Examining the Relationship Between Media Use and Political Engagement: A Comparative Study Among the United States, Kenya, and Nigeria

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Given the growing use of and dependency that individuals have on media, the relationship between media use and political engagement has been a subject of study among scholars across nations. The current study expands this line of research using a secondary analysis of a worldwide survey (N = 1,775) collected by Pew Research to examine antecedents of political engagement in three nations: the United States, Kenya, and Nigeria. This study examines country-specific differences in how views on national politics and media use differently relate to political engagement. Results identify differences in the effects of traditional and new media use on political engagement between countries. Specifically, accessing news from social media and online news platforms is related to higher levels of political participation across countries. However, the influence of positive perceptions of the economy on political participation is found to differ in each nation. Implications for research on media use and political behavior across countries varying in democratization are discussed.

Keywords: media use, political engagement, Kenya, Nigeria, United States

Public interest in electoral processes and political engagement are central to democratic governance (McLeod et al., 1996). While engagement ensures the sustenance of democracies, it also deepens the roots of popular rule in young democracies (Dalton, 2017). Research has shown that media consumption promotes political engagement. News use influences political engagement by increasing political knowledge and perceived efficacy, while guiding citizens’ attitudes and judgments (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; McLeod et al., 1996; McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Thorson, Swafford, & Kim, 2017). Researchers have equally demonstrated that consumption of online news, including through social media, promotes participation in political activities (Chan, Chen, & Lee, 2017; de Zuniga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014).

Despite an abundance of research investigating media effects on political attitudes and behavior, most of the existing inquiry has been conducted in developed Western democracies and, increasingly, throughout Asia (Blumler, 2015; Chan et al., 2017). Limited research has examined the relationship between

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media and politics across international contexts or with the goal of engaging in meaningful comparative analysis while taking economic, cultural, social, and political differences into consideration (Blumler, 2015). Indeed, no identifiable studies have compared the dynamics of media use and political participation between established Western democracies and rising African democracies.

The current study aims to address this gap through examination of the relationship among citizens’ views on national politics, their use of news media, and political participation in the United States, Kenya, and Nigeria. Although these countries feature different levels of democratization, their relative similarities provide a unique opportunity for an international comparison. Each of these countries is democratic, with media systems that citizens are dependent on for political news and information (Freedom House, 2017). However, the U.S. is considered an established democracy with highly developed media systems compared with Kenya and Nigeria. Although Kenya and Nigeria are similarly classified as hybrid regimes (EIU Democracy Index, 2018), they differ in that Kenya has a more consistent and stable democracy compared with Nigeria’s, which has been punctuated by decades of authoritarian military rule. Kenya and Nigeria similarly feature established media systems, yet both are less technologically advanced and experience limited Internet penetration compared with the U.S. (Freedom House, 2017).

Using secondary analysis of data collected by Pew Research Center in its spring 2016 Global Attitudes and Trends survey, this study examines the influence of political attitudes and both new and traditional media use on political engagement. Specifically, this work examines how perceptions of economic performance in each nation, confidence in political leadership, and news consumption impact political engagement.

**Political Engagement**

Political engagement broadly refers to cognitive or behavioral involvement with events of political relevance (Gibson & Cantijoch, 2013). The concept encompasses a broad range of activities that range from passive to active (Hooghe, Hosch-Dayican, & van Deth, 2014). Cognitive involvements with political issues, political expression, and specific acts of participation all count as political engagement (Hooghe et al., 2014). Political engagement is distinguishable from the related concept of civic engagement, which is more concerned with nonpolitical interaction involving an individual’s connectedness to and trust in his or her immediate community (Barrett & Brunton-Smith, 2014; Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004). For instance, civic engagement may be manifested through activities such as attending city council meetings or volunteering, whereas political engagement would involve activities ranging from sharing political information online or offline to more substantial acts such as voting or protest.

