expert knowledge, populist leaders have deinstitutionalized public diplomacy. This signifies that they now monopolize the power to transmit messages and to project an international image through executive power, rather than through the habitual institutional channels (cultural institutes, educational exchanges, interviews with journalists, etc.).

In the same vein, social media have enhanced the presidential profile of public diplomacy, for it allows for the dissemination of messages among global audiences, without intermediaries. This technique yields contradictory results. As to social activity, deglobalization is reducing the number of travelers and exchange students, the mainstays of educational, cultural, and experiential exchanges. The difficulties in obtaining student visas, the doubts surrounding the Confucius Institute, and the abrupt exit of the UK from the European Union's Erasmus Programme are all symptoms of how hard it is becoming to conduct conventional public diplomacy. Likewise, deglobalization is encouraging the development of global cultural practices that, nonetheless, are restricted to the local/regional sphere. Thus, it is not now necessary to

travel to Europe to discover its huge artistic and cultural heritage. Travel becomes more irrelevant in the experience of public diplomacy.

In sum, conducting public diplomacy in times of deglobalization is becoming increasingly more complex. The theoretical conceptualization of soft and hard power is insufficient to understand the new dynamics of global communication. The discipline's Anglo-Saxon origins have been displaced by practices adapted to emerging countries, which implement the tactics of their political and cultural traditions. The same is occurring with communication techniques, designed for societies open to dialogue and to the exchange of reliable information. In a politics that tolerates lies, the hyperbole on Twitter, and disinformation as part and parcel of negotiation techniques, the functions of listening and advocacy are being undermined by the generalized mistrust among governments, transnational actors, and citizens. Global culture is adapting to the national perspective with a view to incorporating prepolitical values into the international sphere. Deglobalization has overlapped with "Westlessness," defined as "the decay of 'the West' as a relatively cohesive geopolitical configuration anchoring a normative model of global order in which commitments to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law are central" (Munich Security Conference, 2020, pp. 6–8).

Cultural and educational exchanges are dwindling owing to political pressure (the rejection of scientists and students from specific countries), altering the rhythm of growth for exogenous reasons. In international broadcasting, the European Union's original decision to defend cultural exception has become the predominant broadcasting management model, even though the offerings of platforms have become standardized. In relation to journalism, the proliferation of the self-labeled "counterhegemonic television channels" is challenging the global and open information model, as well as professional standards.

The research question on which this article is based does not end here, but opens up new avenues that have yet to be explored. There are two lines of research that stand out above the rest. First, the immediate and long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The strategies implemented by the United States, the UK, China, the European Union, and Iran offer different narratives on how to meet a global problem. The lessons learned will affect other global public dilemmas, especially climate change. The second line is nation branding management in accordance with the principles of nation building, which is becoming gradually more commonplace in the academic literature. Is the commitment to nation branding compatible with a contraction of global markets? Will this be aimed at local audiences at the expense of international ones?

These are complicated times for public diplomacy, whose ethos has been distorted by the political structures of deglobalization. At any rate, the aim of this article has been to confirm a basic trend: the growing relevance of international political communication for international relations.

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