Although political engagement is often equated with participation, the latter concept is thought to reflect a narrower set of behaviors intended to influence political outcomes (Pontes, Henn, & Griffiths, 2018). According to Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), political participation is concerned with “doing politics rather than being attentive to politics” (p. 39) and is often demonstrated through concrete behaviors such as voting, donating money to a political candidate, or volunteering for a political campaign. This view is not uncontested. For instance, other researchers argue that given the emergence of online media and new avenues for engagement, this definition should be extended to include political expression that has the
potential to shape outcomes by influencing the attitudes of other citizens (e.g., Gibson & Cantijoch, 2013; Hooghe et al., 2014; Segesten & Bossetta, 2017). To fully capture the range of political behaviors that may manifest online or in offline settings, the current study focuses on political engagement, broadly defined as expressive or behavioral acts undertaken by citizens with respect to some political event or process.

Despite differences in conceptualization, scholars agree that active citizenry is desirable (McLeod et al., 1996, 1999), resulting in research investigating factors associated with political engagement such as knowledge, interest, and efficacy (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; McLeod et al., 1996, 1999), all of which guide political action. Political efficacy involves individuals’ perceived capacity for political expression, trust in the political institutions to be responsive to such expressions, and the belief that expression will yield the desired effects (Geissel & Hess, 2017). As such, individuals with high levels of efficacy are likely to engage in political activities including protest, voting, and opinion expression. In fact, political efficacy is one of the concepts most consistently linked to political participation across cultural contexts (de Zuniga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012; Hoffman & Thompson, 2009).

**News Media Use and Political Engagement in the U.S.**

Much of what citizens know about their political system, actors, and activities is based on media representations. In the U.S., traditional media channels are known to play an important role in molding public opinion, attitudes, and even political behaviors (Rooij & Green, 2017; Thorson et al., 2017). Although participation in democratic processes provides U.S. citizens the opportunity to directly participate in governance, much of their experience and knowledge is mediated (Bennett & Entman, 2001). Media representations guide citizens’ evaluations of social issues, and such evaluations are effective at inducing participation in political activities, particularly when such evaluations are negative (Martin, 2008). For instance, individuals perceiving problems with the political system or economic performance may be more motivated to participate by their desire for change.

News consumption is also associated with political participation among U.S. citizens, both directly and indirectly. For instance, newspaper reading directly promotes participation in political activities (McLeod et al., 1999). Regarding indirect effects, news consumption is associated with increased political knowledge (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000) and helps to cultivate strong emotions related to political actors/issues, which guide decision making and promote political action (Gan, Lee, & Li, 2017). Further, exposure to partisan television news motivates participation by strengthening preexisting evaluations and evoking attitudes toward political candidates, either positive or negative (Kim, 2017).

Newspaper reading has been linked to voting and deliberation at a community level by increasing knowledge and efficacy (de Zuniga, Puig-1-Abril, & Rojas, 2009; McLeod et al., 1996, 1999; Thorson et al., 2017). In fact, declines in newspaper reading have been found to lead to equal declines in political knowledge (Lee & Wei, 2008). Several studies find newspaper reading is more predictive of political involvement than radio or television news consumption (de Zuniga et al., 2009; Scheufele, Nisbet, Brossard, & Nisbet, 2004). Yet, accessing political information via radio is associated with higher civic engagement and voting (Pasek, Kenski, Romer, & Jamieson, 2006; Rooij & Green, 2017).
Through the widespread adoption of the Internet and social media that provide news content, there is a renewed need to examine whether accessing news online translates to online and offline political engagement. This is particularly the case as new media allow a variety of expressions, including commenting, sharing, signing petitions, and donating, among other actions, which appear as online political engagement (Dimitrova, Shehata, Stromback, & Nord, 2014) and may extend to offline settings (de Zuniga et al., 2014).

In the U.S. context, there is evidence that accessing news through digital media is positively associated with political participation both online and offline (de Zuniga et al., 2009, 2012, 2014). In fact, studies suggest that using social media or blogs to access news is similarly potent or even more effective in driving political participation compared with traditional media, depending on demographic attributes of citizens (de Zuniga et al., 2009). This is noteworthy considering that more than half of the world’s population now has Internet access, and more than 3 billion individuals are active on social media platforms, which provide news content (Global Digital Report, 2018).

Accessing news via social media may lead to engagement by providing political information and increasing knowledge (Bode, 2016), but also by linking social media users with like-minded individuals, political actors, and partisan institutions (Dimitrova et al., 2014). This, in turn, exposes social media users to specific calls for involvement in social causes, thus increasing the likelihood of taking part in collective action (de Zuniga et al., 2014; Dimitrova et al., 2014). Studies have also demonstrated that the influence of social media use on political participation is not limited to online settings. For instance, de Zuniga et al. (2012, 2014) found that accessing news on social media platforms was positively related with both online and offline political participation.

**News Media and Political Engagement in African Nations**

Whereas the relationship between media use and political engagement has been widely studied in the Western world, especially the U.S., investigations in African nations are less extensive. Beyond differences between economic and political landscapes, poor communication infrastructure may result in limited information access and connectivity (Nyirenda-Jere & Biru, 2015). For instance, Internet penetration stands at 45.6% and 47.7% in Kenya and Nigeria, respectively, compared with 76.2% in the U.S. (Freedom House, 2017). Conversely, radio and newspaper are powerful tools for political socialization, mobilization, and community development in both Kenya and Nigeria (Edegoh, Ezeh, & Anunike, 2015; Omwoha, 2016).

Unlike in the U.S., state-owned media outlets remain prominent across African countries, including Nigeria and Kenya. One consequence is that citizens distrust information emanating from state-owned media outlets, especially for controversial information or political issues that implicate key political figures or the government as a whole (Ismail & Deane, 2008). Although the media in both countries are among the freest and most potent in sub-Saharan Africa (Freedom House, 2017), government censorship and indirect control of media organizations remain (Kamau, 2018; Mukhongo, 2015).

Many African countries are identified as young democracies weighed down by legacies of authoritarianism, electoral malpractice, violence, and high levels of poverty (Freedom House, 2017).
However, nations differ in their economic growth, technological advancement, and political development evidenced by democratization. In South Africa, where there is a high level of trust in mainstream media, youths report limited consumption of mainstream news and low levels of trust in public institutions and political processes (Bosch, 2013). The lack of interest in mainstream media content was attributed to its exclusion of youth-related content and overwhelmingly pessimistic coverage of public affairs (Bosch, 2013). Although the pessimism among South African youth about the potential for democracy to produce change may explain their disinterest (Malila & Oelofsen, 2016), there is evidence that they prefer different forms of engagement, such as online political expression (Mhlomi & Osunkunle, 2017). However, whether this translates to offline participation remains inconclusive (Bosch, 2016).

Scholars theorizing about political engagement in Africa promote the Internet and social media as potential enablers of social change. For instance, it has been suggested that increased access to information as a result of Internet access could lead to a corresponding increase in opportunities for political engagement and democratization (Emmer & Kunst, 2018; Kalyango & Adu-Kumi, 2013). However, limited research has demonstrated enhanced political engagement. In a comparison of political engagement across Kenya, South Africa, and Zambia, van Rensburg (2012) concluded that poverty, the inability to adapt technologies for local use, and individuals’ disillusionment with political institutions have limited Internet use as a platform for engagement.

While the Internet and social media may have provided information and platforms for political expression, whether they promote offline engagement remains open to debate. In Zimbabwe, it was found that virtual engagement has not necessarily translated to offline action (Mutsavai & Sirks, 2015). During the 2010 Tanzanian election, individuals accessing news via social media reported increased cynicism about the fairness of the democratic process and reported lower levels of voting (Bailard, 2012). Indeed, social media present an opportune platform for discussing politics, including protest among Zimbabwean youth, although they were unwilling to participate in demonstrations (Matingwina, 2018).

Traditional media, particularly radio, have powerful roles in political mobilization and participation in Kenya (Muhiingi, Agonga, Mainye, Mong’are, & Maranga, 2015; Omwoha, 2010, 2016). Since the liberalization of broadcast media in the late 1980s to early 1990s, privately owned media operations have expanded in Kenya, resulting in a variety of voices and perspectives on nearly 200 radio stations (Amutabi, 2013). Broadcasts are in English and local languages, many of which allow listeners to participate, which may increase their sense of efficacy and validate their perspectives (Srinivasan & Diepeveen, 2018). In fact, Kenyan media play an important role in providing political information and setting the agenda for political discourse, although scholars question the objectivity and professionalism of media outlets, especially those owned by political elites (Amutabi, 2013; Ogola, 2011).

Internet services in Kenya were introduced in the mid to late 1990s and expanded rapidly over the next two decades (Mureithi, 2017). Internet access in the 1990s was limited, expensive, and hindered because of poor technological infrastructure, but this was followed by substantial and sustained expansion in connectivity in the 2000s, much of which can be traced to the introduction of mobile devices (Communication Commission of Kenya, 2007; Kaigwa, 2017; Stork, Calandro, & Gillwald, 2013; Wyche & Olson, 2018). Further, social media are increasingly used in the political domain by politicians and the
electorate alike (Ndavula & Mueni, 2014). Recent studies demonstrate that Kenyan youth use social media for political information seeking, sharing, and online expression (Bing, 2015; Kamau, 2017). Further, among Kenyan youth, it was found that accessing news online was related to both political interest and knowledge (Kamau, 2017). Taken together, these findings suggest that social media use promotes political engagement online.

Nigeria boasts one of the most robust and diverse media environments in Africa (Daramola, 2017). Since the liberalization of broadcast media in 1992, the media industry has expanded and features nearly 300 radio stations and numerous television stations, of which about 100 are state owned (Nwulu, Adekanbi, Oranugo, & Adewale, 2010). While the state retains ownership of a portion of broadcast channels, print outlets are almost exclusively privately owned, independent and critical of government, and influential in setting the agenda for political discourse despite intimidation and attacks on press freedom (Freedom House, 2016). Internet access and connectivity have also expanded rapidly in Nigeria. Like Kenya, the 2000s saw an unprecedented increase in Internet access and use in Nigeria, driven by the proliferation of mobile devices (Kuboye, 2017; Nigerian Communications Commission, 2019).

Research investigating the relationship between media use and political action in Nigeria found that students primarily accessed news via social media, but newspaper readership was the only form of media use that predicted voting (Tesunbi & Nwoye, 2014). This aligns with research indicating that traditional media in Nigeria, especially print, play a prominent role in political discourse (Jibo & Okoosi-Simbine, 2003). Conversely, accessing political information via social media has been found to be associated with enhanced social capital, online political expression, and offline political activities, including voting and volunteering in campaigns (Mustapha, Gbonegun, & Mustapha, 2016). Likewise, Onyechi (2018) found that Nigerian students who spend more time on social media are likely to participate in campaigns during elections.

Others have demonstrated that accessing news and expressing opinion on social media is associated with participation and mobilization in Nigeria (Abubakar, 2012; Dagona, Karick, & Abubakar, 2013). However, most focus on voting at the national level rather than other indicators of participation (Krawczyk & Sweet-Cushman, 2017). Further, the bulk of available studies have relied on convenience samples of youth or college students, limiting generalizability.

Given the differences among the countries under examination, this study investigates several factors that may influence political engagement across international contexts. First, based on discussion of citizens’ perceptions of government and economic stability, the following research questions are posed:

**RQ1a:** How does confidence in leadership relate to political engagement across the U.S., Kenya, and Nigeria?

**RQ1b:** How do perceptions of the current national economy relate to political engagement across the U.S., Kenya, and Nigeria?

As noted in the literature review, efficacy is known to promote political engagement. Therefore, the following hypothesis tests this assumption:
**H1:** Perceived participation efficacy positively relates to political engagement across the U.S., Kenya, and Nigeria.

Based on existing research addressing the influence of media use on political behaviors, the following research question and hypotheses examine the relationship between consumption of media information and political engagement across nations:

**RQ2:** How does use of TV for news relate to political engagement across the selected countries?

**H2:** Using newspaper and radio for news positively predicts political engagement across the U.S., Kenya, and Nigeria.

**H3a:** Using online news media positively predicts political engagement in the U.S., but not Kenya and Nigeria.

**H3b:** Using social media for news positively predicts political engagement in the U.S., but not Kenya and Nigeria.

**Method**

Data were obtained from the Pew Research Center spring 2016 Global Attitudes and Trends survey, which features a cross-sectional sample of adults from 19 nations. A probability sample of 3,217 respondents (U.S., 1003; Kenya, 1124; Nigeria, 1094) was initially collected with margins of sampling error ranging from ±3.4 to ±4.7. Respondents without Internet access were eliminated to produce the final sample (N = 1,775) of respondents from the U.S. (n = 799), Kenya (n = 502), and Nigeria (n = 474). The surveys in Kenya and Nigeria were conducted via face-to-face interviews in 2016 from March 29 to April 19 and from March 31 to May 16, respectively. The U.S. sample was surveyed via telephone between April 4 and April 24, 2016. Respondents in Kenya and Nigeria were sampled using multistage stratified sampling, whereas the U.S. sample was selected using random digit dialing of landlines and cell phones.

**Measures**

**Independent Variables**

Variables used in this test target were (a) views on national politics, including confidence in political leadership, perceptions of a country’s economic status, and perceptions of participation efficacy; (b) media use, including both their online and offline habits; and (c) demographics that were used for control purposes.

**Confidence in political leadership.** This item assessed participants’ confidence in current political leadership. For each nation, the questions asked: “How much confidence do you have in ________ to do the right thing regarding world affairs?” (1 = no confidence at all to 4 = a lot of confidence). The U.S. sample was asked about President Barack Obama (M = 2.63, SD = 1.20). The Kenyan sample was asked about
President Uhuru Kenyatta ($M = 3.14$, $SD = 1.00$). For the Nigerian sample, respondents were asked about President Muhammadu Buhari ($M = 2.90$, $SD = 1.14$).

**Perceptions of economy.** This item gauged participants’ perceptions of their country’s economic status. Participants were instructed to think about their economic situation and asked how they would describe it ($1 = \text{very good}$ to $4 = \text{very bad}$). Before analysis, items were reverse coded and combined into an index (U.S.: $M = 2.39$, $SD = 1.01$; Kenya: $M = 1.95$, $SD = .80$; Nigeria: $M = 2.03$, $SD = .81$).

**Perceived participation efficacy.** This measure evaluated participants’ likelihood of participation by asking how likely they were to contact an elected official or participate in a demonstration regarding (a) poor quality schools; (b) government corruption; (c) poor health care; (d) poverty; (e) discrimination against vulnerable or disadvantaged groups; and (f) police misconduct ($1 = \text{very likely}$ to $4 = \text{not at all likely}$). Before analysis, items were reverse coded and combined into an index (U.S.: $\alpha = .88$, $M = 2.81$, $SD = .85$; Kenya: $\alpha = .83$, $M = 3.07$, $SD = .82$; Nigeria: $\alpha = .87$, $M = 3.05$, $SD = .86$).

**Accessing news via TV.** Respondents were asked how often they get news from TV ($1 = \text{often}$ to $4 = \text{never}$). Responses were reverse recoded for analysis (U.S.: $M = 3.26$, $SD = .99$; Kenya: $M = 3.36$, $SD = .95$; Nigeria: $M = 3.22$, $SD = .86$).

**Accessing news via newspaper.** Respondents were asked how often they get news from the newspaper ($1 = \text{often}$ to $4 = \text{never}$). Responses were reverse recoded for analysis (U.S.: $M = 2.43$, $SD = 1.16$; Kenya: $M = 2.74$, $SD = 1.06$; Nigeria: $M = 2.53$, $SD = 1.06$).

**Accessing news via radio.** Respondents were asked how often they get news from radio ($1 = \text{often}$ to $4 = \text{never}$). Responses were reverse recoded for analysis (U.S.: $M = 2.92$, $SD = 1.05$; Kenya: $M = 3.51$, $SD = .84$; Nigeria: $M = 3.38$, $SD = .81$).

**Accessing online news.** In an effort to measure respondents’ use of varying forms of online news, all participants were asked how often they get news from news websites, blogs, and news apps ($1 = \text{often}$ to $4 = \text{never}$). Responses were reverse recoded (U.S.: $M = 3.04$, $SD = 1.08$; Kenya: $M = 2.64$, $SD = 1.18$; Nigeria: $M = 2.93$, $SD = 1.08$).

**Accessing news via social networking sites.** Respondents were asked how often they get news from social networking sites ($1 = \text{often}$ to $4 = \text{often never}$). Responses were reverse recoded (U.S.: $M = 2.73$, $SD = 1.23$; Kenya: $M = 3.09$, $SD = 1.08$; Nigeria: $M = 3.17$, $SD = .97$).

**Demographics.** Four demographic items were assessed: age, gender, education, and religiosity (see Scheufele, Nisbet, & Brossard, 2002). The sample from each country was predominantly male (U.S. 52.6%; Kenya 57.3%; Nigeria 67%). The U.S. sample reported an average age of 47 ($SD = 17.71$), the Kenyan sample had an average age of 29.4 ($SD = 10.24$), and the Nigerian sample had an average age of 28.90 ($SD = 10.00$). Concerning education, respondents indicated whether they completed high school or less, some college to college degree, or a graduate degree (U.S.: $M = 1.90$, $SD = .64$; Kenya: $M = 1.38$, $SD = .51$; Nigeria: $M = 1.50$, $SD = .54$). Religiosity was evaluated by asking how important religion is to
each respondent (1 = not at all to 4 = very important) in the U.S. (M = 3.12; SD = 1.05), Kenya (M = 3.90; 
SD = .40), and Nigeria (M = 3.96; SD = .47).

Dependent Variable

Serving as the dependent variable, these items assessed varying ways of politically engaging that were consistent across nations. Aspects of online and offline forms of political engagement were evaluated by asking whether respondents had (a) signed a petition about a political or social issue online; (b) posted their own thoughts or comments on political or social issues online; (c) encouraged other people to take action on a political or social issue online; (d) attended a political campaign event or speech; (e) participated in an organized protest of any kind; (f) voted in an election; and (g) participated in a political, charitable, or religious-based volunteer organization (1 = have not done/would never do to 4 = have done in the past year). Responses to were merged to form an index (U.S.: α = .75, M = 2.52, SD = .69; Kenya: α = .70, M = 2.22, SD = .60; Nigeria: α = .70, M = 2.37, SD = .66).

Data Analysis Techniques

Hierarchical regression analyses were performed to answer the research questions and test the hypotheses. Demographic variables were entered as the first block of the model, which consisted of sex, education, age, and religiosity. This was followed by the political perception variables: confidence, perceptions of the economy, and participation efficacy. The final block consisted of traditional media use variables (i.e., use of TV news, newspapers, radio for news) and new media use items (i.e., use of websites/blogs/apps and social media for news content).

Results

RQ1a asked how confidence in leadership relates to actual political engagement across Kenya, Nigeria, and the U.S. As shown in Table 1, confidence in leadership was not a significant predictor of political engagement in the U.S. (β = .02, p = .61), Kenya (β = -.07, p = .22), or Nigeria (β = .03, p = .52).

RQ1b asked how perceptions of the current national economy relate to actual political engagement in the three selected countries. According to results seen in Table 1, individuals with a more positive perception of the current national economy were significantly more likely to participate in forms of political engagement in the Kenyan sample (β = .10, p = .03). On the other hand, those with a positive perception of the current national economy in the U.S. were significantly less likely to engage in political activities (β = -.06, p = .04). However, perception of the national economy was not predictive of engagement among the Nigerian sample (β = .07, p = .18).

H1 predicted that perceived participation efficacy will be positively related to political engagement across the three countries. Results show that individuals with a high level of perceived political participation efficacy are significantly more likely to engage politically among citizens in the U.S. (β = .34, p < .001), Kenya (β = .16, p < .001), and Nigeria (β = .18, p < .001). Therefore, H1 was supported (see Table 1).
Table 1. Hierarchical Regression Predicting Political Engagement.

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<th>United States</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>Religion</td>
<td>.02</td>
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<td>11.5**</td>
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<td>Perception of Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incremental $R^2$ (%)</td>
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<td>Total $R^2$ (%)</td>
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Note: The beta weights are final standardized regression coefficients. 
* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

RQ2 explored how the use of TV for news relates to political engagement across the selected countries. As seen in Table 1, individuals who use TV for news are not more likely to engage in forms of political engagement among both the Kenyan ($\beta = .01, p = .82$) and Nigerian samples ($\beta = .00, p = .92$). Yet, those who reportedly use TV for news are significantly less likely to engage in forms of political engagement among the U.S. sample ($\beta = -.13, p < .001$).

H2 predicted that use of newspaper and radio for news will positively predict actual political engagement in the U.S., Kenya, and Nigeria. Results show that newspaper reading was not a significant predictor of political engagement for citizens in the U.S. ($\beta = .03, p = .58$), but approached significance for both the Kenyan ($\beta = .09, p = .05$) and Nigerian ($\beta = .09, p = .06$) respondents. However, individuals who frequently used radio for news were significantly more likely to engage politically in the U.S. ($\beta = .07, p = .03$), but not in Kenya ($\beta = .01, p = .81$) or Nigeria ($\beta = .07, p = .15$). As such, H2 received limited support (see Table 1).

H3a predicted that use of online news media (websites, blogs, and news apps) will positively predict actual political engagement in the U.S., but not in Kenya and Nigeria. Data analysis showed that Americans who frequently use online news media are more likely to engage politically ($\beta = .16, p < .001$). As predicted, accessing news via blogs and websites was not a significant predictor of political engagement in Kenya ($\beta = .04, p = .38$). Unexpectedly, Nigerians who use online media for news were found to be significantly more likely to engage politically ($\beta = .11, p = .04$). Therefore, H3a was partially supported (see Table 1).
H3b predicted that use of social media for news will positively predict actual political engagement in the U.S., but not in Kenya and Nigeria. Data analysis showed that frequent use of news on social media sites led users to be more politically engaged in the U.S. ($\beta = .08, p = .03$). Similarly, frequent users of news on social media sites were also more likely to engage in politics in Kenya ($\beta = .13, p = .007$). Yet, Nigerians who frequently use social media for news were not found to be more likely to politically engage ($\beta = .02, p = .71$). Therefore, H3b was partially supported (see Table 1).

Discussion

This study provides an important international comparison that addresses the influence of media use on political engagement in developed and developing democracies, previously lacking in existent research. The overarching purpose of this study was to examine how news media use is associated with political engagement. Specifically, the relationship between use of new and traditional media for news, and political engagement was examined across the U.S., Nigeria, and Kenya. Results showed that media use was predictive of political engagement, however, there were differences in the effects of traditional and new media on political engagement. Similarly, the observed effects of media use varied across the three countries examined.

Although confidence in leadership did not predict political engagement across all three countries, there were differential outcomes of perceived economic vitality across countries. Findings suggest that perceptions of a good national economy motivate Kenyans to participate in order to sustain such developments, whereas U.S. participants with similar perceptions feel more at ease and therefore less motivated to participate politically. In contrast to the U.S. and Kenyan samples, Nigerian respondents were neither more nor less likely to engage politically in response to perceptions of the economy. Findings suggest that perceptions of economic vitality influence engagement may vary depending on the context. In some countries, discontinuity in policy implementation across administrations may undermine development efforts (Tettey, 2012), prompting citizens to engage to ensure that positive change is sustained.

Although research has identified efficacy as a predictor of engagement, findings extend understanding of efficacy’s role in fostering engagement to settings that differ socially and politically. These findings suggest that participation efficacy is more strongly associated with political engagement in the U.S. than in Kenya or Nigeria, as indicated by beta scores. That is, U.S. citizens who possess participation efficacy may be more likely to participate compared with international counterparts. This may be attributed to the fact that efficacy results from both the individual’s capacity to act and the responsiveness of the political environment to such action (Craig, 1979). As such, it may be that while individuals who have a sense of efficacy recognize their capacity to engage politically, American citizens possess a greater expectation of government responsiveness.

Regarding the relationship between media use and political engagement, findings indicate that accessing news via different media has different outcomes. For example, results show that TV news viewing is a negative predictor of engagement in the U.S., but this is not the case for Kenyan and Nigerian audiences.
This can be explained by differences in media ownership, resulting in news content that differs internationally. Unlike the U.S., where media are driven by commercial imperatives, broadcasts in Nigeria and Kenya remain under direct (via ownership) or indirect (political) influence of the state and may focus more on development-related communication (Ciboh, 2017; Simiyu, 2013).

The finding that accessing news via newspapers does not predict political engagement (particularly in the U.S.) stands in contrast to previous research (McLeod et al., 1996, 1999; Thorson et al., 2017; Zhang & Chia, 2006). Similarly, the failure of radio use to predict engagement in Kenya and Nigeria contrasts with research suggesting that radio is a potent tool for political engagement and development communication in Africa. There are several explanations. Many studies that promote radio as a driver of political engagement in African countries tend to use small case studies and, in some cases, are based on argumentation and commonsense assumptions rather than empirical evidence (e.g., Edegoh et al., 2015; Muhiingi et al., 2015; Omwoha, 2010, 2016). Also, the current study does not consider alternative patterns of use that may explain expected results. For instance, there is evidence that cross-cutting media use in an African context may have an inhibiting effect on political engagement (Moehler & Conroy-Krutz, 2016). As such, the political behaviors of radio news listeners may differ as a function of specific consumption patterns.

Another possible explanation is that the influence of radio on political engagement could be indirect, rather than direct, and that radio news consumption promotes political engagement by increasing knowledge and efficacy (Conroy-Krutz, 2018). As noted earlier, it is likely that structural factors, such as patterns of media ownership, would also influence media effects of political behavior. Government ownership of and influence on media (especially broadcast media) in African countries may influence citizens’ trust in the media, perceptions of media bias, and responsiveness to media (Moehler & Singh, 2011). In the U.S., however, similar perceptions may result from partisan bias evident in media reporting and lead to reduced levels of political engagement (Ho et al., 2011).

In the U.S. and Nigerian samples, individuals who access news via blogs and news websites reported higher levels of political engagement. Accessing news via social media has similar effects among the U.S. and Kenyan samples. These findings, though puzzling, demonstrate how social media platforms differ from websites. Social media allow citizens to connect directly with political influencers, permitting the development of political affect and motivation to participate in collective action (Chan, 2016; Tang & Lee, 2013). Further, there is evidence that effects of information congruence/incongruence differ between social media platforms and news websites/blogs (Kim & Chen, 2016), due in part to the friendship-driven nature of social media (Baek, 2015; Kahne & Bowyer, 2018).

Overall, these findings support the assertion that accessing online and social media news promotes engagement (Holt, Shehata, Stromback, & Ljungberg, 2013; Park, 2015; Tang & Lee, 2013). Research suggests that distrust in mainstream news leads to increased reliance on online and social media for news, which predicts participatory news production and sharing, resulting in increased engagement (e.g., Ardevol-Abreu, Hooker, & de Zuniga, 2018). Moreover, findings indicate that, despite differences in Internet penetration and technology infrastructure, the Web remains an important platform for expression and engagement.
Of relevance are findings that newspaper reading was only associated with engagement among Kenyans, whereas radio use only predicted political engagement in the U.S. Therefore, efficacy remains the most consistent predictor of engagement, more so than accessing news via traditional media. Indeed, it can be argued that individuals with a high sense of efficacy consume news content to acquire information that enables them to engage. Further, the findings of this study negate the view that accessing news via online and social media would only result in “slacktivism,” particularly among African audiences (Bosch, 2013; Malila & Oelofsen, 2016). Perhaps most important, these results point to the increasing relevance and impact of online and social media on engagement in the modern political environment.

Taken together, findings indicate that the influence of different media channels on political engagement vary internationally. As noted earlier, variations in observed media effects reflect differences in democratization and levels of political and media development. Scholars have called for new conceptualizations of political engagement better suited to African political systems, suggesting that current conceptualizations do not thoroughly grasp the manifestations of political engagement in African systems (e.g., Emmer & Kunst, 2018). Therefore, the current study is not without its limitations. A major limitation is that the current study cannot be used to determine causality because it uses cross-sectional data rather than a longitudinal approach. This limits the conclusions that can be reached using the findings. Despite this, the accumulation of research in this area provides reason to suspect that media use for news is a source of influence on political engagement as found in this study (de Zuniga et al., 2014; Dimitrova et al., 2014). Further, the use of secondary data placed constraints on the questions asked and the variables that could be examined, and this limited the use of items for measuring the desired constructs.

Despite limitations, this study contributes to knowledge on how media use is associated with political engagement and raises questions about other sociopolitical factors that may influence engagement, especially in developing countries. Future research should examine motivations for media use in developing democracies, which may predict engagement in societies that differ from Western countries.

References


